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Abstract 
This thesis is the result of a journey through nine countries, documenting the lessons of 
over eighty diverse stakeholders, ranging from multinational resource company 
executives to local landowners, about how businesses can amend their Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) practices to facilitate peaceful development. Drawing on the 
cases of Bougainville and Papua, it analyses the effectiveness of dominant mainstream 
models of CSR pursued by major resource companies to respond to threats to peace 
that arise from the issues of most concern to locals. A problem that this thesis reveals 
is that despite a commitment to CSR, Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), PT Freeport 
Indonesia (Freeport) and BP (British Petroleum) failed to resolve local grievances 
related to their business practices in Bougainville and Papua. A framework of 
'Interdependent Engagement' is designed in response to these failures. 
Interdependent Engagement addresses limitations of CSR _to resolve the conflict 
flashpoints associated with the extraction of natural resources. 
Contrary to common expectations, the voluntary social and environmental initiatives 
pursued by the extractive industry do not automatically lead to improved conditions 
for local communities. In some cases, particularly where armed conflict arises, these 
initiatives may even produce more harm than good. Despite this potential danger, 
corporations continue to be encouraged to expand the scope of their existing CSR 
practices to encompass a role in peace building. 
Guided by a multi-site research design, the thesis connects the motivations, intentions 
and constraints of corporations operating in zones of conflict with local perspectives 
and expectations in the CSR context. The data confirm that dominant forms of CSR as 
.. 
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used by the case study companies are limited in their capacity to assist resource 
extraction companies to avoid social conflict. This is due to the fact that CSR has 
historically tended to focus primarily on the distribution of material benefits, rather 
than on engagement with the deeper sources of injustice that resource companies 
often become entangled with. Drawing on the case studies of Bougainville and Papua, 
eight crucial sites of interdependence between BCL, Freeport and BP and the 
grievances at the heart of the two conflicts are identified. These are: 
1. historical injustice; 
2. the denial of customary land rights; 
3. regional inequality & contests over resource wealth; 
4. cultural, political and economic marginalisation; 
5. human rights violations; 
6. community disruption; 
7. environmental damage, and 
8. aspirations to define the future. 
The thesis finds that there are four important limitations of dominant models of CSR 
discourse that have constrained its ability to engage with these interdependencies . 
These are: the emphasis on pledges over institutional change, responsiveness to host 
states to the exclusion of local communities, failure to incorporate alternative visions 
of justice into the design of voluntary social and environmental initiatives, and the 
implementation of one-size-fits-all solutions to complex social and environmental 
problems. 
VIII 
A significant outcome of this thesis is a new method for the design of CSR in areas 
affected by conflict - Interdependent Engagement. Based on the principles of 
mutuality, reflexivity, engagement and flexibility, Interdependent Engagement is 
presented as a model of CSR transformed. 
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Chapter 1: The Challenge of CSR and Conflict 
... In every organisation or company, the management should be connected with 
us. It took so many years to understand that. Nobody understood that at the 
time ... but they do now. 
(BOU18, Bougainvillean landowner, interview with Kylie McKenna, Bougainville, 2010). 
In April 2010 I travelled to Arawa, the old mining town of the Bougainville copper mine 
in the south of the island. During my stay in Arawa I visited the house of an elderly 
Bougainvillean landowner who had a long history of involvement in the Panguna 
Landowners Association {PLA). During the operating years of the Bougainville copper 
mine, the PLA lobbied for a greater share of the wealth derived from the project for 
local landowners, and compensation for the environmental damage it caused. I had 
only arranged to speak with this one landowner, but during our meeting about ten 
people from his family joined us. They sat across from the elderly man and myself in 
silence, listening to every word he recounted of his experiences of the past, and his 
hopes for Bougainville's future. During our discussion, he spoke of the unfairness of the 
Australian colonial Administration that supported a mining agreement that was not 
considered to include the people of Bougainville. The landowner spoke of lobbying BCL 
and the Papua New Guinea {PNG) Government for more compensation, and the 
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unwillingness of the corporate executives at the time to listen to the grievances of local 
people. He spoke of communication problems between landowners and BCL's Village 
Relations Office, of the murder and rape of women by migrants to Bougainville from 
other parts of PNG and the feeling of becoming a stranger on his own land . 
The story I heard that day reflected upon an extremely painful past. But as images of 
the past were invoked, the elderly landowner also drew my attention to possible 
futures for the Bougainville copper mine. He went on to talk about a belief that BCL 
have learned from the mistakes of the past, and his certainty that if Bougainvilleans 
truly want independence from PNG, the mine must be re-opened. 
In a deceptively simple way, this story encompasses many of the lessons learned during 
the course of this study. Drawing on the thoughts of over eighty stakeholders, ranging 
from multinational resource company executives to local landowners, this thesis 
explores the theme of how businesses might amend CSR practices to facilitate peaceful 
development. As the landowner alluded in his comments about the connection 
between local people and corporations, this study focuses on the interdependence 
that exists between large natural resource companies and the societies in which they 
operate . The purpose is to investigate the productive possibilities that might emerge 
from engaging with this interdependence, rather than denial of it. The aim is to 
contribute to understandings of how large natural resource companies can not only 
avoid the violent conflict that is so often associated with the extractive industry, but 
can actually facilitate the peaceful development of natural resources. 
The follow ing research questions lie at the heart of this thesis : 
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1. Is there a role for large natural resource companies in the promotion of peace 
building? 
2. How effective is CSR in resolving local grievances related to resource 
development? 
3. Why is it that, despite a commitment to CSR, large natural resource 
companies failed to resolve the local grievances related to resource 
development in Bougainville and Papua? 
4. How might CSR be transformed to avoid the violent conflict that is often 
associated with resource development? 
The scope of the study 
The empirical focus of the research presented here is the business activities of three 
large natural resource companies and their corporate partners operating in 
Bougainville (PNG) and Papua 1 (Indonesia): 
• Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL); the operator of the Bougainville copper 
mine located in Panguna, Autonomous Region of Bougainville, PNG . 
Ownership of BCL consists of 53.58 per cent Rio Tinto, the PNG Government 
19.06 per cent, public shareholders 27.36 per cent (Bougainville Copper 
Limited, 2010) 
• PT Freeport Indonesia; operator of the Ertsberg and Grasberg copper and 
gold mines located in Papua province, Indonesia. PT Freeport Indonesia is 
owned by Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, 90.64 per cent and the 
1 Th is study uses the term 'Papua' to refer to the entire western half of New Gu inea desp ite its division 
into two separate provinces, Papua and West Papua in 2003 (see Ch 7) . 
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Indonesian Government 9.36 per cent (Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, 
n.d.a). Rio Tinto also has a significant joint venture interest in the Grasberg 
mine, entitling the company to "40 per cent share of production above 
specified levels until 2021 and 40 per cent of all production after 2021" (Rio 
Tinto, 2011). "40 per cent share of production above specified levels until 
2021 and 40 per cent of all production after 2021" (Rio Tinto, 2011). 
• BP (British Petroleum or 'beyond petroleum'); operator of the Tangguh 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project located on the Bintuni Bay area, West 
Papua province, Indonesia. Partners in the Tangguh project include: 
Mitsubishi and INPEX Corporation 16.30 per cent, China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation 13.90 per cent, Nippon Oil Exploration (Berau) 12.23 per cent, KG 
Berau/KG Wiriagar (held by a consortium of small Japanese companies) 10.0 
per cent, LNG Japan Corporation 7.35 per cent, Talisman 3.06 per cent (BP 
p.l.c, 2012a). 
The study deliberately focuses on companies in the extractive sector, rather than other 
industries because of the centrality of natural resource development to the 
Bougainville and Papua conflicts, and the strong links between this industry and civil 
conflict globally (Bannon & Collier 2003; Ross 2004). Because of the consideration of 
resource conflict through the lens of CSR, the operating companies analysed are all 
high profile, multinational corporations with a public commitment to social and 
environmental programs. Moreover the intention is not to provide an extensive 
account of all resource development projects in Bougainville and Papua, but rather to 
reveal the extent to which the CSR programs used by the case study companies have 
been designed to engage with the concerns of local communities in these areas. 
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Bougainville and Papua are just two of sixteen recorded civil wars around the world 
linked to natural resource development during the period 1990-20022 (Ross, 2003, p. 
18). However these locations have been under-represented in scholarly studies of the 
role of CSR in resource conflict. Much of the existing CSR literature focuses on Africa, 
and in particular the case of Shell in Nigeria (Akpan, 2006; lte, 2004; Omeje, 2005; 
Pegg, 1999; Watts, 2004; Zalik, 2004). The African literature draws on local accounts of 
CSR to pose useful questions about the field of CSR more broadly. A similar approach 
to the case studies is adopted in this thesis. By connecting the motivations, intentions 
and constraints of executives from large natural resource companies with local3 
perspectives, this research builds on existing scholarship to provide a detailed account 
of the social consequences of this field of business practice. In this sense the aim is to 
contribute to knowledge of the causes of resource conflict in Bougainville and Papua 
specifically, as well as to elucidate lessons that might be learn~d from these particular 
conflicts for the development and implementation of beneficial CSR in other locations. 
Bougainville and Papua are particularly valuable cases to examine as they both provide 
a SO-year longitudinal perspective over which to consider how CSR might be re-
conceptualised to more effectively contribute to peaceful development. The history 
2 However the roots of both the Bougainville and Papua conflicts stem from much earlier than 1990. 
3 The term ' local' will be used broadly throughout this thesis to refer indigenous Bougainvilleans and 
Papuans. This term however, is problematic due to the fact that grievances related to resource 
development vary according to a variety of factors such as, vicinity to the project and development 
priorities . Effort will be made throughout the thesis to the labelling of groups, particularly in 
Chapter 7 where the priorities of mining lease landowners will be contrasted to those not 'directly 
affected' by the resource project. It will be argued that failing to engage w ith what can be qu ite 
different sets of concerns can lead to the creation of new internal conflict. 
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and current context of the conflicts in Bougainville and Papua have been the subject of 
significant and distinguished study in which the connections between the relevant 
multinational corporations and the dynamics of the two conflicts has been identified 
(Ballard, 2001; Ballard & Banks, 2007; Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010; 
Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010; Filer, 1990; Regan 2003}. The 
intention of the research presented in this thesis is not to attempt to re -write or 
duplicate this work. Rather, by combining prior research with new fieldwork, the aim is 
to analyse the potential for the association between resource development and armed 
conflict to be somehow transformed to facilitate peace. Moreover, the case studies of 
Bougainville and Papua are not highlighted because there are gaps in the existing 
literature about the details of the two conflicts, but rather the case studies have been 
selected as mechanisms through which to consider the possibilities that exist for large 
corporations to contribute to peace. 
The final parameter to acknowledge from the outset is that this study will primarily 
focus on the action that resource extraction companies (as opposed to governments or 
other actors) operating in conflict zones take to manage the potential for conflict. This 
action ranges from 'business as usual' to proactive initiatives targeting specific social 
and environmental problems. The focus on corporate activity excludes other variables 
which might alter the impacts of resource development on conflict affected societies, 
such as the role of importing state policies in shaping the 'resource curse' in exporting 
countries (Wenar, 2011). The intention of highlighting the role of corporations is not to 
deny the relevance of other variables, but rather to enable a clear focus on the 
discrepancy that exists between CSR practices and local expectations. The purpose 
being to develop a more meaningful form of corporate engagement with the societies 
6 
and environments in which they operate. 
Business and peace 
Stimulated by the proliferation of civil wars in regions rich in natural resource wealth, 
as well as high-profile cases of alleged corporate complicity in human rights violations, 
scholars, international human rights organisations and civil societies have sought to 
define the responsibilities of business operating in conflict and post-conflict 
environments. This has been noticeable in the development of numerous international 
initiatives that feature recommendations about how business can avoid contributing to 
conflict. Key examples include the United Nations {UN) Global Compact policy dialogue 
on the Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict4 and the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights5 . These international initiatives have been mirrored by a 
bourgeoning scholarship on the links between natural resources and violent conflict 
(Bannon & Collier, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; Le Billon, 2001; Ross 2004). While much of 
the existing literature highlights the negative impacts of corporate activity on the 
dynamics of armed conflicts, there is an increasing interest in exploring the potential 
for ethical business behavior to contribute to peace (Ford & McKenna, 2008; Fort & 
4 At this meeting, "representatives from companies, labour and NGOs [Non-Government Organisations] 
identified four key issues in conflict prevention and peace building, for which they believed that a 
multistakeholder approach could be most effective" (United Nations Global Compact, 2006) . These 
include: revenue sharing; conflict impact assessment and risk management; transparency and 
multistakeholder partnerships. 
5 Freeport, BP and Rio Tinto are participants in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
that include a set of principles "to guide Companies in maintaining the safety and security of their 
operations within an operating framework that ensures respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Mindful of these goals, the participants agree to the importance of continuing dialogue and 
keeping under review these principles to ensure their continuing relevance and efficacy" (Foley Hoag 
LLP, 2011) . For more information visit: http://voluntaryprinciples.org/ 
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Schipani, 2004; Gerson, 2001; Andersson, Evers & Sjostedt, 2011; Oetzel, Westermann-
Behaylo, Koerber, Fort & Rivera, 2010). This indicates that scholars are expanding their 
work on CSR to incorporate the fields of conflict resolution and peace building. 
One problem with encouraging business to expand pre-existing CSR commitments is 
that there remains a gap in understanding about how and why the CSR practices 
deployed by corporations operating in conflict affected societies can have negative or 
unintended consequences. Instead, the voluntary commitments pursued by 
multinational corporations are generally assumed to be beneficial for the affected 
societies and environments. Consequently, the literature on CSR continues to be 
dominated by calls for corporations to make voluntary commitments to the 
communities in which they operate by appealing to their profit motive. This is evident 
in Michael E. Porter and Mark Kramer's (2006} influential article, Strategy and society: 
The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. 
In contrast to much of the new literature on business and peace which encourages 
corporations to actively engage in the promotion of peace building processes, this 
research considers why it is that previous CSR practices have not always achieved their 
aims. Further, it explains how and why CSR as it currently exists amongst major natural 
resource companies is limited in its capacity to assist corporations avoid social conflict. 
The study concludes that this limitation is attributable to the failure of current models 
of CSR to respond to the social and environmental issues of most concern to locals. 
This problem stems from the design of CSR practices around the distribution of 
material benefits, rather than an engagement with the deeper sources of injustice 
with in which resource companies are embroiled. 
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Reflecting inductively on the data from the case studies of Bougainville and Papua, 
eight crucial sites of interdependence between large natural resource companies and 
the grievances at the heart of the two conflicts are identified. These are: historical 
injustice (Ch 5), the denial of customary land rights (Ch 6), regional inequality and 
contests over resource wealth (Ch 7), cultural, political and economic marginalisation 
(Ch 8), human rights violations (Ch 9), community disruption (Ch 10), environmental 
damage (Ch 11), and aspirations to define the future (Ch 12). In identifying these sites 
of interdependence, four important limitations of CSR in areas affected by conflict are 
exposed: the emphasis on pledges over institutional change, responsiveness to host 
states to the exclusion of local communities, failure to incorporate alternative visions 
of justice into the design of voluntary social and environmental initiatives, and the 
implementation of one-size-fits-all (Newell, 2005, p.556) solutions to complex social 
and environmental problems. 
The hypothesis developed in the chapters that follow is that CSR could assist 
corporations to promote peace building if it were re-designed in such a way as to 
engage with the interdependencies between business activity and the root causes of 
conflict. The conclusion reflects more abstractly on the model of Interdependent 
Engagement as a new path for CSR. This model aims to encourage corporations to 
incorporate the connections between their operations and the causes of conflict into 
the planning and conduct of large extractive projects in conflict sens it ive 
environments . 
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Introducing Bougainville and Papua 
There has been relatively little scholarly analysis of Bougainville and Papua in the 
context of the broader literature on CSR. However, there are a number of striking 
similarities between the Bougainville and Papua cases that lend them to comparative 
analysis. Both conflicts involve self-determination as a key aspiration, with a significant 
proportion of Bougainvilleans seeking independence from PNG, and Papuans seeking 
independence from Indonesia. Both the PNG and Indonesian governments confront 
similar problems of governing a scattered and ethnically diverse population. Both of 
these governments also reluctantly agreed to a form of autonomy as a way to resolve 
the push for self-government, with both Bougainville and Papua being granted limited 
forms of autonomy in 2001. 
The Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
The Autonomous Region of Bougainville is located in the South-West Pacific. The 
region comprises two main islands, Buka and Bougainville, and numerous surrounding 
smaller islands (see Figure 1). After the French explorer Louis de Bougainville sailed 
through the region in 1768, Bougainville experienced several phases of colonial 
administration. Bougainville is geographically, racially and culturally linked to the 
Solomon Islands group (Dorney, 2000, p.38}, but has been politically incorporated into 
PNG since the nation's independence from Australia in 1975. Scholars estimate human 
occupation on Bougainville at almost 30,000 years (Griffin & Regan, 2005, p.xxvii). 
However despite this long history, the population remains relatively small at just under 
200,000 in 2005 (Griffin & Regan, 2005, p. xxvii). 
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Prior to the 20th century Bougainvilleans did not share a strong sense of unified 
identity. Rather, people identified themselves according to small independent groups 
marked by distinct languages and customs. In the latter half of the 1900s Canberra and 
Port Moresby became increasingly interested in developing the natural resources 
located on Bougainville, so suggestions that it might break away from PNG were 
resisted. As these processes took place, a nascent 'Bougainvillean' identity began to 
emerge, the chief marker of which was the dark skin colour of Bougainvilleans in 
contrast to the peoples of PNG. 
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Rich deposits of copper ore were discovered at Panguna, central Bougainville in 1964. 
This led to the Australian Administration's forced eviction of local landowners to 
commence the development of what became the Bougainville copper mine {Sirivi & 
Havini, 2004, p.xviii). As will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5, the Australian 
Government was motivated by a perceived need to develop a source of long-term 
income to finance an independent PNG into the future. The development of the mine 
in concert with arrangements for the decolonisation of PNG and the secessionist 
aspirations gaining momentum on Bougainville, laid the early conditions for conflict. 
The result was a decade-long civil war, which claimed the lives of between 1000-2000 
people through direct fighting, but many more through the indirect effects of the war 
(Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.87). This thesis focuses on how BCL 
attempted to deal with this complex and volatile situation as it unfolded, and contrasts 
these efforts with the priorities and expectations of locals. 
Papua, Indonesia 
Papua comprises the western half of the island of New Guinea, which is located 250 
kilometers north of Australia (see Figure 2). It incorporates two provinces, Papua and 
West Papua that include a number of surrounding islands. Similarly to Bougainvil le, 
Papua is a region that has been politically incorporated into a nation state that is 
culturally and ethnically distinct from the local indigenous population (though the rest 
of Indonesia is also ethnically diverse). While the people of Papua are ethnically 
Melanesian and share cultural ties with their PNG neighbors, Papua was 
controversially integrated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1969. Since this time, 
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Papua has suffered considerable and continuing violence orchestrated by the 
Indonesian security forces in the name of national development and unity. While 
deaths from this conflict are estimated to be in the tens of thousands ( Braithwaite, 
Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.61}, the use of torture as an instrument of 
repression is considered the most prevalent means of violence being perpetrated in 
Papua today (Hernawan, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2009}. 
Papua is rich in natural resources but its population of approximately 3.5 million (see 
Elmslie, 2010} consistently ranks as one of the poorest in Indonesia (Levi, 2011). The 
economic importance of Papua to the Indonesian state is directly linked to the control 
of natural resources by the government and large multinational corporations. As will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the history of resource development in this 
region has been deeply entangled with the concurrent process of the incorporation of 
-
Papua into Indonesia from the 1960s. Since this time an armed resistance movement, 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement or OPM} has lobbied Jakarta for 
self-determination with associated intermittent armed conflict occurring, particularly 
in the area surrounding the Freeport mine. 
13 
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Papua is home to the biggest gold mine and the second biggest open cut copper mine 
in the world, operated by a subsidiary of Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, PT 
Freeport Indonesia (hereon referred to as Freeport). More recently, in 2004 the 
mult inat iona l company BP constructed an LNG project in the Bintuni Bay area of West 
Papua province (see Figure 2). This study analyses the social and environmental 
impacts of resource development ~n Papua and compares and contrasts the CSR 
practi ces an d pol icies of Freeport and BP in Papua and West Papua, w ith those of BCL 
in Bo ugainville. 
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A Note on Terminology 
The term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR} is used to encompass other related 
terms such as 'corporate citizenship', 'corporate accountability' and 'sustainable 
development'. It should be noted that while the term CSR is used to encompass a 
broad range of activities undertaken by corporations in relation to community 
responsibilities - the term 'CSR' itself was not commonly used until the 1990s (see 
Ch 3}. The activities undertaken by corporations in the period from 1920 onwards 
(see Ch 3} have evolved over time, beginning with fairly basic public relations 
exercises to more sophisticated community development models, or what Kemp 
(2009, p.204-6} refers to as 'high-end participation'. These distinctions have been a 
priority for analysts seeking to trace the development of corporate thinking in this 
area. However what is of interest for the purposes of this thesis is that all of these 
activities were designed to address corporations unuerstanding their 
responsibilities to the communities and environments directly impacted by their 
operations. Furthermore, throughout this thesis preference is given to the term 
CSR due to the theoretical and methodological opportunities that arise from a 
detailed analysis of the 'social' element of CSR (McKenna, 2007}. Thus, while a 
broad and encompassing term limits engagement with the nuanced differences 
among similar terms, in the context of this research it has paved the way for new 
theorizing in the field. 
Chapter 3 argues that previous analysts have taken the inclusion of the 'social' in CSR 
for granted, skating over important opportunities to conceptualise CSR practices as 
interdependent with the social, political, cultural and economic contexts in which they 
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are implemented. By highlighting the mutuality that exists between corporatio~s and 
their local host communities, the need for corporations to prioritise institutional 
reform, rather than simply distribute material resources is emphasised. While there is 
an abundance of definitions of CSR, two of the most commonly used are those 
outlined by the Commission of the European Communities and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (Dahlsrud, 2008, p.1}: 
... A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis (Commission of the European Communities, 2001} and; 
... The commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local communities 
and society at large to improve their quality of life (World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, 1999}. 
Broadly speaking, the above definitions capture what it is being referred to by the term 
CSR throughout this thesis. However, the conclusion outlines a potential new 
formulation of CSR as Interdependent Engagement. 
This study draws on a broad definition of 'peace building' as the creat ion of a 
"structure of peace based on justice, equity and cooperation" (Gawerc, 2006, p.49} . 
The term itself has a relatively short history, only becoming popularised in 1992 
following Boutrous Boutros-Ghali's document, An agenda for peace, preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Boutros-Ghali originally defined peace 
building as applicable only to 'post-conflict' situations with a particular emphasis on 
projects that bring States involved in international conflict together (Boutous-Ghali, 
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1992). 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, there has been a shift in the global 
dynamics of armed conflict away from interstate war towards intrastate conflict 
(Kaldor, 2007). Moreover, since the early 1990s, the term 'post-conflict' has been 
problematised as conflict is seldom 'solved' (D'Costa & Ford, 2008, p.11). 
Consequently, the term peace building has begun to encompass a broader range of 
activities and actors, with relevance to all phases of a conflict {Gawerc, 2006, p.439). 
This may include, for example, "establishing dispute resolution mechanisms and 
cooperative arrangements as well as meeting people's basic economic, social, cultural 
and humanitarian needs" {Reith & Zimmer, 2004, p.S). It is in this broader sense that 
the term peace building will be used throughout this thesis. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 sets out and justifies the research methodology, and outlines the six phases 
of the research and their corresponding sources of data. It also discusses the iterative 
design of the Interdependent Engagement Framework alongside the emergence and 
analysis of new data. 
The third chapter describes the theoretical framework through which CSR in 
Bougainville and Papua will be analysed. Drawing on Bruno Latour's {2005) work, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, the chapter 
questions the use of the word 'social' in CSR without any explanation of what the 
'social' refers to in this context, or what the idea incorporates. By problematising the 
use of the social, it is argued that CSR is not a static relationship between an abstract 
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notion of society, but a field that incorporates a diverse range of actors with their own 
interests and agendas. This understanding of CSR makes it possible to think of 
corporations as interdependent with the social, political, cultural and economic 
contexts in which they operate. Following this conceptual critique, the chapter draws 
on the work of Nancy Fraser (1996; 1997; 2000) to question the types of justice claims 
that CSR has been designed to redress. It is argued that CSR as it currently exists 
amongst major resource companies is primarily structured around a distributive justice 
paradigm, whereas armed conflicts are often characterised by claims for both 
'recognition' and 'redistribution'. For corporations to resolve local grievances related 
to resource development in conflict areas, they may need to expand this focus to also 
include cultural or symbolic recognition through, for example, acknowledging the role 
of resource development in the historical incorporation of Papua into Indonesia. 
Chapter 4 explains the actors, institutions and important events involved in the 
Bougainville and Papua conflicts. Through a discussion of the historical entry points of 
BCL, Freeport and BP into Bougainville and Papua, the chapter introduces the eight 
crucial sites of interdependence identified between the companies and the grievances 
at the heart of the two conflicts: historical injustice, the denial of customary land 
rights, regional inequality, contests over resource wealth, cultural, political and 
economic marginalisation, human rights violations, community disruption, 
environmental damage and aspirations to define the future. 
The remaining eight chapters outline each component of the Interdependent 
Engagement Framework that will be fleshed out in the conclusion of the thesis. Each 
chapter focuses on the local grievances associated with BCL, Freeport and BP's 
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presence and activities in Bougainville and Papua and how the companies have 
engaged and/or disengaged with these concerns. 
Chapter 5 explores the intertwining of resource development with local historical 
narratives in Bougainville and Papua. The chapter establishes how BCL and Freeport 
have been perceived by Bougainvilleans and Papuans as the providers of the financial 
capacity that has trapped them in an unwanted political relationship with PNG and 
Indonesia respectively. The chapter argues that BCL and Freeport have become caught 
up in Bougainville and Papua's highly emotive political contests for self-determination. 
Despite this connection, current and former executives of BCL and Freeport have been 
reluctant to acknowledge their complicity with broader colonisation and 
decolonisation processes. Instead, the companies have approached the local 
community according to a distributive justice framework (which in practice has 
-
sometimes been a distributive injustice project), in which they have sought to establish 
harmonious relationships with communities through the distribution of material 
benefits. In order for companies to resolve the roles they have been perceived by 
locals to have played in historical injustices, corporations need to widen this focus to 
include symbolic recognition, through for example, rewriting the original legal 
agreements between states and companies to recognise the customary land rights of 
landowning communities. 
Chapter 6 explains that as a result of the state's control of natural resources, BCL, 
Freeport and BP have been generous and responsive to the central governments of 
PNG and Indonesia, reinforcing the state's denial of customary land tenure . One 
problem associated with this approach is that local indigenous populations often 
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perceive the state as the main perpetrators of the injustices that give rise to ~rmed 
conflict. To redress this 'framing error', a model of CSR that establishes local 
communities as active participants in the resource project is advocated. 
Chapter 7 explores the inequitable distribution of resource wealth in favour of the 
central governments of PNG and Indonesia, rather than the resource producing 
regions of Bougainville and Papua. While recognising the importance of achieving an 
equitable distribution of resource wealth, giving locals a greater share of this wealth is 
not sufficient to avoid conflict. Rather, the potential to avoid conflict is contingent on 
how this wealth is distributed; as well as an engagement with how these resources can 
distort local relationships. One way this might be achieved is through a model of CSR 
that responds to the changes that occur in relationships at the national, provincial and 
local levels in an ongoing manner. 
Chapter 8 discusses the efforts made by the three companies to initiate dialogue with 
local communities. As a consequence of the companies responsiveness to the state 
discussed in Chapter 6, BCL and Freeport have not succeeded in opening long-term 
dialogue with all stakeholders of the resource project. This exclusion aggravates 
broader grievances relating to cultural , political and economic marginalisation. In the 
Interdependent Engagement Framework, preventive peace dialogue on the social, 
political, economic and environmental terms of access to land takes place through on-
going and collaborative negotiations between all stakeholders of the resource project. 
Chapter 9 argues that BCL and Freeport have failed, in different ways, to recognise the 
fears about, and hostilities towards, the state's security forces held by locals. In 
contrast, BP' s Community Based Security Strategy deployed in Papua has 
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demonstrated an awareness of the apprehension that many Papuans hold towards 
Indonesian security forces. The chapter explains how and why BP's community model 
was made possible and the positive ramifications that have followed from this 
approach. 
Chapter 10 argues that natural resource companies have a limited capacity to predict 
the social impacts that resource development will have on a local community. This is 
reflected in the cases of Bougainville and Papua where resource projects have created 
a number of social problems that were either not anticipated during the initial stages 
of the projects, or the companies were unwilling to engage with because of the way 
they saw their business interest. Consequently, the three companies have become 
caught up in broader processes of community disruption. The chapter explains that 
this might be avoided through the development of flexible and context-specific 
-
community development projects that respond to problems as they emerge, rather 
than static solutions based on a company or consultants past experiences in radically 
different circumstances. This flexibility also enables corporations to develop the 
capacity to use local grievances as the basis from which they can implement more 
meaningful community development projects. 
Chapter 11 argues that the adoption of 'sustainable development' discourse by the 
natural resource sector has not led to greater local participation in decisions relating to 
the environment. In the cases of Bougainville and Papua, this is reflected in the 
marginalisation of indigenous landowners in environmental impact assessments and 
surveys. Consequently, decisions relating to environmental management have tended 
to be made by actors and institutions that do not share the same cultural attachments 
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to land. The environmental damage caused by natural resource development _has a 
tendency to provoke conflict, as it triggers strong feelings of injustice relating to the 
control of land and the denial of local wisdom. The chapter explains that through 
learning to be more interdependent with indigenous peoples, resource companies can 
develop more meaningful, less Western and more spiritually engaged forms of 
ecological interdependence. 
Chapter 12 argues that participation in the promotion of local reconciliation processes 
is the greatest opportunity that natural resource companies have to empower locals to 
determine their own future. While there are important differences between 
Bougainville and Papua in regard to the roles that companies are expected to play in 
reconciliation processes, both cases emphasise the need to work towards mutually 
beneficial economic development. For this to occur, all stakeholders need to take 
active responsibility for the resource project, including the local community. 
Chapter 13 draws together the lessons of each chapter into a new inductive model, 
which I have called 'Interdependent Engagement'. The development of this model 
represents the cumulative learnings of the thesis and aims to create a framework 
through which companies can establish a more meaningful connection with local 
communities. The Interdependent Engagement Framework is built around the data 
collected during the research project. Its core purpose is to address the disconnection 
between resource companies and local populations that the Bouga invillean landowner 
referred to in the opening quotation of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
This chapter sets out the approach that was developed for the empirical research of 
this study and the rationale behind it. It describes the research in terms of six phases 
each with corresponding sources of data, particular possibilities and limitations. It also 
highlights the iterative design of the Interdependent Engagement Framework that will 
be drawn out in the conclusion of the thesis, alongside new data collection and 
analysis. 
Research philosophy 
A qualitative approach was selected to explore the interaction of CSR policies and 
practices in relation to the dynamics of conflict in Bougainville and Papua. As set out in 
Chapter 1, answers are sought to the following research questions: 
1. Is there a role for large natural resource companies in peace building? 
2. How effective is CSR in resolving local grievances related to resource 
development? 
3. Why is it that despite a commitment to CSR, large corporations have failed to 
resolve local grievances related to resource development in Bougainville and 
Papua? 
4. How can CSR be transformed to avoid the violent conflict that is often 
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associated with resource development? 
Table 1 - Thesis Phases and Data Types 
Thesis Phases 
Phase 1: Fieldwork on CSR and peace 
building 
Phase 2: Case studies and comparison 
Phase 3: Implementing CSR 
Phase 4: Corporate actors in Bougainville 
and Papua 
Phase 5: Local perspectives and 
expectations 
Phase 6: Modeling and hypothesising: 
development of the Interdependent 
Engagement Framework. 
Data Type 
Interviews at corporate headquarters 
Existing academic & civil society literature 
Existing case study literature 
Peacebuilding compared project 
Corporate reports & documents 
Existing case study literature 
PNG and Indonesia fieldwork 
Interviews at corporate national head 
office 
Consultants 
Former employees 
Bougainville and Papua fieldwork 
Interviews with landowners, non-
government organisations {NGOs), 
religious leaders, ex-combatants, women's 
leaders etc . 
All of the above . 
Finding answers to these questions requires both broad inquiry and microanalysis as 
the field of CSR and the conflicts of Bougainville and Papua are complex and interactive 
(Creswell, 2003, p.182). This complexity requires methods of qualitative data collection 
"which are both flexible and sensitive to the context in which data are produced" 
(Mason, 2005, p.3), rather than quantitative methods that are characterised by more 
rigid and structured frameworks {Mason, 2005, p.3). The qualitative approach is also 
more applicable to this study as it emphasises that research questions are emergent 
24 
rather than tightly prefigured, and may change and be refined as understanding 
develops {Creswell, 2003, p.181). An inductive, interpretive approach has been 
essential to the method of this study, as it has required a shuffling between an 
emerging new framework for the design of CSR and data collected from multi-sited 
fieldwork (Creswell, 2003, p.183). 
When put into practice this methodological approach resulted in six phases and 
corresponding sources of data collection (set out in Table 1). 
Phase 1: fieldwork on CSR and peace building 
The genesis of the research was a larger comparative project examining 
Myanmar/Burma, Bougainville and Papua. The aim was to target the corporate 
headquarters of large natural resource companies operating in these three regions as 
the primary source of data. As Table 1 shows, Phase 1 of the research involved 
fieldwork with executives at the headquarters of major resource corporations in 
London, Paris, Geneva, Beijing, Kuala Lumpur and Alberta, Canada. All of these 
interviews occurred in November and December of 2008. 
In Phase 1 interviews with executives from multinational resource development 
companies' CSR area or related department were undertaken. A list of companies with 
operations in Myanmar/Burma, Bougainville and Papua was compiled through Internet 
research and a review of both academic and civil society literature. Participants were 
then identified by searching publicly available information, such as conference 
proceedings and news articles, and in official documents, such as annual reports or 
websites. A letter was then sent to these executives by email, asking them to grant a 1-
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2 hour interview at the company's head office. A semi -structured interview wa? then 
conducted with executives who agreed to be interviewed focusing on the broad topic 
of the role of business in the promotion of peace building6. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 3, the corporation is not a 'fixed' or 'static' entity. Thus the decision to 
interview executives from companies with only a shareholding in the case study 
projects provided an opportunity to verify data collected from the operating 
companies. 
The aim of this phase of data collection was to understand how corporate actors 
conceptualise their commitments, responsibilities, successes, risks and failures 1n 
contributing to the objective of peace in their areas of operation. The aim was to 
discover how and in what ways the perspectives of corporate executives matched 
emerging scholarly and activist expectations that corporations adopt new peace 
building roles 7. The initial hypothesis at this point of the research was that existing CSR 
practices might need to be replaced by a new peace building model. Such a model 
might enable corporations to avoid the likelihood of creating or exacerbating violent 
conflict in communities affected by their operations. However, the key finding from the 
interviews conducted was that corporations would prefer to address issues related to 
peace bu ilding through existing CSR frameworks. 
Interviews in Phase 1 were conducted w ith nine participants; eight were conducted 
face to face , however the Canadian interview occurred via telephone. The Canadian 
6 See Appendices for sample interview questions used in the preliminary an d in-country fiel dw ork. 
7 The expectation that corporations adopt peace building roles will be discussed in detail in Cha pter 3. 
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interview was initially planned to take place face to face, as a second trip to interview 
executives based in North America was scheduled for 2009. However as will be seen in 
Phase 3, as findings emerged it became apparent that it would be more illuminating to 
complement the interviews at international corporate headquarters with in-country 
fieldwork. All interviews were conducted in English and were not tape-recorded; 
written notes were taken. 
During the course of Phase 1 the study narrowed to two cases, with Bougainville and 
Papua to be the primary focus, as the quality of access and available data was more 
promising for these locations than for Myanmar/Burma. Further, existing literature on 
the Burmese context proved to be thinner and was unlikely to provide adequate 
answers for the project's research questions. 
Phase 2: Case studies and comparison 
Phase 2 involved a drilling down from broad understandings of how CSR is structured 
at the global level and the role of corporations in peace building to a more specific 
focus on, and comparison between, the case studies of Bougainville and Papua . The 
interest was in exploring how specific business practices have intersected with armed 
conflict and how corporations have responded. 
Case study approach 
A case study method was chosen for considering the aforementioned research 
questions. According to Yin (1989, p.23}, the distinguishing features of the case study 
method include a focus on contemporary phenomena within real-life contexts when 
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the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in 
which multiple sources of data are used. 
The case study research strategy is appropriate for this study as it seeks to examine the 
effectiveness of CSR in the context of two areas affected by conflict, with a key interest 
in exploring how CSR is conditioned by the context in which it is mobilised. In addition, 
the research questions at the heart of this thesis are too complex for one source of 
data collection, requiring information from multiple sources (e.g. corporate executives, 
local landowners, government officials), locations (e.g. the company's home country 
headquarters, host country head office and local communities), and materials (e.g. 
corporate documents, newspaper articles and existing scholarship on the two 
conflicts). The case study method allows the researcher to conduct detailed 
observations of specific examples to carefully consider the particularities of each 
scenario. In this study, Bougainville and Papua became the units of analysis, and the 
aim has been to investigate how CSR is systematically related to local grievances in 
these two loca I contexts . 
In an era of globalisation, the research sites of social scientists are rarely fixed in single 
or discretely bounded locations. This development has increasingly required scholars 
to stretch the methodological traditions of their disciplines in an effort to connect 
international regulation with local justice (Merry, 2006). The decision to adopt a case 
study approach was also influenced by the work of Sally Engle Merry (2006) who 
suggests that a useful way of exploring the impact of placeless global phenomena (such 
as international human rights discourse) is to "locate sites where global, national, and 
local processes are revealed in the social life of small groups" (Merry, 2006, p.29) . 
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Merry refers to this approach as 'de-territorialized ethnography' which contrasts from 
traditional single place-based ethnographies in that it seeks to engage with the 
fragments of a larger system while recognising the fact that the system is neither 
coherent nor fully graspable (Merry, 2006, p.29). 
The case study approach enables the researcher to move beyond the territorial 
confines of one site to connect local experiences with global phenomena. Such a 
capacity is particularly important for this study as CSR policy transcends geopolitical 
boundaries, connecting the offices of corporate headquarters' to local villages, 
households and individuals. CSR policies can be designed, for example, by executives at 
a company's headquarters in London yet implemented by staff at a local head office in 
Jakarta. The company might also be a signatory to guidelines and voluntary initiatives 
generated by the UN in Geneva, while conducting regular dialogue in the township hub 
of a small Pacific province. 
CSR policy shares the de-territorialised, transnational character of other global 
phenomena such as human rights discourse. Therefore a case study approach focusing 
on the implications for particular people in specific locations is a useful way of 
grappling with the social consequences of CSR. Bougainville and Papua are both 
locations where it is possible to map the interplay of global, national and local CSR 
processes in small communities. As part of Phase 2, existing literature on the 
characteristics of the conflicts in Bougainville and Papua was examined to build a 
detailed understanding of how the relationship between the relevant global 
corporations and local communities emerged, developed, played out and continue to 
evolve in these locations. 
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Comparative approach 
Once a number of case studies have been identified, a comparative approach opens up 
opportunities to look for similarities or patterns of behavior, which might be more 
broadly relevant than for just a single location. Findings of this nature have the 
potential to establish an evidence base upon which to consider new social theories and 
models for action. While this thesis combines the case study and comparative 
approaches, the examination of two case studies are not put forward as constituting 
grounds for universal applicability. The potential for the findings of this thesis to be 
applied to the field more broadly should be subject to future research, including 
detailed analysis of specific local contexts. Acknowledging these limitations, the 
examples of Bougainville and Papua are presented in this study to point to possible 
global connections, rather than to firmly define them. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Bougainville and Papua were chosen as case studies due to a 
number of striking similarities. Perhaps the most compelling similarity is the strong 
connection between natural resource development and the political incorporation of 
both Bougainville and Papua into geographically distant nation-states. This has 
implicated BCL, Freeport and BP in the justice claims of a large proportion of 
Bougainvilleans and Papuans. A rich body of literature has examined the complex 
associations of these corporations with the dynamics of armed conflict in Bougainville 
and Papua . This literature will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 and ranges from 
analyses of n atu ra I resources as a stru ctu ra I factor at the roots of conflict (see 
Bra ithwa ite, Charlesworth , Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.103; Braithwaite, Braithwaite, 
Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.144), to the consequences of natural resource development 
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on the two indigenous populations (such as human rights violations (Ballard, 2001), 
social disintegration (Filer, 1990) and environmental damage (Connell, 1991). This 
study seeks to build on this solid analytical foundation by offering insights into how 
large corporations might transform their business practices in order to contribute to 
peace. 
In addition to the political similarities that exist between Bougainville and Papua, there 
are also historical commonalities between the case study companies. Both BCL and 
Freeport signed their first legal agreements with their respective host governments in 
1967. The similarities between the historical trajectories of BCL and Freeport provides 
a unique, longitudinal opportunity to compare the types of measures the two 
companies have implemented to achieve more harmonious relationships with local 
host communities. Aside from the two mining enterprises, a much newer project in 
-
West Papua operated by BP will also be examined. BP's Tangguh LNG project., which 
began production in 2005, is an important additional case study as the company is 
considered by many commentators to have made a particularly admirable effort in the 
area of CSR (Ross, 2003, p.29). While it is very early in the life of the Tangguh project, 
the case provides a valuable insight into how one company has attempted to design its 
CSR policies and practices in light of the lessons learned from previous projects. 
Moreover the research presented in this thesis is a comparative analysis of three 
companies operating across three provinces: Bougainville, Papua and West Papua. 
'Peacebuilding Compared' 
During Phase 2, the researcher of this study was fortunate enough to be able to draw 
on the work of several regional scholars based at the Australian National University, as 
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well as to hook into the 20 year Peacebuilding Compared project led by Professocs John 
Braithwaite and Hilary Charlesworth. These connections have been essential to the 
empirical depth of this study, particularly in terms of identifying sources of data, 
establishing new connections in the field as well as providing important points of 
triangulation for the new data collected. Aside from fieldwork undertaken for this 
thesis, 248 interviews have been conducted for the Peacebuilding Compared project on 
the Bougainville case (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.141) and 99 
on the Papua case (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.146). As a 
member of the project team, I had access to fieldwork notes from each of these 
interviews conducted by others. 
The analysis of the combined Bougainville and Papua material illuminated the key 
grievances of the local communities. It also identified the diverse range of actors, 
institutions and events that were identified as the triggers of those grievances. The aim 
of documenting the conflicts in Phase 2 was to provide an opportunity to easily 
contrast the concerns of local communities with the types of social and environmental 
initiatives pursued by the three companies. 
Phase 3: Documenting CSR 
In Phase 1, it was discovered that corporations see CSR as the primary vehicle through 
which they have opportunities to promote peaceful development. In Phase 2 a deeper 
understanding of the issues that instigated the conflicts in Bougainville and Papua 
developed. In Phase 3, a broad range of corporate reports and documents was 
examined in order to investigate how well the existing CSR pract ices of the three 
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companies aligned with the root cause of the two conflicts. The aim was to trace the 
characteristics of the CSR practices of the case study companies to uncover the types 
of practices that have been, and are currently being, implemented in Bougainville and 
Papua. Corporate documents available in the public domain (such as company 
websites, annual reports, CSR reports and public interviews) were the main source for 
this phase of data collection. A number of common themes were identified across all of 
the corporate materials examined and thus are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Characteristics of CSR 
Statement of corporate values and approach to CSR 
Employment practices & local-national-expatriate ratios 
Security 
Social programs 
Economic development & infrastructure 
Human rights 
Environmental projects 
CSR budget information 
A particular benefit of corporate documents is that they provide an unobtrusive means 
of sourcing information and "represent data that are thoughtful , in that participants 
have given attention to compiling" (Creswell, 2003, p.187). These corporate documents 
were also an important supplement to the data collected from interviews with 
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individual executives, providing insight into the complex relationship betwet;n the 
executives' subjective perspectives and objective interests. The drawback to public 
corporate documentation as a data source is that the information is highly filtered to 
present the company in the best possible light, and, as such, may not provide a 
completely open account of the company's interests and intentions. They are also 
often designed for an international rather than a local audience. However they do 
provide a valuable insight into the basis upon which corporations consider themselves 
to be socially responsible. The analysis of secondary materials was also complimented 
with the corporate executive interviews undertaken in Phases 1 and 4. This provided 
useful opportunities to 'control' the line of questioning, or pursue issues that the public 
documents did not cover ( Creswell, 2003, p.186}. Interviews also open the opportunity 
for respondents to provide additional information outside of the company's highly 
structured public documents. 
Combining the findings from Phases 1, 2 and 3 a draft framework was developed for 
how CSR might be usefully reworked to assist companies to avoid conflict. The draft 
framework focussed on the existence of discrepancies between local perspectives of 
the problems associated with the resource projects and the focus of existing CSR 
policies . It also outlined an emerging disjuncture between the visions of social justice 
held by corporations and local communities . In this way the draft framework provided 
the beg inn ings of a new theoretical approach to how CSR might be transformed to 
reduce the likel ihood of resource development contributing to conflict. The remaining 
phases aimed to collect relevant data to enable the development of a practical model 
th at might offer an alternative means for the design of CSR in areas affected by 
co nfli ct. 
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Phase 4: Corporate actors in Bougainville and Papua 
Phase 4 marked the commencement of specific fieldwork related to the Bouga inville 
and Papua conflicts. As mentioned earlier I had not initially planned to undertake 
regional or local fieldwork. However, as my understanding of the discrepancy between 
existing CSR policies and the priorities of locals increased, it became essential to collect 
primary data to explore this hypothesis. In line with Merry's (2006) approach to de -
territorialised ethnography in-country fieldwork provided an opportunity to trace the 
translation of global CSR policies into tangible action in two specific locations. Figure 3 
plots the locations of all the fieldtrips conducted in the course of this research. During 
Phase 4 two consecutive fieldwork trips to PNG and Indonesia were undertaken, in 
which executives and former employees from the case study companies, BCL, Freeport 
and BP, were interviewed. This included interviews with current and former 
consultants working with the case study companies with knowledge or expertise on 
these companies such as, consultants and former employees. 
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The draft framework developed in Phase 2 and the analysis of corporate materials in 
Phase 3 provided the basis for the questions asked during interviews in Phase 4. Using 
a similar method to the Phase 1 interviews described earlier, participants were 
identified by searching publicly available information on the Internet and in official 
documents. In cases where names and contact details were not available in the publ ic 
domain, a letter was sent to the company's headquarters requesting the appropriate 
contact details . In two of the case study companies, executives who participated in 
earlier interviews assisted in providing new local contacts with various people within 
the company. Utilising the relationships with corporate executives developed in earl ier 
phases of the research proved an effective strategy. The fact that the research request 
was brought to the executives' attention from company headquarters, ass isted in 
generat ing swift and enthusiastic responses . Two out of the three operating compan ies 
we re very w ill ing to part icipate during the f ield tr ip and all part icipants (see Tab les 3 
and 4 fo r a breakdown of part icipants per case study) were w ill ing to be inte rvi ew ed at 
a la t er stage. 
The loca l hea d offi ces8 of the ca se study compa nies are based in the cap ital cit ies of 
the ir respect ive nat iona l host governm ents {Po rt M ores by9 an d Ja karta ), rather t han 
provi ncially located in Bouga invill e or Papua . In terviews w ith co rporate execut ives 
s lnterv1e\.\S w ith current execut ives from these compan ies took place in the ir loca l head office. w ith tne 
e,cept1on of one execut ive\\ ho offered to be interviewed during a visit to Canberra . 
-:i 
- Despite the suspension of BCL's mining operations in Bougainvill e, the company continues to have a 
management team in Port ~loresb, .. 
.., 
were mostly conducted in English. Executives from BCL and Rio Tinto were fluent in 
English; however five participants from BP were not, so an interpreter was used. On 
one occasion, a group interview took place involving six participants, five of whom 
were not fluent in English. One of these participants, a fellow BP executive with English 
language training from a tertiary institution, offered to interpret the interview. 
The use of interpreters in qualitative interviews can threaten the validity of data 
collected. The major concerns are that the interpreter will summarise and/or modify 
responses; constrain the researcher from probing further into the interviewees' 
responses; or that the interpreter will not be sensitive to responses that are not wholly 
satisfactory or truthful (Kaborg & Bertero, 2001, p.52-3). These concerns were 
particularly pertinent to the interviews that took place at BP's head office in Jakarta 
where a colleague of five of the participants acted as an interpreter in a group 
environment. There was minimal opportunity to change this scenario, as the 
researcher was not made aware in advance that more than one executive would be 
attending the interview, or that the additional participants had minimal English 
language skills. However, the researcher did have an opportunity to discuss his/her role 
as the interpreter to understand and translate questions and to be sensitive to the 
interviewees' responses. With the exception of the one group interview at BP, all other 
interviews were conducted one-on-one and lasted between 1-2 hours. 
Aside from executives who were working in the companies' head office, in this phase 
of data collection, interviews were also conducted with numerous other people with 
valuable knowledge of the companies' CSR activities. Th is included former employees, 
consultants and executives from shareholder companies. 
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The stakeholders in the two case studies were numerous and I did not interview all of 
them. Indonesian, Australian and PNG government officials are another group of 
stakeholders who could have been included in this phase of the research. Their views 
as the regulators which set the terms and conditions of resource extraction would add 
another layer of verification and would likely provide additional (divergent) 
perspectives. Data was also not collected from individuals associated with the 
Indonesian and Papua New Guinean sides of the two conflicts. Many Indonesian and 
PNG nationals have been directly affected by the conflicts, and most likely hold views 
about how the wealth derived from the three resource projects should be equitably 
shared. While the absence of these voices represents a gap in the data collected in this 
study, documenting the perspectives of local communities most directly affected by 
resource development have been consciously prioritised. As will become evident in the 
remainder of this thesis, local communities are often excluded from decision-making 
and it is their voices that are least likely to be heard. One of the aims of this research 
has been to begin to address this type of marginalisation. However, this is not to say 
that other perspectives are less valid and Chapter 13 will further explore some of the 
implications of this empirical limitation. 
Phase 5: Local perspectives and expectations 
The fifth phase of fieldwork focussed on the perspectives of indigenous Bougainvilleans 
and Papuans. The aim of this phase was to understand the extent to which the local 
commun ities believed the companies had engaged with their grievances, how this 
engagement was taking place, as well as the perceived consequences of not engaging. 
Aga in I used interviews to collect this data . The interviewees in this phase were 
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individuals and organisations with knowledge or experience of the case study 
companies' business activities, such as landowners, government officials, religious 
leaders, women's leaders and journalists. These interviews focused on the participants' 
experiences of the companies' current and past corporate community programs. The 
interviews also sought to document community perceptions of the underlying 
motivations of CSR practices as well as potential roles for the companies in 
contributing to peaceful development in the future. 
Figure 4 - Bougainville copper mine 20 years after closure, May 2010. Photo: Kylie McKenna 
The Bougainville fieldwork took place during April and May 2010. These interviews 
were conducted in three main areas: Buka (the provincial capital of Bougainville), 
Arawa (the old mining town of the Bougainville copper mine), and Panguna (the site of 
the Bougainville copper mine, see Figure 4). Mr James Tanis who held the office of. 
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President of Bougainville at the time of the visit invited the researcher to the province. 
Support in identifying suitable research participants was also provided by members of 
the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) and previous contacts established by 
colleagues working on the Peacebuilding Compared project. 
Interviews were mainly conducted one-on-one in English. However, a small number of 
interviews were conducted in New Guinea Pidgin with the aid of an interpreter. The 
interpreter was a native born Bougainvillean with considerable interpreting 
experience. He was also knowledgeable about the political and personal sensitivities 
involved in interviewing Bougainvilleans about the mine and the conflict. 
A key ethical consideration for both cases was that the participants might discuss 
traumatic experiences that occurred during the conflicts, and that this might adversely 
affect their wellbeing. To avoid this outcome, during interviews I did not ask questions 
directly related to personal experiences of the actual violence of the conflict. Rather, 
the questions focused on the participants' involvement, experiences, perceptions and 
expectations of the companies involved. The researcher was also mindful of the fine 
line between generating information that might contribute to justice and change, and 
adversely affecting the research site and the project's participants. With this in mind, it 
was important to allow a significant portion of the interviews to be shaped by the 
interests of the participant and the direction they wished to take the conversation. 
While I went in to interviews with a prepared set of questions, these were posed 
flexibly and pursued to varying degrees depending on the responses of participants. 
One particular concern in the conduct of the Bougainville fieldwork was that 
participants might wrongly believe that because the researcher was a white Australian 
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asking questions about BCL (an Australian mining company), that she had some 
involvement in the company and that this might raise suspicions about plans for a 
possible resumption of mining (see Ch 12}. To avoid any misunderstandings, as well as 
to meet the requirements of the project's ethics approval granted by the Australian 
National University, all interviewees were given an information sheet which described 
the aims and objectives of the research project, the contributions the study sought to 
make, as well as the tertiary affiliation of the researcher. The information sheet was 
written in English and translated verbally by the interpreter as required. To provide a 
sense of context for interviewees, the researcher also made clear her connections with 
relevant colleagues at the Australian National University who have conducted 
extensive fieldwork in Bougainville and with whom many respondents were familiar. 
In Bougainville, former employees of BCL were easy to find by speaking to civil servants 
and NGO workers in Buka, and then asking for suggestions with whom to talk to. 
Former employees of the mine were generally older people with a considerable depth 
of knowledge and a range of perspectives on the Bougainville conflict. In many 
instances, former employees of the mine now hold senior government positions within 
the ABG and are closely monitoring negotiations for a possible resumption of mining. 
Further, government officials from the ABG were easy to locate and access simply by 
walking through the small town of Buka and knocking on the doors of relevant 
government offices. Representatives of the ABG bureaucracy were usually on-hand and 
willing to be interviewed for my research. lsusues relating to the potential re-opening 
of the Panguna mine are very topical in the lead up to the referendum on 
independence sometime between 2015-2010. Bougainvilleans are keen to share their 
views on the options available and there is no threat of persecution by the PNG 
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government for those who speak openly. This is very different in the Papua case yvhere 
discussion of this kind is far more risky and anonymity was of utmost importance. This 
issue of sensitivity accounts for the fact that a greater proportion of government 
officials were interviewed in the Bougainville case, in contrast to the Papua case. 
In Papua I was required to rely more heavily on interviews with NGO workers and 
journalists as they are afforded a greater (though by no means total) ability to speak 
independently than others, such as government officials who are more constrained by 
official views. While this does affect the material collected for the Papua case, the data 
collected remains a significant contribution due to the political and logistical 
challenges associated with foreign academics, journalists and NGO workers gaining 
access to the region. It also speaks to the reality of the sense of censorship that 
contributes to feelings of oppression in Papuan society and which feeds into 
contemporary independence movements. 
In Bougainville the number of women's leaders that I was able to interview was also 
significantly greater than in Papua. In Bougainville the number of womens leaders that 
I was able to interview was also significantly greater than in Paua. This disparity speaks 
to the greater density and prominence of women's organisatios in Bougainville who 
participated in peace negotiations and were key early movers in shaping the peace. 
Fieldwork in Papua took place during June and July 2010. These interviews occurred in 
Jayapura (the Papua provincial capital} and Timika {the mining town of the Freeport 
mine). Interviews were mainly conducted in Indonesian through the use of two 
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different interpreters. Both interpreters were native-born Papuans with English 
language training from tertiary institutions. Both had experience in interpreting, and 
were conscious of the political and personal sensitivities relating to research on large 
corporations and conflict in Papua. As with the Bougainville fieldwork an information 
sheet was provided to participants and translated as required. 
All participants in this research were offered complete anonymity unless they wanted 
to be quoted as the source of the information they provided. Generally, respondents 
requested that their information be kept confidential, with only a small number of 
respondents happy for their name to be attributed as the source. While respondents 
were generally enthusiastic to be involved, there were also anxieties amongst Papuans 
relating to the use of categories when aligning quotes with certain companies, 
particularly if they worked as consultants or were employees. To accommodate this 
confidentiality concern, while maximising the potential for the reader to establish 
conclusions and interpretations directly from the data (Karborg & Berteo, 2003, p.54), 
an indication of the types of people interviewed has been supplied in Tables 2 and 3. 
Yet where there is any even slight worry that reference to types of people (e.g. a 
"religious leader") for both cases might compromise the informants confidentiality, 
only coded identification (e.g. BOU6, Papua17) will be used. 
In Papua, an important additional source of information was consultants for Freeport 
and/or BP, as well as NGO groups working in collaboration with these companies. In 
some cases, NGOs become involved in the implementation of CSR practices through 
corporate-community partnerships or are invited to train company staff in areas 
related to CSR (for example, human rights education for company security staff). 
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Potent ial consultants and NGO worker interviewees were identified by talking to . 
regional scholars at the Australian National University as well as by seeking the advice 
of NGOs and religious organisations in Papua and Jakarta . In some instances, 
consultants are named publicly in corporate documents, while in other cases these 
details are kept private by request and/or for security reasons. 
Table 3 - Bougainville sources of data 
. 
Data source Number of interviewees10 
. 
Rio Tinto executive - Australia 1 
BCL executive 2 
Former BCL employee 8 
ABG Division Chief Executive Officer {CEO) 3 
Civil servant 3 
Resident/landowner from a mining lease area 5 
Landowner group chairman 2 
Women's leader 5 
Me 'ekamui Government member 1 
Small scale miner 2 
ABG advisor 4 
Peacem aker 1 
Ex-combatant 2 
Total = 39 
10 In two cases there was more than one interviewee present for one interview, so the to tal num ber of 
interviews for the Bouga inville case was 37 . 
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An important limitation of the data collected for this study is that while in Papua the 
researcher did not visit local communities surrounding BP's Tangguh LNG project. 
During her visit to Papua in June 2010, protests were taking place across both 
provinces. Based on local advice about the likelihood of the protests turning violent, a 
decision was made not to travel to the western province. The problem associated with 
the lack of data from locals surrounding the Tangguh project is that the thesis will 
present a less balanced and informed analysis of the situation in this particular area. 
While several Papuans with direct experience of this project were interviewed, the 
findings presented on the Tangguh project are not as substantial as they are for the 
BCL and Freeport cases. Nonetheless, this small data set and synthesis of secondary 
materials can be used as a basis for further research on the social and environmental 
impacts of Tangguh. Further, considering the dearth of contemporary primary data 
about Papuan perspectives on the Tangguh project, even the small amount of data 
presented in this thesis represents a worthwhile contribution to knowledge. 
Table 4 - Papua sources of data 
Data source 
BP executive - London 
BP executive - Indonesia 
Tangguh LNG shareholder company executive 
Number of 
intervieweeS11 · 
1 
6 
1 
11 In one case there was more than one interviewee present for one interview, so the total number of 
interviews for the Papua case was 41. 
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Data source Number of 
. . . 11 
mterv1ewees 
BP employees 3 
Freeport Employees 4 
Former Freeport employees 2 
NGO Worker 14 
Religious leader 6 
Journalist 3 
MRP (Maje/is Rakyat Papua/Papuan People's Council) staff 1 
member 
National Commission for Human Rights (Kamnas HAM} staff 1 
member 
Tangai Papua (Freeport Union for indigenous workers) member 1 
LEMASA (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme/The 1 
Amungme Tribal Council) staff member 
LEMASKO (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Kamoro/The 1 
Kamoro Tribal Council) staff member 
LPMAK (Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat Amungme don 1 
Kamara I The Amungme and Kamoro Community Development 
Organisation) staff member 
Women's leader 1 
Total= 47 
Table 4 (continued) - Papua sources of data 
Phase 6: Modeling and hypothesising: development of the 
Interdependent Engagement Framework. 
Once the five main phases of data collection were complete, the data was organised by 
typing up all handwritten notes and attributing each interview a code. These notes 
were then read to get a general sense of the information and the views expressed. 
Some notes were also written in the margins to record initial thoughts, and theoretical 
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and methodological issues. With the characteristics of both the two conflicts and CSR 
documented, the grievances that the companies were engaging and/or disengaging 
with could be more clearly identified. The data showed that, generally speaking, the 
CSR practices and policies of the case study companies did not align with the 
grievances and root causes of the conflicts in Bougainville and Papua. 
To refine and flesh out the draft framework developed in Phase 2 a coding process was 
undertaken. The data was organised into categories that were labelled according to 
what I have called the common sites of interdependence between local communities 
and corporations that emerged from the fieldwork data. Quotes from respondents 
were coded according to a number of key areas where a discrepancy was evident 
between local and corporate perspectives on how business activities intersect with the 
causes of armed conflict. Eight broad sites of interdependence were identified at this 
point, however in line with the commitment of this thesis to a reflexive methodologica I 
approach the categories were constantly reassessed and re-worked throughout the 
writing phase. As thinking about the data deepened, a vision for the potential of what 
might be achievable through the redesign of CSR became clearer. Using the existing 
literature on each of the identified categories as a point of triangulation several of the 
original categories were ultimately reformulated to better reflect current scholarship 
and practice. The terms listed below represent the final iteration of the sites of 
interdependence that are considered in the chapters that follow. 
• Historical injustice, 
• Denial of customary land rights, 
• Regional inequality and contests over resource wealth, 
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• Cultural, political and economic marginalisation, 
• Domestic security politics, 
• Community disruption, 
• Environmental damage, and 
• Local reconciliation. 
The eight sites of interdependence became the starting point from which the complex 
nature of corporate to local CSR relations was mapped. There are other categories that 
could be used to frame an analysis of the gap between what executives believe and the 
expectations of locals in relation to CSR (such as gender), however the eight identified 
here represent the most dominant themes that emerged from the data collected. The 
sites of interdependence became the spine for the structure of this thesis and for a 
new model for the design of CSR. 
For each of the sites of interdependence the researcher mapped how CSR has 
traditionally operated in areas affected by conflict. A reconfiguration of CSR was then 
put forward to address the identified discrepancies between local and corporate 
concerns and priorities . Through this process a model was developed that provides an 
opportun ity to plot multiple relationships on a continuum from CSR that is more likely 
to aggravate violent conflict to CSR that might facilitate the promotion of peace. In 
Chapter 13, this model is brought together into the Interdependent Engagement 
Framework (see Table 5) . 
The methodological aim of the Interdependent Engagement Framework is to identify 
(and potent ial ly extend ) areas of connection between companies and the local 
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communities, while also fleshing out some of the other actors and institutions, 
associated with resource projects, such as the State and the military. This links with the 
broader theoretical argument (developed in Chapter 3), that CSR is not a static 
relationship between a company and an abstract notion of society and reified 
responsibilities to it. Rather, CSR is a field that incorporates a diverse range of actors 
with their own interests and agendas. 
Table 5 - lnterdepend!ent Engagement Framewo,rk - Summary 
Sites of Interdependence 
Historical llnjustlce 
Den i1al of Customary Land Rights 
Regional i:nequality and contests over resource 
wealth - CSR 
CSR as it 
Cultural, po litical and econom i1c margina lisation Reconfigured 
c.urrendy exists 
Human Rights Violations 
Community Disnuption 
Environmental Da mage 
Aspirat ions to Defin e the Future 
Disengaged Engaged 
The way in which each component of the Interdependent Engagement Framework was 
arrived at as an empirica l destination is discussed in more deta il in later chapters . 
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However, the Framework is foreshadowed now to provide a sense of its itf rative 
design, informed by multi-site qualitative interviews and analysis of primary and 
secondary materials . 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the six phases of data collection and fieldwork that 
structured this research. With data collected from numerous sources, locations and 
materials, the study can be described as taking a qualitative, comparative case study 
approach . While it is a study of just two cases, this limitation is mitigated by the long 
history of each case, in which different kinds of engagement and CSR are in play. 
Further, while only two locations are analysed, the practices of three major 
corporations are examined. This data is also supplemented and strengthened from 
data collected from more peripheral corporate players in the narrative, including 
execut ives from Rio Tinto. 
In the following chapter, the existing literature related to the research questions is 
outlined . It then introduces the search for a theoretical framework through which CSR 
in Bouga inville and Papua could be examined. 
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Chapter 3: The interface of CSR with Conflict and 
Peace Building 
This chapter explores the existing literature connected to CSR in Bougainville and 
Papua, conflict and peace building. It begins with a discussion on the links between 
natural resources and violent conflict. Following this, the concept of CSR will be 
analysed, in particular its evolution over time as a measure to respond to the social 
and environmental impacts of business activity. The adoption of CSR as a tool deployed 
by natural resource companies is considered, before moving into a discussion of the 
new expectations that CSR be extended to encompass a role for business in peace 
building. In the course of this analysis, several limitations of both these ideas are 
identified. The chapter then outlines an alternative theoretical framework through 
which CSR in Bougainville and Papua will be examined in the remainder of this thesis. 
Natural resources and conflict 
Numerous studies have sought to demonstrate the links between natural resource 
development and violent conflict (Bannon & Collier, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; 
Ross, 2001; Ross, 2003; Sachs & Warner, 2001}. Much of the focus of this literature 
termed 'the resource curse' or the 'paradox of plenty', can be charachterised by an 
emphasis on 'endogenous' factors such as poor economic growth, poverty, corruption, 
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state weakness, authoritarianism and repression, all of which increase the likelih_ood of 
armed conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 2001; Ross 2003; Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
As limi (2006, p.4) argues, resource wealth "sows the seeds of discord and conflict 
among domestic stakeholders, such as politicians, developers, local tribes, and citizens 
(also known as tax payers)". Resource revenue can be wasted when stakeholders are 
motivated by quick wins and revenues can be distributed inequitably among groups 
(limi, 2006, p.4-5). 
An exception to this domestic focus however, is Franks (2007) analysis of resource 
appropriation in Chile and West Papua. Franks argues that the endogenous focus of the 
natural resource literature "leaves out many of the important aspects and actors 
surrounding RA [Resource Appropriation]" {2007, p.4-5). Franks suggests that the 
process of Resource Appropriation (which involves three key phases: domination; 
detachment and consumption) "is not simply achieved by the power of an army or type 
of economic instrument but through a broad array of socio-ecological techniques 
employed by a dominant group(s) that reshapes relationships of space and place, 
perception and experience, society and ecology" (2007, p.11). These techniques Franks 
argues, extend beyond " the internal factors of individual nation -states" (2007, p14) 
such as ideologies of neoliberalism; trade liberalization; the expansion of corporate 
power and "the various foreign and economic policies pursued by nation -states" (2007, 
p.13 ). Franks ma intains that these 'exogenous' factors characterise a broad shift away 
from nat ion state dom ination towards "more complex and less formal forms that have 
involved inte rs tate and internat ional institutions and actors" (2007, p.13) . This form of 
dom inati on he arg ues, illu strates the becoming of Empire described as "a multiform 
st ra t egy of globa li sing power pursued at multiple sites" {2007 . p.13) . 
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It is also true that, evocative of modernization theory, the natural resource curse 
literature continues to prioritise the internal problems which restrict economic growth 
through natural resource development. The most prominent example of this is 
reflected in arguments that the presence of natural resources provides both an 
incentive for warring groups to compete and sell off the resource, as well as the 
financial means to purchase weapons {Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). 
As Bannon and Collier (2003, p.3} argue, civil war is expensive and the tools of war 
have to be financed. In line with this argument, the authors claim that rebel 
movements can be characterised, in part, as business organisations. Without a source 
of finance, they "will wither away or be capable of only limited and low-level violence-
more of an irritant than a serious threat to an established government11 (Bannon & 
Collier, 2003, p.3-4). Another example of the thesis that resource conflict is motivated 
by financial gain will be discussed in Chapter 9. This chapter will show how 'spoilers' 
such as the state's security forces can be seen to actually create conflict in order to 
demand higher protection payments from foreign firms operating major extractive 
projects. 
While there is general consensus in the literature that these economic motives can 
and do contribute to conflict, there is less agreement as to how influential they are 
relative to other socio-cultural factors (Ballentine & Nitzchke, 2003, p.2), such as the 
influx of 'economic migrants' and disruptions to traditional ways of life {Hook & 
Ganguly, 2000, p.65). This has become known as the 'greed vs . grievance' debate, 
where the motivations of rebel movements are categorised as either 'loot seeking' or 
'justice seeking' (Ballentine & Nitzchke, 2003, p.2). The data assembled for this thesis 
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suggest that the Bougainville and Papua conflicts can be characterised . by a 
combination of both. Some individuals are motivated by greed, while others simply 
want an end to the social and environmental disruptions caused by large extractive 
projects. For still others, possibly most, the motivations of both greed and grievance 
merge in ways that are difficult to disentangle. 
Despite the clear connections between resource wealth and armed conflict, Bannon 
and Collier point out that the natural resource curse should not be considered destined 
(Bannon & Collier, 2003, p.11). While diamonds were central to economic and social 
collapse in Sierra Leone, they were "critical to Botswana's success in becoming the 
fastest-growing economy in the world and a middle income county" (Bannon & Collier, 
2003, p.11). The Botswana case has led some analysts (limi, 2006, p.1) to argue the key 
to avoiding the resource curse is "good governance - specifically a strong public voice 
with accountability, high government effectiveness, good regulation, and powerful 
anticorruption polices ... ". To some degree therefore, the resource curse can be 
considered to be a reflection of the political situation in which resource development 
occurs. Resources can result in social conflict and division but the case of Botswana 
also shows that they can be a resource to build relationships, through, for example, 
poverty reduction. 
The resource curse literature provides useful insights into the structural problems 
associated with resource development across the globe. However, one limitation of 
this literature for the purposes of this study is the common tendency to focus on the 
'macro' structural problems associated with a nation's dependence on resource 
revenues . The danger of this approach is that more nuanced analyses of the roles that 
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large corporations play in exacerbating or prolonging violent conflict can be excluded. 
More critical studies of the resource curse hypothesis tend to take a micro approach 
and argue that the dynamics of resources affecting the conflict do not fit the standard 
posited dynamics of the resource curse hypothesis. Aspinall {2007, p.950), for example, 
argues that the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, was not determined by "any 
intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction". Rather, "the key factor was the 
presence of an appropriate identity based collective action frame" {Aspinall, 2007, 
p.950). The crux of Aspinall's argument is that "what determines rebellion is not the 
presence of a natural resource industry and its material effects, but rather how it is 
interpreted by local actors" {2007, p.953). Aspinall concludes that: 
... the Acehnese grievances about natural resource exploitation only arose and 
became politically consequential for violence as part of a wider discourse of 
deprivation that positioned the Acehnese as victims of the Indonesian state 
{2007,p.968). 
Akin to Aspinall, Banks (2008, p.23) argues "what appear to be 'resource' conflicts in 
Papua New Guinea are actually better conceived as conflicts around identity and social 
relationships". Rather than illustrative of the resource curse, Banks {2008, p.23) 
suggests that "the very different conceptualizations of natural resources in most 
Melanesian societies [see Ch 11]- as elements of the social world as much as any 
external environmental sphere - means that resources become a conduit for local 
social and political agendas and tensions to be expressed". We will see throughout this 
thesis that both Aspinall and Banks' arguments also have relevance for the Bougainville 
case, in which mining related grievances arose "in tandem with identity construction" 
55 
(Aspinall , 2007, p.968}. We will also see this exemplified in the Papuan case- where 
Freeport's mining operations have been the target of non-Amungme and non-Kamara 
members of Papuan separatist movements as part of a broader struggle for merdeka12. 
Watts (2004} is another analyst who has focused on the local level to explain the 
connection between natural resources and conflict. Watts (2004} draws on the 
example of oil extraction in Nigeria to explore what he refers to as the impacts of 'oil 
capitalism' on 'governable spaces'. Defining governable space as "a specific 
configuration of territory, identity and rule", Watts argues that 'chieftainship', the 
space of 'indigeneity' and the 'nation' are three spaces associated with oil, conflict and 
violence. The major cause of this violence according to Watts is: 
.. . the presence and activities of the oil companies ... [that] constitute a challenge 
to customary forms of community authority, inter-ethnic relations, and local 
state institut ions principally through the property and land disputes that are 
endangered, via forms of popular mobilizat ion and agitation (Watts, 2004, 
p .54). 
Watts' analysis is important as it draws out the socia l dimension of the polit ical 
economy of oil by high lighting the changes that occur in relat ionsh ips as a result of o il 
12 In Chapter 9, it w ill be shown how the targeting of Freeport's mining activities by Papuan 
separatists has resulted in the exacerbation of human rights violations by Indonesian security forces 
in the vicinity of the m in e. This has resu lted in a pathological circle of violence in which Indonesian 
security forces are accused of orchestrating acts of violence - who then blame this on the OPM to 
rationalise increased security payments from Freeport. 
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extraction. Chapter 7 will explain how the Watts analysis is also relevant to the social 
problems that emerge through the distribution of resource revenue and compensation . 
Multinational corporations and conflict 
Beyond the links between the presence of resource wealth and armed conflict, more 
specific links between the presence of multinational resource companies and the 
occurrence of conflict have also been identified. Interest in exploring these links has 
coincided with a perceived general shift in the dynamics of armed conflict since the 
end of the Cold War. This shift is characterised by a trend towards intrastate conflicts 
rather than interstate wars (Kaldor, 2007). Kaldor argues that previous conflicts 
predominantly occurred between states or actors aspiring to state power where the 
aim was the military capture of territory and battle between armed forces (Kaldor, 
2007, p.5). The 'New Wars' in contrast, are considered to generally take place in the 
context of failing states: 
... where borders become increasingly irrelevant. They are fought by networks 
of state and non-state actors, where out-and-out battles are rare and violence 
is directed mainly against civilians or symbols of order and they are 
characterized by a new type of political economy involving a combination of 
extremist politics and criminality (Kaldor, 2007, p.5). 
The literature on the New Wars is important for this analysis as it illuminates the 
varied ways in which companies may contribute to armed conflict as a result of be ing 
caught up in the local political economy. The New Wars literature also opens up 
opportunities to explain for example, why some social groups consider companies to 
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be legitimate targets of violent attack for reasons that go beyond hostility related to 
the impact of their business activities (Ford & McKenna, 2008, p.2). These links have 
been categorised according to two broad scenarios; cases where corporations seem to 
be complicit in armed conflicts through for example, financing warring parties, and 
cases where corporations play more indirect roles in exacerbating civil wars through, 
for example, exploitative economic arrangements, environmental damage and an 
influx of economic migrants (Calvano, 2008; Hook & Ganguly, 2000; Patey, 2007). 
While much of the New Wars literature focuses on the indirect roles of business in 
exacerbating conflict {Calvano, 2008, p.794), there is no consensus as to what 
constitutes corporate 'complicity' in conflict {Sherman, 2001, p.2). 
While the categorisation of corporate actors as either complicit or indirect contributors 
to conflict warrants analysis, there is a more pressing need to expand on the small 
empirical insights we have on the full range of interdependencies between business 
and the sources of conflict. A valuable contribution in this regard is Zandvliet's (2005, 
p.185) identification of four key relationships that result in a company's activities 
impacting on conflict dynamics, whether inadvertent or not. These are: 
1. The relationship between corporations and the communities where 
operations take place (e.g. disputes may arise from environmental pollution 
or unequal distribution of resources); 
2. Intergroup or 'intercommunal' conflicts in the area of operation (e.g. disputes 
may result from giving employment to 'outside rs') ; 
3. Corporations can become the proxy targets for grievances held by local 
groups against the government (e.g. disputes over resource wealth); and 
4. Tensions between the company and government authorities may diminish a 
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company's ability to operate. 
All four of these key relationships are relevant to the cases of Bougainville and Papua 
and will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of this thesis. 
Another important contribution to the literature on the relationship between resource 
companies and conflict is Laplante & Spears' {2008) analysis of community consent 
processes in the extractive sector. They put forward three main reasons why extractive 
industry projects are particularly vulnerable to community opposition. Firstly, resource 
development projects are long-term, usually with a lifespan of at least 20 years. 
Second, the projects are complex, involving a chain of investments, multiple contracts 
and numerous parties. Finally, they are also capital intensive, usually requiring 
investments of many millions of dollars. Laplante & Spears {2008, p.74-5} go on to 
identify a number of key triggers of conflict that are often associated with the presence 
of a resource project, including: 
• the need for delineated land that lead to property disputes; 
• the state's eviction of landowners; 
• the size of the project relative to traditional projects; 
• an influx of workers; 
• temporary employment that disappears; 
• unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of a resource project; 
• deep environmental impacts that are sometimes irreversible; 
• the facilitation of corruption; 
• fear of human rights violations or the use of private security; and 
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• the support corporations provide to unpopular regimes. 
This list is not exhaustive, but it does provide a good indication of the types of conflict 
flashpoints associated with resource development that this study will also identify in 
Bougainville and Papua. 
There have been two schools of thought about the best way for companies to ethically 
work with the communities in which they operate. The first is a harm minimisation 
approach (Calvano, 2008; Hook & Ganguly, 2000; Laplante & Spears, 2008), which 
draws on existing frameworks of CSR. Harm minimisation approaches involve adapting 
business practice to reduce the potential for harm or likelihood of conflict. The other, 
more proactive approach take the idea of reducing harm an extra step, and involves an 
attempt to engage corporations in actively building conditions that are conducive to 
peace (Fort & Schipani, 2004; Gerson, 2001; Wenger & Mockli, 2003). 
What is Corporate Social Responsibility? 
'CSR' has become recognisable shorthand for the onus on business to consider the 
consequences of business activity on the societies and environments in which they 
operate . However, despite over 50 years of scholarship on CSR, there is no universally 
accepted definition. Moreover, CSR can incorporate a number of related terms such as 
community relations and community development, adding further ambiguity to 
defining this field 13 . 
13 For a discussion of the differences between pub lic relations (corporate reputat ion management), 
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Generally speaking, CSR manifests as voluntary commitments in the form of socio-
economic development projects, employee volunteering, community-business 
partnerships, social and environmental impact assessments, and the adoption of 
discretionary codes of conduct {such as labour standards, human rights and 
environmental protection}. Information on a company's CSR policies and programs can 
usually be found in designated reports published on websites, under various titles such 
as, a 'CSR report' or 'Sustainable Development report'. A more recent trend has been 
to document CSR policies and programs alongside a statement of the company's values 
{such as Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold's {2008) Core values: Working toward 
sustainable development). 
The design and promotion of CSR has become an industry in its own right, with large 
for-profit and not-for profit sectors providing advice to corporations on issues ranging 
from social reporting and benchmarking strategies {Global Reporting Initiative, n.d.}, to 
the establishment of partnerships between business and other social domains {such as 
health centres and development NGOs). This industry includes the employment of 
'community development practioners' within natural resource companies to facilitate 
community development at the local level {Kemp, 2009, p.198). There are good 
practice guides for the natural resource industry (e.g. Franks, Brereton, Moran, Spaker 
& Cohen, 2010; ICMM 2010}; international awards for the most socially responsible 
and irresponsible companies (e.g. Corporate Responsibility Magazine's {2010) '100 best 
community relations (building 'amicable' relationships) and community development (characterised as 
'high-end participation') see Deanna Kemp's (2009, p.204-6) discussion on "community development as 
a distinct domain of practices in mining" drawing on the IAP2 (n.d.) public participation spectrum. 
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corporate citizens' and Greenpeace' s (2012) 'public eye awards' television 
advertisements promoting social responsibility achievements (e.g. Westpac and 
Chevron in Australia); university professors of CSR (e.g. Prof. Dirk Matten (Crane & 
Matten, 2007; Matten, Crane & Chapple, 2003; Matten & Moon, 2008} and Prof. Frank 
Figge (Figge & Hahn, 2005; Figge & Hahn, 2004; Figge, Hahn, Schaltegger & Wagner 
2002}; academic journals (e.g. the CSR and Environmental Management journal); 
conferences (e.g. the International CSR conference); and research institutes of CSR 
(e.g. the CSR Research Centre at Beijing University and the Centre for Social 
Responsibility in Mining at the Univeristy of Queensland) which all feed into this 
industry. There are also numerous global initiatives that focus on minimising the 
negative social and environmental impacts of business activity, such as the UN Global 
Compact14 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations 15 as well resource 
guides for integrating gender considerations (see for example, Rio Tinto 2009} and 
cultural heritage management (see for example, Rio Tinto 2011) into the community 
work of resource companies 
Approaches to CSR: from the 'profit motive' to the 
interrelationship between business and society 
Attempts to address the negative impacts of business on society are not a new 
14 
"The Un ited Nations Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are comm itted 
to align ing the ir operations and strategies with ten un iversally accepted principles in the areas of human 
r ights, labour, environment and anti-corrupt ion" (UN Global Compact, n.d) . 
15 
"The OECD Gu ide li nes for Multinational Enterprises are far reaching recommendations for respons ible 
bus iness conduct" (OECD, 2011), that encompass recommendations on : disclosure; human rights; 
emp loyment and industrial re lat ions; environment; bribery; consumer interests ; science and technology; 
competit ion ; and taxat ion . 
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phenomenon. Some analysts {Cheney, Roper & May, 2007, p.4} trace the origins of 
such initiatives back to the late 1870s when corporate activities were beginning to be 
identified as having detrimental impacts on society. Corporate responses to these 
concerns have a similarly long history. For example, during what is known as the 
'progressive' era in the United States (from 1900-1920) industrialists were believed to 
have "found themselves in the awkward position of advocating a system of factory 
labour that, by many critics standards, was proving to be a detriment to society" 
{Cheney, Roper & May, 2007, p.4}. In response, corporations began implementing 
employee welfare programs designed to "curb growing dismay over the negative 
impact of industrialization on community and family life" (Cheney, Roper & May, 2007, 
p.4). 
Despite these early forays into social responsibility, the core expectation of business 
remained to maximise profits for shareholders {Carroll, 1991, p.39}. It was not until the 
1970s that this view changed dramatically. At this time the establishment of a new 
generation of regulatory agencies in the United States {US) (e.g. the Environmental 
Protection Agency and Occupational Health and Safety Agency) began to identify not 
just shareholders, but also the environment, employees and consumers as company 
'stakeholders' {Carroll, 1991, p.39}. In this way, from the 1970s onwards, expectations 
of the responsibilities of business widened. 
The broadening of expectations on corporate CSR activities triggered a vast, 
interdisciplinary literature analysing and attempting to define the scope of these newly 
identified responsibilities. Garriga and Mele {2004, p.65} categorise this literature into 
four dominant approaches that corporations should either : 
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1. meet objectives that produce long-term profits; 
2. use business power in a responsible way; 
3. integrate social demands into core business activities; 
4. contribute to a good society by doing what is ethically correct. 
The responsibility of business to produce long-term profits is most evident in 
Friedman's (1970} influential claim that "political mechanisms, not market 
mechanisms, are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources" 
(Friedman, 1970, p.122). While most accounts of CSR today recognise corporate 
responsibilities beyond the profit motive, there remains a persistent view that the 
social activities of business are only a means to achieve economic results (Garriga & 
Mele, 2004, p.51}. This view has led to emergence of a number of studies that seek to 
demonstrate an empirical correlation between social responsibility and financial 
performance (e.g. Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh, 2007}. The results of these studies are 
then employed by lobby groups to encourage corporations to adopt CSR, by appealing 
to their financial 'bottom line' (Porter & Kramer, 2006} . 
The second dominant approach to CSR identified by Garriga & Mele (2004} is reflected 
in Davis's (1960} claim that the "social responsibilities of businessmen need to be 
commensurate with their social power" (Davis, 1960, p.71) . Davis argued that 
corporations should demonstrate a concern for their impacts on society and the 
environment due to the political and financial influence they wield on important 
decisions relating to issues such as environmental management and employment 
conditions . The responsible use of corporate power continues to be a theme in more 
recent literature, particularly in debates concerning the erosion of state authority in an 
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era of globalisation (Hall & Biersteker, 2002), as well as the power relationships 
between corporations and communities in developing countries (Garvey & Newell, 
2005). 
Aside from the profit and power arguments, other approaches to CSR emphasise social 
demands and ethical responsibilities (Garriga & Mele, 2004, p.51). A prominent 
example is Carroll's {1991) 'pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility' which outlines 
four key components that should be incorporated into conceptualisations of CSR: 
economic responsibility (be profitable), legal responsibility (obey the law), ethical 
responsibility (do what is right/fair, avoid harm) and philanthropic responsibility (be a 
good corporate citizen). Importantly, Carroll also outlines what he considers the ideal 
business orientation towards local communities as one which "management sees 
community goals and company goals as mutually interdependent" (Carroll, 1991, 
p.47). 
Fifteen years following the publication of Carroll's pyramid of CSR, Porter and Kramer 
(2006) entered the CSR debate. Although the connections are not made explicit in this 
paper, there are clear links between the earlier work of Carroll and the ideas of Porter 
and Kramer. Specifically, Porter and Kramer expand the idea that businesses should 
work towards the development of mutually beneficial practices for business and 
society. The authors argue that there are two important limitations to current 
approaches to CSR: 
1. they pit business against society, when clearly the two are interdependent; 
and 
2. they pressure companies to think of CSR in generic ways instead of in the way 
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most appropriate to each firm's strategy (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p.1) . . 
To overcome these limitations Porter and Kramer suggest, ((we must root it in a broad 
understanding of the interrelationship between a corporation and society while at the 
same time anchoring it in the strategies of specific companies" {Porter & Kramer, 2006, 
p.S). In practice, the authors do not expect that corporations would take on every 
social issue, but rather choose a few that "represent opportunities to make a real 
difference to society or to confer a competitive advantage" {2006, p.13). The logic 
being that the closer the social issue is to the company's core business interests, the 
more likely it will be effective in addressing it. 
Carroll (1991) and Porter and Kramer's (2006) interest in exploring the 
interrelationship between business and society is the approach to CSR taken in this 
thesis. Community grievances relating to resource development in zones of conflict 
often feed into, and exacerbate, deep sources of injustice beyond the company's core 
business activities. As such, Porter and Kramer's interest in exploring the possibilities 
that can emerge through engaging with the interdependencies of business and society 
is adopted in this study. However, there is an important point of difference between 
the focus of this study and that of Porter and Kramer. This project does not share 
Porter and Kramer's emphasis on the development of 'strategic CSR' based on a 
company' s core business activities. The Interdependent Engagement analysis 
presented in this thesis takes a much broader, less inward looking approach. A broader 
approach to the design of CSR aims to reflect the multifarious complexity of the social 
and environmental impacts of large natural resource companies in areas affected by 
confl ict. Moreover, in the chapters that follow, the full range of grievances associated 
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with business activity, and not just those relating to corporate strategy will be 
analysed. 
CSR in relation to conflict and peace 
One consequence of the increasing globalisation of markets and trade is that 
foreign corporations have unprecedented opportunities to expand internationally. This 
has resulted in an increasing number of foreign firms operating in areas affected by 
conflict (Andersson, Evers, Sjostedt, 2011, p.10). However the translation of Western 
CSR practices into non-Western locations has been problematic, generally not 
functioning to reduce conflict between resource companies and local communities in 
the same way that might be anticipated in a Western context. The CSR role played by 
mining corporations in non-Western contexts such as Melanesia is therefore of utmost 
-
importance given the widespread adoption of this discourse globally. Examining CSR in 
PNG for example, lmbun (2007, p.179) argues that {(in the PNG mining industry, there 
appears to be a lot of activities undertaken by MNMCs [multinational mining 
companies] that pertain to the needs and aspirations of the 'significant other' or the 
local community". Im bun argues that cases such as the Bougainville copper mine are 
crucial to this analysis as the case has stimulated mining companies in PNG to embrace 
"a more 'human face' in dealing with local communities" (2007, p.179). 
Laplante & Spears {2008, p.69) ask a similar question to that being posed in this thesis: 
... why is it that, many of the large extractive industry companies having taken 
up the mantra of CSR in recent years, conflicts between such companies and 
their communities are multiplying as never before? 
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The reason they suggest, is that CSR only addresses a narrow range of 'headline 
grabbing' issues such as corporate complicity in human rights violations by security 
forces, rather than disputes over community control of resources and the right to 
control the direction of their lives (Laplante & Spears, 2008, p.69). Laplante and Spears 
suggested solution to making CSR more effective lies in corporate engagement in 
"consent processes with communities and groups directly affected by projects with a 
view to obtaining their free prior and informed consent" (Laplante & Spears, 2008, p. 
69). 
Obtaining community consent for resource projects is difficult, complex and a long-
term process. Communities rarely speak with one voice (Calvano, 2008, p.794), and 
attitudes towards resource extraction are likely to change as the social and 
environmental impacts become more visible. In addition, as Kapelus (2002, p.290-1} 
argues, because corporations who wield the power to define what constitutes 'the 
community', corporate executives decide who can represent the community and what 
consent for a project will entail. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, corporate 
understandings of what constitutes 'the community' also have a significant impact on 
how the scope of CSR obligations is defined. In some cases the parameters are limited 
to villages directly affected by the resource project, while in others, corporate 
definitions of 'the community' are broadened to encompass a sub-district or an entire 
region. 
Beyond ensuring consent, Calvano {2008, p.801-2} argues that there are three other 
avenues for companies to limit the potential for business activity to contribute to 
conflict : 
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1. increase the connection between multinational corporations and the 
development goals of poverty relief and sustainability; 
2. shift to a perspective where local communities in poor countries are viewed 
as potential consumers with tremendous buying power; and 
3. develop recognition among corporate executives that being responsive to 
local communities makes good business sense. 
This view is also shared by Sherman (2001, p.12) who argues that: 
... normative appeals may not be enough to ensure sustained improvement; 
measures intended to shift corporate behaviour towards peace will also need 
to engage corporate self-interest. 
While the costs of conflict for corporations are significant (including safety risks to 
employees, expenditure on security, destruction of property, and even loss of ability to 
operate) (Laplante & Spears, 2008; Rettberg, 2007), peace can also present costs for 
business. For example, new taxation may be imposed to support post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts (Rettberg, 2007, p.465). This places limits on the value of 
appealing solely to the profit motive of firms as a means of encouraging engagement in 
peace building. 
A more intricate analysis of the actions that corporations might take to minimise their 
risks of contributing to conflict is provided by Hook & Ganguly (2000). Drawing on a 
comparative study of three natural resource companies operating in situations of 
ethnic conflict, the authors provide four recommendations: 
1. avoid distributing compensation through host governments and make 
payments directly to landowning groups; 
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2. minimise environmental harm; 
3. develop preferential employment policies favouring local people; and 
4. try to avoid significantly altering the way of life of local ethnic groups. 
In addition to point three, Franks {2012, p.4) rightly cautions that the social impacts of 
resource development are dynamic and that the key benefits associated with resource 
development can lead to new challenges: 
.. . For example, new employment opportunities often considered a key benefit 
of projects may in fact lead to social challenges if the specialist skills required 
by the industry are not available locally or take time to develop through 
vocational training programs 16 . 
An important addition to point four is also that altering the current way of life of local 
ethnic groups can dismiss their desire for development17, or at least the positive 
impacts associated with it such as, local business development; royalties and taxes; 
road and infrastructure upgrades and development of human capital {Franks, 
Brereton, Moran, Sarker & Cohen, 2010, p.3). 
Of the literature analysed in this chapter, Hook & Ganguly's recommendations come 
closest to the themes that will be developed herein. The reason for this, most likely, 
rests in the simi larity of case studies (both include an analysis of BCL in Bougainville 
and Freeport in Papua), as well as the adoption of the comparative method. This thesis 
aims to bu ild on Hook and Ganguly' s recommendations by developing them into a new 
16 This will be discussed in more detail in Cha pter 10. 
17 I am grateful to an anonymous examiner for highlighting th is. 
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model for the design of CSR in areas affected by conflict 
The limitations of existing approaches to CSR 
There have been as many critics of CSR as there have been proponents. Critiques range 
from a focus on the limitations of the market in the delivery of public goods (Doane, 
2005} to the incapacity of transnational corporations to become fully responsible and 
accountable citizens (Palacios, 2004}. While these two ends of the spectrum focus on 
the 'corporate' component of CSR, there has been much less engagement with the 
'social' element of this field of business practices (Banerjee, 2006, p.73} or what 
Franks, Brereton, Moran, Sarker and Cohen (2010, p.1) refer to as "the interaction of 
mining impacts with other past, current and future activities that may or may not be 
related to mining". This has resulted in little analysis of the transferability of CSR 
practices to non-Western industrialised societies, or any associated harmful or 
unintended consequences. 
One case where there has been some consideration of the social consequences of CSR 
is the literature on Shell's CSR initiatives in the Niger Delta. The main concern raised in 
these studies is that Shell's adoption of CSR has resulted in the "de-politicization" of 
the NGO sector via incorporation into the CSR framework (Zalik, 2004, p.404). Related 
to broader arguments regarding the "marketization of civil society" (Lodge & Wilson, 
2006, p.61}, analysts (Calvano, 2008; Blowfield & Frynas, 2005} suggest that local 
communities are increasingly sceptical of NGOs due to their perceived entanglement 
with the interests of funders, who are sometimes corporations with vested profit 
motives. This can compromise the local legitimacy of NGOs and their ability to 
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meaningfully represent the interests of the communities they were initially established 
to serve. Other concerns relate to Shell directing the path for socio -economic 
development in the region with little or no contribution from the Nigerian government 
{lte, 2004; Mass, 2005); the implementation of inappropriate or incomplete socio -
economic projects {Christian Aid, Friends of the Earth, Platform & Stakeholder 
Democracy Network, 2004; Mass, 2005); and the exacerbation of existing conflicts in 
the region {Christian Aid, Friends of the Earth, Platform & Stakeholder Democracy 
Network, 2004; Mass, 2005). 
As touched on earlier a common explanation for why there are so many pitfalls 
associated with CSR, is the fact that it is generally corporations who define the terms of 
partnering with communities (Akpan, 2006, p.233). The development of CSR policies 
based on the interests of business (Banerjee, 2008, p.52), is believed to have resulted 
in the implementation of inappropriate community development projects, which 
further entrench the negative perceptions held by local communities of large 
corporations . As Calvano {2008, p.796) argues; 
... the issues usually associated with CSR may not be the highest priorities in 
particular regions of the world. Thus, local communities may view MN Cs 
[multinational corporations] as unresponsive to their particular needs even 
though firms have ambitious CSR programs. 
Loca l commun it ies are often treated as passive recipients of better or worse CSR 
(McKenna & Bra ithwa ite, 2012, p.334) . However, by questioning the use of the 'social ' 
in CSR and the j ust ice cla ims it is designed to redress, a more complex explanation 
beco mes evi dent. 
7 
The search for an alternative theoretical framework 
The limits of CSR as it is usually implemented include a narrow understanding of the 
'social' and a disproportionate focus on distributive justice. In the following section, the 
ideas of Bruno Latour on 'the social' and Nancy Fraser on justice are introduced. The 
ideas of both theorists are used in this thesis to develop a deeper understanding and 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of traditional CSR18, as well as to model new 
and more effective ways of 'doing' CSR. 
Latour's {2005) Reassembling the social has been instrumental in the development of 
the arguments presented in this thesis. His theory of the social posits, "it cannot be 
construed as a kind of material or domain" {Latour, 2005, p.1). Latour's analysis of the 
'social' calls into question what he considers the default position of sociology that 
draws on terms such as 'society', 'social order', and 'social practice' to distinguish it 
from other domains such as, economics, geography, biology, psychology, law, science 
and politics (Latour, 2005, p.3}. However Latour argues that there is "no distinct 
18 The terms 'traditional CSR' and 'current CSR discourse' will be used throughout this thesis to refer to 
refer to the dominant modes of CSR that are currently favoured by most international resource 
extracting companies - in particular those operating in the relevant case study sites. The types of CSR 
that I will refer to as 'traditional' are characterised by a focus on the distribution of material benefits 
rather than on two-way engagement with the justice concerns of affected communities. This is not to 
presume that there are not notable exceptions. For example, Kemp (2009, p.204-6) has identified 
differences between public relations, community relations and community development approaches 
across a spectrum of engagement. What I intend to demonstrate through the course of this thesis is that 
the level of genuine engagement in CSR practices is determined, to a large degree by a sidelining, or 
misunderstanding of the 'social' in the term CSR. While the focus is on three specific case studies in two 
countries, the international corporations involved are significant players in the resource extraction 
industry and operate across numerous other locations worldwide. This indicates that the limits of the 
CSR models employed in Bougainville and Papua are to some degree indicative of global approaches to 
CSR. 
73 
domain of reality to which the label 'social' or 'society' could be attributed" (2005: 4). 
Latour' s aim is thus to redefine sociology not as the 'science of the social', but as the 
tracing of associations (Latour, 2005, p.l). 
Latour' s understanding of the 'social' as a "very peculiar movement of re -association 
and reassembling" (Latour, 2005, p.6} enables a more holistic and complex account of 
CSR. This is because Latour argues for an analysis of the 'social' itself, rather than rely 
on a variety of other concepts such as 'globalisation' and 'power' to explain isolated 
dynamics. This thesis seeks to take a Latourian approach by problematizing the 
concept of 'the social' within CSR. While not dismissing the importance of other 
paradigms, these are only able to provide partial critiques of the interaction between 
the field of CSR and the context in which it is implemented. This can result in the 
sidelining of other important factors, which may play a role in the outcome of CSR 
policies and programs. This might include for example, the historical circumstances 
that led to the development of an extractive project or the recognition of customary 
land tenure systems by the host state. 
Questioning the use of the 'social' also enables a conceptualisation of CSR as 
interdependent with the political, economic, legal and cultural context in which it is 
implemented. When 'the social' is rendered problematic, rather than taken for granted 
in the analysis of CSR, one can begin to see how the field is both contributor to, and 
participant in, a specific social context. From this perspective, 'CSR' cannot operate 
somewhere above 'society' in order to then contribute to 'it'. Reframing CSR with 
reference to Latour's concept of the social, CSR can no longer be understood - as it 
currently is - as engaging in a static relationship with some abstract notion of society. 
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Rather, CSR is a field that is deeply embedded in a diverse range of actors and 
institutions with their own histories, interests and agendas. This includes, for example, 
national governments that set the rules of corporate-community engagement and are 
ultimately responsible for regulating the behavior of corporations, and the national 
military, which might become involved through the provision of security. Moreover, 
the 'corporate' in CSR also reifies the complex network, relationships and peoples that 
fall under the label of the 'corporation'. 'It' includes for example, shareholders, 
investors, subsidiaries, 'community development practitioners' {Kemp, 2010) and 
'corporate strategists' (Shoenberger, 1994).Other associations that will be explored in 
this thesis include landowner or tribal groups who are involved in the distribution of 
CSR funds and act as representatives of communities most affected by resource 
development and different ethnic groups who migrate to resource producing regions in 
search of economic opportunities. Such 'associations' and the -relationships between 
them are explored in the Interdependent Engagement Framework. 
Another theoretical insight that has informed the analysis of CSR in this study 
questions the focus of CSR in terms of the justice claims it aims to target. Fraser (1997} 
illuminates the importance of this question by distinguishing two types of justice claims 
analytically: redistribut ion claims that focus on "socioeconomic injustice, which is 
rooted in the political-economic structure of society", and recognition claims that focus 
on cultural or symbolic injustice, "rooted in social patterns of representation, 
interpretation, and communication" (Fraser, 1997, p. 70-1). Fraser acknowledges that 
in practice, the two are intertwined. However, she argues that the distinction is useful 
in order to question the "sorts of mutual interferences [that] can arise when both kinds 
of claims are made simultaneously" (Fraser, 1997, p.74). The core of Fraser's argument 
75 
is that : 
... recognition claims often take the form of ca !ling attention to, if not 
performatively creating, the putative specificity of some group, and then of 
affirming the value of that specificity. Thus they tend to promote group 
differentiation. Redistribution claims, in contrast, often call for abolishing 
economic arrangements that underpin group specificity. (An example would be 
feminist demands to abolish the gender division of labour). Thus they tend to 
promote group de-differentiation. The upshot is that the politics of recognition 
and the politics of redistribution appear to have mutually contradictory aims 
(Fraser, 1997, p.74). 
The purpose of drawing on Fraser's analytical distinction between recognition and 
redistribution here is not to highlight the contradictory nature of these claims when 
they are made simultaneously, but to illustrate the type of justice claims that CSR has 
been designed to redress. The argument which will be put forward is that CSR has 
primarily been structured according to a distributive justice framework through the 
delivery of material resources to communities affected by an extractive project (for 
example, the allocation of money through a landowner trust fund 19, or the provision of 
funding for new infrastructure or services). While material resources are far from 
inconsequent ial , armed conflicts are often also characterised by claims for recogn ition 
and re distri but ion, and the most effect ive remedy might be a wise balance between 
19 For a deta il ed analysis of mining sector foundations, trusts and funds and differences in the way they 
are structured and evolved over time, see World Bank (2010). 
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the two. Throughout the remainder of this thesis, it will be argued that for 
corporations to resolve local grievances related to resource development in confl ict 
areas, they need to consider ways to expand the distributive paradigm to also include 
cultural or symbolic recognition. A framework for what this type of engagement might 
look like is then outlined in Chapter 13. 
Potential roles for business in peace building 
Aside from the traditional approaches to CSR which focus on minimising the negative 
impacts of resource development on conflict affected societies, there is an emerging 
interest in exploring the potential role for the private sector in peace building. A theme 
that emerges in this literature is the tension between whether such contributions 
should occur through proactive engagement or emerge organically as indirect positive 
outcomes of increased economic development. 
Regarding the 'indirect' roles that corporations can play in peace building, Fort and 
Schipani (2004, p.11) argue that corporations are engines that produce jobs, and with 
them the economic and social benefits that follow from employed individuals. They 
identify three connections linking business and peace building: 
• standard ethical business practices may reduce bloodshed 
• legal rules undergirding corporate governance may be reconsidered to 
include peace as a governance telos; and 
• business could become a more important dimension of foreign policy 
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Through these links, Fort and Schipani identify four specific contributions business can 
make to peace, "fostering economic development, exercising track two diplomacy 20, 
adopting external evaluation principles, and nourishing a sense of community" (2004, 
p.4). Such contributions, they argue, can contribute to the development of a more 
harmonious environment. 
Similarly, Gerson (2001, p.103) argues that business has an important role to play in 
peace building as ''conflict settlement requires the injection of hope born of 
employment and economic opportunity" and "only the private sector can provide this 
over the long term". The heart of Gerson's argument is that jobs and economic 
opportunity offer hope to the 'seemingly disinherited', with new incentives to maintain 
stability and break the cycle of violence (2001, p.109) . In addition to the benefits of 
employment and economic opportunity, Gerson (2001, p.107) claims that the 
characteristics of business logic can be useful in any conflict management process, 
through "the provision of managerial know-how and expertise to enable all the actors 
in the field - the World Bank, the UN, and civil society- to operate in a more 
streaml ined and synergistic fashion ". 
Wenger & Mockl i (2003, p.8) share Gerson's outlook that there are two key avenues 
th rough wh ich bus iness can engage in peace building. Corporations can "pursue core 
bus iness act ivit ies such as trade and foreign direct investment, with a specif ic conflict 
20 Gawerc (2006, p.443) defines track two diplomacy as "bringing together scholars, senior journalists, 
op inion leaders, former government offic ials, or other pol it ically influential individuals from conflicting 
part ies to work together w ith the intent ion of clarify ing long-standing disagreements, exploring different 
poss ibiliti es for reso lving them, and ga ining insight into the ways in which a collaborative process 
between the two cou ld be promoted". 
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prevention perspective; or they can transfer know-how with regard to private sector 
development especially to local communities" (2003, p.8). 
Other analysts suggest that business is already playing a direct role in peace building 
through pre-existing commitments to CSR. As Sherman (2001, p.3) argues "more than 
is commonly recognized, some private sector actors have undertaken policies that seek 
to promote human rights and environmental health and to mitigate or avoid conflict in 
host communities". One limitation of Sherman's analysis is the lack of supporting 
examples. This makes it difficult to ascertain how he distinguishes CSR from proactive 
efforts towards the mitigation or avoidance of conflict. 
A report published by the Collaborative Engagement Project (2003) analyses the 
potential role for corporations in peace building from the corporate perspective. This 
report suggests that corporations do consider peace building a _part of their CSR, but 
are unlikely to call it 'peace building' as this is viewed as too political a term. Further, 
there is a belief that corporations do not have the expertise or capacity to adopt a 
proactive role. This claim supports the preliminary finding of this study outlined in 
Chapter 2, that corporate executives do not see a role for corporations in the 
promotion of peace building. However, there may be opportunities for peace building 
activities to occur through existing CSR frameworks, as opposed to the generation of 
new policies and programs under the moniker 'peace building'. The Collaborative 
Engagement Project (2003, p.4) issued the following recommendations for future 
research: 
• gather further empirical insight into how business activities and conflict 
interact; 
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• document best practices on a local level; 
• develop stronger links between policy and practice; and 
• incorporate conflict impact assessments into feasibility studies 
A key strength of the Collaborative Engagement Project report is that it includes an 
analysis of the perspectives of corporate executives, rather than the more one-sided 
approaches discussed earlier in the chapter which tend to make one of two polarising 
assumptions; either that business activity will always have a negative impact on zones 
of conflict, or that it will be inherently beneficial. By including the perspectives of 
corporations, the Collaborative Engagement Project allows for a more nuanced analysis 
of the roles of specific cases of corporate activity in areas affected by conflict. This way 
of thinking has a greater potential to result in the development of practical strategies 
to assist corporations to avoid harm and to possibly contribute to positive change. 
Moreover, the problem with a significant proportion of the business and peace 
building literature is that it is not based on an in-depth account of the links between 
business and conflict. As such, analysts promote avenues for business in peace building 
without a detailed understanding of the specific roles that corporations play in the 
dynamics of armed conflict, and how they might amend their business practices in 
order to counter these effects. 
Conclusion 
This chapter opened with a discussion of the strong links that have been ident ified in a 
broad range of literature between natural resource wealth and armed confl ict. Th is 
was followed by a consideration of the concept of CSR and what, if any, responsibility 
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corporations should shoulder for mitigating the impacts of the 'resource curse'. As part 
of this analysis a number of different approaches to CSR were outlined, as well as some 
important limitations to the design of CSR policies and programs for implementation in 
areas affected by conflict. To overcome these limitations the theoretical ideas of 
Latour and Fraser were introduced. The ideas of these two theorists are brought 
together to develop a two-pronged approach to considering how CSR might contribute 
to peace in areas affected by conflict. 
The first element of the theoretical approach of this thesis involves an emphasis on 
developing the capacity to think of CSR as interdependent with the social, political, 
legal, economic and cultural context in which it is implemented. This allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of the specific business policies, practices and relationships 
that may contribute to conflict. Conversely, by transforming these business practices, 
policies and relationships, corporations have a clearer pathway to create conditions 
conducive to peace rather than conflict. The second guiding theoretical principle draws 
on the work of Fraser who distinguishes between the types of justice claims being 
made and the remedies put forward to respond to these claims. In making this 
distinction Fraser enables an understanding of existing CSR frameworks as relying on a 
distributive paradigm, despite the fact that (as the next Chapter explores) corporat ions 
are enmeshed in a wide range of injustices, some of which can be characterised as 
claims for cultural or symbolic recognition. 
In combining the ideas of social interdependence with the full range of justice claims of 
local communities in CSR practices, this study seeks to overcome some of the 
limitations identified in both existing CSR practice and the business and peace building 
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literature. By reframing CSR in terms of interdependence throughout the rest of this 
thesis, a way in which CSR might be reconfigured to incorporate some of the goals of 
peace building will be shown. The first step in this journey begins in the following 
chapter in which the core justice claims at the heart of the Bougainville and Papua 
conflicts are set out. 
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Chapter 4: Conflict in Bougainville and Papua 
This chapter introduces the eight crucial sites of interdependence I have identified 
between the resource development companies and the grievances at the heart of the 
two conflicts in Bougainville and Papua. Using these sites as a frame of reference, this 
chapter outlines the actors, institutions and important events involved in the 
Bougainville and Papua conflicts. The aim is to show how the justice issues at the heart 
of the two conflicts incorporate claims for both recognition and redistribution. The 
significance of the eight sites of interdependence for each of the case study locations 
will then be discussed in more detail in the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
Bougainville 
Historical injustice 
The Bougainville conflict cannot be understood in isolation from the island's colonial 
history. This early history laid the foundations for Bougainville's eventual political 
incorporation into Papua New Guinea, which can be seen as an ethnically and culturally 
distinct nation-state. Bougainville was first colonised by Germany in 1884 in an effort 
to spread German presence in the pacific east from PNG and into the northern part of 
the Solomon Islands group. At the same time as this was occurring, Britain was 
extending its colonial footprint into the southern end of the Solomons. Eventually, in 
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1899 Germany and Britain came to an agreement to divide the Solomons between 
them. Germany maintained control of the islands of Buka and Bougainville, while the 
rest of the Solomons were recognised as British Territory. This division led to 
Bougainville's separation from the Solomon Islands, despite the existence of strong 
geographic, cultural and trade ties between the two. At the start of World War I, 
Germany's control of Bougainville was disrupted by the arrival of an Australian 
expeditionary force (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.10). Formal 
control of Bougainville was then granted to Australia by the League of Nations in 1921. 
Australia administered Bougainville as a part of the Trust Territory of New Guinea until 
PNG's independence in 1975 (Sirivi & Havini, 2004, p.xvi). During this period, 
Bougainvillean leaders debated whether to allow their lands to be 'returned' to the 
Solomon Islands or if they should lobby for secession (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, 
Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.12). However the Australian Administration did not 
countenance either of these options, maintaining that Bougainville was politically a 
part of PNG and should remain so. The fact that early explorations for alluvial gold in 
the 1930s indicated the presence of rich natural resources on the Island was further 
motivation for Australia to maintain control of Bougainville (Sirivi & Havini, 2004, p.xvi). 
When rich deposits of copper ore were later discovered at Panguna in central 
Bougainville in the 1960s, Australia was eager to find a way of using these resources to 
finance its withdrawal as administrators of PNG . 
The Australian Government's interest in supporting the emergence of an independent 
PNG through Bougainville's resources exacerbated the deep resentment that many 
Bougainvilleans already felt toward the Administration. This resentment was 
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attributable to a lack of respect for Bougainville's traditions and customs, as well as the 
permanent alienation of land for plantations through processes and terms little 
understood by the Bougainvillean 'sellers' (Regan, 2003, p.136). Moreover, the early 
experience of Australian control of Bougainvillean land was not positive, and was 
compounded by the fact that Bougainvilleans had minimal control over their political 
future. Early calls for a referendum on independence were rejected by both the UN, 
and later, by the newly independent state of PNG. 
BCL enters the conflict 
BCL became deeply caught up in the processes leading to Bougainville's political 
incorporation into PNG. This was due to the timing of BCL's entry, the Australian origin 
of the firm and the fact that it entered into a legal agreement with the Australian 
Government via the Territory of New Guinea, rather than with indigenous landowners. 
As a result, many Bougainvilleans perceived BCL as symbolic of Australian colonialism, 
and more specifically, as the providers of the financial capacity that cemented their 
entrapment in an unwanted political relationship with PNG. 
BCL, a subsidiary of Cozine Rio Tinto Australia (CRA), entered Bougainville in 1964, 
following geological confirmation of copper mineralisation in the Panguna/Kupei area 
(BCL, 2010-11). CRA held the majority ownership with 53 per cent. 28 per cent was 
floated on the Australian Stock Exchange and 19 per cent was bought by the Australian 
Government for the future independent State of PNG (Dorney, 2000, p.42). A large 
number of shares were also reserved for purchase by Bougainvilleans; however it is 
unclear how many actually benefited (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, 
p.12) . 
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The first major agreement between BCL and the Territory of New Guinea was reached 
and enacted by the Territory's House of Assembly in 1967 (Denoon, 2000, p.l). The 
1967 Agreement committed the Australian Government and BCL to "terms concerning 
taxation, royalties, environmental management, employment and infrastructure" 
(Denoon, 2000, p.3). Australian civil servants and lawyers for CRA negotiated the 
agreement without the consultation of local Bougainvillean landowners (Ogan, 2004, 
p.5). The lack of Bougainvillean involvement in the 1967 Agreement was reflected in 
the profit shares of the minerals produced, with only 5 per cent of the Government's 
royalty of 1.25 per cent to be distributed amongst landowners (Ogan, 2004, p.5). 
Denoon (2000, p.3) argues that Australia's direction of the 1967 Agreement indicates 
that it, rather than BCL, was responsible for the events that unfolded on Bougainville. A 
former CEO of BCL, Paul Quodling claims that the Administration was facing an 
enormous dilemma, "whether to mine (accepting the attendant conflict with cultural 
standards) or not to mine (accepting the loss of economic benefit to independent PNG" 
(Quodling, 1991, p.1). How much weight this dilemma actually held in the Australian 
Government's decision-making process is open to speculation. However the eventual 
decision to pursue mining operations in the way that they did, suggests that, for the 
Australian Government, building an economic foundation to facilitate formal withdraw 
from PNG, took precedence over any concerns about Bougainvillean customary land 
rights . 
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The denial of customary land ownership 
The land on which the copper mine in Bougainville was constructed belongs to the 
Nasioi language group21, many of whom were forced to relocate (Ogan, 2004) . "When 
villagers refused to sell, the government expropriated their land and flew in riot police 
to clear the way for surveyors" (Denoon, 2000, p.3). According to a former BCL 
Chairman Don Vernon, the company's management also had difficulties understanding 
the complexities of Nasioi land ownership22 . This was because it was not "immediately 
obvious that the Nasioi derived rights to land through matrilineal inheritance, 
especially as these rights appeared to be exercised by men" (Vernon, 2005, p.260) . This 
misconception was passed on to BCL by the Australian patrol officers who had only 
dealt with men when they compiled lists of land titleholders in the 1960s23 (Dorney, 
2000, p.40). 
The key issue regarding land ownership, however, was not that BCL failed to 
understand the complexities of customary land tenure but that the state possessed the 
power to override these systems and take control of natural resources . This was 
because the Australian mining laws that regulated the construction of the mine 
21 For a more detailed description of the Nasioi before and after the development of the mine, see Ogan, 
E. (2004) . 'The Bougainville Conflict: Perspectives From Nasioi', State Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Discussion Paper, 99: 3, Research School of Pacific and Asian Stud ies, ANU . 
22 However, Regan argues that land usage was not necessarily related to 'ownersh ip' . "There were 
aspects of the relatively egalitarian (in material terms) traditional cultures in Bougainvil le that probably 
increased the tensions inevitably involved in the economic inequalities arising from participation in the 
modern economy" (Regan, 1998, p.271) . 
23 One way the company sought to deal with the complexities of land ownership was to sponsor 
research programs under the auspices of the University of Hawai'i and the Development Stud ies Centre 
at the Australian National Un iversity (Vernon, 2005, p.260). 
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stipulated that the ownership of precious metals was vested in the state for the .benefit 
of the nation as a whole. As a result the wealth generated through the mine could be 
used to finance the development of other areas of PNG and not just the land, or region 
from which they derived. 
Because the state wielded the power to control Bougainville's natural resources, and 
the capacity to legislate, BCL primarily negotiated the terms of access to land with the 
Australian Government, rather than the individual or group of landowners. This 
arrangement bypassed the traditional Bougainvillean land tenure system, which made 
no distinction between surface and sub-surface rights, or allowance for those who did 
not share a cultural relationship to a tract of land to draw benefits from it. In this way, 
Bougainvilleans came to perceive BCL as entering into a legal agreement with an 
institution that did not have the legitimacy to control the land. 
Regional inequality & contests over resource wealth 
The sense of injustice felt by Bougainvilleans about the Australian/PNG decision-
making power over their land was exacerbated by the inequitable distribution of 
mining revenue in favour of PNG over Bougainville. While BCL made compensation 
payments to Bougainvilleans during the exploration phase of the mine's development, 
these were quite small, and a coherent plan to safeguard the economic rights of locals 
was absent from the 1967 Agreement. 
Following the advocacy of Bouga inville's House of Assembl y member, Paul Lapun, the 
Australian Administration agreed to give landowners 5 per cent of the 1.25 per cent 
royalties it received from the mine plus an occupation fee of $6.50 per acre of land 
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($16.25 per hectare) (Quodling, 1991, p.48). This did not add up to a significant sum for 
landowners, little more than 6 cents per AUD$100 of the value of minerals taken from 
their land (Ogan, 2004, p.5). 
Lapun was criticised by some landowners who believed his advocacy resulted in a poor 
compensation deal for Bougainvilleans. Other Bougainvilleans, who were against the 
development of the mine altogether, questioned Lapun's mandate to negotiate the 
agreement at all. For some of these people, no amount of money would have been 
considered sufficient to agree to mining. The 1967 Agreement signalled to many 
Bougainvillean landowners that they would be required to suffer the social and 
environmental costs of a mining project to fund the development of a nation to which 
they felt no sense of belonging, and from whom they enjoyed minimal protection. 
Production of the mine began in 1972, just prior to the election uf the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) that supported independence for PNG. The early production period of the 
mine was characterised by increasing demands for secession on Bougainville. The 
passion and intensity of these demands were beginning to be recognised by the new 
leader of PNG, Michael Somare. One of Somare's strategies to counter secession 
demands was to renegotiate the Government's share of the mine's earnings 
(Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.13). The new distribution of sha res 
was a key aspect of what came to be known as the 1974 Agreement. Under this 
Agreement, the revenue sharing framework consisted of 60 per cent nationa l 
government, 35 per cent shareholders, 5 per cent North Solomon's Provincial 
Government and 0.2 per cent landowners. 
The 1974 Agreement gave the forthcoming independent state of PNG full control over 
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the distribution of resources. In that same year, Somare established an Jnterim 
Provincial Government on Bougainville (the North Solomons Provincial Government) 
that was granted responsibility for passing on most of the royalties of the mine to the 
province (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.13). 
Cultural, political and economic marginalisation 
In spite of providing the provincial government a share of the royalties in 1974, 
material benefits did not flow to villages outside of the direct mine area until 1980, 
following BCL's initiation of a new compensation package. An executive committee 
that included several members of the PLA governed the package {Thompson, 1991, 
p.82). The PLA was established in the 1970s and comprised of a group of elder 
landowners who lobbied the Government and the company collectively over a broad 
range of concerns. 
Rather than resolving the issues, the distribution of material resources created new 
tensions among Bougainvilleans. The most significant dispute was between the older 
generation of landowners (who were involved in the distribution of resources through 
the Road Mining Lease Trust Fund), and a younger generation of landowners who 
believed the PLA board members were siphoning off funds for their own benefit. 
The younger generation of landowners formed their own association dubbed, the New 
Panguna Landowners Association (NPLA). The NPLA was distinguished by its younger 
membership and its "organised nature, the sophisticated use of arms and explosives, 
and its persistence" (Wesley-Smith, 1991, p.188 -9) . Francis Ona, a former employee of 
BCL eventually took over as head of the NPLA then rallied supporters to loot and 
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destroy BCL property in 1988, and to subsequently demand an unsustainable 10 billion 
kina for environmental damage plus a SO per cent share of the mine revenue 
(Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.19}. When denied these demands, 
Ona called for the mine to be closed and further attacks were made on BCL property. 
The inter-generational dispute over access to BCL's resources thus became an initial 
spark for conflict around the mine site. 
The divisions and conflict between landowner groups further aggravated the 
communication problems that marked the interactions between BCL, the national 
government and landowners. The intersections of resource development with pre-
existing cultural, political and economic marginalisation also constrained efforts by BCL 
to build effective stakeholder consultation and an effective partnership with 
Bougainvilleans. 
Human rights violations 
The most damaging attack on BCL property occurred in 1988 when an electricity pylon 
at the mine site was blown up on orders from Francis Ona, who had formed the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Following these attacks and a number of other 
violent incidents, the PNG Government sent in Police riot squads to regain control and 
to restore mining activities. In the context of existing tensions between Bougainville 
and PNG, this action resulted in immediate claims of police brutality, and violence 
began to escalate. The BRA retaliated with further attacks on Government property to 
which the Government responded in June 1989 by inserting the Papua Guinea Defence 
force (PNGDF) and declaring a state of emergency on Bougainville (Braithwaite, 
Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.24). 
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The entry of the PNG military and subsequent allegations of human rights ab.uses led 
to a significant increase in the level of local support for the activities of the BRA. Some 
estimate the group had up to 300 armed and active members in 1990 "and 
undoubtedly enjoyed the assistance of many more" (Wesley-Smith, 1991, p.189). 
However BRA forces were often undisciplined and many Bougainvilleans experienced 
violent victimisation at the hands of members. Others opposed the BRA because they 
resented the withdrawal of government services available to Bougainvilleans that 
followed the BRA's attacks on government property. These Bougainvilleans formed 
what became known as the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF} in the early 1990s, 
which overtly pitted Bougainvilleans against Bougainvilleans, adding new complexities 
and dimensions to the conflict. 
Community disruption 
Once production began, it was the influx of 'outsiders' from other parts of PNG, which 
became a pervasive issue relating to PNG's governance of Bougainville. At least, this 
was the main source of hostility for Bougainvilleans not directly affected by the mine. 
In contrast, the displaced Nasioi held a quite different set of grievances, primarily 
associated with their loss of land, environmental degradation, and of the standard of 
housing provided by BCL (Regan, 1998, p.276). 
It is estimated that more than 10,000 (mostly) men were employed by BCL at the peak 
of construction (Howley, 2002, p.29), with the following estimates concerning the 
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cultural ratio of the workforce 24: 
• 241 Nasioi, 
• 3861 expatriates, 
• 6328 employees from other areas of PNG (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy 
& Dunn, 2010, p.13} 
However the main source of tension was not the high proportion of non-
Bougainvilleans employed at the mine, but rather the activities of PNG 'redskin' 25, 
migrants who remained on Bougainville regardless of whether they held employment 
at the mine. Thus, while the 'redskins' did indeed take thousands of jobs at the mine 
(Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.20}, of equal concern to the 
Bougainvilleans were the unemployed 'squatters' who established bush camps on the 
outskirts of the mine or gained employment on plantations or in other small 
businesses. As a Bougainvillean ABG Department CEO stated: 
.... an influx of people came. Over time people's attitudes changed because they 
brought social problems. They started creating problems and gave rise to 
conflicts. They were settling on people's land. [They] acted against our way of 
living. People took advantage of the situation. Not BCL workers but the people 
who came for attraction. BCL employees were not the problem, [it was] the 
24 Regan (1998, p.275) further adds that there were approximately 200 business enterprises in 
Bougainville dependent on BCL which employed about 4000 people of whom about 50 per cent were 
Bougainvillean. 
25 The term 'redskin' is used by Bougainvilleans to refer to the lighter skin colour of Papua New 
Guineans. 
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people in the bush camps {BOU11, ABG Department CEO}. 
Bougainvilleans resented the 'redskin' migrant's lack of respect of Bougainvillean 
customs, who for example, established gardens and camps on customary land without 
the prior approval of landowners. The migrants not employed by the mine were also 
blamed for an increase in a variety of community safety issues including rape, assault, 
prostitution, 'raskolism', and alcohol abuse (Connell, 1990, p.51}. 
New social problems also manifested through what Colin Filer refers to as the, 
"economic stratification of the landowning community" (Filer, 1990, p.116}. Newly 
acquired wealth distorted the traditional social structures of village life because of the 
wealth it generated for young 'playboys' that could not be matched by the elder village 
leaders26 (Howley, 2002, p29}. As a consequence, Howley {2002, p.30} claims that the 
young people began to discover a new socialisation process where they increasingly 
focussed on imitating peers rather than aspiring to the cultural values of the elders in 
the community. The greatest impact of these changes was on the status of women in 
the community who had previously made significant contributions to social control 
(Regan, 1998, p.275). 
Environmental damage 
Due to the enormous scale of the mine and the environmental damage caused by BCL's 
tailings disposal system, the Nasioi were not the only landowning group to be affected 
by the development of the mine. According to Regan (2006, p.6), " BCL1 s mining-related 
26 For more detailed examples of class conflict and econom ic in equa lity see (Regan, 1998, p. 274) . 
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leases cut across the middle of Bougainville, about 50 km from east coast to west 
coast. They covered 13,047 hectares, about 1.5 per cent of Bougainville ... ". 
Consequently, the mine affected a significant proportion of the population, and 
created enormous landowner resentment for removing 1.215 billion tonnes of their 
land and turning 99.4 per cent of it into waste (Dorney, 2000, p.40). 
While the original 1967 Agreement between the Australian Administration and BCL 
restricted the dumping of tailings waste, this regulation was eventually reversed to 
allow tailings to be disposed of in the Kawerong-Jaba river system. This is believed to 
have caused chemical pollution of the river, killing off fish stocks, an important source 
of protein for local villagers. The development of the mine and its supporting 
infrastructure also led to the permanent alienation of agricultural land and traditional 
food sources. For a population dependent upon agriculture, the loss of this land 
represented a significant threat to the future survival of Bougainvilleans and their 
traditions. 
Aspirations to define the future 
In 2012, Bougainville is formally recognised as an autonomous region of PNG, and has 
experienced over fifteen years of peace building activity. The primary focus of these 
peace building initiatives has been to open spaces of dialogue between Bougainvillean 
and PNG leaders, as well as reconciliation between combatants of the BRA and the 
BRF. Although the peace process has generally been viewed as successful (Turner, 
2007, p.93), it was based on the assumption that the mine would never re-open. BCL 
and the future of the mine was not a crucial aspect of the peace agreements. 
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From 2007 onwards, support for the possibility of reopening mine began to build 
among the Bougainville political elite. Renewed interest in mining is attributable to a 
requirement in the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement that a referendum on 
Bougainville's independence from PNG be held sometime between 2015 and 2020. 
Many Bougainvilleans believe that independence will not be economically viable 
without a substantial source of revenue (Momis & Garrett, 2012). Thus, the long-held 
desire among a significant proportion of Bougainvilleans for political independence 
from PNG continues to frame the mining debate on the Island. This time around, 
potential mining revenue is viewed as a means to support Bougainvillean 
independence from PNG, rather than PNG's independence from Australia. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 12, my fieldwork indicates that the current favoured 
option amongst Bougainvilleans is for a resumption of mining, with BCL the preferred 
operating company. This thesis therefore, can be seen to capture a pivotal moment in 
Bougainville's history as the population considers a possible future as an independent 
nation, and the role that mining might play in such a future. 
Papua 
Historical injustice 
Similar to Bougainville, conflict in Papua can be traced to its historical incorporation 
into a nation state with which the population does not hold strong loyalties or 
connections. Indonesia is comprised of an extraordinarily broad range of cultures and 
language groups. The process of unification has not been without contest or difficulty, 
both from the perspective of the peoples incorporated, and the Government with the 
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challenge of administering such a vast geographic and ethnically diverse area. Papuans 
are located in one of the largest geographic regions of Indonesia (22 per cent of the 
total land mass) at the very periphery of the archipelago. These factors, combined with 
strong cultural connections to the peoples of the eastern half of the island of New 
Guinea (who enjoy political independence), has meant that for Papuans, the 
discomfort associated with 'lndonesianisation' has been particularly acute. 
Papua became the site of an imperial struggle between colonial powers (British, 
Germans and the Dutch) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As early as 1824 
the British agreed that the region would form part of the Dutch East Indies, however 
the first successful European settlement occurred some 30 years later with a German 
missionary settlement on an island near Manokwari. It wasn't until 1898 that the Dutch 
established a permanent settlement in Manokwari and Fak Fak. The Dutch were 
temporarily displaced in 1942 when the Japanese occupied the northern coast of West 
New Guinea as part of its World War II campaign. Following the conclusion of the war 
in 1945, the region was returned to Dutch control. However at the same time, 
Indonesian nationalists made claims for all of the Dutch East Indies to form part of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Following a four-year conflict, the Netherlands officially 
recognised Indonesian sovereignty over the Dutch East Indies, with the exception of 
Papua. 
Conflict in Papua can be seen to have begun as an international conflict between two 
states; a dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands about historical claims over 
territory (Heidbuchel, 2007, p.36). When the UN recognised Indonesia as a sovereign 
state in 1950, the territory did not include the western half of New Guinea, which 
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remained under Dutch control {Heidbuchel, 2007, p.38). 
Over the next few decades, local aspirations for independence gathered momentum, 
with the support of the Dutch who continued to challenge Indonesia's territorial 
claims. After several failed negotiations between the Sukarno government and the 
Netherlands, an agreement was signed in 1962 in New York to transfer the sovereignty 
of Western New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia. Under the terms of the 
New York Agreement, "Indonesia was obliged to hold a plebiscite on Papua's future, an 
"Act of Free Choice", within six years of the transfer of power to Jakarta in 1963" {Wing 
& King, 2005, p.l}. 
According to Singh {2008, p.96-7}, "as a means of increasing the chance of winning the 
1969 Referendum, the Indonesian government. .. went out on a political mission to 
'lndonesianize' the people of West lrian 27" and Papuan elites who were considered to 
be pro-Netherlands and pro-Papua came under pressure from the Indonesian security 
forces. In contrast to Dutch policy on education and economic development, which 
encouraged Papuans to think of themselves as culturally distinct from the rest of the 
Indonesian archipelago {Chauvel, 2006, p.181), Suharto's New Order attempted to 
reformulate the Indonesian nation as a 'cultural polity', replacing competition and 
conflict with harmony at the expense of diversity {Chauvel, 2006, p.181) . As a result of 
these conflicting ideologies, Papuans increasingly came to perceive Indonesia as their 
new colonisers {Singh, 2008, p.97). 
27 A previous name for West Papua province. 
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The Act of Free Choice took place in 1969 through a series of regional consultations 
that were widely believed to be stage managed by Indonesian intelligence officials 
(McGibbon, 2006, p.12). The Indonesian Government chose 1,026 voters of a 
population of 815,906 who voted unanimously for integration into Indonesia, a 
somewhat implausible result made possible by the repressive security environment 
surrounding the 'free choice' (McGibbon, 2006, p12, Wing & King, 2005, p.1). Although 
the UN has subsequently been criticised for going along with the charade of a 'free 
choice' for Papuans (McGibbon, 2006, p.13L Indonesian sovereignty over Papua was 
henceforth recognised by the international community. 
Following the Act of Free Choice, Papua was declared a Military Operation Zone in 
which freedom of movement was severely restricted and regulated (Wing & King, 
2005, p.1). During Suharto's New Order "expressions of cultural identity, such as songs 
sung in local languages, were considered a manifestation of a separatist movement 
and were punishable by torture and even death" (Wing & King, 2005, p.1). Despite the 
devastating effects of Indonesia's security driven approach to Papua, it is believed to 
have been counterproductive, in that it served to strengthen a separate Papuan 
identity and cement the desire for independence (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004, p.1-2). 
One manifestation of this has been the small and poorly armed guerrilla group called 
the OPM. The OPM's primary goal is nothing short of full political independence for 
Papua (Singh, 2008, p.127), and although it has never threatened Indonesian control of 
the province, the movement has played an important symbolic role in representing a 
'Papuan identity1 and associated political aspirations (Chauvel, 2006, p.181). The OPM 
launched its first operations against Indonesian forces in 1965. The Indonesian 
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Government's retaliation to these operations extended until 1969. An estimated 
30,000 Papuans were killed by the Indonesian military during this period (Braithwaite, 
Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.61). 
Papuan resistance to Indonesia has continued via a largely peaceful independence 
campaign (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2002, p.i). Despite incredible cultural 
heterogeneity on the Papuan side, the demand for merdeka (freedom or liberation) 
has become almost universal among indigenous people of the region {ICG, 2002). 
Repression of Papuan aspirations for merdeka is believed to be somewhat less intense 
than in the 1960s, with torture rather than murder "the dominant means of terrorising 
the people of Papua into submission" (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 
2010, p.63). Periodic raisings of the morning star flag, first hoisted in the 1960s as a 
symbol of Papuan independence, remain "the most persistent provocations to which 
the military has responded with violence" (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 
2010, p.63). 
Freeport enters the conflict 
By the time the Act of Free Choice was held in 1967, Indonesian leadership had shifted 
from Sukarno to Suharto. "The new President focused on rebuilding the economy, left 
in tatters by Sukarno, by putting a group of prominent US trained economists in control 
of economic policy" (McG ibbon, 2006, p.11-2). Whereas Sukarno's economic approach 
was inward looking and dominated by state enterprises, the New Order aimed to open 
the Indonesian economy to foreign aid and investment (Robertson -Snape, 1999, 
p.593 ). 
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Corruption was endemic in the Indonesian economy under both administrations 
(Robertson-Snape, 1999, p.592). Indeed, under Suharto Indonesia held the, "dubious 
distinction of being perceived as the most corrupt nation in Asia ... " (Leith, 2003, p.33) . 
The Indonesian brand of crony capitalist corruption had crucial implications for the 
economic development of Papua, for which the administration received considerable 
support from the World Bank. As Leith (2003, p.33) claims: 
... one of the greatest services the World Bank did for the Suharto regime was to 
routinely "soften" or "sanitize" its influential country reports on Indonesia 
(including statistics with regard to the alleviation of poverty), which Jakarta and 
its Western allies could then use as a first line of defense against the regime's 
critics (Leith, 2003, p.34). 
Such tactics promoted Indonesia to international financial markets without demanding 
accountability for human rights violations or the squandering of natural resources 
{Leith, 2003, p.34). Suharto's Indonesia thus provided a short-term environment of 
incredible freedom for natural resource companies to develop operations in Papua 
with little regulation. Environmental legislation was sidestepped, civil society silenced 
and companies shielded from societal demands (Leith, 2003, p.257). 
The first international company to take advantage of the liberal environment created 
by the Suharto regime was 'Freeport Sulphur'. The company entered Papua after 
signing a Contract of Work28, the first of its kind, with the Indonesian government in 
28 
"Put simply, a contract of work falls somewhere between the older colonial "concession" 
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1967. However, according to Franks (2007, p.261-2L declassified records reveal that 
Freeport did in fact begin construction prior to the official transfer of Papua to 
Indonesia in collaboration with the Indonesian military, and that this "involved the 
murder and torture of Papuan opponents of the mine, including Amungme and 
Kamoro indigenous landowners ... ". The 1967 contract gave Freeport the 'official' 
mining rights for thirty years within a 250, 000 acre concession area of a mine site at 
Ertsberg. The Agreement stipulated that Freeport would be free from land rents and 
included a three year 'tax holiday' with no Indonesian equity requirement. 
Furthermore, the contract contained "few controls over the use of foreign personnel 
and goods" (Leith, 2003, p.61). In this way, the contract essentially designated Freeport 
as a contractor employed by the Suharto regime (Ballard, 2001, p.12L and granted the 
company rights to take over land and impose resettlement of the Amungme and 
Kamoro (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.71). 
The denial of customary land rights 
The contracts signed between Freeport and the Indonesian Government were based 
on the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which stipulates that mineral resources are the 
property of the state (Smith & Ng, 2002, p.102). Thus, similar to Bouga inville, the state 
held t he power to control the natural resources discovered on Papua, and to override 
customary ownersh ip and the sp iritual significance of the land. 
arrangements, in wh ich the fore ign contractor gets full ownersh ip of the minerals and even the land, 
and product ion sharing, in wh ich the host country immed iately gets t itle to all equipment an d 
improvements, and after a short period owns the entire operation " (Mealey, 1996, p.83). 
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The site of Freeport's mining area is home to two indigenous communities, the 
Amungme and Kamoro 29 . When the company began to establish campsites in the area, 
the immediate response of the Amungme was to set up "crosses of wood that 
traditionally indicated that trespass beyond the point indicated was not permitted by 
the owner of the land" (Ballard, 2001, p.24). However the 1967 contract did not 
require Freeport to obtain the consent of the Amungme and Kamara to proceed with 
the development of the mine. Rather, the Indonesian Government explicitly bestowed 
upon the company rights to acquire land and re-settle the indigenous population with 
no obligatory compensation or consultation procedures (Smith and Ng, 2002, p.102). 
In Chapter 11 we will see that the permanent alienation of this landscape by Freeport 
has not only disrupted traditional land cultivation practices, but has desecrated a site 
of spiritual significance for the Amungme. This has intensified Papuan objections 
relating to the undermining of indigenous customs under Indonesian rule, and the lack 
of local control over land. 
BP enters the conflict 
The denial of customary land rights has also been the source of criticisms by the Soway, 
Wayuri and Simuna relating to the development of BP 1 s Tangguh LNG project in the 
Bintuni Bay area of West Papua province. The acquisition of the land required for the 
29 For a deta il ed account of how the Kamoro have adapted to major po li t ical and economic change 
brought about through a history of interaction w ith "outs iders" see Harp le (2002). For an ana lysis of 
representations of Papua n socio-cu ltura l change and domin ant stereotypes of 'Papuan' identities see 
Cookson (2008). 
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development of this project has implicated BP in the complex relationship between 
Papua and Indonesia. 
The Indonesian Government approved the Tangguh LNG project in 2005 through a 
production-sharing contract with Indonesia's regulatory body for oil and gas, 
{BPMIGAS}. Financed by several international banks, the facility "involves the tapping 
of six fields to extract combined proven reserves of around 14.4 trillion cubic feet of 
clean gas" {BP p.l.c, 2012b}. 
Prior to BP's involvement in West Papua, the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO} and 
British Gas conducted exploration activities in the area. Following their discovery of 
significant natural gas reserves, a consultation and negotiation process took place 
between ARCO and BPMIGAS for the acquisition of a 3,200-ha plot for the LNG site, 
and a 200-ha plot for the resettlement of the Tanah Merah community who occupied 
the area {BP Berau Limited, 2006,p.xxi}. 
As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, local landowners now contest the 
fairness of the consent processes under which the land was acquired in 1999 to 
develop the Tangguh project (JATAM 2003, Down to Earth, 2005, p.6}. Three 
landowning clans previously held the traditional land rights to the LNG site: the Wayuri, 
Soway and Simuna {BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.xxxvi}. 
Regional inequality & contests over resource wealth 
Papua ' s natural resources have been controlled by the state, with income derived from 
these projects disproportionately favouring the central government (actually the 
Suharto family}, with minimal returns flowing to the two provinces. This is evident in 
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Papua's consistent ranking as the poorest region of lndonesia 30 (World Bank, 2005, 
p.8). In this way, similar to Bougainville, Papuans can be seen to have suffered the 
social and environmental impacts of resource development, while simultaneously 
missing out on a corresponding surge of financial benefits in their region. We will see 
in Chapter 7 that in 2001 the Indonesian Government took action to provide Papuans 
with a more equitable share of resource revenue through the implementation of 
Papuan Special Autonomy Law No. 21. However, the 'handing back' of Special 
Autonomy by Papuan leaders in 2010 has created significant uncertainty as to the 
future of this improved revenue sharing formula. 
Cultural, political and economic marginalisation 
The low financial returns to the Papuan provinces, combined with high rates of poverty 
and pre-existing tensions between tribal groups has also led 10 conflict over the 
community resources delivered by the two companies. The ICG (2002, p.20), for 
example, claims that since the mid 1990s one of the biggest problems facing Freeport 
has been inadequate stakeholder communication procedures, and uninformed 
distributions of money associated with its decision to provide one per cent of annual 
gross revenue to local landowners (Leith, 2003, p.105). 
Based on the experiences of Freeport, BP has attempted to avoid the sudden insertion 
of large amounts of money into the local economy; however tens ions have also 
emerged between groups over access to BP resources. Conflict emerged as a result of 
30 Accord ing to the World Bank (2005, p.8), in 2003, 38 per cent of Papua's popu lat ion lived in poverty, 
more than doub le the national average of 17 per cent. 
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BP's allocation of housing, health and infrastructure to villages affected. by the 
development of the LNG plant on the south shore of the Bintuni Bay area. This 
distribution failed to take into account the fact that the gas extracted by BP is partly 
drawn from a reservoir under the north shore. Communities from the north shore have 
since lobbied BP for a share of profits associated with the project. 
Human rights violations 
By stipulating that Freeport "provide for and meet the logistic needs of government 
officials" (Ballard, 2001, p.28}, the company's 1967 Contract of Work with Suharto's 
regime led to the presence of large numbers of troops around the mine site. As the 
mine is considered to be a 'vital national asset', Freeport has been required by the 
central government to use the Indonesian security forces and police as a source of 
project security. Since the 1990s, the company has come under intense international 
scrutiny for human rights violations committed by the Indonesian security forces in the 
vicinity of the mine (Ballard & Banks, 2007}. 
International scrutiny of Freeport's operations increased following a riot, which took 
place in Freeport's Contract of Work area in 1996 that left three people dead, and led 
to the temporary closure of the mine. In response, Freeport funded an increase in 
Indonesian troop numbers and is believed to have paid a onetime fee of US$35 million 
to the Indonesian military as well as an annual contribution of $11 million (Blair & 
Phillips, 2003, p.63-4). The military has accused local Papuans of instigating these 'riots' 
and several shooting incidents in the vicinity of the mine over the last decade. However 
they are widely believed to have been orchestrated by the Indonesian military 
themselves as a means of capturing and guaranteeing into the future, additional 
106 
financial benefits from Freeport (Perlez & Bonner, 2005). 
In contrast to the approach of Freeport, which has been criticised by outside 
observers, BP has been commended for its Integrated Community Based Security 
(ICBS} arrangements in West Papua. Recognising the tensions associated with the 
presence of the Indonesian military in Papua, BP's community strategy aims to reduce 
the presence of Indonesian security forces around the Tangguh facility, drawing 
instead on local civilians. BP has also been commended for conducting the first human 
rights impact assessment to ever be conducted for a natural resource project in 
Indonesia, and for the provision of human rights training by NGOs for its security 
personnel. Chapter 9 will explain that although BP's community based security has 
been well received in Papua, there remain significant fears amongst indigenous 
Papuans concerning the use of Indonesian security forces if something like a riot or 
sabotage were to occur in the vicinity of the Tangguh project. Future security risks 
associated with the Tangguh project are also dependent on BP' s success in avoiding 
the sudden influx of money and the creation of a relationship of welfare/dependency 
with villages directly affected by the project. 
Community disruption 
Similar to Bougainvillean experiences of resource extraction, the Freeport and Tangguh 
projects have led to a number of significant new social problems surrounding the 
mining and gas facilities. As discussed earlier, some of these problems are attributable 
to the community development contributions made by Freeport and BP to the two 
provinces. Freeport's One Per Cent Trust Fund, for example, is believed to have 
created a welfare/dependency mentality amongst the local community (Abrash, 2001}, 
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and a number of social problems related to substance abuse such as an increase in 
HIV/ AIDS. The main criticism that emerged in interviews relating to Freeport's 
implementation of the One Per Cent Trust Fund is that the funds have been distributed 
without any corresponding education and capacity building of the local community. 
However, education is a long-term process and it is not clear that community leaders 
would prefer funds to be held back paternalistically until the beneficiaries are 
educated. Nonetheless, this is a dominant concern and criticism of Freeport, often 
expressed by Papuan religious leaders. 
Similarly again to Bougainville, Freeport and BP's presence in Papua and West Papua 
has led to a dramatic increase in economic migrants from other parts of the nation 
state . This has exacerbated a deep concern amongst Papuans that they are becoming a 
minority on their own land, damaging hopes for independence and increasing fears 
about the diminishment of indigenous cultures and traditions. The increasing numbers 
of migrants from other parts of Indonesia has also resulted in significant competition 
for access to local economic opportunities, and the capture of community 
development resources distributed to local villages by Freeport and BP . 
Environmental damage 
Freeport's mining activities in Papua have taken place in the context of weak 
environmental regulation, a fact that has further fuelled Papuan complaints that the 
Indonesian Government has plundered their land in the pursuit of national economic 
development. No environmental impact assessments were undertaken prior to the 
development of Ertsberg as this was not a widespread practice in the mining industry 
in the 1960s. Adding to this, the Suharto Government has been accused of deliberately 
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breaching the existing (albeit weak) Indonesian environmental laws to assist Freeport. 
The primary concern centres on the environmental damage caused by the company's 
disposal of tailings waste into the Ajkwa River. The impact of this method of disposal 
on both the immediate vicinity of the mine and the downstream environment has 
triggered a number of international protests against the company. These include a 
lawsuit filed against Freeport in the US under the Alien Tort Claims Act (Beanal vs. 
Freeport}31 ; the withdrawal of Freeport's US$100 million political risk insurance by the 
Overseas Private Insurance Corporation in the US; and the divestment of the Norway 
government's pension fund. 
In contrast to Freeport, BP was required to undertake an environmental impact 
assessment prior to the construction of the Tangguh project. However the assessment 
process has been disputed by a number of Indonesian environmental NGOs for failure 
to consult landowners from the Bintuni Bay area. Further, the 2000-2002 
environmental impact assessment occurred several years after the project had already 
been approved by the Indonesian government, through the transfer of land in 1999. 
Aspirations to define the future 
Since the fall of the Suharto regime there have been numerous attempts to 
decentralise government administrative functions and cede more decision-making 
authority to regional governments. On 21 November 2001 for example, President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri enacted a Bill on the subject of 'The Special Autonomy for the 
31 See utwatch .org (n .d.). 
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Province of Papua'. The key components of The Special Autonomy Law with r.egard to 
the protection of Papuan indigenous peoples are: the acknowledgement that 
indigenous Papuans are Melanesians and that substantial mistakes have been made by 
the state in the past; the establishment of the Papua People's Assembly (MRP}; 
recognition and protection of the rights of the customary community, and the 
restriction of transmigration (Sumule, 2002, p.13-6). However implementation of 
Special Autonomy was slow and incomplete. In 2010 the law was symbolically 'handed 
back' by Papuan leaders, in part because of the view that the Special Autonomy Law 
primarily benefits Indonesians and a handful of corrupt Papuan politicians (see timmer, 
2007, p.469-470). With this in mind, reconciliation processes in Papua can be 
considered to be at a much earlier stage than those on Bougainville. 
The initial stages of reconciliation have focused on relationships between Papuans and 
the Indonesian Government, Papuans and the Indonesian military, and Papuans caught 
on different sides of the conflict. The Indonesian Government has been widely 
criticised in Papua for its lack of political will to engage in 'dialogue' with Papuan 
leaders. There is also a growing recognition amongst Papuan leaders that to open more 
meaningful dialogue with the Indonesian Government about improving conditions for 
Papuans they need to build local consensus, and move away from an insistence on 
political independence in the first instance. As such, the primary focus amongst 
Papuans in 2012 has been to develop a collective vision for the future of Papua . 
Chapter 12 explains that significant progress has been made towards achieving a 
consensus on Papuan aspirations for the future through the Papua Peace Conference 
held in Jayapura on 5th -7th July 2011. At this conference, delegates developed a list of 
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44 'Indicators of Papua, Land of Peace'. These indicators encompass issues directly 
related to the future of natural resource development in Papua, which offer Freeport 
and BP an important opportunity to contribute to a locally meaningful vision of the 
resolution of the Papua conflict. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the background to the Bougainville and Papua conflicts, 
particularly highlighting the involvement of BCL, Freeport and BP. In this analysis, eight 
crucial sites of interdependence are identified as common to both conflicts. 
Consideration of these eight sites of interdependence reveals that that the companies 
have been connected to a variety of justice claims that extend beyond claims for a 
greater distribution of material benefits. In particular, these justice claims have had 
-
particular implications for the way in which locals perceive the companies as complicit 
in their political entrapment with PNG and Indonesia respectively. 
In the following chapters, the eight sites of interdependence are explored in greater 
detail, at the same time providing some texture as to how this eight-level framework 
was formulated from the data of the Papua and Bougainville experience. This narrative 
begins with an analysis of the colonial logic that drove the beginnings of natural 
resource exploitation in Bougainville and Papua. In doing so, it will be revealed how 
BCL and Freeport in particular, have denied the social aspects of their projects in 
different ways, and the implications this has had on the effectiveness of their CSR 
programs. 
The Interdependent Engagement Framework will allow us to address the suppression 
1 1 1 
of the social as a general problem of business projects that are seen variously by 
business leaders in my interviews as 'technical', 'environmental', 'engineering' or 
'commercial' projects . As Latour (2005, p.2) argues, "the social seems to be diluted 
everywhere and yet nowhere in particular" . In this vision of CSR social aspects are 
often conceived of a kind of icing that is not interdependently connected to the cake . 
Let us begin this journey then by first seeing the social as inevitably historical and for 
colonised peoples, profoundly colonial in their consciousness. 
I 12 
Historical 
injustice 
Chapter 5: Colonial Legacies 
Corporations side-step their 
entanglement with colonisation 
and decolonisation 
Corporations acknowledge 
local colonial legacies and the 
company's involvement in 
them 
This chapter examines in depth the first identified site of interdependence, historical 
injustice, as a key conflict flashpoint associated with resource development. In the 
literature relating to resources and conflict in Bougainville and Papua, the starting 
point is often the historical chain of events leading up to the contemporary conflict 
scenarios. Historical approaches have been usefully adopted to describe the 
geographic, social, cultural, economic and environmental contexts of Bougainville and 
Papua. They are also employed to elucidate the conditions, which have shaped specific 
local complaints about the manner in which resource exploitation has occurred . These 
analyses of the past however, have not always been extended to include, or been 
integrated into, contemporary debates on the conduct of CSR in conflict-prone areas, 
or of CSR more broadly. Rather, the entanglement of resource exploitation with 
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colonisation and decolonisation processes has lurked as a shadow that appears 
somehow beyond the scope of the responsibilities of business. 
This chapter takes a different view, arguing that an acknowledgement of the 
intertwining of resource companies with colonisation and/or decolonisation processes 
is an essential starting point to establishing a more meaningful engagement with local 
communities. More specifically, the chapter will explore the ways in which BCL, 
Freeport and BP have been perceived by Bougainvilleans and Papuans as implicated in 
the colonisation and decolonisation of Bougainville (vis-a-vis PNG) and Papua (vis-a-vis 
Indonesia) . These perceptions are then juxtaposed with the views of corporate 
executives from the companies involved. The aim of this approach is to identify how 
and in what ways the companies have attempted to engage and or disengage with 
these entanglements, as well as the consequences of disengagement on their efforts to 
establish harmonious relationships with local landowners. 
Colonialism - a note on terminology 
The concept of 'colonialism' is used in several ways depending on the context. Firstly, 
colonialism can refer to a moment in time, which is evident in Holmes, Hughes and 
Julian's (2012, p.432) definition as, "a period in history during which a Western nation 
maintains power over a territory other than its home territory". In a second usage, 
colonialism forms a framing device to explain the historical, economic, pol itical and 
social dynamics of the past, present and future. This use of the term is evident in the 
characteristics of the 'colonial situation' as defined by Fanon (cited in Barfield , 1997, 
p.69) . That is: political and legal domination over an alien society; relations of 
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economic and political dependence; a reorientation of the political economy toward 
imperial economic interests and needs; and institutionalised racial and cultural 
inequalities. Thirdly, colonialism is sometimes used to describe an administrative 
structure and set of policies such as, a UN mandated territory or trusteeship. In this 
thesis, the concept of colonialism is used to refer to specific colonial administrative 
structures established on Bougainville and Papua (which have included the activities of 
large corporations in a series of injustices), stemming from the economic and civilising 
missions of the colonial powers. 
The case studies of Bougainville and Papua demonstrate that processes of colonisation 
are not clear-cut. Relationships between 'coloniser' and 'colonised' are not fixed, but 
constantly negotiated, re-negotiated and sometimes even over-thrown. Nor should 
concepts of colonialism be reserved to refer to sets of relationships of Western 
domination over an 'oriental' other. For example, the political changes that occurred in 
the wake of World War II saw the Dutch shift from being a long established occupying 
power in Papua to champions of Papuan independence in the face of a neo-colonial 
Indonesian state. Similarly, after experiencing several waves of European colonisation, 
Bougainvilleans found themselves transformed into an 'internal colony' of the newly 
decolonised state of PNG. Moreover, the very process of PNG decolonisation signalled 
just a new phase of colonisation for Bougainville. Both Papua and Bougainville have 
experienced multiple layers and stages of colonial domination. What this chapter seeks 
to do is explore the ways in which resource development has been caught up in these 
layers. Paradoxically, resource development has come to symbolise both the potential 
for sustainable self-determination and one of the largest obstacles to political 
independence. 
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Colonialism was declared illegitimate by the UN in 1960, which condemned it as "alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation" (cited in Slater, 2004, p.175L however 
"there is a general sense throughout much of the developing world that decolonization 
has not resulted in meaningful economic or political independence" (Barfield, 1997, 
p.69). Further, there is wide recognition that the colonial encounter continues to have 
ongoing impacts in the lives of many. 
To explain the continuity of the 'colonial situation', scholars have adopted the term 
'post-colonialism'. This term represents an attempt to capture the contemporary 
problems in developing countries through "a retrospective reflection on colonialism" 
(Said, cited in Banerjee & Prasad, 2008, p.91). Similar to colonialism, therefore, 'post-
colonialism' is a concept that is used as a descriptor for a particular historical 
moment32 as well as an analytical tool to think about the ongoing impacts of the 
colonial era. The "traces of colonialism in the present" (Banerjee, 2000, p.5) explored 
in this chapter relate to the pre-specification of the path to 'development' and 
'progress' for Bougainville and Papua (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008, p.91). The argument 
presented is that for Bougainville and Papua, the pathway to development has been 
characterised by the domination of physical space, reformation of indigenous 
knowledge systems, and framing of local economic histories from alien perspect ives 
(Parsons, 2008, p.102). These expressions of external domination have profoundly 
conditioned relationships between BCL and Bougainvilleans, and Freeport, BP and 
32 However, the use of the 'post1 in 'post-colon ialism' is problematic and has been criticised for 
upholding the "i mperial idea of line ar t ime" (McClintok, 1992, p.85) which promotes the misperception 
" that co lon iali sm as a historica l real ity has somehow ended" (Ba nerjee, 2000, p.5). 
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Papuans. 
While Bougainville and Papua are not considered post-colonial contexts, in that they do 
not yet enjoy political independence from the national governments of PNG and 
Indonesia, post-colonial theory raises important questions and concerns for the design 
of CSR in these areas. Of crucial interest for this thesis is the emphasis in post-colonial 
thought on recognising the connections between the past and the present, and the 
ways in which understandings of the past can determine possibilities for the future. 
CSR itself occurs amid, and contributes to, the social processes through which groups 
of people seek to make sense of the past and lay foundations for the future. Moreover, 
CSR does not operate within an 'a-historical' vacuum but forms a dynamic component 
of an ever changing, contested and negotiated 'social'. 
Bougainvilleans and Papuans have drawn on the entry point of-resource companies to 
challenge the 'self justificatory narratives' (Chakrabarty, 2006, p.341) of capitalist 
development in the hands of their central governments. As argued by Chakrabarty 
(2006, p.341), history is contradictory, plural, and heterogeneous. Challenges to 
narratives include coercion, political, institutional, and symbolic violence: 
... often dispensed with dreamy-eyed idealism, and it is this violence which plays 
a decisive role in the establishment of meaning, the creation of truth regimes, 
in deciding, as it were, whose and which 'universal' wins (Chakrabarty, 2006, 
p.341}. 
This chapter seeks to expose some of the corporate and nationalist narratives of 
resource development and show how these narratives are shaped by the structures of 
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colonialism . In this way, the chapter aims to write into the CSR paradigm, "the 
ambivalences, the contradictions, the use of force, and the tragedies and ironies that 
attend it" (Chakrabarty, 2006, p.341). 
The case studies of Bougainville and Papua reveal how struggles for self-determination 
are informed by collective memory33 within contexts of power imbalance that defines 
whose history is spoken, heard and subsequently recognised. As Karagiannis {2004, 
p.65} aptly states, "the confinement of responsibility to future good intentions and its 
translation into 1global responsibility' are equivalent to forgetting the colonial past". 
This 'forgetting', however, is not total. It requires a narrative that exacts a cost on both 
the designers and recipients. This chapter takes up this point, arguing that CSR is 
conditioned by the past. The complicity of large natural resource companies (both 
perceived and real) in historical injustices, has established a fraught perception of the 
companies in the collective memories of Bougainvilleans and Papuans. 
Bougainville 
... Culturally people are impacted. Sudden change to the worlds. BCL introduced 
it. Most of that was brought in by BCL {BOU29, Landowner from Nasioi). 
Concern about the manner in which the Bougainville Copper Agreement (Mining 
(Bouga inville Copper Agreement) Ordinance 1967) was reached and enacted in 1967 
w as a pers istent theme in fieldwork interviews with Bougainvilleans . The Agreement 
33 Coll ective memory is defined by Te ite l (2000, p.70 ) as, " a process of reconstruct ing the rep resen tat ion 
of t he past in the light of the present". 
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will be discussed here as an example of the historical injustices which underpinned the 
development of the mine. Indeed it was a negotiation that took place against a 
background of the hegemony of Australian thinking on tax revenue for state building, 
rather than the protection of individuals or landowning groups. 
The marginalisation of landowners in the 1967 Agreement is partly attributable to the 
colonial Administration's understanding of development as linked to modern 
'progress'. This understanding held little room for traditional Bougainvillean 
perspectives about the significance of land. Contrary to the views of BCL executives, for 
Bougainvilleans the company's operations were symbolic of the cultural, social and 
economic changes imposed under the Australian Administration. The gulf between the 
perspectives of Bougainvilleans and BCL executives about the historical development 
of the mine was a strong theme that emerged during fieldwork interviews. The data 
reveal that although local criticism of the 1967 Agreement is largely levelled at the 
Australian and PNG governments, BCL is perceived by Bougainvilleans to have been 
intricately linked to the historical injustices exercised by these governments. 
In comparison to the case of Freeport in Papua (which will be discussed later in this 
chapter), BCL can be seen to have facilitated a 'culture shock' in Bougainville. This 
shock was characterised by a sudden shift towards a new economic mode of 
development, rather than by a violent imposition of a foreign culture that is often 
associated with concepts of colonialism (although there were elements of this in 
Bougainville too) (Blaskett, 1995, p.4}. The social and economic transformations 
facilitated by the mine had the effect of disrupting traditional cultural practices. 
Bougainvilleans perceived BCL, alongside the Australian and PNG governments, as the 
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key drivers of these changes. 
The Australian Administration 
The early stages of Australian colonial rule prior to WWII are important for 
understanding the emergence of local objections related to resource development in 
Bougainville. The development of the mine can be seen to have intensified and 
accelerated a number of societal changes, which had been recently ushered in by the 
Australian Administration. These changes have been described as representing an 
Australian view of civilisation viewed as "unwanted ways of life to Bougainvilleans" 
(Oliver, 1973, p.184). 
The first phase of these encroachments on Bougainvillean ways of life began in 1921, 
when Australia was offered a mandate from the Trusteeship Council of the League of 
Nations "to take care of the Territory of New Guinea until it was ready for self-
determination" (Elder, 2005, p.142). Australian rule over Bougainville was suspended 
during the Japanese occupation of 1942-45 (Elder, 2005, p.145) but was handed back 
to Australia in 1947, when the UN gave approval to Australia to create a joint 
administration over Papua and New Guinea (Denoon, 2000, p.32). This mandate, 
according to Oliver (1991, p.78), was: 
... subject only to the obligation that the administration would be carried out so 
that the customs and usages of the indigenous inhabitants would be protected, 
their cultural and educational advancement assured, their rights and interests 
self-guarded, and an increasingly progressive share in the administrative and 
other serv ices given to them, as the territory developed . 
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Indicative of the characteristics of the 'colonial situation' identified by Fanon (cited in 
Barfield, 1997, p.69}, this set of ideas shaped the way Bougainvilleans could operate 
through Western understandings of civilisation, education, and integration. As Elder 
argues, the traditional order of Bougainville was essentially in a process of being 
replaced by the "white man's wishes" (2005, p.150). These wishes were largely 
exercised through a plantation economy, which destroyed long established 
Bougainvillean garden culture and local modes of production {Elder, 2005, p.143-64}. 
However, the paradox of the colonial situation on Bougainville was that the civil 
administration through the oversight of patrol officers was relatively minimal. 
Moreover, during my research it was indicated to me, that Bougainvilleans received 
the cessation of violence in the form of head hunting and cannibalism as somewhat of 
a relief, perhaps in prospect and certainly in retrospect. 
The imposition of a foreign land tenure system over customary ownership34 however, 
can be regarded as a key colonial transformation that enabled the development of the 
mine in a manner that contravened the express wishes of many Bougainvilleans. Land 
is often a tension in colonial relationships as it not only provides an incentive for the 
coloniser to hold on to territory, but it also highlights the colonial refusal to recognise 
alternative systems, especially with regard to land use and control {Banerjee & Prasad, 
2008, p.93}. On Bougainville, the Australian Administration believed from the outset 
that all subsurface minerals discovered were owned by the state. This conflicted with 
Bougainvillean understandings of land tenure in which: 
34 Customary land tenure in Bougainville is discussed more extensively in Chapter 6. 
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... traditionally, land belongs to numerous small, local matrilineal clan lineages 
and the right to exploit it is shared by clan members. Ownership of land can be 
transferred away from a lineage by custom, but only in limited circumstances, 
such as in the process of mortuary practices. The concept of leasing to 
outsiders for extensive periods for purposes involving destruction of land are 
not encompassed by landownership rules (Regan, 2003, p.137) 
Conflicting understandings about the right to control land became a crucial source of 
dissatisfaction for landowners once the mine began production. The main concerns 
related to control over land with no obligatory compensation procedures; gender 
ignorance of women as caretakers of the land and the re-organisation of people's lives 
with dramatic changes to clan leadership. 35 Local discomfort with many of the social, 
cultural and economic transformations that had been gradually creeping in under 
Australian colonial rule was further aggravated by the commencement of mining 
operations. 
In colonial contexts an administration's development activities are often pursued 
within a discourse of 'caretaking' or 'stewardship' . However these same activities can 
be just as easily understood within paradigms of 'explo itation '. The fact that 
prospecting for mineral resources began to occur during the very early phase of 
Australian rule on Bougainville is indicative of the caretaking / exploitation tension : 
... [in 1929] the Australian Bureau of M ineral Resources had set the scene for 
35 The consequences of these changes will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
122 
further mineral exploitation when a prospecting license virtually gave 
prospectors the freedom to march all over the mountains and, in most cases, to 
arrive unannounced upsetting the landowners who did not understand what 
was going on (Havini & Havini, n.d, p.8}. 
The lack of information and education provided by the Australian Government to 
landowners regarding the mining activity occurring on their land, later became a 
passionate source of contention for Bougainvilleans when rich copper ore was later 
discovered at Panguna in 196436 . 
Discovering Panguna 
... They thought landowners within Panguna district didn't know what was 
happening. They tried to set up. People weren't ready to open the mine. I told 
[the] colonial mission and headquarters that there would be bloodshed {BOU19, 
Landowner group chairman). 
The second period of Australian rule is the most important phase for this discussion of 
BCL's intersection with historical injustices on Bougainville. It was during this time that 
the Australian Government paved the way for BCL to begin mining activities. As a BCL 
executive stated, 11Australian colonialism ... was in our best interests. It got the mine 
running. It was impressive given the isolated location" (BOU2, BCL Executive). 
36 The methods BCL used to inform Bougainvilleans of the impact the mine would have on their land will 
be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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During the late 1960s37, the ALP, under the leadership of Gough Whitlam, " broke the 
bipartisan tradition and made PNGs destiny an issue in Australian politics" (Denoon, 
2000, p.37} . Whitlam advocated the decolonisation of PNG, as he believed that: 
... Australians could justify their role in PNG's society and economy only if the 
indigenes perceived that they themselves were being prepared for 
participation in all the jobs which were being performed anywhere in PNG 
(Whiltlam, 2002}. 
Following extensive tours of PNG in the 1960s, Whiltlam declared that "the rest of the 
world will think it anomalous if PNG is not independent by 1970" (Whitlam, 2002) . 
When he was elected leader of the ALP in 1967, Whitlam began establishing the early 
conditions for an independent PNG, which he believed could be made possible through 
economic 'development' (Denoon, 2000, p.36}. Several years before Whitlam took over 
the ALP leadersh ip a report was released by a "Territory of Papua and New Guinea 
geologist, which suggested the existence of a large low grade porphyry copper deposit 
[on Bougainville] " (Jackson, Graham, Moore & Partners, 1971, p.1} . Following th is 
discovery CRA arrived on the Island with a Special Prospecting Authority issued by the 
Adm inistrat ion to further investigate the resource potential of the site (Denoon, 2000, 
p.62). 
The early explorat ion period was marked by landowner res istance, partly driven by 
37 During this time, there were changes in ideas about racial inequality back in Australia where an early 
land rights movement had emerged, and ignited a debate over land rights for Indigenous people in 
Australia . 
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stories of what CRA had done in Nauru. It was rumoured that the company had taken 
minerals out of Nauru, and left nothing for the people {Denoon, 2000, p.66}. By the 
time local Bougainvillean resistance brought prospecting activity to a standstill in 1965, 
it had become clear to both CRA prospectors and colonial officers that the landowners 
were quite opposed to mining. However, with power to control the land vested in the 
Administration, CRA and the Australian Government continued negotiations, leaving 
landowners with little choice in whether or not mining would occur. As a 
Bougainvillean civil servant stated, 
... Mr Barnes was the Australian minister for external affairs. When there was 
resistance he flew in by chopper and literally told them we will get the mine 
working whether they like it or not {BOU13}. 
In this way, the Administration paved the way for the creation ef the mine and evicted 
landowners from exploration sites. These processes can be seen to have included some 
attempt to explain the development of the mine to local Bougainvilleans. However 
there does not appear to have been any engagement in genuine consultation about 
the project or recognition that local landowners should have any right of veto . 
Meanwhile, CRA considered central Bougainville to be a promising site to extract 
copper and devised a corporate structure to manage the investment and development, 
with Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd {BCPL, later BCL} as the operating company. One of 
the first objectives of BCL was to gain the support of the Australian Government to go 
ahead with the mine. It did so by appealing directly to the Administration's financial 
interests in making PNG less fiscally dependent on Australian largesse, and by making a 
case for the benefits of development for Bougainvilleans. This is reflected in the 
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following statement of a former CRA chairman, Sir Maurice Mawby, to the Australian 
Government : 
... [a Bougainville mine] will result in a decrease in the Commonwealth funds 
necessary for maintenance of Australian administration ... and we would hope 
[to] do much to train the natives and guide them into a peaceful acceptance of 
independence compatible with our Australian hopes (Denoon, 2000, p.80) 
The 1967 Agreement 
... Bougainville got the wrong end of the stick as far as questions of benefits 
were concerned. Australia were preparing for independence for PNG. PNG 
wasn't politically or economically ready. Except when it found BCL. Australia 
thought1 we will get the money whether you like it or not (BOU131 
Bougainvillean civil servant). 
On the eve of PNG's independence in 1975, Bougainville attempted to secede (Tonks & 
Dowling, 1999, p.11) . At this time, the current President of the Autonomous Region of 
Bougainville, Father John Momis, lobbied for Bougainville's independence, making his 
case to the UN Trusteeship Council in New York. According to Gough Whitlam (2002): 
... Momis said that Bouga inville wished to determine its own destiny and that its 
90,000 people were ethnically and culturally part of a separate Solomon Islands 
group . Olewale [Ebia Olewale, the PNG Minister for Justice] told the Council 
that if the separatist principle was accepted 'it could result in the creation of 
700 potential mini-states in Papua New Guinea' . The Trusteeship Council 
unanimously extended congratulations to Papua -New Guineans on their 
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successful preparations for independence and expressed confidence that the 
unity of the country would be successfully maintained. 
This statement makes it clear that the Australian Government was well aware that BCL 
was on the verge of entering into a major business deal which would one day see the 
mine reside in the hands of a government that did not have legitimacy in the eyes of a 
significant proportion of Bougainvilleans. According to Tonks and Dowling (1999, p.12), 
it was an independent PNG Government, rather than Bougainvilleans specifically, that 
the first Chairman of BCL, Frank Espie, prioritised. Moreover, Espie was overt in stating 
that he wanted a mining agreement that would be seen as satisfactory for the first 
Prime Minister of an independent PNG Government (Tonks & Dowling, 1999, p.12). 
The Agreement reached and enacted by the Territory's House of Assembly in 1967 was 
thus brokered between BCL and the Australian Territory of PNG. It committed the 
Australian Government and BCL to "terms concerning taxation, royalties, 
environmental management, employment and infrastructure" (Denoon, 2000, p.3). 
Clearly, BCL negotiated the development of the mine with the state, rather than the 
customary landowners or local inhabitants. 
Furthermore, Denoon {2000, p.90), argues that instead of concern for the impacts the 
project would have on the people of Bougainville, the main issue considered by the 
company's negotiating team was the protection for the financial backers of the project. 
Because: 
... in the end, the project cost about $A423million. Shareholders invested 
$130million, and borrowings amounted to $334million, of which the twenty-
seven banks in the Bank of America syndicate found $110million. This leverage 
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was self-evident, and they were exceedingly fussy about the institutions·and 
countries to which they would lend capital 38 (Denoon, 2000, p.91) . 
In spite of this, Denoon claims that there were some measures included in the 
Agreement, which attempted to take into account the welfare of Bougainvilleans, such 
as raising education and health facilities to a specific standard (Denoon, 2000, p.95). 
However, some of these matters were not outlined in the Agreement itself, but in an 
exchange of letters between senior officers of the Administration and high officials 
within the company. 
Tonks and Dowling argue that BCL was anxious to initiate these kinds of community 
initiatives so that people living in the mining lease areas would benefit from the 
venture (Tonks & Dowling, 1999, p.13). In order to achieve this, BCL established a 
Village Relations Department to provide information to locals on the company's 
activities, and assisted with issues such as compensation, the establishment of small 
businesses, information on crops and livestock, as well as mediation between 
Bougainvillean and expatriate employees. These initiatives however, were inadequate 
to tackle the much deeper landowner concern that their country was being exploited 
to finance an independent PNG while Bougainville's own aspirations for independence 
were ignored and declared illegitimate . In this way BCL became a key player in a 
tr iangular relationship between the Australian Administrat ion, aspiring leaders of an 
independent PNG and Bougainvillean leaders advocat ing separat ism . 
38 These amounts also show why the l 0billi on kina claim made by Francis Ona was so unrealistic. 
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Although the blame for the Agreement being an unfair deal for Bougainville has largely 
been leveled at the Australian and PNG governments, interviews conducted for this 
project reveal a popular perception amongst Bougainvilleans that BCL was also 
complicit in the social changes ushered in under Australian colonialism, and which 
continued when the region was incorporated into PNG. In one interview a BCL 
executive sought to challenge the existence of this perception arguing that: 
... BCL was seen as the only way to get attention from the national government. 
It wasn't a symbol of Australian colonialism - the Bougainvilleans wanted to get 
at the government, not the commercial entity {BOU1). 
Another BCL executive stated, 
"The problem was between Bougainville and the rest of PNG. The mine was just 
a catalyst for conflict that was blamed on BCL" (BOU2). 
Regardless of whether these perceptions are considered legitimate by corporate 
executives, they are important to consider as they represent local perceptions of the 
company in a crucial period of Bougainville's history, with many Bougainvilleans 
believing that while "BCL did fulfil the Agreement. .. the Agreement was an injustice on 
Bougainville" {BOU6, Bougainvillean former BCL employee). 
1974 Renegotiations 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1970s were characterised by increasing support for 
secession on Bougainville. Part of Somare's strategy to counter the secession demands 
was to add to the payments provided to affected landowners by setting up an Interim 
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Provincial Government which would receive all the royalties from the mine (but- not the 
large tax revenues or shareholding). The aim of this was to ensure that all 
Bougainvilleans, and not just those from the immediate mine site would benefit from 
the wealth generated by the project (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, 
p.13 ). Further, Soma re required that BCL provide the entire mine's supporting 
infrastructure, as well as jobs to 3,500 Papua New Guineans39 (Blaskett, 1995, p.50}. 
These new requirements came to be known as the 1974 Agreement. 
Under the 1974 Agreement, ''revenues were assured for the independent state of PNG 
and Australia was able to withdraw from its colony within a comparatively short 
period" (Blaskett, 1995, p.50). A significant failure of the 1974 Agreement however, 
was that it failed to improve local participation in the negotiations (Blaskett, 1995, 
p.50). Rather, the new agreement was directed mainly at the tax regime and was 
considered a victory for PNG (Regan, 2003, p.138). 
Regan argues that although the 1974 agreement, "in the context of political 
confrontation over Bougainvillean demands for devolution of power" (Regan, 2003, 
p140) , Bougainville as a whole did in fact get a small percentage of the mining 
royalt ies, local interests were still not consulted in any effective way. Dorney {1998, 
p.53 ) supports this argument by stating that : 
... wh il e the BCL agreement struck in 1974 certa inly made the mine share its 
w inn ings w ith the national government in a way that was exemplary for its 
39 The prov1s1on of emp loyment to Papua New Guineans general ly, rather than to Bougainvilleans 
specifically, w ill be d iscussed in Chapter 10. 
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time, the mine was nonetheless insensitive to local interests and driven purely 
by the profit motive, and was abetted in this attitude by the national 
government. 
The story of the Bougainville copper mine reveals that national governments can 
undermine resource companies' responsibilities to community development as a result 
of their own political and economic interests in the resource project. This reflects the 
colonial character of the relationship between PNG and Bougainville that BCL cannot 
be separated from, however distinct they may have considered themselves to be. It is 
clear that in the context of Australian decolonisation of PNG, Bougainville experienced 
the exploitation of the 'periphery' for the benefit of the 'core' (PNG). Having said this 
(with the methodological limits of the thesis set out in Chapter 2 in mind), it is worth 
noting that from the perspective of leaders such as Somare and Whitlam these actions 
might be viewed as occurring in the interests of 'all the people of PNG'. Nonetheless, 
the company has been perceived by Bougainvilleans as a facilitator of the central 
government's interests, rather than an organisation committed to responding to the 
rights and objections of Bougainvilleans. As will now be discussed in relation to the 
Freeport mine in Papua, these historical connections can entrench a particular negative 
perception of the company in the collective memory of locals. Such a memory presents 
significant challenges to future attempts by such companies to establish a harmonious 
relationship with the community. 
Papua 
... It is hard to find any problem in Papua not connected to Freeport. It shows 
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how significant it is when one talks about Papua. Any problem with Indonesia is 
the same as what people accuse Freeport of doing. Some people accuse 
Indonesia of polluting culture. Freeport is the other side of the same coin of 
Indonesia - modernisation, social diseases ... Put that in context and start to 
think about CSR and it will be more complex (Papua 1, Papuan NGO worker). 
Papua's involvement in the decolonisation process of Indonesia or more simply, the 
terms on which the territory was incorporated into Indonesia is the core grievance 
expressed by the local independence movement. Similar to the way that the nature of 
mining operations in Bougainville were characterised by an Australian, then PNG 
colonial power, Papua has been described as an 'internal colony' (Smith & Ng, 2002) 
where "the core dominates the periphery politically and exploits it materially" 
(Hechter, 1999, p.9). A significant proportion of Papuans have contested the coercive 
nature in which their homeland was incorporated into Indonesia, and most 
importantly, the treatment of Papuans by the Indonesian Government and security 
forces since that time. 
The incorporation of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia, as well as its economic 
underdevelopment relative to the rest of the state, laid the foundations for its 
independence movement, including the armed separatist group the OPM. Papua 's core 
objections are political, directly linked to contested processes such as the 'Act of Free 
Choice '. However cultural factors and the emphasis on 'difference' (ethnically, 
culturally and geographically) have also contributed to keeping "the demands for 
autonomy or complete independence alive" {Smith & Ng, 2002, p.95) . This 
understanding of Papuan expressions of independence reinforce the argument made in 
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the previous chapter, that the justice claims at the heart of the Papuan conflict can be 
conceptualised as claims for both 'recognition and redistribution' (Fraser, 1997}. 
In crucial ways, the American mining company, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold is 
perceived to have been used as a tool by the Indonesian state to exploit Papua through 
the political relationships the company shared with the US Government and Suharto's 
New Order regime; the justification and source of funding the huge mining project 
provided the Indonesian military and the lack of financial returns to the Papuan 
economy. Of significance to the future of Freeport's presence in Papua, respondents in 
this study also highlighted Freeport's controversial entry into the province as a key 
factor constraining progress in the company's long and fraught relationship with local 
people. As a Papuan member of the Freeport union for indigenous workers 'Tongoi 
Papua' stated, 
... before the status of Papua, Freeport already made a contract in 1967. That's 
the problem. That's why until now there is always a problem {Papua24}. 
The remainder of this chapter explores the history of bad relations between Freeport 
and indigenous Papuans, and seeks to explain the historical injustices that have 
conditioned Freeport's later attempts in the mid-1990s to establish more valuable 
relationships with indigenous Papuans. 
A contract with the state, not indigenous Papuans 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1967 contract between the Indonesian Government and 
Freeport essentially established the company as a contractor working for the regime 
{Ballard, 2001, p.12}. The mine itself was to be used as an investment to serve the 
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interests of the company and the state, rather than indigenous Papuans :
40 The 
Contract required no occupational health and safety, environmental or labour rights 
provisions; rather, the regime essentially gave the company the right to acquire land 
and re-settle the indigenous population with no obligatory compensation or 
consultation {Smith and Ng, 2002, p.102). As Mealey {1996, p.303) claims, "Freeport' s 
contract of work to extract copper from lrian Jaya is with the republic of Indonesia, not 
the villages of Wa". Moreover, Freeport was not obliged to participate in local or 
provincial development programs and no restrictions were placed on the company's 
environmental practices. The 30-year contract made Freeport the exclusive mining 
contractor within an Ertsberg-centred 10 km square {PT Freeport Indonesia, 2006, p.4) 
The Company also owned most of the core businesses associated with mining 
operations in Papua {Cookson, 2005). 
The practice of granting companies a monopoly over a particular trade or product was 
designed by Suharto's New Order to "provide ample opportunities for political 
patronage and corruption" (Robertson-Snape, 1999, p.594). Consequently, the 
company has been strongly resented by Papuans for the relatively small financia l 
returns del ivered to the province in comparison with the substantially larger profits 
fl owing to the centra l government, the Suharto family and the mi li tary
41 {Sumule, 
2002, p.9). One major concern is that only sixteen per cent of the Freeport workforce 
an d its su pporting compan ies were Papuans, so the "salaries and other benefit s pa id to 
40 The prob lems associated w ith the state sett ing standards on corporate -commun ity development and 
th e protection of loca ls w ill be discussed in Chapter 6. 
41 Th is w ill be discussed more extensive ly in Chapter 6. 
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the employees have a relatively small impact on the development of local economies" 
{Sumule, 2002, p.10). 
Freeport has also been charged with the destruction of "sites of considerable 
traditional significance" {Ballard, 2001, p.30). The 1967 Contract contained an overt 
disregard for the customary land rights of the Amungme and Kamoro, with the land 
effectively considered terra nullius. As such, Freeport has been perceived as deeply 
connected to internal colonialism occurring in Papua at the hands of the Indonesian 
state. As a Papuan religious leader stated: 
... Since 67-68 Papuans see the Indonesian government and Freeport working 
together without the Papuans. The Papuans became outsiders and Indonesia 
and Freeport became owners. We are living in that situation now. We West 
Papuans live as outsiders in our own home. In all countries, it is universal. When 
someone will visit other people they ask if I can come to you. But in this case 
they haven't. Kamara and Amungme never invited them to come here. The 
Amungme people protested {Papua27}. 
Article 2 of the 1967 Contract granted the company rights to resettle people living in 
the project area, however this was not explained to the local people affected {Mealey, 
1996, p.303). Subsequently, accusations emerged that inadequate protection was 
afforded to the Amungme and Kamoro people in the areas of housing, food, health and 
the protection of their culture {Soares, 2004, p.121}. 
The 1967 Contract also led to the presence of large numbers of troops around the mine 
site because it explicitly required that Freeport "provide for and meet the logistic 
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needs of government officials" (Ballard, 2001, p.28). Military brutality in the region has 
fuelled support for independence from Indonesia (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & 
Dunn, 2010, p.72). The direct connection between the development of the mine and 
the increased presence of Indonesian troops is closely linked to dissatisfaction of local 
communities 1 about Freeport's mining operations {Ballard, 2001, p.28). Freeport 
therefore, has been viewed as highly complicit in the Indonesian Government's initial 
destruction of the indigenous environment for the benefit of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Illegal mining? 
Unfortunately however, association with the exploitation of the remote fringes of an 
empire for the benefit of a colonial core is not where the negative 'symbolism' of 
Freeport in the collective memory of Papua ends. The Contract was signed in 1967, 
two years before Indonesia was given sovereignty over Papua and as highlighted 
earlier, Freeport had even begun construction prior to this time (see Franks, 2007, 
p.261-2). This period was "seen by many Papuans [as a time in which] the Indonesian 
Government shouldn't make any major business decisions" (Papua45, former Freeport 
employee). Freeport's entry during this time has created a popular perception in Papua 
that: 
... Freeport is illegal mining. Same as illegal fishing, illegal logging. Why is there 
illegal mining? Because I am a landowner. Indonesian government and 
American government never invite landowners to sign an MOU [Memorandum 
of Understanding] of the company because in 1967 Papua under UN, not fully 
136 
under Indonesian government42 {Papua31, Papuan Human Rights NGO worker). 
Indonesia held interim authority over Papua under the New York Agreement, which 
was brokered between the Netherlands and Indonesia in 1962 by the United States. 
Indonesia was given Temporary Executive Authority on the condition that a 
referendum on independence was to be held in 1969. This Temporary Executive 
Authority was only intended to remain in Papua until 1969, giving Indonesia the 
authority over the territory on the 1st May that year. "And so the period of Indonesian 
interim rule began that, according to the New York Agreement, was intended to 
familiarize the local population with their new bosses" (Drooglever, 2009, p.624}. 
According to Drooglever {2009, p.624}, foreign influences were eliminated as much as 
possible. The Government banned labour unions, political parties that had been 
established under the Dutch Administration and Indonesian education was introduced. 
Additionally, Indonesians replaced Papuan civil servants responsible for regional 
subdivisions and districts, and an official policy of transmigration was implemented 
with the aim of demographically integrating Papua into the rest of Indonesia. A 
simultaneous influx of Indonesian security forces contributed to an increasingly 
ubiquitous and repressive Indonesian presence in Papua. 
The fact that the Contract of Work took place before the granting of Indonesian 
42 This example also demonstrates the conflict between the public rhetoric of the UN in relation to 
support for decolonisation, and the practical implications of their actions and decision making in terms 
of the perpetuation of colonial structures. This conflict is also evident in the previous discussion of the 
Australian Government's overt support for PNG independence, while the same time refusing to 
entertain Bougainvillean claims for self-determination. 
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sovereignty means that the legal basis for Freeport's entry is unclear. The New York 
Agreement itself provided ambiguous terms and conditions for what types of activity 
could occur during the interim period of Indonesian authority. No mention was made 
about the terms on which the Indonesian Government might enter into major business 
decisions. Adding to this ambiguity was the fact that, owing to Suharto's ascension to 
acting President (he became President a year later}, at the time of the Agreement 
there was no existing Foreign Investment Law in Indonesia (Mealey, 1996, p.81-4). 
In 1967 Papua was certainly viewed by the Indonesian Government as a frontier region 
to test the potential for foreign investment. Constituting the first of its kind, there was 
a lack of precedents for the Suharto regime to draw on in regard to contract 
development for large-scale mining projects. Subsequently the legality of Freeport's 
entry into Papua is indeed vague. However while this ambiguity makes it hard to gauge 
the legality of the project; it simultaneously makes it equally difficult to definitively 
establish its 'illegality'. Freeport's entry into Papua can therefore be read as a contest 
between the contrasting stories that the Indonesian state and separatist Papuans tell 
about the past, albeit with unequal capacities to make these histories heard. As 
McEwan (2009} argues, power dynamics are not only economic and political but also 
deeply cultural. On the one hand, is an American mining company with an interest in 
supporting and upholding the wishes and interests of the state and capitalist 
development; and on the other hand, a small indigenous population living on the 
periphery in a very remote part of the world. 
What we learn from these circumstances is why it was so easy for the Indonesian 
Government to establish contested mining practices. With Papua viewed as a 'frontier' 
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of development, the territory was ripe for exploitation. Further, as the territory is 
located in a remote part of the world, activity in the region went largely unnoticed and 
unmonitored by the international community. 
Freeport and American interests 
As the New York Agreement stipulated that Indonesia held authority over Papua 
according to the terms and conditions of a UN Temporary Executive Authority, the UN 
had a responsibility to ensure the referendum was free and fair (Leith, 2003, p.12) . 
However, they clearly failed in this task (Leith, 2003, p.12). The contested manner in 
which the Act of Free Choice took place and the failed protection of Papuan rights by 
the international community, ignited suspicions that Freeport was not only a symbol of 
Indonesian economic exploitation, but also provided a reason for why "America used 
its power to support Indonesian integration" (Papua22, Human Rights worker). As one 
Papuan Human Rights worker stated: 
... At that time, it [the contract] was already made, so America used its power to 
support Indonesian integration because of its investment in resources. The 
military at the time used force to go into Papua. That's why some Papuans 
recall the result of Freeport because it is illegal or not valid {Papua22}. 
The power that Freeport exercised in the US support for Papua's integration into 
Indonesia is also highly contested. On the corporate side, the arguments that support 
Freeport's lack of influence point to the small size of the company and the Ertsberg 
copper mine during the Act of Free Choice process. As a former Freeport employee 
responded to this suggestion, 
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... as if Freeport was used as a bargaining factor between the US and Indonesia. 
It is wrong because it was a small company. It could not be used as a bargaining 
factor (Papua45). 
This statement does bear some truth as the Ertsberg mineral deposit was only a small 
copper mine at the time of the Act of Free Choice and was reaching closure by 1988. It 
was not until the current Chairman of Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold, Mr James R. 
Moffett, 11went to Papua to see if the company could get anything else that they 
discovered the 1real mine' in Grasberg 11 (Papua45, former Freeport employee). It was 
the development of this later copper and gold deposit which led to the expansion of 
the company's operations in Papua and transformed Freeport into an international 
mining company. However while the perceived potential for resource extraction in 
Papua was not on a large scale, it is likely that the US was motivated in this Cold War 
context to support the Indonesian Government as much as possible in an effort to 
reduce the likelihood of Indonesia leaning toward the communist camp. 
Despite the evidence that United States support for Indonesian rule in Papua was not 
financially motivated, there remains a lot of emotion associated with Freeport and its 
political connections both in Jakarta and in the US, with demands from some Papuans 
for "payback from the US" {Waromi, 2010). As the President of the West Papuan 
National Authority recently commented in relation to a US Senators Congressional 
Hearing in Washington: 
... We West Papuans have a lot of history with the United States ... General 
MacArthur's children might not know their father dropped us two thousand 
guns to fight the Japanese during World War 2. John Kennedy's children 
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probably don't want to know their father called us 'just 700,000 cannibals' as 
he artfully bullied the Dutch into relinquishing its colony to the Indonesians. I 
would of course remind Ellsworth Bunker's children that their father was the 
architect of the New York Agreement that enslaved us to the Indonesians. And 
then there's Mr Kissinger and the whole Freeport mine business (Waromi, 
2010). 
More specifically on the 'whole Freeport mine business', those who argue Freeport did 
have the power to influence the decisions of the US Government highlight two key 
areas. First, the 1967 Contract which is believed to have been a political move on the 
part of the Suharto regime, "aimed at exploiting the 'unsubtle connection' between 
letting foreign companies in and securing international support" (Leith, 2003, p.60). 
Second, several influential board members of Freeport also had ties to the US 
Government (such as members of the Rockefeller family and Augustus "Gus/) Long - a 
former member of President Johnson's Foreign Intelligence Agency). 
In regards to the latter, Leith argues that Freeport was particularly attractive to the 
New Order regime, despite other international companies competing for the same 
mining contract. By engaging with Freeport, Indonesia may have believed they could 
simultaneously strengthen US support for their claim on Papua (Leith, 2003, p.13). 
Moreover, through the company's connections with the "echelons of power in 
Washington" (Leith, 2003, p.58), Freeport was seen as a valuable resource to fulfil the 
regime's needs on more than one level. 
Leith (2003, p.59) further argues that the links between Freeport's board and the US 
Government meant that the 1967 Agreement also ushered in the interests and 
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influence of the US in Papua . She believes that this interest was evident in the way: 
... Washington was to directly support Freeport's association with the new 
regime by guaranteeing $60 million worth of loans the company received from 
U.S. lending agencies that enabled it to proceed with the project (Leith, 2003, 
p.58). 
Despite the links between Freeport and the US Government, "the power relationship 
between the Indonesian state and foreign capital shifted a number of times; between 
the regime and the company it shifted significantly - in the state's favour" (Leith, 2003, 
p.66). This was because Suharto's regime was no longer plagued by the political 
insecurities that it held in the 1960s. 24 years of authoritarian rule gave the New Order 
the power to confidently exploit foreign capital {Leith, 2003, p.66). However this power 
shift would again reside in the hands of the perceived oppressor of indigenous Papuans 
- the Indonesian state, and more specifically, Suharto and his business allies {ICG, 
2002, p.18). 
The power shift in favour of the New Order took place during a time in which Freeport 
announced the discovery of Grasberg. The new mine required Freeport to sign new 
contracts with the Indonesian Government in 1991 and 1994 which " effectively gave 
the company exploration rights for approximately nine million acres and the right to 
m ine any discoveries for a further fifty-year period" (Leith, 2003, p.64) . However, in 
contrast to the relat ively na·i"ve approach of the Indonesian Government during the 
1967 contract, Suharto wrote the terms of the new contract with personal interests at 
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stake43 . According to Leith (2003, p.66), the 1991 contract required "higher payments 
to the government, restrictive exploration conditions, incorporation in Indonesia, 
Indonesian equity in the company ... together with an unwelcome commitment to build 
a smelter on Java ... ". 
The future of corporate community relations in Papua 
As of 2012, the requirements on Freeport to provide welfare services for Papuans have 
become so all-encompassing that the company is considered by some to operate as a 
de-facto form of local government (ICG, 2002, p.18). As one interviewee stated: 
... We are in number three of colonisation. First was big country - USA and 
Dutch. Second was Indonesia. Third is Freeport - new coloniser. Because he is a 
partner of Indonesia. They come without anything - everything is not legal. 
Freeport colonise and has everything - modernisation and things for the 
military to guard. Money to command the police and military. It is a model of a 
small state. An environment department, same as a minister. Defence minister, 
security department ... Freeport is a new coloniser for us. So we are most victims 
because under three [colonisers] above us (Papua301 Papuan activist). 
The story of Freeport's role in the incorporation of Papua into Indonesia provides an 
important backdrop for thinking about CSR in the region. The logic which enabled 
Papua's incorporation into Indonesia has shaped the relationship between indigenous 
43 Accord ing to the ICG (2002, p.18), Freeport guaranteed an estimated US$673 million in loa ns to 
Suharto-l inked interests between 1991 and 1997. 
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Papuans and Freeport and crucially, local perceptions of the company in relation to 
efforts to deliver CSR. 
It appears unlikely that calls for Freeport to acknowledge their complicity in the 
contested nature in which Papua was incorporated into Indonesia will be met. This is 
partly because the Indonesian Government has so far resisted Papuan demands for an 
historical review of the Act of Free Choice. The stalemate over this issue is evident in 
contemporary debates between Papuan leaders and the Indonesian Government 
about dissatisfaction with the Special Autonomy package granted in 2001. In these 
discussions, the Indonesian Government has remained unwilling to recognise Papuan 
refusal of Special Autonomy and a request for an historical review of the Act of Free 
Choice. Rather, the Government tends to respond with an attitude of, "We give you 
lots of money, why are you not happy?" However as of 2011, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono has agreed to participate in 'dialogue' with Papuans. The success or 
otherwise of this dialogue is yet to be realised, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 12. 
The same issues about how Papuan history is defined and understood have not 
escaped BP 's Tangguh LNG project in the Bird's Head 44 peninsular of West Papua . This 
is despite the fact that many Papuans who have been involved with consultations 
facilitated by BP perceive the company more positively than Freeport . BP 's CSR 
initiatives do not directly set out to support Papuan calls for an historical review of the 
dA For an historical analysis of the Bird's Head pen insular see Timmer (2000) . 
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Act of Free Choice. However, the company has implemented practical strategies, which 
indicate sympathy for the injustices that Papuans have experienced as a consequence 
of major natural resource projects. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, BP 
has put in place a Community Based Security Strategy that aims to reduce the presence 
of Indonesian security forces around the project, by drawing on local civilians to 
provide security services. Other positive examples interviewees discussed in relation to 
BP include a greater respect for indigenous land rights, a commitment to dialogue and 
pro-active attempts to reduce the in-migration of non-indigenous Papuans (see Ch 10). 
Despite these efforts, there is a distinct sense that Papuan trust in BP is far from 
secure, with considerable fear associated with the presence of the company in the 
context of the broader collective memory of Freeport's entry into the area. As Socratez 
Sofyan Yoma (2005), President of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches of Papua, stated 
in a letter addressed to the Group Chief Executive of BP: 
... What makes you so sure that you can avoid Freeport's mistakes? We know 
from experience that dogs will always find vomit to eat. Whether you like it or 
not, wherever there is money, the TN I [Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian 
military] will be there sooner or later to lap it up. They will create an "incident", 
blame the OPM [Free Papua Movement] and then insist that they provide 
"protection", at a price, for a "vital national asset". We also know from 
experience that in West Papua ruled by Indonesia, where foreign companies 
operate, our people eventually become marginalized in our own land. 
By conducting business in Papua under the Indonesian Government, there is no way 
that BP can completely avoid gaming in the complex and contested colonial 
145 
relationship that exists between the Indonesian state and indigenous Papuans. In many 
ways, Papuan concerns about BP's extractive activity do not centre on demands for 
greater community development or access to resources. Rather, they centre on 
previous experience of major natural resource companies as facilitators of Indonesian 
colonialism, Indonesian security forces, state corruption and the cu ltu ra I 
marginalisation of indigenous Papuans. 
The historical incorporation of Papua into Indonesia is not an injustice that can be 
reconciled with money alone. As the remainder of this thesis aims to show, Freeport 
has been unable to resolve Papuan feelings of injustice through the distribution of 
community resources. While access to wealth is always valued, it has been unable to 
tackle much deeper grievances about the company's involvement in the historical 
incorporation of Papua into Indonesia - a crucial justice claim of Papua's independence 
movement . 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the historical processes that led to Bougainville and Papua's 
incorporation into PNG and Indonesia provide important contextual information for 
analyses of CSR in these areas. The negative perception of resource companies in the 
collective memory of Bougainvilleans and Papuans due to their complicity in the 
colonial enterprise of the dominant nation state, has constrained corporate efforts to 
improve community relations. This negative perception highlights a key learning from 
the two case studies . That is, the processes and political conditions which lead to the 
establishment of resource projects cannot be disassociated from future possibilities for 
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meaningful relationships between the companies involved and local communities. 
In the cases of Bougainville and Papua, resource development projects have been 
entwined with historical injustices associated with political incorporation into PNG and 
Indonesia, and their economic exploitation for the benefit of these states. Resolving 
these grievances cannot be easily solved through the distribution of material resources 
alone. As Fraser argues (1996, p.5-65), "neither redistribution alone nor recognition 
alone can suffice to remedy injustice today ... to pose an either/or choice between the 
politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition is to posit a false antithesis". 
Hence a retrospective engagement with cultural or symbolic recognition, through, for 
example, re-writing the original agreements between states and corporations or 
participating in local reconciliation ceremonies is also required. The options available 
to BCL, Freeport and BP will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 12. 
An important observation of this chapter was that the state has both the power to 
control the land, as well as the power to legislate. The following chapter argues that 
the state's capacity to override customary land tenure establishes a 'framing error' in 
the conduct of resource development. The error made by the companies is that they 
tended to be generous and responsive to the central government, at the expense of 
customary landowners and communities directly affected by the resource project. 
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Chapter 6: State Law & Customary Land Ownership 
Site of Disengaged Engaged 
interdependence ( CSR as it mostly is) {CSR reconfigured) 
Denial of customary Corporations draw on State Corporations open pathways 
land rights law (or national stories) to to challenge state law (or 
legitimise local grievances and national stories) and regional 
facilitate regional inequality inequality 
One of the more important observations in Chapter 5 was the inadequate protection 
afforded to Bougainvilleans and Papuans by their respective central governments, and 
their marginalisation in important decisions relating to resource development. The 
issue this chapter addresses is that the state's control of natural resources in 
Bougainville and Papua has led BCL, Freeport and BP to be responsive to the terms of 
access to land set by the governments of PNG and Indonesia, rather than the 
customary owners of the land on which they operate . The second site of 
interdependence discussed in this chapter therefore, is the involvement of the three 
companies in the state's denial of customary land rights . 
The sidelining of customary land r ights by the central government prompts a 
consideration of the state's role in complementing Interdependent Engagement in 
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peace building. The state's control of natural resources highlights the limited capacity 
of Interdependent Engagement to resolve local grievances when the state itself fails to 
protect the rights of locals. Through an analysis of the state's control of natural 
resources in Bougainville and Papua, this chapter argues that corporate responsiveness 
to the terms of access to land defined by the host state does not guarantee the 
legitimacy or fairness of the resource project. Thus, while corporate agreement to 
abide by the host state's laws would generally be encouraged, the cases of Bougainville 
and Papua highlight that these laws can actually represent an injustice for locals. 
This chapter argues that while the host state is ultimately responsible for the 
promotion of peaceful natural resource development, corporations have an important 
role to engage directly with locals to ensure that their rights are not unjustly 
compromised in the states pursuit of national economic development. Put another 
way, rights are better protected when respect for rights is a plural accomplishment of 
networked governance (Braithwaite, Charlesworth & Soares, 2012), when many actors 
(the UN, states, corporations, courts, NGOs) each seek to cover the weaknesses of the 
other with their own strengths in terms of rights responsiveness. 
The role of the state in complementing Interdependent 
Engagement in peace building 
The responsibilities of host states in the promotion of responsible business practices 
have received increasing interest alongside the debate over the respons ibilities of 
business in zones of conflict. A prominent example is the UN Secretary Genera l on 
Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie's delineation of the 'responsibilities of states' 
in the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework'. According to Ruggie {2008, p.10) 
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host states have a responsibility to reinforce the steps companies take themselves to 
respect the rights of citizens. This includes: the strengthening of market pressures on 
companies to respect rights such as mandatory CSR reporting; the development of 
policies, rules and practices to determine corporate liability and punishment; the 
promotion of conflict-sensitive business practices; and to advise corporations on 
human rights risks (Ruggie, 2008, p.10-4}. While Ruggie recognises that host states find 
it difficult to strengthen social and environmental standards due to fear of foreign 
investor challenge (Ruggie, 2008, p.11L he does not explore states' responsibility to 
balance the protection of minority rights with the pursuit of national economic 
development. 
The fact that states might need assistance in balancing minority rights with national 
development is highlighted by Ballentine and Haufler (2009, p.5} who argue that, "in an 
ideal world, sovereign states would be willing and able to manage peacefully their 
internal conflicts and husband their economic assets for the collective well-being of 
their citizens". However in areas affected by conflict, "companies may be undercut not 
just by less scrupulous companies, but by host governments unconcerned or unable to 
address issues of corruption, criminality and conflict" (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development and ICUN - The World Conservation Union, 2006) . 
Ballentine and Haufler {2009, p.6) believe that conflict-sensitive business cannot take 
place in the absence of the state's assistance, through, for example, security sector 
reform, transparency, good governance and the protection of human rights. Thus, 
complementing the focus of this thesis on the interdependence between business 
activity and the societies in which they operate, the authors argue that "whether 
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positive or negative, the behaviour of companies is not simply a function of their own 
corporate cultures, but also and fundamentally a function of the broader playing field 
in which they operate" (Ballentine & Haufler, 2009, p.31). As a result of the 
interdependence between corporate activity and broader political activity, there are 
limits to what corporations can achieve in the pursuit of social and environmental 
responsibility without collaboration with state authorities. This is especially true in 
cases where there is a history of political and economic marginalisation of minority 
groups, as in Bougainville and Papua. 
This chapter discusses a key avenue through which states often fail to assist 
corporations to protect the rights of locals: the overruling of the customary ownership 
of the land on which natural resources are exploited. State control of land establishes 
natural resource companies as accountable to the laws of nation states. This means 
that states wield the power that determines the responsibilities of large natural 
resource companies, even if locals perceive the state as "an alien external force" 
(Boege & Franks, 2011, p.7). Moreover, as a consequence of the state's power to 
control land, it is the central government that ultimately determines the conduct of 
natural resource companies. This includes: the use of security to protect the resource 
project and supporting infrastructure; the revenue sharing framework, and 
environmental management processes. In this way, the power to control land 
establishes the state as the most influential audience and regulator of CSR practice. 
This is particularly problematic in situations where the state's mandate to negotiate on 
behalf of affected communities is contested. 
The limit of Interdependent Engagement in this regard is that unlike states, 
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corporations do not have the authority to recognise customary land rights and 
landowners themselves do not hold sovereign rights to sub -surface resources . As a 
result, corporations are obliged to abide by the demands of the host state, rather than 
those of the customary landowners who might share a different legal, political, 
economic and cultural agenda to that of the central government. Having said this, 
corporations operating in areas with a history of political and economic marginalisation 
do have an important opportunity to protect the rights of minority groups. This can be 
achieved through adding checks and balances to state laws that are considered 
detrimental to the rights of locals. For example, corporations can challenge the state 
laws relating to the use of security around extractive projects. This is not an unrealistic 
expectation as the employment of the state's security forces can lead to allegations of 
corporate complicity in human rights violations, potentially resulting in litigation, 
damage to the company's reputation and breaches of the regulatory guidelines 
stipulated by the financial lenders of the resource project45 (such as the World Bank or 
As ian Development Bank). 
What it is being suggesting here therefore, is that corporations' ability to recognise 
customary land rights is often heavily constrained by the state. However, in recognising 
the fact that states can fail to balance the rights of minority groups in the pursuit of 
economic development, corporations may also encounter important opportunities to 
challenge the state on social and environmental issues. Importantly, this includes the 
promot ion of greater recognition of customary rights to land . 
45 One example of this will be d iscussed in Cha pter 9 in rel at ion t o BP's Integra t ed Comm uni ty Based 
Security Strategy in Papua . 
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Land ownership and control 
The state's failure to recognise customary land rights has been a core issue expressed 
by the independence movements of Bougainville and Papua. State control of natural 
resources in Bougainville and Papua stems from the decolonisation processes of PNG 
and Indonesia discussed in Chapter 5. Reflective of broader political trends in the 20 th 
Century, newly independent states tended to focus on proclaiming national 
sovereignty through the institutionalisation of modern, Western European legal 
systems. This led to the subordination of customary land tenure systems and 
traditional forms of authority that were often seen as impediments to modernisation 
and nation building (Boege & Franks, 2011, p.6; Kyed & Buur, 2006, p.1). Consequently, 
the control of natural resources came to be vested in the state so that the wealth it 
generated could be used for the benefit of the entire nation. 
Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008, p.iii) refer to landscapes which "combine 
elements of the introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming 
from local indigenous traditions", hybrid political orders. Despite efforts to subordinate 
customary land law, traditional social structures have continued to inform "the 
everyday social reality of large parts of the population in developing countr ies even 
today, particularly in rural and remote peripheral areas" (Boege, Brown, Clements & 
Nolan, 2008, p.603). The continued importance of customary law in developing 
countries has resulted in significant contests between landowners and states over the 
legitimacy of ownership; the appropriate use of land; and entitlements to the benefi ts 
it creates. As the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (2008, p.47) outl ines : 
... under customary land tenure, ownership is based on an enduring notion of 
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inter-generational stewardship or guardianship of the physical property and 
what it represents to the group. This contrasts markedly with the Western 
notion of ownership ... which is defined in terms of individuals (or commercial 
entities), physical property and the state. 
Conflicting perspectives on land ownership can result in significant volatility in regions 
with a distinct ethnic identity to that of the majority of the population, or which are 
geographically distant from the central government. The logic of the state is to use 
resource wealth for the benefit of the entire nation. However customary landowners 
do not always believe the state has the legitimacy control their land, nor do they 
adhere to the logic that the resources extracted should be used to fund the 
development of the nation as a whole. As Boege and Franks (2011, p. 7) argue: 
... whereas statutory law governs the deals between companies and 
governments, customary law still plays a crucial role at the community level. 
Local populations often perceive the state as an alien external force that is not 
only physically distant (in the capital city) but removed from their everyday 
reality. 
State ownership of natural resources in some contexts may not be considered fair or 
legitimate in the eyes of local landowners; however it is generally the state that makes 
the decisions about the terms and conditions for corporate activity. This establishes a 
'framing error' in the conduct of resource extraction in which corporations are 
generous and responsive to the host state, less so to the local communities directly 
affected by the resource project . The following section, explains the tensions between 
the state and customary landowners in Bougainville and Papua , and the consequences 
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of this on corporate-community relations in these areas. 
Bougainville 
Customary land tenure in Bougainville 
... BCL and PNG government suppressed our traditional beliefs and system. If they 
entered [according to] our traditional ways, we wouldn't have [had] the crisis {BOU20, 
Bougainvillean ABG Government Department CEO). 
Conflicting perceptions regarding the ownership and control of the minerals extracted 
from the site of the Bougainville copper mine can be traced to the Australian colonial 
Administration's view that the Panguna valley was loosely owned and sparsely 
populated {Oliver, 1973, p.162). According to Oliver, this understanding 
misrepresented the complexity of landownership on Bougainville, pointing out that for 
local people there is no such thing as 'wholly free' or un-owned land on the Island 
{1973, p.162). Oliver claims that while customary land tenure on Bougainville is so 
complex that "perhaps no two language communities on Bougainville -Buka have 
exactly the same ideas" {Oliver, 1973, p.162), they all have numerous traditional rules 
in common: 
• different features of the landscape may be owned by different persons, but 
do not traditionally distinguish surface from sub-surface features in terms of 
ownership; 
• persons owning land tend to be multiple rather than individual; 
• in instances of multiple ownership of any land feature, the tenure rights are 
truly 'joint' ; 
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• ownership of the more permanent features of a tract of land changes mostly 
through inheritance and mainly through women; and 
• there is general opposition to unauthorised trespass, but there is generosity 
in granting temporary use if requested (Oliver, 1973, p.163). 
In contrast to the shared tenets of land ownership described by Oliver, the Territory's 
1928 Mining Ordinance stipulated that company prospectors did not require the 
permission of landowners, and specified that the ownership of precious metals was 
vested in the state for the Territory as a whole (Oliver, 1973, p.163). This clearly 
contradicted Bougainvillean understandings of shared ownership by local clans, in 
which no distinction was made between surface and sub-surface rights. As one 
Bougainvillean landowner explained during an interview held at the Panguna mine, 
.. . they said that everything was for the queen. I wanted to stop them at Kube 
but they said everything 6ft underground belongs to the Queen (BOU27}. 
Similarly, a Bougainvillean women's leader and former BCL employee stated: 
... because crown law says yours is only on the top. But we believe up top goes 
rights down. [Now] the PNG government says the bottom belongs to them 
(BOU27}. 
Following PNG's independence in 1975, the central government of PNG maintained the 
state ' s ownership and control of the minerals extracted from the Bougainville copper 
mine, and that it would use this wealth for the benefit of the whole nation. 
Consequently, the state used its power to override customary law in the name of 
nat ional econom ic development. 
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Legal rights for landowners 
... BCL said we cannot talk to you. You go and talk to the government and then 
they will talk to me (BOU20, Bougainvillean ABG Department CEO/Landowner) . 
The exclusion of Bougainvilleans in the Bougainville Copper Agreement is most evident 
in the state's marginalisation of locals in important decisions relating to the production 
of the mine. Their exclusion from the 1967 Agreement meant that local landowners did 
not have an opportunity to define the obligations with which BCL should comply. 
Consequently, BCL were only held legally accountable to the state's limited terms of 
access to land outlined in Chapter 5, affording no legal protection to the indigenous 
landowners. As a result, BCL became embroiled in local complaints about the central 
government regarding state denial of alternative land tenure systems and other 
apprehensions relating to the regulation of the mine. 
A particular resentment of Bougainvilleans towards the state was the lack of mining 
revenue and infrastructure that filtered back to the province. This was compounded by 
the fact that the PNG Government itself was a significant shareholder in the Panguna 
mine with a (19.06 per cent) stake. Consequently, the state held a financial interest in 
maximising the profit of the mine, while also wielding the power to decide what social 
and environmental damage would be an acceptable trade-off for these profi ts46 
(Thompson, 1991, p.76). Thus, while many Bougainvilleans believed that 118CL were 
46 The issue of contests over resou rce wea lth w ill be discussed in more deta il in the next chapter, but it 
is ra ised here in order to illustrate how loca l interests can often be comprom ised by the states own 
'profit motive'. 
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willing to listen but not the national government'' (BOUll, Bougainvillean Civil 
Servant), there is only so much the company could achieve without the cooperation of 
the state . 
As a direct consequence of the state's ownership of sub-surface minerals, the Panguna 
mine provided a major source of national income, with BCL contributing 16 per cent of 
PNG's internally generated income and 44 per cent of its exports between 1972 and 
1991 (Thompson, 1991). The problem for Bougainville however, was that very little of 
this income was channelled back to the island where: 
... the roads were not even bitumen and BCL only built roads for where they 
operated" [BOU11, Bougainvil/ean Civil Servant]. 
Thus as Thompson (1991, p.77) states: 
... while a large proportion of the financial benefits gained by the national 
government from mining on Bougainville have been utilized for the benefit of 
all Papua New Guineans, the social costs have been borne largely by the 
Bougainvilleans themselves. 
The state's role in complementing Interdependent Engagement in this situation would 
be to ensure that greater benefits are returned to those affected by the resource 
project than to citizens elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter 5, one example of where 
the state could have worked towards this was in the 1974 renegotiations of the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement . However this Agreement was written during a period 
of Australian colonial rule where a new state was created for a territory (PNG). This 
territory actually incorporated numerous peoples 'states', each with their own 
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customs, languages and land tenure systems. Instead of integrating the complexities of 
this into the conduct of mining on Bougainville, the PNG Government gave Bougainville 
as a whole a greater share of mining royalties, but not an increase in the control of 
land. The outcome of the 1974 renegotiation demonstrated to Bougainvilleans the 
unwillingness of the state to tackle the much bigger problem of Bougainville's land 
being destroyed for the economic development of PNG. In hindsight, it might have 
been better to use the renegotiation process to make significant changes in the 
management and control of the mine and to channel funds into restoring the social 
and environmental harms on locally negotiated terms. 
Papua 
Bougainvillean dissatisfaction with the PNG Government's authority to control land has 
to a large degree been mirrored by Papuan attitudes to the Indonesian state. With the 
aid of Indonesia's security forces, the Government has been accused of exploiting 
Papua's resource wealth to fund development in other parts of the nation. Papuans 
often say that when they go to Jakarta and see all the huge office buildings they begin 
to understand where the money made from Papuan mines has gone. Comparable to 
the Bougainville case, Indonesian law has overridden customary land tenure in the 
governance of mining, oil and gas . Consequently, the Papua case illustrates similar 
themes to those already discussed for Bougainville: the lack of legitimacy of the state 
to negotiate on behalf of landowners; the imposition of a foreign land administration 
system; the lack of trust in the state to protect indigenous rights, and t he 
disproportionate allocation of revenues in favour of the state. 
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In recent years the Indonesian Government has begun making efforts to ensure greater 
social and environmental standards for resource companies through state law. 
Indonesia has become the first country to oblige CSR (Rosser & Edwin , 2010} following 
the adoption of the 2007 Indonesian Corporate Law No.40 as well as the 2007 
Indonesian Investment Law No.25 (Waagstein, 2011, p.455). The Laws deliver on the 
view that the social responsibilities of business will be strengthened as a legal 
obligation and not just left to the goodwill of corporations alone. Even though obliging 
CSR might be a suitable option in theory, there are two key limitations of this approach . 
Firstly, mandatory CSR does not afford greater recognition of customary land rights. 
Second, mandatory CSR further entrenches the distributive paradigm of CSR that this 
thesis argues is insufficient for the meaningful resolution of local grievances. 
What is being advocated in Indonesia? 
Details concerning mandatory CSR in Indonesia can be found in Article 74 of the 2007 
Indonesian Corporate Law No.40. The Article states that: 
• Compan ies doing business in the field of and/or in relation to natural 
resources must put into practice Environmental and Social Respon si bility47 . 
• The Envi ronmental and Social Responsibil ity contemplated in paragraph (1) 
const itutes an obligat ion of the Company wh ich shall be budgeted for and 
calcul ated as a cost of the Company performance of wh ich sha ll be wi th due 
attention t o decency and fa irness. 
47 Environmental and Social Respons ibility is defined in Article 1 of 2007 Indonesian Corporate Law No.40 
as : " a company' s commitment to taking part in sustainable economic development in order to improve 
the quality of life and environment, which will be beneficial for the Company itself, the local community, 
and society in general ". (cited in Waagstein, 2011, p.459) 
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• Companies who do not put their obligation into practice as contemplated in 
paragraph (1) shall be liable to sanctions in accordance with the provisions of 
legislative regulations. 
• Further provisions regarding Environmental and Social Responsibility shall be 
stipulated by Government Regulation. (cited in Waagstein, 2011, p.459) 
The biggest problem associated with clarifying the intent of Article 74 is that the 
President of Indonesia has not stipulated the implementing legislation (Rosser & Edwin, 
2010, p.17). Until such time that the implementing regulations are produced, civil 
society organisations and business associations will be left to speculate on the direction 
of the new Laws (Waagstein, 2011, p.465). 
A source of this speculation has been the draft implementing legislation outlined 
during a constitutional court hearing in 2009. In this hearing several business 
associations argued that CSR should be "voluntary, depending- on the size of the firms 
and in which sectors they operated" {The Jakarta Post, 2009}. The presiding judge M. 
Mahfud M.D dismissed the case arguing that: 
... investors, both domestic and private, have to build a harmonious relationship 
with society and their surroundings ... [and that] companies will contribute more 
to the society and environment if voluntary CSR programs are made mandatory 
(The Jakarta Post, 2009). 
Despite reinforcing state support for mandatory CSR the court hearing provided no 
additional clarity on the nature and scope of the new laws. This has been reflected in 
two very contradictory understandings of the draft implementing legislation in two 
scholarly articles focusing on the new laws. On the one hand, Waagstein {2011, p.461} 
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claims that: 
... according to the governmental plan outlined during the Constitutional Court 
hearing, the size of CSR fund and fine, its purpose, and its beneficiaries will be 
determined by the local government depending on the needs of that particular 
region . 
On the other hand, Rosser and Edwin (2010, p.2) claim that: 
... the draft of the implementing legislation gives companies full discretion over 
the activities that constitute CSER [Corporate Social and Environmental 
Responsibility] and how much to invest in them, effectively subverting the 
mandatory requirements of Article 74. 
The option described by Waagstein would make local government the primary 
audience and recipient of a 'CSR fund'. In contrast, the option described by Rosser and 
Edwin predicts that the onus will be entirely on corporations to prescribe their own 
CSR agenda - with the only mandatory requirement that companies report on their 
implementation of CSR programs in their annual reports (as obliged under Article 
66(2)). Whatever the practical implications, it appears clear that the new laws 
pertaining to CSR in Indonesia do not emphasise the issues of most concern to locals . 
More specifically on the topic of this chapter, they do not include greater recognition of 
customary land r ights. Indeed, the debate over mandatory CSR is primarily focu se d on 
the issue of how much corporations should spend on CSR, rather than efforts to 
establish landowners as "as peers, capable of part icipat ing on a par with one another" 
(Fraser, 2000, p.113) in the conduct of the resource project . 
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Customary land tenure in Papua 
As was discussed in relation to Bougainville, the Papuan experience of resource 
exploitation has been intricately linked to state control of land. The land in question in 
the Papua case holds particular spiritual and cultural significance (see Chl0). When 
Freeport arrived in Papua, the Amungme and Kamoro were living rich subsistence 
lifestyles where their land had both economic and spiritual significance. Land was 
regarded simultaneously as a source of food, a shelter in time of tribal war and a place 
to communicate with ancestral spirits (Tebay, 2005, p.11). According to Abrash and 
Kennedy {2002, p.64), the mountain on which the Freeport mine was developed holds 
particular spiritual significance in Amungme cosmology, which depicts the mountain 
"as the sacred head of their mother and its rivers are her milk. To the Amungme, 
Freeport is digging out her heart". The permanent alienation of this landscape into the 
hands of Indonesia, has thus not only contradicted traditional land cultivation 
practices, but has deeply offended the unique Amungme spiritual ties to the mountain. 
Indonesian law during the 1960s did in fact recognise customary land rights. However, 
these rights carry no legal weight in relation to resource development as a result of 
two clauses in the Indonesian Constitution. Article 33, Clause 2, states that: "branches 
of production which are important for the state and which affect the life of most of the 
people shall be controlled by the state" (cited in Sumule, 2002, p.6), while Clause 3 
stipulates that; "land and water and the natural riches therein shall be controlled by 
the state and shall be made use of for the greatest welfare of the people" (cited in 
Sumule, 2002, p.6}. What this means in practice is that "should valuable resources be 
found on their traditional lands or should the state determine that it requires their 
163 
land, then such land automatically becomes tanah negara (state-owned land)" {Leith, 
2003, p.109L 
The fact that the laws of the Indonesian state stipulate that sub-surface minerals can 
be used for the benefit of the government reinforce feelings of exploitation held by a 
significant proportion of Papuans. The Indonesian state is seen by Papuans as neither 
holding the legitimacy to negotiate with resource companies on their behalf, nor 
demonstrating sensitivity to their culture and spiritual ties to the land. Consequently, 
the exploitation of Papua's land for the benefit of the national development of 
Indonesia has, and continues to be, deeply associated with Papuan calls for 
independence. For these reasons, Boege and Franks' (2011) argument that locals often 
perceive the state as 'an alien external force' is also an accurate description of the 
Papuan context. However the financial interests of the state's security forces in 
Papua's natural resource development (see Ch 9} means that the state is not 
necessarily physically distant. 
Legal rights for landowners 
There is no denying the importance of legal protection to landowners in formal 
agreements between states and corporations. However the fact that the legal basis of 
these agreements can contradict the cultural significance of land results in contested 
understandings of the results of these negotiations. As a result, affording landowners 
greater property rights alone is not enough to guarantee the protection of locals in the 
process of resource extraction. This has been most evident in recent accusations put 
forward by three landowning clans residing in the vicinity of BP's Tangguh LNG project. 
The landowners argue that the handover of their land was involuntary despite signing a 
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written agreement relinquishing their customary land rights for the development of 
the LNG site (Down to Earth, 2005, p.8}. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, prior to BP's involvement in the Tangguh project, ARCO and 
British Gas were involved in exploration activities in Bintuni Bay. Following the 
discovery of significant natural gas reserves, a consultation and negotiation process 
took place between ARCO and BPM IGAS for the acquisition of land ( BP Berau Limited, 
2006, p.xxi}. ARCO has since been accused of being given access to the customary lands 
of three landowning communities, the Wayuri, Soway and Simuna without their 
consent (JATAM 2003, Down to Earth, 2005, p.6}. 
In BP's resettlement planning document (BP Berau Limited, 2006}, the company 
defends ARCO's acquisition of land, arguing that "from the outset the project 
recognised indigenous or adat communities with special connections to land and 
resources". As suggested earlier, recognition of traditional rights in Indonesia has 
historically held little significance, as these customary land rights can be overridden by 
the state. However it is now a requirement in Indonesian law that land is obtained in 
consultation with the customary landowners and the establishment of appropriate 
methods of compensation (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.46}. 
The Wayuri, Soway and Simuna communities do not deny that representatives signed 
the agreement that relinquished their land rights, however they do dispute the terms 
of the agreement. The clans' core objection is that according to Indonesian law, once 
these traditional rights are extinguished, they are irretrievable. The landowning groups 
claim that in signing the agreement they believed land rights would be relinquished for 
the life of the gas project, not forever. However as BP states, "the law makes it clear 
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that a traditional land right that has been relinquished cannot be revived or reclaimed 
by heirs" (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.45). 
As an appendage to BP's resettlement planning document (BP Berau Limited, 2006), 
the company included the minutes of the Agreement between PERTAMINA/ARCO and 
representatives of the landowners, dated 20 th May and 19 th July 1999. The Minutes 
documented that the: 
... landowners irrevocably relinquish the rights to the land, and their hak ulayat 
(indigenous land rights) will become forever null and void. The status of the 
land is released to the State, so that the Government shall grant the title to the 
land to PERTAMINA48 (BP, 2006, p.265). 
The minutes were signed by representatives of all three clans and witnessed by 
members of the Manokwari local government. Five years later, the three-landowning 
clans released a statement addressed to BPMIGAS claiming that: 
... the Soway, Wayuri and Simuna relinquished land to Pertamina was not legally 
valid because it did not reflect whatsoever the value we place on land as a 
source of livelihoods which had been handed down to us through the 
generations (quoted in Down to Earth, 2005, p.6). 
The contested nature of the PERTAMINA/ARCO agreement ra ises important questions 
about processes of consent, in particular how much informat ion the landowners were 
J'l PERTAMI NA is the Ind onesian state oil com pany whi ch previ ously held the regul atory funct ion of 
Indonesia ' s oil and gas Industry which is now held by BPMIGAS. 
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given, the language in which the information was provided and how much pressure 
was placed on the landowners to sign the documents. However the fundamental issue 
raised by the landowners is that the Agreement does not align with the traditional 
significance of land in their lives. While ARCO and the Indonesian Government might 
not have acquired the land in violation of Indonesian land laws, in the eyes of the clans 
the status of the land remains contested. 
The Papuan case demonstrates that even when states enact new laws in an attempt to 
promote legal certainty, they can also increase uncertainty for the 'social license to 
operate' for natural resource companies in contexts where land ownership is 
contested. This can lead to significant implications for the sustainability of mining 
operations. For example, the conflict that ensued in Bougainville led to the cessation of 
mining activities altogether. The social issue that BP must now manage is that the 
Soway, Wayuri and Simuna clans will continue to claim the invalidity of the acquisition 
of their land from which the company profits significantly. 
Since the core complaint of these landowners is related to the permanent alienation of 
their land, the mandatory CSR paradigm that Indonesia has adopted is unlikely to 
encourage BP to resolve this conflict. This is because the landowners are not seeking 
greater levels of compensation or more community development projects. Rather, as 
the landowner's argue: 
... the community development projects and plans about new settlement and 
proposed community fund are part of BP's social commitment as set out in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment. They are nothing to do with the issue of the 
status of land that we are demanding (Down to Earth, 2005, p.6). 
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Unless BP and the Indonesian Government work hard to tackle the underlying -issues 
associated with the status of land, no revenue or community development package will 
be considered sufficient recompense by the landowners. Indeed, demands for changes 
to state law to return the legal ownership of the land to the traditional owners fall 
within the remit of governments, not corporations. However, a voluntary approach to 
CSR {that is not driven by the interests of the state) opens a significant opportunity for 
BP to contribute to peaceful development in Papua. It may be possible for BP to use its 
financial and political influence to lobby Jakarta for greater recognition not only of 
traditional landowning rights, but also the importance of land to the cultural identity of 
Papuans. In this way, voluntary CSR can be used to promote status equality, feeding 
into the resolution of justice claims for recognition as articulated by Fraser {2000, 
p.113} . As is demonstrated in the Papuan case, such claims for recognition can hold 
equal, in some cases more, weight in the peaceful resolution of local resentments of 
resource extraction. 
One practical example that BP has mentioned it is willing to take in the pursuit of 
Papuan claims for recognition, is to approach the Government to reverse the 
irrevocability of hak ulayat and to return these rights to the landowners once the 
Tangguh project has been completed {BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.69}. It is too early in 
the life of the project to evaluate BP's efforts to translate this commitment into action. 
However the history of resource development in Papua indicates that if BP does not 
handle th is conflict successfully its corporate image will become increasingly enmeshed 
in, and tarn is hed by broader Papuan struggles for merdeka. 
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Resource politics as state politics 
... Indonesia doesn't see us as real Indonesian citizens. They just use us for what 
they need in Jakarta {Papua29, Religious leader). 
Comparably again to Bougainville, the state's ownership and control of Papua's natural 
resources has been further complicated by the fact that the Indonesian Government 
draws significant financial profit from the Freeport and BP projects. Consequently, the 
state and its security forces (see Ch 9} have a strong interest in maximising the profits 
of the two resource projects, and simultaneously wield the power to decide what social 
and environmental damages are acceptable for the benefit of all Indonesians. 
As detailed in Chapter 5, during the period 1991-2000 Freeport paid an average of 
US$180 million in taxes and revenues to the Indonesian government each year, making 
it Indonesia's largest taxpayer (Tebay, 2005, p.19}. In regards to BP, current estimates 
suggest that the Indonesian Government will earn nearly US$9 billion from the 
Tangguh LNG project from 2006-2030, of which US$3.6 billon will go to West Papua 49 
(Tebay, 2005, p.19}. 
On the face of it $3.6 billion to the province of West Papua and $9 billion for the whole 
nation might not appear inequitable. However there have been significant problems in 
ensuring that these resources trickle down to locals and are not siphoned off by a 
corrupt political elite. In the next chapter we will see that despite Jakarta giving 
49 The revenue sharing framework between the newly divided provinces of Papua and West Papua 
under Papuan Special Autonomy Law No. 2001 will be discussed in the next chapter . 
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Papuans a generous share of these revenues under Papuan Special Autonomy Law {80 
per cent from forestry, fisheries and mining, and 70 per cent from oil and gas 
exploration), the implementation of this law is widely considered to have failed 
{Hernawan, 2011). 
Indeed akin to the early responses of the PNG Government towards Bougainville, 
Indonesia has attempted to give Papuans a greater share of revenues without 
simultaneously engaging with broader disputes over the recognition of customary land 
and the social and environmental problems caused by resource development. The 
limitation of state mandated CSR to foster peaceful resource development 
demonstrated by the Papuan case is that while the central government is receiving the 
lion's share of the natural resource revenue, they are unlikely to be motivated to 
prioritise the protection of local landowner rights. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that as a result of the state's ownership and control of natural 
resources in Bougainville and Papua, BCL, Freeport and BP have been generous and 
responsive to the interests of the central governments of PNG and Indonesia. In this 
way, resource development companies are seen by local communities as acting to 
endorse and further entrench the state's den ia I of customary land tenure. Evident here 
is the denial of the capacity for locals to define what makes up 'the social' for 
themselves. While the social is "imagine d to be a limited specific domain" (Latour, 
2005 , p.8) by corporat ions, it might more accurately be conceptualised as a fluid, 
complex and heterogeneous web of associations {Latour, 2005, p.8). 
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The denial of this complexity has been a core objection of both the Bougainville and 
Papua independence movements. Although the state is ultimately responsible for 
promoting peaceful development, it has been argued that corporations should, where 
possible work to promote minority rights in the face of central governments' pursuit of 
national development. As the Bougainville and Papua cases illustrate, without this level 
of engagement there is a high risk that the companies will become caught up with 
broader political struggles against the nation state. It also increases the risk that 
resource projects will be shut down altogether. 
An important observation is this chapter was the state's control of natural resources 
often results in the inequitable distribution of resource wealth. In the following 
chapter, regional inequality in Bougainville and Papua will be explored more 
extensively. It will be argued that even though a logical solution to this issue may 
appear to centre on providing landowners a greater share of mining royalties, these 
funds can distort local relationships and create new internal divisions over access to 
resource wealth. 
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Chapter 7: Hierarchies of Revenue and Compensation 
Site of Disengaged Engaged 
interdependence ( CSR as it mostly is) (CSR reconfigured) 
Regional inequality Corporations treat local Corporations acknowledge 
& contests over communities as an diversity in the ways local 
resource wealth homogenous entity and are communities are affected by 
not conscious of the problems resource development, but are 
associated with different conscious of the dangers in 
levels of compensation creating hierarchies of 
compensation 
Chapter 6 highlighted several issues associated with the perceived inequitable 
distribution of resource wealth in favour of the central governments of PNG and 
Indonesia, over the resource producing regions of Bougainville and Papua . This chapter 
delves into these issues more deeply by in troducing the third site of interdependence : 
regional inequality and contests over resource wealth. The problem exposed is that 
addressing tensions over regional inequalities is more complex than simply giving locals 
a greater share of resource wealth. In the absence of critical engagement with the 
ways in which resource wealth can distort local relationships, funnelling additional 
revenue back to the resource producing regions is an insufficient mechanism to avoid 
conflict (Ross, 2009, p.3) . 
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This chapter will demonstrate that the potential to avoid conflict is contingent not only 
on the level of wealth distribution, but also on how this wealth is distributed. In other 
words, the 'how' is as important as the 'how much'. For example, symbolic reparation 
for damage to land with specific spiritual significance to locals (see Ch 11) can be as 
important as, or more important than material reparation for mining activities. 
Analysis of and comparison between BCL, Freeport and BP's revenue sharing and 
compensation procedures, reveals how the companies have created and/or 
exacerbated a number of critical internal divisions. These divisions can most accurately 
be mapped according to a three-layered hierarchy: national, provincial and local. This 
chapter will show how important divisions in Bougainvillean and Papuan society have 
been created at each of these levels. 
This chapter uses the lens of hierarchies of compensation and regional inequality to 
further develop the broader argument of this thesis as a whole, that distributing 
material resources to local communities is not enough to resolve local grievances and 
contests over natural resource development. Quite the contrary, material resources 
have the potential to ignite, prolong and exacerbate conflict when they are distributed 
without a simultaneous engagement with their effects on local sources of injustice and 
tension. 
The economic drivers of conflict 
As discussed in Chapter 3, since the 1990s, there has been a flood of scholarship on 
natural resources and civil war (Ross, 2009, p.337). This scholarship was stimulated in 
part by Paul Collier who argues that, "economic agendas appear to be central to 
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understanding why civil wars get going. Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by 
economic opportunities than by grievance". The logic of Collier's argument is that " if 
economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting 
from conflict and that these groups therefore have some interest in initiating and 
sustaining it" (1999, p.l). Thus, instead of the more popular emphasis on the 
grievances associated with the exploitation of natural resources, Collier argues that 
economic factors are the main drivers of conflict, with some small identifiable groups 
directly profiting from the violence. This 'greed' hypothesis points to the potential for 
civil wars to be created by individuals or groups who attempt to loot the resource in 
order to finance a rebellion movement, thereby funding the start-up costs of an 
insurgency or extending the duration of the conflict (Ross, 2004b, p.39). In this way, 
the greed hypothesis does not: 
... suggest that rebels launch a conflict in anticipation of resource wealth; 
rather ... that rebels use looted resource wea Ith in the prewar phase to buy arms 
and hire soldiers - thus funding the "start-up costs" of initiating a rebellion 
(Ross, 2004b, p.40) . 
While individuals or groups of individuals might not launch a conflict in anticipation of 
siphoning off resource wealth, the presence of resource wealth may extend conflict by 
providing a financial incentive for continued violence. In relation to the Bougainville 
case for example, key members of the BRA continued the push for independence from 
PNG because they believed an independent Bougainville was fiscally possible through 
re -opening the mine (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.23). Thus, 
while Francis Ona ' s initial attacks on BCL property might be perceived as an attempt to 
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close the mine forever, Ona was also motivated to achieve a fairer financial deal for 
landowners and for Bougainvilleas a whole (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 
2010, p.23}. 
Other actors, such as state security forces or foreign mercenaries, might be more be 
directly motivated by greed and trigger violence as a means to financial gain. Another 
example from the Bougainville case are the efforts of Sandline International, a British 
based private military company that convinced several members of the PNG 
Government in the mid 1990s to contract services to 'blast' the leadership of the BRA 
(Dinnen, 1997, p.70}. Sandline was motivated to engage in the Bougainville conflict not 
only for payments for services provided to the PNG Government {US$25 million}, but 
also by the promise of a future stake in the mine if Rio Tinto were willing to sell their 
share. 
According to Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn {2010, p.43}, paradoxically, 
"Sandline's resource diplomacy played out to shorten the war" and catalysed a peace 
deal on Bougainville. Chapter 9 will discuss yet another example of military spoilers in 
the case of Papua, where the Indonesian security forces are widely believed to have 
instigated attacks in the vicinity of Freeport's mining area as part of a protection racket 
to guarantee ongoing security payments. 
Aside from the greed thesis set out by Collier, Haysom and Kane (2009} reveal a 
number of important links between large natural resource companies and host country 
economies that can heighten the risk of civil war. These are : 
• the unequal distribution of resource revenue; 
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• inaccurate procedures for identifying landowners; 
• opportunities for corruption; 
• the uneven distribution of revenues locally; 
• the creation of new social problems (such as substance abuse and crime); and 
• the creation of new class structures. 
In Bougainville and Papua, there is evidence of all six of these problems associated with 
the distribution of resource wealth generated by the BCL, Freeport and BP projects. 
This chapter aims to flesh out the links between the distribution of resource wealth 
and conflict. Drawing on the regional work of Colin Filer and Glenn Banks, it explains 
how the distribution of wealth in Bougainville and Papua has resulted in important 
changes in the relationships between individuals, groups, and local environments (Filer, 
1990, p.190) . It begins by outlining the iterative design of the resource companies' 
compensation and revenue sharing procedures. This is followed by an explanation of 
how these procedures have created contests over resource wealth in Bougainville and 
Papua . 
Bougainvi/le 
The early stages (1963-1966) 
The first compensation pol icies of BCL were determined by the Australian 
Administration under the 1963 Prospecting Authority and the 1928 M ining Ordinance 
(Bedford & Mamak 1979, p.3). Under this legislation, the only compensation payments 
to be made directly to landowners related to damaged trees, gardens and other 
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personal property destroyed by the company prospectors (Connell, 1991, p.61; 
Bedford & Mamak, 1979, p. 7). Consequently, compensation payments during this 
period were quite low and were negotiated by landowners and company prospectors 
without external mediation. 
Once the Administration and the company decided to go ahead with the mine, more 
formal procedures for the distribution of compensation were deemed necessary. 
Subsequently, in 1966 the Australian Government amended its 1928 Mining Ordinance 
to grant the company three mining leases that included the port mine access road, the 
special mining lease, and the tailings area around the Kawerong-Jaba river system. The 
1966 amendment to the 1928 Mining Ordinance incorporated the following provisions 
for compensation: 
• Damage to surface and improvements 
• Loss of surface rights and access 
• Consequential damage 
• Formalisation of procedures through the Mining Warden 
• Payment of occupation fees of 5 per cent unimproved value (Quodling, 1991, 
p.47). 
As discussed in Chapter 6 the revenue sharing formula that favoured PNG as a nation, 
rather than Bougainville specifically, was one of the earliest local complaints directed 
towards the company an9 the Administration. Protests against the agreed revenue 
sharing formula gained political momentum when Bougainville's House of Assembly 
member, Paul Lapun, lobbied the Australian Government to obtain a better deal for 
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landowners. Lapun's main concerns were that under the 1966 Mining Ordinance 
amendments Bougainvilleans were only entitled to compensation for minor damages, 
and that the amendments included no coherent plan to safeguard the economic rights 
of locals (Thompson, 1991, p.75). To address these issues Lapun introduced the Mining 
New Guinea Bill No.2 in 1966, "which proposed that 5 per cent of royalties which the 
Administration would receive from the company should be paid directly to 
landowners" {Cooper, 1991, p.58). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the problem with Lapun's proposition was that his views on 
the how mining should be progressed on Bougainville were not shared by all 
landowners. Further, at this time there was no individual or representative body, which 
had the authority to represent all landowners. Lapun can be seen to have been in the 
impossible position of trying to represent the interests of both landowners who 
welcomed the mine, and landowners that simply wanted the company to go away. 
The earliest discussions regarding the distribution of wealth from the Bougainville 
copper mine were deeply entwined with conflicting views over Bougainville's future, 
and particularly the role of mining. The increased fiscal compensation for 
Bougainvilleans negotiated by Lapun under the 1966 amendments to the Mining 
Ordinance had little hope of alleviating the concerns of the landowners who opposed 
the mining project under any circumstances. 
The construction and production period 
Despite considerable opposition to the development of the mine, the Australian 
Government passed Lapun 's proposed amendments to the 1966 Mining Ordinance and 
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the Bougainville Copper Agreement was passed a year later (Cooper, 1991, p.58) . 
Despite the more favourable terms won by Lapun, the inaccurate procedures used to 
identify landowners meant that the royalty distribution agreement still became a key 
factor contributing to conflict (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.16). 
As Wesley-Smith and Ogan (1992, p.256) claim, neither the company nor the 
Administration took: 
... into account the traditional hierarchy of land rights that served a different 
mode of production. Thus, villagers who had subsidiary claims under traditional 
tenure systems received much less than those who were regarded, however 
correctly, as primary right holders. 
In spite of the fact that the 5 per cent of the Government's royalty of 1.25 per cent 
represented a relatively small amount of money, the way in which it was distributed 
contributed to the unequal distribution of revenues in "an area that had previously 
been categorised by a relative egalitarianism" {Wesley-Smith & Ogan, 1992, p.259). 
Former CEO of BCL, Paul Quodling {1991, p.46), has defended the company's early 
compensation policies on the basis that "there was little in the way of precedents 
throughout developing countries and virtually none within the Melanesian 
landownership culture". Whether previous business experience in Melanesia would 
have resulted in a deal more conducive to peace in Bougainville is open to speculation . 
What can be said in hindsight is that two crucial mistakes were made during th is 
period . Firstly, both the company and the Administration lent too heavily on the views 
of a single Bougainvillean, Paul Lapun who had not been vested authority to represent 
the views of all landowners. Second, the distribution of payments was not designed 
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with regard to Bougainville's customary land tenure system (see Ch 6). 
Despite the problematic nature of the compensation agreement1 the construction of 
the mine commenced, leading to dramatic and sudden social and environmental 
changes in Bougainville. Alongside these changes, landowners began claiming 
compensation for a diverse range of damages at higher rates than the 1966 Agreement 
specified. For example, Connell claims that during the period 1969-80, compensation 
was made available to landowners for crops, resettlement, nuisance, land occupation 1 
pollution (of rivers and fish), and loss of bushland (Connell, 1991, p.61-2). Bedford and 
Mamak (1979, p.41) further claim that BCL was required to build houses for relocated 
villagers in permanent materials, develop road access, construct a church and provide 
water tanks. 
Payment for these facilities, which totalled around AU$75,000 (Bedford & Mamak 1 
1979, p.42), were originally provided by the Administration upon application by 
landowners to the Mining Warden . However BCL later established a Village Relations 
Department to handle the distribution of funds to affected villages . Compensation 
mostly occurred in the form of one-off cash payments 1 with the most substantial 
payments made to villagers living directly on the mine site or along the Jaba River 
valley {Connell, 1991, p.62). 
The method of providing one -off cash payments proved problemat ic. A large 
proportion of these payments were used for short-term ends {Connell, 1991, p.63; 
Quodling, 1991, p.52L and landowners considered 'one-off' arrangements to be an 
inadequate form of compensation for the loss of cash crops that would have generated 
income throughout the period of the mine's operation {Connell, 1991, p.63). There was 
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also confusion on the Island about the nature and capital value of these payments. As 
Bedford and Mamak (1979, p.3) claim, there came to be a: 
... widely held belief on Bougainville that very large sums are being paid 
annually to people living near the mine. On the other hand, others claim that 
those Bougainvilleans in the lease areas are receiving virtually nothing in the 
way of compensation. 
These conflicting perceptions are also reflected in the Bougainville data collected for 
this study. For example, a Bougainvillean civil servant claimed: 
... landowners were paid like the dole in Australia. They had everything they 
wanted. They became lazy. We regarded them as wealthy {BOU36}. 
On the other hand, a former Bougainvillean employee of BCL stated: 
... towards landowners they were not benefiting too much. The national 
government was benefiting. The rate was too low to the locals who own the 
land {BOU22, former BCL employee). 
These statements point to the communication problems that tainted the distribution of 
compensation payments amongst Bougainvilleans. They highlight the lack of 
transparency on behalf of the company regarding the amounts of money distributed, 
to whom and for what reasons. Despite these obvious problems, neither BCL nor the 
Administration developed adequate solutions, and the distribution of wealth became 
more and more problematic as mining progressed. 
Bougainvillean concerns about the distribution of revenue between Bougainville and 
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the central government of PNG escalated a major debate in 1974, just prior to -PNG's 
independence. As discussed in Chapter 6, in response to Bougainvillean criticisms, 
Michael Somare granted Bougainville a share of the mining royalties via the newly 
formed North Solomon Islands Provincial Government. Despite giving the Provincial 
Government a share of the royalties, the 1974 renegotiations did not result in tangible 
benefits for villages living outside of BCL's mining lease areas. Consequently, tensions 
began to emerge over the uneven development of Bougainville. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, BCL initiated a new compensation package in 1980 
supplementary to the 1974 Agreement with the PNG Government (Braithwaite, 
Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.17). This package was to be distributed through 
the Road Mining Lease Trust Fund, governed by an executive committee that included 
several members of the PLA (Thompson, 1991, p.82). The aim of the Fund was to 
generate a source of revenue for Bougainvilleans once the mine ceased operation 
{Connell, 1991, p.65; Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.17), and 
would also be used to provide assistance for education, health and other basic services 
(Thompson, 1991, p.82). 
The Trust Fund was seen as a logical response to tensions between Bougainvilleans 
over unequal development; however it too gradually became a source of antagonism, 
with conflict igniting between the executive and other landowners {Thompson, 1991, 
p.82) . According to the Bougainville data, landowners held three core grievances about 
the Fund. First , it diverted revenue away from landowners and into projects 
geographically distant from the mining lease area. Second, under the Trust Fund 
arrangement, landowners did not enjoy immediate benefits. Finally, a younger 
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generation of landowners believed the executive were siphoning off funds for their 
own benefit . As a Bougainvillean landowner explained: 
... The money was being paid into the Road Mining Lease Trust Fund ... What 
was happening was the money was not being paid directly to the landowners 
but to the Trust Fund. We asked, 'why isn't the Road Mining Lease Trust setting 
up benefits for what BCL was paying into their accounts?'. There was an 
expectation that anything to do with disruption to landowners should have 
been paid direct to the beneficiaries (BOU20, ABG Department 
CEO/Landowner). 
Following continued speculation that the Trust Fund's management was "corrupt and 
self serving" a coup took place in 1987 "with the old PLA being replaced by a new 
group of mostly young people led by Perpetua Serero and FFancis Ona" (Thompson, 
1991, p.83). As discussed in Chapter 5, Ona then demanded the sum of 10 billion kina 
for environmental damage, as well as a SO per cent share of the mine's revenue. When 
these demands were not met, violent attacks on the mine ensued. 
Greed vs. grievance 
Various experts of the Bougainville conflict have applied the greed vs. grievance debate 
discussed earlier in this chapter. These scholars (Regan, 2003; Banks, 2005; Filer, 1990) 
share the view that the young landowners were not motivated by greed. For example, 
Regan (2003, p.134) claims that: 
... although grievances about the distribution of mine revenue were central to 
the origins of the conflict, the conflict was not primarily about rebel access to 
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the wealth of the mine, nor did that wealth provide funding needed to make 
the rebellion more viable and thereby continue to its presence. 
Further, Banks (2005, p.187} argues that although there were calls for money, "this was 
less a call for a greater share of resource rents and more a statement that no amount 
of money would satisfy their grievances". As such, the dominant thesis in the literature 
on Bougainville is that although some individuals in Bougainville's opposition 
movement might well have been motivated by greed, it was not the dominant driver. 
Instead, as Regan argues: 
... local grievances about the impact of mining operations and the way its 
revenues were allocated fed into a long-standing sense of cultural and political 
exclusion felt by Bougainvilleans precipitating armed conflict (Regan, 2003, 
p.134}. 
As the greed vs. grievance framework provides a limited lens through which to 
consider the nature of the conflict in Bougainville, scholars such as Filer (1990} and 
Banks (2005} have built on the framework by including a cultural analysis of the 
influence of Melanesian ways of being in the distribution of resource wealth. Banks, for 
example, argues that the greed vs. grievance polarity limits our understanding of 
Melanesian resource conflicts, which might, " be more accurately mapped around 
notions of identity: individual, group and region" (Banks, 2005, p.188) . Similarly, Filer 
suggests that resource conflicts in PNG are not primarily about greed or grievance but 
are "more centrally about the changes that occur in relationships between individuals, 
groups, and local environments" (Filer, 1990, p.190}. 
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Banks and Filer thus consider the distribution of resource wealth as a single factor that 
generates a broader reconfiguration of local space. Mirroring Latour's {2005, p.l) 
theory of the social, the local community is not "a stabilized set of affairs". This idea is 
backed up by the Bougainville data collected for this study, which indicates that BCL's 
distribution of compensation and revenue has led to the creation of new internal 
divisions that can be mapped according to a 'hierarchy of revenue and compensation'. 
In Bougainville, the interview data indicates the establishment of a three-layered 
hierarchy. 
National level division - Bougainville 
The first division is created at the national level between PNG and Bougainville and 
stems from the small amount of wealth channelled back to Bougainville compared with 
the central government. As discussed earlier, this unequal distribution exacerbated 
strong feelings of resentment that Bougainville's land was being exploited for the 
development of other provinces of PNG. As a Bougainvillean women's leader claimed : 
... the national government was looking to develop other provinces. I don't know 
why they did it. I was always talking about roads ... they were never built like 
they were in Rabaul. They are important for access to services. Women are still 
carrying 'vegies' on their back {BOU33}. 
Provincial level division - Bougainville 
The second division was created at the provincial level with tensions evolving between 
landowners from the mining lease area and Bougainvilleans more broadly. The key 
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driver of this division was the perceived lack of development for Bougainvill€ as a 
whole, in contrast to the landowners. While the impact of resource extraction was 
most intense and visible for the directly affected local landowners, the impacts of the 
mining project were not limited to people from BCL's mining lease areas. One 
Bougainvillean women's leader expressed it this way, the compensation regime, 
... benefited only the surroundings [of the mine]. It didn't benefit us. That's when 
the problem started. Big damage was done on the outside too" (BOU26, 
women 's leader/ religious leader). 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, regional tensions can be traced to 
communication problems associated with BCL's Village Relations Department who 
11didn 1t voice the concerns of all Bougainvilleans 11 (BOU19, Bougainvillean Landowner) . 
However, some argue that the problem was also connected to the focus of BCL's 
contributions to community development, which primarily targeted district level 
projects rather than local village improvements. For example, most of the 
infrastructure projects initiated by BCL were located in the town area of Arawa. This 
meant that the benefits were primarily experienced by those closely associated with 
mining operations, rather than those residing in the villages. 
According to my fieldwork observations, there are two ways in which Bougainvilleans 
believe BCL and the Government could have contributed to equitable development on 
Bougainville . Firstly, through the construction of sealed roads and secondly, by 
providing broader access to health and education. This is illustrated in following 
quotes: 
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... The roads were not built. The only bitumen bit was from BCL to 
Lo/oho ... Bougainville has no roads and there are pot holes {BOU 17, 
Bougainvillean former employee of BCL) 
... The government never contemplated asking the company to build roads 
outside of the mining lease {BOU34, Bougainvillean former employee of BCL} . 
... Health and schools should have been improved. Only the best hospital was in 
Arawa, not in Buka or in the villages. They should have thought of equal 
development. When the mine was open, they should have looked at 
communities and asked how they can sustain their lives (BOU33, Bougainvillean 
women's leader). 
Local level division - Bougainville 
The third division created by the revenue distribution framework operating on 
Bougainville took place at the local level between landowners themselves. This mainly 
occurred in the form of generational disagreement about how local concerns should be 
communicated to BCL management, and in relation to the operation of the Road 
Mining Least Trust Fund. As a Bougainvillean former employee of BCL stated: 
... the Trust Fund was managed by the landowners. That broke the conflict with 
old and young" {BOU6 Bougainvillean Civil Servant/ Former employee of BCL}. 
Another issue that triggered intergenerational disputes among Bougainvillean 
landowners was the perception that the older generation were reaping the financial 
rewards of the mine, at the expense of the young. According to an executive of BCL, 
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this problem emerged when landowners stopped sharing the compensation payments 
equitably amongst themselves : 
.. . they [the old PLA} would only get the compensation they were entitled to from 
the Bougainville Copper Agreement but there were accusations that they 
weren ' t giving that money out (BOU1, BCL executive). 
This view was supported by some of the Bougainvilleans interviewed, who claimed 
that : 
... the problem was that they weren ' t sharing with families, only certain 
members of the family" (BOU12, Bougainvil/ean peacemaker). 
Further, over the life of the mine, BCL's compensation and revenue sharing procedures 
can be seen to have resulted in a number of important internal divisions. In some 
instances the three key actors, (BCL, the Australian Administration and the PNG 
Government) made crucial mistakes, which resulted in tensions between locals over 
access to resources . However in other cases divisions were created by the fact that 
these actors distributed resources without an awareness of how these resources would 
im pact loca l social dynamics. 
Papua 
Freeport 
While seri ous flaws in t he Bougainvi lle Copper Agreement can be ident if ied , Freeport's 
Contract of Work wi t h th e Indonesian Government was even more problematic 
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(Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.71). Unlike BCL, which was 
required to compensate local landowners, Freeport was not required to pay any 
compensation to the Amungme and Kamoro people (Leith 2003, p.61}. Rather, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, the 1967 Contract was mainly concerned with encouraging 
foreign investment in Indonesia, and providing a source of revenue for the Suharto 
regime. However, while Freeport did not provide cash compensation in the early days 
of its mining activities, it has participated in extensive community development work 
since the mid-1990s. 
Much of Freeport's contributions to the Amungme and Kamoro peoples have been in 
the form large cash payments towards community development and infrastructure 
projects. This blurring of the boundaries between compensation 50 as opposed to 
community development51 has made it difficult to analyse Freeport's compensation 
procedures. The pattern of merging cash payments with community development was 
initially established in an agreement between Freeport and leaders of the Wa Valley in 
what is referred to as the 1974 January Agreement. Responding to requests from the 
Amungme people for 'dialogue', the company pledged to construct community 
facilities such as schools, clinics and markets in exchange for their approval of mining 
activities (Abrash, 2001}. According to Mealey {1996, p.303-4}, six chiefs affixed their 
thumbprints to a document sealing the exchange of land under the terms set out in the 
1974 January Agreement. However, according to several reports (ICG, 2002; Abrash, 
5
° Compensation is defined as money given to compensate loss or injury, or for requisitioned property 
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002, p.467) . 
51 Such as contributions to infrastructure, social and economic development projects which may or may 
not be motivated by a need to repair harm. 
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2001), the affected villagers " did not find out until 1995 that, according to state 
records, they had ceded a million hectares of land for development" (ICG, 2002, p.17 -
8) . 
Given that the Chiefs 'signed' an agreement that they were unable to read for 
themselves, the conditions under which the January Agreement was brokered certainly 
left considerable scope for misunderstanding. It is quite possible that the Chiefs had 
not been adequately informed about the contents of the Agreement. Despite this, 
Freeport considered the January Agreement a victory for hak ulayat in Indonesia, as it 
represented the first formal recognition by the Government that Papuans had a right 
to compensation (PT Freeport Indonesia, 2008, p.37). 
According to Freeport, the compensation set in place by the January Agreement has 
been paid to the landowning communities in the form of rekognisi (recognition) 
payments towards mutually agreed projects to benefit the community' 52 (PT Freeport 
Indonesia, 2008, p.37) . However, the extent to which these payments have been 
mutually agreed is contested. As a Papuan Human Rights worker stated: 
... Freeport had done something considered compensation for land but the local 
community view is that this is not compensation - it's just decided by Freeport 
themselves - no discussion {Papua221 Human rights worker) . 
Fo ll owing the discove ry of the Grasberg m ineral depos it , there was a dramat ic increase 
52 According to Freeport (PT Freeport Indonesia (2008, p.37), there are currently two on-going rekogn isi 
payments : the Kamoro village recognition program and the Tig o Deso (three villages) Devel op ment 
Program (for the Amungme tr iba l group) . 
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1n both mining activity and national and international attention on Freeport's 
operations in Papua (Ballard & Banks, 2007, p.7). As discussed in Chapter 5, Freeport 
was required to sign new contracts with the Indonesian Government in 1991 and 1994 
in order to develop the Grasberg discovery. Although the Indonesian Government was 
considerably savvier in setting the terms of the Grasberg contract for national benefit 
than they had been in 1967, the economic rights of indigenous Papuans remained a 
low priority. As such, Freeport's financial contributions associated with the Grasberg 
mine have been primarily initiated in response to a number of violent incidents 
surrounding the Freeport area in the 1990s rather than state legislation. 
Freeport's 'community development' response to incidents of violence around the 
mine reflects the company's unwillingness to meaningfully engage with the deeper 
issues that prompted the violence. While community development can be considered a 
worthy CSR practice generally, the violent episodes that have erupted around the 
Grasberg mine site have not been triggered by local dissatisfaction with levels of 
community development. Rather, local protests directed at Freeport have focussed on 
concerns about the militarisation of the Freeport area, and associated human rights 
violations (see Ch 9). For example, Freeport's largest community development 
response occurred in 1996 following a three-day riot that resulted in damage to 
Freeport facilities and the death of three people (Leith, 2003, p.102). According to 
Ballard (2001, p.27), these riots were directed at Freeport's security department in 
response to the injury of a Dani man who had been hit by a Freeport vehicle . The 
incident heightened international scrutiny of the company by international 
organisations such as the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, which began releasing 
reports on human rights conditions in the area. Subsequently, Freeport came under 
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stronger pressure from both Jakarta and international NGOs to find solutions to local 
concerns about the mine (Leith, 2003, p.104). 
In response, Freeport initiated a Land Rights Trust Fund. As discussed in previous 
chapters, this Fund became known as the One Per Cent Trust Fund as it involved a 
commitment by Freeport to distribute one per cent of its annual gross revenue 
annually over each of the next ten years (Leith, 2003, p.105). While the Land Rights 
Trust Fund is now only distributed to the Amungme and Kamoro tribes, the one per 
cent was initially allocated to seven tribal groups in the region (Soares, 2004, p.136). 
According to Soares {2004, p.136), 11before the disbursement of the One Percent Trust 
Fund, Freeport encouraged the indigenous communities to establish 'NGOs' [to 
represent each of the seven tribes] in order to administer disbursements from the 
Trust Fund". However according to Ballard and Banks (2007, p.21}, the Indonesian 
security forces high jacked this process and appropriated a portion of the funds under 
the guise of assisting the equitable distribution of the Fund to the indigenous 
communities. The authors claim the Indonesian security forces did this by insisting 
that: 
.. . the fund be disbursed among all of the neighbouring ethnic groups, the so-
called 'seven suku [tribes]'. By putt ing forward their own clients as leaders of 
these groups, individual security units were able to siphon off the lion's share 
of the benefits earmarked for the indigenous communities. (Ba llard & Banks, 
2007, p.21) 
hile Freeport did eventually decide to narrow the beneficiaries of the One Per Cent 
Trust Fund to the Amungme and Kamara peoples, this led to a clash between the 
Amungme and the Dani (one of the seven tribes), in which eleven people were killed 
(Soares 2002, p.136). Following these clashes and due to a number of other social 
problems associated with the One Per Cent Trust Fund, the Amungme tribal council 
(Lembaga Adat Masyarakat Amungme, LEMASA) eventually refused to accept money 
from the fund at all. The reason, Abrash (2001) claims, is that the Fund was considered 
a bribe on the part of Freeport for its 'social license to operate'. As one LEMASA 
representative stated, "with the help of God we shall never [succumb] to the offer of 
bribes, intimidation or [be] dishonestly induced into accepting PT Freeport Indonesia's 
"Settlement Agreement"" (anonymous, cited in Abrash 2001). This characterisation of 
Freeport's payments was also reflected in my fieldwork observations where Papuans 
described the One Per Cent Trust Fund as 'blood money' distributed by Freeport under 
duress. As a Papuan activist stated: 
... Local people pressured the company and {Freeport] decided to give one per 
cent of profit and was announced to the world as compensation to local people. 
But [it] was blood compensation. If they really wanted to do it, why didn't they 
do it from the beginning? {PapuaS}. 
Despite the many issues associated with the Fund, Freeport continued to inject large 
amounts of money into the Papuan community, with some estimates that by the end 
of 2000, $66.lm had been committed (Leith, 2003, p.105). In 2008, Freeport (PT 
Freeport Indonesia, 2008, p.39) claims that it committed another $34.6m to the Fund, 
but initiated changes in the way the resources are distributed. According to the new 
arrangement, the Fund is managed and distributed by the Amungme and Kamara 
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Community Development Organisation (Lembaga Pengembangan Masyarakat 
Amungme don Kamoro, LPMAK} which was established by Freeport in 2002 with the 
aim of sharing responsibility for the distribution of the funds among local government 
agencies, church leaders and indigenous peoples. 
The procedure for distributing allocations from the Fund involves the Amungme tribal 
council (LEMASA) and the Kamoro tribal council (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku 
Kamoro, LEMASKO) submitting proposals for services to LPMAK. The LPMAK board 
then decides which projects will receive funding. The main criticism from within these 
organisations is that while LPMAK is ostensibly independent from Freeport, the 
company still controls how the money is spent. As a representative of one of these 
organisations stated: 
... I agree that the money be given to LPMAK but not 1f Freeport is controlling the 
money. Just leave LPMAK independent and we will arrange it ... so people can say 
LP MAK is not a department of Freeport but is independent {Papua26}. 
BP 
The initial compensation procedures for the Tangguh LNG project were quite different 
to those developed by Freeport. In the 1990s ARCO and British Gas conducted 
exploration activities, wh ich resulted in the felling of sago, nipa palms and small trees 
(BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.54}. BP claims that the companies agreed to pay 
compensat ion for these damages in the form of a single lump sum payment of 
approximately AUD$7,800 to the affected communities that was distributed among 
clans by a village leader (BP Berau Lim ited, 2006, p.61). 
Once the location for the Tangguh project had been decided, more extensive 
negotiations took place regarding the appropriate form of compensation. According to 
BP (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.55-6), several meetings were then held between the 
companies, the resettlement affected communities, community advisors and the 
government to negotiate the compensation procedures. As discussed in Chapter 4, BP 
was particularly concerned about the possible social problems that could result from a 
sudden injection of large amounts of money: 
... it became clear that a compensation package comprising cash and in-kind 
benefits would be the most effective way of addressing the complex social and 
cultural issues associated with the land tenure and use rights affected by the 
Project (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.55-6). 
In terms of the cash payment, it was agreed that BP would award a lower rate of cash 
compensation to that stipulated under the Decree of Manokwari No. 213 of 1999 
which had guided negotiations for compensation between locals and logging 
companies in the area. According to the Manokwari Decree, compensation was 
calculated at IDRP30-S0/m2• In contrast, it was decided that IDRP15m 2 
(USD$0.0015/m 2) would be awarded to the landowning clans in the vicinity of the 
Tangguh project. This would be in conjunction with an 'in-kind' compensation package 
which included items such as new houses, clean water and community facilities. 
However a number of Indonesian NGOs have issued a letter to BP disputing the claim 
that the compensation was an agreed amount, and suggest that the indigenous 
landowners continue to be unsatisfied with the compensation arrangements 
established in 1999 (WALHI, JATAM & KAU, 2005). Therefore, similar to Freeport's 
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1974 January Agreement, while leaders of the landowning clans in the 1999 Agreement 
signed documents 'agreeing' to the exchange, the outcome of the negotiations has 
since been challenged . 
An important difference between Freeport and BP was that in order to gain the 
financial lending necessary for the development of Tangguh, BP was required to follow 
international regulations regarding indigenous people and involuntary resettlement. As 
such, a publically available Resettlement planning document (BP Berau Limited, 2006) 
was developed for the Tangguh project according to the World Bank Groups 
Operational Directive 4.30 and the Asian Development Bank's policy on involuntary 
resettlement . The resettlement planning document outlines the compensation 
procedures for lost assets and income; assistance for relocation; the prov1s1on of 
appropriate housing, land, and infrastructure comparable to what the relocated 
villagers would have without the project; as well as the impacts of resettlement (Asian 
Development Bank, 2011). The logic underlying the resettlement planning process is to 
ach ieve at least the same level of wellbeing for resettled households as would have 
been in place if resettlement had not taken place (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.xxii) . 
Once the project' s exploration phase was complete, it was decided that the opt imal 
si te for the Tangguh LNG plant was the southern shore of Bintuni Bay in an area 
occup ied by the Tanah Merah village53 (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.xxii). Following the 
53 According to BP, the Tanah Merah village community com prised 127 households, which were required 
to relocate to two locations west of the village, namely the new villages of Tanah M erah an d Onar Baru 
(BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.6) . Construction of the new settlements commenced in 2002 with the Tanah 
Merah community having been relocated in 2004. 
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consultation agreements for the exchange of this land discussed in Chapter 6, BP 
established a marine safety exclusion zone and detailed agreements regarding 
entitlements for resettlement. 
Significant problems arose however, when BP began building houses and new facilities 
for the relocated households. The Bintuni Bay area of the Tangguh project comprises a 
number of villages scattered along the northern and southern shores of the bay, with 
Baba (on the south shore} and Aranday (on the north shore} the closest towns to the 
Project site (TIAP, 2002, p. 7}. The total budget allocated for the resettled villages from 
1999-2009 according to BP, was US$31,126, 451, with compensation representing 70.8 
per cent (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.xxiv}. 
The allocation of these funds and their distribution is documented in an 'entitlement 
matrix' incorporating the holders of the hak ulayat (the Soway, Wayuri and Simuna 
clans}., types of loss (land, marine resources, houses, gardens, forests, community 
facilities, cultural sites, livelihood and income} and entitlement. The entitlements 
provided by BP include both cash payments for land, the establishment of a 
development foundation of US$2million for the three landowning clans, as well as 
material objects such as motors for fishing boats, meeting halls and traditional food 
packages (BP Berau Limited, 2006, p.xxiv-xxxiii}. 
The differences between Freeport and BP in regard to compensation are indicative of 
the 30 year time lapse between the establishment of the two projects, and the more 
comprehensive regulatory guidelines that resource companies must now adhere to in 
order to guarantee financial lending. This is evident in the more rigorous public 
reporting of BP's compensation procedures in comparison to the scarcity of detail on 
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Freeport's. As will be discussed further however, the new regulatory environment has 
not guaranteed the avoidance of conflict over BP's compensation. Aside from security, 
competition and jealousies over the distribution of compensation has been one of the 
most difficult issues BP has faced in the establishment and maintenance of their 
operations at Tangguh. In this way, similar to BCL in Bougainville, Freeport and BP's 
distribution of compensation and revenue in Papua can be seen to have led to the 
creation of new internal divisions. 
National level division - Papua 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Indonesian Government has received a greater share of 
revenue from the Freeport project than Papuans. This is evident in the lack of 
provisions for compensation and community development in Freeport's various 
contracts with the Indonesian Government since it entered Papua in 1967. Therefore 
while some Freeport employees proudly claim that 11Freeport is the only company in 
Indonesia brave enough to give one per cent annually// (Papua6}, this one per cent does 
not amount to much in comparison to Freeport's contributions to Indonesia 
{Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.73). According to Freeport, from 
the period 1996-2004 the companys total contribution to the One Per Cent Trust Fund 
was $152 million . However as highlighted in Chapter 6, the direct benefits to Indonesia 
(through dividends, taxes and royalties) amounted to more than $8billion {PT Freeport 
Indonesia, 2008, p.39 ). As a result, many Papuans want to see either the closure of 
Freeport' s m ining act ivities or at least a significant increase in the profits to be 
returned to Papua . One Papuan religious leader stated: 
... Freeport is not helping. We want to see Freeport close because the share of 
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profit is not right. .. when we think rightly it must be 50 per cent for Freeport and 
50 per cent for Papua. That would be right. The mining company have high 
technology but the copper and gold - that belongs to the Amungme, Kamara 
and Papuan peoples. They must share the profit 50/50 {Papua27, Religious 
leader). 
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the beginning of the reformasi period, 
Indonesia has gradually adopted a more decentralised system of government with 
significant implications on fiscal balancing between the central and regional 
governments (Resosudarmo, 2005, p.4). In addition, President Megawati Sukarnoputri 
enacted the Bill on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua on 21 November 2001, 
which contained a new revenue sharing framework for extraction of Papua's natural 
resource wealth. 
The Special Autonomy Law has important ramifications for both the Freeport and BP 
projects. This is evident in the focus of the Autonomy package on recognition that 
Papua's natural resources have not been used in a way that has improved the living 
standards of Papuan natives, or respected their basic rights (BP Berau Limited, 2006, 
p.24). The Special Autonomy Law also implements a new revenue sharing framework 
for mining, oil and gas. Under the new framework 20 per cent of (post-tax) mining 
revenue will go to the central government, while 80 per cent will go to the regional 
government. In contrast, 70 per cent of net revenues from gas and oil production (after 
taxes and cost recovery) will be returned to the province, with the 70 per cent to be 
divided amongst the Provincial Government, producing region and other cities of t he 
province (TIAP, 2011, p.33). 
199 
According to the Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel (TIAP) (2011 , p.33), Special 
Autonomy transfers of BP ' s revenues have been channelled directly to the province of 
West Papua since 2008. Yet despite these large cash infusions , West Papua province 
continues to have the highest poverty rate in Indonesia (36.8 per cent) , only slightly 
above Papua province (34.8 per cent) (TIAP, 2011, p.33). Further, and as discussed 
previously, the political status of the Special Autonomy package has been rendered 
uncertain following the symbolic 'handing back' of Special Autonon1y in 2010. 
According Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn (2010, p.91 ), this symbolic 
gesture was partly driven by the majority Papuan view that the associated revenues 
would only benefit Indonesians and a handful of corrupt Papuan politicians. Some also 
hold the view that most of these funds will be diverted back to corrupted pockets m 
Jakarta and will never actually reach Papua (Papua4 7, Indonesian religious leader). 
Provincial level division - Papua 
The revenue sharing formula set out in the Special Autonomy package has led to the 
creation of provincial tensions following Megawati's decision to divide Papua into 
three new provinces: Papua, Central Papua and West Papua. The new division meant 
that the wealth derived from the Tangguh project would only flow to West Papua 
province and not to Papua as a whole. As Budiardjo {2004) stated in a letter addressed 
to BP : 
... specifically, the division of West Papua will mean that the Tangguh revenues 
will now flow largely to Western lrian Jaya [West Papua] and not to Papua 
Province as a whole, thus exacerbating the potential for horizontal conflict and 
economic inequity. 
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While the risk of conflict associated with the divisions led President Susilio Bambang 
Yudhoyono to impose a moratorium on the creation of new provinces (TIAP, 2011, 
p.10), the national legislature enacted a law in 2008 that recognises the separation of 
Papua into two provinces: Papua and West Papua54 • 
Compared to Bougainville however, my fieldwork observations suggest that there is 
less concern in Papua about local landowners receiving more benefits than other 
Papuans from the companies directly. Landowners are generally not perceived by 
other Papuans as 'lazy' and there have not been demands for the companies to provide 
infrastructure outside of the resource producing areas. Perhaps this is due to the fact 
that Papua is geographically larger than Bougainville, and the magnitude of the 
collective grievances held by Papuans regarding their lack of development under 
Indonesian rule. 
Local level division - Papua 
One of the most critical divisions that Freeport and BP's compensation resources have 
created is at the local level between landowners and/or villagers living in the vicinity of 
the Project areas. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Freeport's One Per Cent Trust 
Fund led to a clash in 1997, which resulted in the death of eleven people. While the 
54 According to one Indonesian informant however, "the legality of the province of West Papua remains 
unclear. The main reason is that in 2003 the Constitutional Court already annulled Law No 45 of 1999 
that creates two new provinces (lrian Jaya Tengah and lrian Jaya Barat) and four districts (Sorong, 
Mimika, Paniai, and Puncak Jaya) as it contradicted the 1945 Constitution . Therefore, all related 
regulations including Presidential Decree no. 1 of 2003 that enacted Law 45/1999 are deemed inval id. 
But the reality shows that the province remains in existence. Eventually President SBY [Yudhoyono] 
issued a Government Regulation No. 1 of 2008 to provide a legal basis for West Papua province. This law 
gives the same status of "Special Autonomy" to the province of West Papua" (Papua47) . 
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Fund was considered a landmark at the time, in many ways there have been more 
critics of the Fund then there have been supporters. This was reflected during my own 
Papuan fieldwork where I encountered many Papuan community leaders critical of 
Freeport's distribution of large amounts of money without providing education or 
capacity building to enable the effective use of these funds. As will be discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 10, this has led to the creation of entirely new social problems 
such as substance abuse. As a Papuan religious leader claimed: 
... they need church programs and socio economic programs to teach people 
how to use money. A problem for the church is the impact of the money -
alcohol and HIV /AIDS (Papua2}. 
The distribution of funds amongst the Amungme and Kamara groups also appears to 
remain contentious despite the administrative changes that Freeport has made 
through the establishment of LPMAK. A representative from one of these organisations 
expressed it in this way: 
... there is no balance between Amungme and Kamoro. Sometimes Amungme 
get more. We get 20 per cen( they get 80 per cent. .. compensotion is not 
bolanced55 (Popuo25}. 
However, in trying to verify the compensation sharing formula, it also became clear 
that there is a lot of confusion within the community as to how the money is being 
distributed. As a representative from one of these organisations stated : 
55 The different negotiation styles of the Amungme and Kamoro will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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... / don't understand the contribution of money we have from the one per cent 
compensation. We don't know how much money consists from one per cent 
(Papua26}. 
A Freeport employee also highlighted the company's lack of transparency in the 
distribution of the Fund: 
... all funding should be monitored for transparency. [We should] work together 
on mapping traditional land rights and help the Amungme and Kamara. They 
have traditional land rights, but land now only belongs to the hands of people 
from outside (Papua12}. 
In regards to BP, it could be said that the company was conscious of the potential 
negative impacts associated with the distribution of the One Per Cent Trust Fund. This 
is evident in BP's attempt to avoid the sudden insertion of large amounts of money, 
and instead to channel these funds into community development and infrastructure 
projects. As discussed earlier, despite these efforts, conflict arose between the north 
shore and south shore villages of the Bintuni Bay area. Although this tension did not 
escalate into violence, it has nonetheless been one of the biggest problems that BP has 
had to manage during the life of the Tangguh project. 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that BCL, Freeport and BP's revenue and compensation 
procedures have led to the creation/and or exacerbation of internal divisions within 
affected societies. It was argued that these tensions have primarily emerged through 
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the creation of contested hierarchies of revenue and compensation at the national, 
provincial and local levels. 
In Bougainville, the division at the national level was exacerbated by the unequal 
distribution of mining revenues in favour of the central government. At the provincial 
level tensions evolved between Bougainvilleans in general and landowners as a result 
of the lack of development and infrastructure initiatives outside of the mining lease 
area. While at the local level a division was created between landowners themselves as 
a result of intergenerational disputes over access to BCL's compensation payments. 
Akin to Bougainville, divisions at the national level in Papua stemmed from the unequal 
distribution of mining and gas revenues in favour of the central government. At the 
provincial level, grievances were also directed towards the central government due to 
the perceived lack of development in Papua more broadly. While at the local level, BP's 
Tangguh LNG project created new tensions between north and south shore villagers 
who were not equally compensated despite comparable adat claims to the gas 
resources. 
This chapter opened with a discussion of the economic drivers of conflict. While there 
is evidence to support Collier's emphasis on 'greed' through the Indonesian military 
capturing Freeport's resources to run a protection racket, the two conflicts are 
characteristic of a different kind of resource curse to what is discussed in this 
scholarship . Bougainville and Papua 's opposition movements did not capture BCL, 
Freeport and BP's resource projects to use them to buy weapons. Rather, it was a curse 
of the resources not being used to build, but to divide. This highlights the fragility and 
dynamism of the interactions that circulate alongside natural resource development. 
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These interactions are "made up of uncertain, fragile, controversial, and ever-shifting 
ties" (Latour, 2005, p.28). 
A common theme identified in this chapter with regard to both the Bougainville and 
Papua cases has been the problems associated with communication between the 
companies and local communities, particularly in terms of transparency around the 
distribution of resource wealth. The next chapter explores this in more depth, and 
argues that the companies' failure to initiate dialogue with all of the stakeholders 
associated with the resource projects has exacerbated the experience of political, 
cultural and economic marginalisation of Bougainvilleans and Papuans. 
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Chapter 8: Preventive Peace Dialogue 
Site of Disengaged Engaged 
interdependence (CSR as it mostly is) (CSR reconfigured) 
Cultural, political & Corporations don't recognise Corporations recognise local 
economic local grievances and deny grievances and open long-te rm 
marginalisation most local people the dialogue with different 
opportunity to negotiate segments of the community 
This chapter discusses the efforts made by BCL, Freeport and BP to initiate dialogue 
with local communities. It will argue that one consequence of the companies' 
responsiveness to the state is that BCL, Freeport and BP have not succeeded (to 
varying degrees) at opening long-term dialogue with all peoples affected by their 
business activities. This exclusion aggravates the fourth site of interdependence 
identified between the companies and the root causes of conflict in Bougainville and 
Papua : cultural , political and economic marginalisation . 
The chapter opens with a discuss ion of the concept of 'stakeholder dialogue'. This term 
is generally used by scholars and companies to refer to processes of communication 
between large corporations and local communities. The effectiveness of stakeholder 
dial ogue as a tool for promoting peaceful development in Bougainville and Papua will 
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then be analysed. It will be argued that although stakeholder dialogue as a mechanism 
to facilitate peaceful development is a good idea in theory, the case studies reveal that 
it is complex to achieve in practice. This is because its success is highly contingent on 
the level of progress made on a variety of other justice claims. 
'Stakeholder dialogue' 
'Stakeholder dialogue' is a business practice that emphasises consultation as the 
baseline for good corporate governance (Unerman & Bennett, 2004, p.685). The 
concept was popularised in the mid-1990s and was implemented by NGOs such as the 
World Wildlife Fund, closely followed by individual companies such as the Body Shop. 
Stakeholder dialogue was later adopted by coalitions of companies including the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (Kaptein and van Tu Ider, 2002, 
p.208). The WBCSD describes stakeholder dialogue as, "a powerful catalyst for change. 
It promotes greater transparency, information sharing and inspires society to work 
together" (WBCSD, n.d, p.2). In recent years, the concept has been so widely accepted 
in both academic and business circles, that it has been acclaimed as "a cornerstone of 
corporate social, environmental, economic and ethical governance" (Unerman & 
Bennett, 2004, p.685) . 
Stakeholder dialogue is underpinned by a commitment between corporations and 
society to better understand the challenges and pressures facing each other (Burchell 
& Cook, 2008, p.44). This commitment is made manifest through principles of 
'openness' and a willingness to consider alternative viewpoints (Burchell & Cook, 2008, 
p.36) . The measure of stakeholder dialogue is referred to in the literature as an 
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'intersubjective moral consensus' {Unerman & Bennett, 2004, p.688} and shared forms 
of knowledge {Burchell & Cook, 2008, p.44). In the context of the extractive industry, 
the goal of stakeholder dialogue could be described as a commitment on the part of 
corporate management to see the resource project through the eyes of the local 
community, and for the local community to see the project through the eyes of 
corporate management. Table 6 summarises the key values, motives and constraints to 
the initiation of stakeholder dialogue identified in the literature. 
Table 6 - Stakeholder dialogue 
Values/Ethical Motives Constraints 
underpinning 
Openness Develop trust Different 
Non-confrontational Transcend entrenched views understandings of 
dialogue 
Sharing Establish new relationships 
Business prefer to 
Understanding Reach mutual understanding work with peers 
Inclusion Understand stakeholder Ignorance of 
Tolerance expectations stakeholder 
Transparency Learn from each other 
opinions 
Empowerment Better communication 
Costly & time 
consuming 
Reduce risk Equality Stakeholder 
Two-way process Understand how the company is diversity 
perceived 
Interactive Insufficient 
Early warning system 
resources Consultation 
Avoid damaging publicity Limitations to Cooperation 
Enable responsibility inclusiveness 
Structured 
Avoid potential conflict 
Proactive 
Informed thinking 
Compiled from : Burchell & Cook, 2008; Mena et al, 2010; Pedersen , 2006; Umerman & Bennett, 2004; 
Burchell & Cook, 2008; WBCSO, n.d; Kaptein & van Tu lder, 2002) . 
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What constitutes 'dialogue' in stakeholder dialogue discourse is somewhat loosely 
defined but can include for example: information dissemination, conferences, reports, 
training and consultation, as well as more structured forums between companies and 
NGOs (Burchell & Cook, 2008, p.157). However since the 1990s, Burchell and Cook 
(2008, p.167) argue that there has been an increasing acceptance on the part of 
business that there is a need to move beyond information dissemination to respond to 
the concerns that stakeholders define for themselves. Subsequently there is an 
increasing need for firms to go further than simply publishing documents about the 
company's priorities to proactively engage with the priorities of locals. 
The process of achieving effective and meaningful stakeholder dialogue is difficult and 
complex. Pedersen (2006, p.138), for example identifies five characteristics of effective 
stakeholder dialogue: 
1. inclusion, 
2. openness, 
3. tolerance, 
4. empowerment, and 
5. transparency. 
Pederson argues, "as a participatory ideal, the stakeholder dialogue should include the 
important groups and individuals who affect and/or are affected by the decision or the 
issue in question". In the case of the extractive sector this could include: landowners, 
NGOs, women's leaders, religious organisations, the state, military and police. However 
as was discussed in Chapter 3, the power and capacity to decide who is included and 
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who is not, is ultimately held by the corporation (Kapelus, 2002, p.290-1) .. These 
decisions are fraught as the inclusion of one group almost always involves the 
corresponding exclusion of another (Mena et al, 2010, p.167). The potential for conflict 
to arise in such situations is extremely high and is clearly evident in the cases of 
Bougainville and Papua. 
An important question to be raised of stakeholder dialogue centres on how the self-
stated goals of 'inclusion, openness, empowerment and transparency' between 
companies and stakeholders can be achieved in the context of resource projects, in 
which the stakeholders (or local communities) are subject to considerable cultural, 
political and economic marginalisation? This question takes in broader considerations 
than just how companies might accurately and justly identify stakeholders. The 
argument presented in this chapter is that there is a gap between the ideals of 
stakeholder dialogue theory and what is actually required to achieve the desired 
'intersubjective moral consensus' (Unerman & Bennett, 2004, p.688). 
The crux of the case put forward in this chapter is that 'understanding' between parties 
and 'empowerment' of local communities is unlikely to manifest in the absence of 
broader commitments by the company to make progress on justice outcomes in other 
areas or alongside particular dialogues about the nature of the company's operations. 
This feeds into a broader vision for a reconfiguration of CSR to be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 13. The proposed reconfiguration includes preventive peace dialogue on the 
social , political and environmental terms of access to land through on -going and 
collaborative negotiat ions between all stakeholders on the full range of justice claims 
that the resource project feeds into . 
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The emphasis on dialogue in Interdependent Engagement is wider than that generally 
encompassed by the discourse of stakeholder dialogue. This is because it highlights the 
importance of not just the creation of a 'safe space' for locals to communicate their 
concerns to the company, but also the potential for resource companies to initiate 
dialogue on the institutional changes required for the development of a mutually 
beneficial resource project. 
Bougainville 
While stakeholder dialogue had not been articulated into a formal set of principles or 
techniques in the days of the operation of the Bougainville copper mine, there is 
evidence to suggest that BCL did recognise the value of dialogue. For example, BCL 
appointed village relations' officers who undertook the specific task of conveying the 
grievances of Bougainvilleans to BCL management. Despite these appointments, 
problems in communication became one of the crucial issues the company faced 
leading up to the conflict (Vernon, 2005, p.258). 
Communication was a particular problem for BCL because although the techniques it 
used were not named 'stakeholder dialogue' it was based on similar principles and, as 
a result, shared the same inbuilt limitations. More specifically, BCL failed to recognise 
that progress needed to be made on the cultural, political, and economic 
marginalisation felt by Bougainvilleans at the hands of the Australian Administration, 
the PNG government and the company itself, before meaningful dialogue could occur. 
This failure was compounded by a corresponding lack of consideration of the 
differences between Bougainvillean and Australian culture, and the ways in which they 
21 1 
might impact on processes of dialogue and communication. 
Colonialism, Language & Racism 
... They thought of us as threatening, but we were there to help them (BOU2, 
Current BCL Executive). 
The earliest constraint for BCL in establishing a positive relationship with landowners 
and villages surrounding its mining lease areas was the colonial logic that drove the 
development of the mine. The development of the mine exacerbated a "long-standing 
sense of cultural and political exclusion felt by Bougainvilleans" (Regan, 2003, p.55). So 
from the outset putting in place Pederson's (2006, p.138) precondition of 'inclusion' for 
effective stakeholder dialogue was highly problematic. 
The processes of dialogue associated with the construction of the Bougainville copper 
mine were characterised by the same features that marked the Bougainvillean 
experience of Australian colonialism. As with the colonial approach of the Australian 
Administration, BCL management promoted themselves to Bougainvilleans as 
benevolent agents of development. In response, locals tended to relate to the 
company with scepticism and doubt. It is clear that BCL's commitment to 'help' the 
locals was driven by an enlightened self-interest based on fear that an independent 
PNG might one day nationalise the mine (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 
2010, p.12). This evident self-interest justified Bougainvillean scepticism about the 
dial ogue process. It also made it difficult to resolve the perception that their land was 
being squandered for the economic benefit of 'outsiders'. 
The disparity between the priorities of BCL management and the concerns of locals 
was further problematised by language barriers. The company found it difficult to 
effectively inform locals of the expected social and environmental impacts of the mine. 
Former CEO of BCL, Don Vernon claims that during the early stages of the mine's 
development there were approximately 2056 distinct language groups present in 
Bougainville, none of which was dominant (Vernon, 2005, p.263). The company initially 
relied on colonial officers for interpretation, before choosing to use Pidgin 57 (Vernon, 
2005, p.263). Two of BCL's first community programs were sponsorship of Pidgin 
language training for expatriate staff (Vernon, 2005, p.263}, and an employee 
orientation program that included education about Australian and Bougainvillean 
social conventions (Robinson cited in Tonks & Dowling, 1999, p.13). 
In addition to being a strategy to improve communication between expatriate 
employees and Bougainvilleans, the Pidgin language training and employee orientation 
program were also aimed at achieving 'tolerance, acceptance and understanding' 
between the company and locals. BCL believed that encouraging communication 
between expatriates and Bougainvilleans would introduce new ideas to the locals 
{Bougainville Copper Limited, BCL Environment and Community Relations Division, 
n.d.) and would reduce the risk of racist behaviour by Australian staff. According to a 
current executive of BCL the company's efforts in this regard were: 
... a form of self-regulation. The big stick was how expensive it was to ship 
people out if they did anything wrong that was likely to cause any disruption to 
56 According to Douglas Oliver (1973), the number of languages was actually 18 in 1963, falling from 19 
pre WWII. 
57 Pidgin had become universal on Bougainville by 1972 (Oliver, 1973, p.187). 
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the mine. Employees had to undergo psychological tests on racism for example. 
It did not always work but the precaution was there (BOU1 1 BCL Executive). 
Some Bougainvilleans believe that the racism displayed by BCL employees 
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of BCL's efforts to achieve effective dialogue. 
Current President of Bougainville, John Momis for example, stated in a letter addressed 
to a former CEO of BCL that "so many of your employees are racist, openly 
contemptuous of us, just as the kiaps were" (Quodling, 1991, p.92}. Momis' reference 
to racism highlights the connection between the effectiveness of Stakeholder dialogue 
and progress made in dealing with deeper sources of injustice, namely, Bougainville's 
colonial history. This deeper issue remained salient regardless of whether racism was 
experienced widely, or whether it was expressed 'on the odd occasion' by a minority of 
individuals58 . Racism in the colonial context is intertwined with broader feelings of 
subjugation on the part of colonised (Bougainvilleans}, and the perceived sense of 
superiority of the colonisers (Australians). As a Nasioi landowner stated: 
.. .racism was not a major issue1 but the people were illiterate and the people 
who came in were educated. It was a sudden impact on the people from the 
primitive to the modern (BOU291 Nasioi landowner). 
This quote demonstrates that achieving 'tolerance, acceptance and understanding' is 
not only constrained by language and incidents of racism, but also the company's 
history and association with broader experiences of colonialism and associated 
58 As w ill be discussed in Chapter 10, racism was more of a problem between Bouga invill eans and 
m igrants from other areas of PNG than it was between Australians and Bouga invilleans . 
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relationships of dependency. In this way, the expectation implied in the stakeholder 
dialogue discourse that consultation can effectively operate in a transcendent manner 
above situations of historical exclusion is too simplistic. 
For language programs and dialogue on the social and environmental impacts of the 
mine to achieve its intended aims, BCL would have needed to first recognise and 
engage with issues associated with the company's involvement in historical injustices. 
Teaching hundreds of employees Pidgin would have required considerable effort on 
the part of BCL, however considering the exclusion of Bougainvilleans from the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement, it is not difficult to see how these efforts were met 
with suspicion, perceived as disingenuous and ultimately proved ineffectual. 
Local perceptions of BCL's effort 
Discrepancies between the mechanisms BCL thought appropriate to establish dialogue 
with Bougainvilleans and the expectations of locals continued throughout the life of 
the mine. Three main criticisms were raised during fieldwork: 1) failure to talk with 
women as owners of the land, 2) failure of village relations staff to speak to villages 
outside of BCL's mining lease areas, and 3} a lack of landowner rights in the 
Bougainville Copper Agreements. 
1) Failure to talk with women as the owners of the land 
In the processes that led to the establishment of the mine, it was Bougainvillean 
women who felt excluded most. Mimicking the colonial practices used in the 
development of plantations, BCL only negotiated with men for access to land. The 
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company did not understand that in Bougainville's matrilineal society, the inheritance 
and ownership of land comes through the female line (Saovana -Spriggs, 2007, p.10). 
Accusations emerged that BCL management denied requests by women to voice their 
concerns. As a Bougainvillean women's leader stated : 
... there was no consultation with women landowners. They make decisions with 
men, not women. Women wanted the mine to be stopped it could have been 
prevented if they listened to the women in the first place. Dialogue should have 
been when people wanted to talk - it caused a lot of frustration. There were 
opportunities to sit together and negotiate, but it came too late. Things were 
already out of hand. They should have come when the women called the 
meetings. When the women start to talk we know something is wrong. Women 
are much closer to land than men. They saw trouble. Perpetua Serero, Francis 
Ono's cousin she went to BCL and said stop we have to talk. They did not have 
time for them. All they wanted was more money (BOU31, Bougainvillean 
Women's Leader). 
By not including female landowners in early decisions relating to the development of 
the mine, BCL established a perception amongst locals that the company was not going 
to engage with the experiences of Bougainvilleans or their social and cultural 
structures. While the stakeholder dialogue literature correctly argues that there are 
limitations to the numbers of stakeholders that corporations can include, the most 
important and correct stakeholders (in this case, the rightful owners of the land) must 
be correctly identified. This can only be achieved by first engaging with, and 
understanding the complexities of the host society's history and culture. 
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2} Failure of Village Relations staff to speak to villages outside of 
the mining area 
Because the mine affected such a large area of Bougainville, local villages were 
affected in very different ways. As discussed in Chapter 7, one of the biggest criticisms 
of BCL's Village Relations Department was that its staff only spoke to villagers in the 
immediate vicinity of the mine. As a Bougainvillean former employee of BCL claims : 
... BCL provided avenues to bring our complaints but liaison officers could have 
really gone out, not only the places around BCL. There was a liaison officer. 
Liaison officers were Bougainvillean or Papua New Guinean but they failed to 
go to the villages. Or If they did, they could have done better {BOU27, Former 
BCL Employee/Women's Leader). 
3} Silence on rights in the Bougainvil/e Copper Agreements 
As discussed in earlier chapters, Bougainvilleans were not party to either of the 
Bougainville Copper Agreements, including the associated compensation and land rent 
deals. Thus aside from BCL's Village Relations Department, Bougainvilleans were forced 
to rely on the PNG Government to represent their concerns collectively to BCL 
management, contradicting their view that "it [land] belonged to the people not the 
government" {BOU28, Ex BRA combatant). BCL's failure to recognise the problematic 
relationship that Bougainvilleans had with the PNG Government meant that locals 
continued to feel excluded from the project and became increasingly frustrated by t he 
lack of response to their complaints. Bougainvillean suggestions on how progress could 
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have been made on this issue give an important insight as to an alternative approach 
to dialogue that might have been more effective 
... what BCL should have done is sit with the landowners and discuss a 
resolution. Then approach the PNG government. This would not have been 
rejected by the landowners. It's our culture. We contribute ideas to the 
discussion. Share grievances and decide on steps. We could have ended it that 
way (BOU20, ABG Department CEO/Landowner). 
If BCL had effectively engaged with the landowners in this way 1 the company would 
have demonstrated that they were willing to learn more about the landowners 1 
experiences of the impacts of the mine. This strategy would have recognised the 
concerns held by Bougainvilleans that the PNG Government was failing to represent 
and protect their interests in the pursuit of national economic development. BCL did 
not believe that any of the three criticisms outlined above reflected a lack of initiative 
or failure on their part. Rather1 the companls management believed that their lack of 
underst anding about the issues of most concern to locals was attributable to 'cultural 
problems 1 associated with hiring Bougainvilleans in the company's Village Relations 
Department . 
Village Relations and 'the wantok system' 
... Management weren 't getting the true picture from the community because of 
the rivalry between clans. If we had known th is at the time, the conflict could 
have been very different (BOU1, Current executive of BCL). 
It has been argue d by BCL execut ive s that the problem s in BCL's Village Relations 
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Department were the result of a clash between two systems: 'clan loyalty' and 
'bureaucratic neutrality'. The 'wantok system', a Melanesian form of social 
responsibility (Lea, 1993, p.91) became a problem for BCL when it appointed 
Bougainvilleans to work in the company's Village Relations Department, and senior 
management positions. These employees were employed to voice the concerns of 
Bougainvilleans generally, but they were "subject to local loyalties and politics and thus 
under suspicion that they favoured some groups more than others" (Vernon, 2005, 
p.264). 
According to David Lea (1993, p.91-2), 'wantokism' "has its roots in the traditional pre-
eminence of community values over individual preferences and sets out "the mutual 
duties and responsibilities, which exist between those individuals who share the same 
language". Wantok (from 'one talk' or language) "were expected to help one another 
with food, lodging and employment" (Levine, 1999, p.170). The system requires that 
wantoks share the benefits and advantages that they acquire (Lea, 1993, p.91} with 
networks of friends, neighbours and acquaintances, and is essentially an egalitarian 
way for the community to take care of one another. 
Local loyalties became a problem for BCL because wantok obligations meant 
Bougainvillean Village Relations' officers were required to maintain responsibility to 
their own clans rather than relevant landowners or to Bougainvilleans generally. As a 
consequence, BCL claim that they were not getting a clear picture of community 
problems because of local rivalries. A current executive of BCL claims: 
... this complexity was the reason we had no Bougainvilleans on the BCL board. 
[A senior Bougainvillean] would just tell BCL community opinions from his own 
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clan - not the experiences of other clans. [Francis] Ona wanted to get rid of him 
for this reason (BOUl, current BCL executive). 
The assertion by BCL that the problems with Village Relations officers were linked to 
the wantok system is contested by Bougainvilleans. As a Bougainvillean who once 
worked for BCL as a welfare officer claimed, Nit was just an attitude problem of the 
people who worked in village relations" (BOU33} rather than any structural limitations 
of the wantok system. The former welfare officer went on to say: 
... it was run by [one of the landowners]. They didn't understand their role .. . and 
it was the very place that people took their grievances. They were not kind 
characters. They were the kind of characters to make a situation diffuse ... Why 
couldn't he speak in his language to his own people? BCL were always willing. It 
was just these people that were problematic. Why couldn't they feel for the 
landowners? (BOU33}. 
Other Bougainvilleans interviewed for this study believe the communication problem 
was more symbolic of a lack of initiative on the part of BCL, rather than any inherent 
li m itat ions of the wantok system in being able to represent the interests of others. The 
CEO of an ABG Department cla imed : 
... People have to be called together. We have clan connections. One will go and 
ta lk to that side and bring the parties together. It 's our culture (BOU20, ABG 
Department CEO/ Landowner) . 
These kin ds of discre panc ies between the v iews of BCL and those of Bouga invilleans 
bring us to t he heart of th e comp lex relat ionsh ip between fore ign mult inat ionals and 
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the life worlds of locals. As a current executive of BCL argued: 
... there is no magic bullet to deal with this complexity. Every place is different 
and there is always a lack of understanding. It is always a problem because we 
are not them ... even when we employed the best anthropologists like [Douglas] 
Oliver, we still had this problem {BOU1, Current Executive of BCL}. 
The method of employing anthropologists as a way to overcome this complexity 
reflects a 'method error' in BCL's approach to dialogue initiatives. This is because no 
one, no matter how deep their understanding of the behaviour of any one group can 
be expected to accurately predict how that group will behave in future radically 
changed circumstances. As Latour (2005, p.28) argues, "relating to one group or 
another is an on-going process made up of uncertain, fragile, controversial and ever-
shifting ties". What is required is a long-term commitment to engage with the voices of 
various groups in the local community, rather than a reliance on fantasies of 
unchanging and homogenous societies that can easily be represented by a minority of 
individuals. Moreover, while BCL made various attempts to engage with 
Bougainvilleans through dialogue initiatives; they were not built on a foundation that 
recognised pre-existing cultural differences and problems, including colonial legacies 
and grievances directed at the state with which BCL was deeply connected. 
Generational disputes 
The need for long-term dialogue with various groups in the community became most 
evident in Bougainville when a generational dispute erupted within the PLA. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, from 1981 a new generation of landowners became 
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increasingly frustrated both with BCL's response to several long-standing disputes, and 
the perceived complacency of the older landowners (Wesley-Smith, 1991, p.188). In 
1987 a separate group, the NPLA formed under the leadership of Francis Ona's cousin, 
Perpetua Serero. According to a Bougainvillean landowner who was a part of the NPLA: 
... BCL and national government, they didn't do anything about this one. There 
was a meeting called. Landowners went but two executives didn't turn up. First 
roadblock started then {BOU24 Chief/Landowner). 
The BCL executives chose not to turn up according to Tanis, because "the management 
of BCL refused to recognise the NPLA, and maintained its links with the long-
established PLA, representing the older generation" (Tanis, 2005, p.463) . This claim is 
supported by a current executive of BCL, who stated that: 
... the so called NPLA approached the company and asked for an unrealistic sum 
of money-but Paul Quodling [CEO of BCL at the time] said no {BOUl, Current 
executive of BCL). 
Although most agree that the demands being put forward by the NPLA were 
unrealistic, there is a popular perception amongst Bougainvilleans that if BCL and the 
PNG government had at least negotiated with them, it's possible that the conflict 
would not have erupted in the way that it did . As a Bougainvillean former employee of 
BCL claimed : 
... At one stage we heard about the Kl0 billion claim. After that, the crisis 
started. No answer to [the] claim. Obviously there was some communication 
weakness. There might have been a different outcome {BOU34, Former BCL 
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Employee). 
Contrary to the perspective of BCL executives therefore, the communication problems 
the company faced was not just born out of the complexity of Bougainvillean culture 
and social structures. Miscommunication between the company and locals also 
emerged through a lack of initiative on the part of BCL to engage with broader sources 
of injustice, especially feelings of exclusion, subjugation and the heterogeneity of local 
communities. By failing to engage with broader experiences of injustice, BCL was 
unable to demonstrate a willingness to achieve a relationship of shared understanding 
with locals, and work towards the development of a mutually beneficial resource 
project. 
Papua 
Unlike BCL in Bougainville, Freeport and BP's activities in Papua have extended beyond 
the 1990s to include an era in which the business community has more explicitly 
adopted concepts of stakeholder dialogue. As a result, both Freeport and BP have 
operated under heightened social pressure to establish open relationships with 
landowners, community organisations and NGOs. Despite this new set of processes 
and expectations, Freeport has struggled to establish effective communication with 
indigenous Papuans. The main indicators of this struggle are 1) the secrecy in which 
the company has operated, 2) the creation of fear through the militarisation of the 
Freeport area, and 3) the creation of divisions in the local community over access to 
Freeport's community funds. In contrast, BP has been somewhat more successful in 
establishing effective communication with local Papuans prior to the construction of 
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the Tangguh project and the establishment of the TIAP. However, it too has been 
criticised for failing to include all stakeholders in its dialogue initiatives and for a lack of 
engagement with the issues of most concern to locals. 
Freeport 
... So far what we feel is that Freeport doesn't think Papuans exist ... Papuans are 
like stones or useless (PapuaS, Papuan peace activist). 
Unlike BCL, who tried to engage with the local population in the early stages of 
business development, Freeport did not do so in earnest until the mid-1990s. Indeed 
the literature (Leith, 2003} suggests, and my interviews confirm, that in the initial 
phases of mining operations, Freeport initiated no measures to engage with locals that 
were anywhere near as developed or proactive as BCL's language programs or Village 
Relations Department. In fact, Freeport's relations with locals in Papua can be seen to 
exhibit the very opposite characteristics of stakeholder dialogue discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold, based in Phoenix Arizona, is notorious for the 
closed nature in which it conducts its business activities. The company is well known 
for denying access to researchers and human rights groups for the purpose of 
conducting social and environmental evaluations of the project site 59 (see Abrash & 
Kennedy, 2002} . In addition, Freeport McMoRan 's CEO, James 'Jim Bob' Moffett has a 
59 See Abrash (2002, p .2-4) for a discussion of a blocked attempt to initiate a fact-finding mission on 
human rights in Freeport's Contract of Work area in 1999, sponsored by the Robert F. Kennedy 
Memorial Center for Human Rights. 
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reputation for making insensitive remarks regarding resource politics in Papua, such as 
Freeport is "driving a spear of development into the heart of lrian Jaya" (Schwarz, 
1991) and "we find President Suharto to be a compassionate man" (cited by 
CorpWatch, 1997). Freeport's lack of transparency has been compounded by the fact 
that Indonesia continues to keep Papua largely hidden from the outside world. This 
occurs through the routine denial of permission to visit the territory by foreign 
journalists and the eviction of humanitarian organisations, including the International 
Commission of the Red Cross, Cordaid and Peace Brigades International (Matsuno et al, 
2011). 
In spite of the focus on secrecy, Freeport has been involved in a number of 
international business initiatives ostensibly designed to promote dialogue on 
responsible business conduct. For example, the President of Freeport McMoRan is also 
the current Chairman of the International Council on Metals and Mining, a CEO driven 
initiative, which aims to strengthen business performance on 'sustainable development 
'
60
. Freeport has also publicly expressed a commitment to stakeholder dialogue 
indicating a desire to work "to improve mutual understanding and respect to enable 
the local people to achieve their aspirations and to continue harmonious relationships" 
(PT Freeport Indonesia, 2006, p.10). 
Notwithstanding Freeport's verbal public commitment to stakeholder dialogue, the 
company has been unable to achieve a positive relationship with Papuans in practice . 
This failure is connected to three key factors. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 6, the 
60 Sustainab le deve lopment w ill be discussed extensively in Chapter 11. 
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primary stakeholder that Freeport has been responsive to is the Indonesian 
Government, rather than the Papuan community. As a result, as in Bougainville, 
Freeport has been perceived by indigenous Papuans as working to further the interests 
of the Indonesian Government in relation to ongoing tensions between the 'core' and 
the 'periphery'. Second, as discussed in Chapter 7, Freeport's community initiatives 
have tended to take the form of reactive measures to combat violence in the Contract 
of Work area, rather than pro-active efforts to engage with the community. Finally, and 
similar again to Bougainville, there have been problems in communication between the 
company and locals due to cultural differences. Moreover while Freeport has been 
relatively successful in communicating a commitment to stakeholder dialogue to its 
shareholders, it can be seen to have failed to translate this verbal commitment into 
action on the ground in Papua. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, one of Freeport's earliest commitments to establishing a 
'partnership' with Papuans was motivated by riots that had broken out in Freeport's 
concession area. This reactive measure took the form of financial distributions from 
the One Per Cent Trust Fund. A perversity of this effort by Freeport to 'partner' with 
locals was that the distributions from the Fund were doled out without first 
understanding or engaging with the complexities of Papuan culture and social 
structures. Specifically, Freeport failed to understand that the communities most 
directly affected by its mining operations, the Amungme and Kamoro, hold different 
expectations of the company and tend to employ quite different communication styles 
{Le ith, 2003, p.89 ). The local 'community' cannot be conceived of as a homogenous 
entity and the cultural practices of some groups more easily engage with Western 
corporate modes of negotiation than others . For example, the Kamoro tribal group is 
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characterised as less 'assertive' and forward looking than the Amungme. As the 
following fieldwork quotes illustrate: 
... We have dialogue between Amungme and Kamara with Freeport. We 
compare with Amungme and they try to find something. Amungme always find 
what they want but Kamara can't find what they want (Papua25}. 
... Amungme and Kamara have a very different culture. The Amungme are 
powerful, strong and have big homes. They can fight for themselves for interest 
in Freeport. The Kamara are weak, never thinking about themselves. Never 
think about the future. Maybe they will be lost after 15years because they 
cannot fight for themselves (Papua 7, Indonesian Journalist). 
Freeport's lack of engagement with differences within Papuan cultures not only 
created the conditions for new internal divisions and tensions, but further aggravated 
the sense that Freeport was not willing to meaningfully engage with the locals or to see 
the mining operation from their perspective. A crucial mistake made by Freeport is that 
it has failed to recognise that money alone cannot establish effective relationships with 
local Papuan communities. As one Papuan stated: 
... the money is the second thing. Dignity and sitting together is most important 
(Papua12}. 
By failing to establish effective dialogue with various groups in the community before 
making distributions from the Fund, Freeport not only failed to align the company' s 
community development programs with the priorities of locals, but also produced new 
jealousies and tensions within and between groups. Therefore, the importance of 
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status equality as an essential precondition for the effective disbursal of community 
funds is evident in both the BCL and Freeport cases. 
2011 worker strikes 
Freeport's failure to "enable the local people to achieve their aspirations and to 
continue harmonious relationships" (PT Freeport Indonesia, 2006, p.10} became highly 
visible in July 2011 when approximately 8,000 Freeport workers at the Grasberg mine 
went on strike. The strikers sought a pay increase from US$1.50 per hour to US$3 per 
hour to make the wages of Grasberg workers comparable to Freeport employees in 
other parts of the world (where wages range from $15 to $30 per hour). Freeport 
management called on the employees to return to work, stating that, "the company 
sees there is no legitimate justification for any form of strike ... " (Sirait cited in Wanda, 
2011). 
Following a weeklong protest, the company and the workers union failed to come to 
an agreement, which resulted in the Union initiating a one-month strike. In response, 
Freeport reportedly offered a 10 per cent pay rise in the coming year and another 10 
per cent for the following year (Freeport Indonesia workers, 2011). Unsatisfied with 
this offer, the workers continued to lobby for higher wages. Following more failed 
negotiations and a decline in Freeport's operating capacity, 114-armed police arrived 
in the mining area in addition to the 600 paramilitary troops already present (Workers 
at Freeport, 2011). Freeport then enflamed an already volatile situation by issuing the 
striking workers with a " No work, No pay", note, claiming the company was not legally 
obliged to pay those who chose to take part in the strike (Rusmana, 2011) . 
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Unable to resolve the strike and coax the employees back to work, Freeport began 
replacing the striking workers with new labour. The strikers set up protests against 
Freeport's attempt to transport the replacement workers into the mining area, which 
escalated into a violent clash with police. News outlets reported that in response to 
being pelted with stones, the police fired warning shots in attempt to disperse the 
protesters {Freeport Indonesia mine, 2011). One of these 'warning' shots claimed the 
life of a protester who was shot in the chest. The violence surrounding the strikes led 
to the death of a further three people and injured a dozen others. Freeport eventually 
agreed to increase wages by 37 per cent. This offer also included improved housing 
allowances, education assistance and a retirement savings plan for workers {Freeport 
Indonesia mine, 2011). 
Consistent with the argument of this chapter, Ballard & Werden {2011) argue that the 
2011 strikes point to the failed efforts of Freeport in the past to establish a mutually 
beneficial venture with local Papuans, exacerbated by the company's slow efforts to 
train a Papuan workforce (see Ch 10). Ballard & Werden argues that the crucial 
constraint to the establishment of effective dialogue between Freeport and locals is 
the interference of the Indonesian Government which, "regards any kind of direct 
negotiation with Papuans, particularly on the part of an outside company like US 
owned Freeport, as a threat to sovereignty, particularly post East Timer". 
The power of Indonesian narratives of the importance of national unity will be 
discussed extensively in the following chapter, but is raised here because the violence 
and intimidation which marked the strikes reflects the fundamental failure of Freeport 
to engage with locals by allowing stakeholder dialogue to be co-opted by the 
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Indonesian security forces. As Ballard & Werden {2011) argue, "the problem is 
whenever they've [Freeport] been pushed to make a choice, they tend to fit onto the 
side of Jakarta and the security forces". This argument mirrors the claim made by the 
Bougainvillean ABG Department CEO that BCL should have sat with the landowners as 
a first step, and then taken a shared resolution to the national government. By treating 
locals with dignity, natural resource companies have an important opportunity to 
initiate dialogue on a wide range of institutional changes that could foster the 
development mutually beneficial resource projects. 
BP 
... BP has been well received because the management of the company had 
already given the first 3 years of community development - the people know we 
are part of the company {Papua3, BP employee). 
In contrast to BCL and Freeport, BP's commitment to dialogue with locals affected by 
the Tangguh LNG project can be characterised as more inclusive and long-term. 
However, BP has also been criticised for failing to include all segments of the 
community. 
Before BP began constructing the Tangguh LNG project, the company spent three years 
{2001-2003) establishing and implementing numerous environmental and socio -
economic development commitments. This forms a stark contrast to the BCL and 
Freeport cases in which no significant community engagement initiatives were put in 
place prior to the establishment of the two mines. According to a BP employee, this 
strategy has worked well because it gave Papuans a sense that BP would recognise the 
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rights of local people (Papua3}. Clearly different to the experience of BCL and Freeport, 
Papuans felt included in the BP project from the very moment of production. Through 
this inclusion, Papuans developed a clearer understanding of the project and the social 
and environmental effects it was going to create prior to commencement of operations 
(Papua8, BP employee). 
BP adopted this more proactive approach to community engagement, cognisant of the 
Freeport experience, knowing it would be attempting to establish business operations 
in an area where resource development had been associated with conflict and human 
rights violations. As such BP felt it was taking a serious risk with its international 
reputation by investing in Papua. Two crucial steps taken by BP to avoid becoming 
embroiled in the kind of conflict associated with the Freeport project included the 
undertaking of the first human rights impact assessment to ever be conducted by a 
resource company in lndonesia61, and the establishment of the TIAP. 
The TIAP was established in 2002, "to provide external advice to senior decision -
makers regarding non-commercial aspects of the Tangguh LNG Project" (BP p.l.c., 
2012c}. The panel is comprised of former US Senator George Mitchell, Lord Hannay of 
Chiswick from the U.K., Ambassador Sabam Siagian from Jakarta, and Reverend 
Herman Saud from Jayapura. The panel has been involved in providing yearly 
recommendations to the management of BP, who are then required to respond 
publicly (through the BP website) to each recommendation. In BP's response to the 
first TIAP report, the company agreed to the recommendation that it, "continue and 
61 Th is will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
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intensify the dialogue BP has begun with the central government, regional government 
leaders in Papua, NGOs and religious leaders" (BP, 2002, p.15). The dialogue initiatives 
that BP commenced in 2002 for example, included initiatives such as local NGO 
meetings, seminars on BP's community based security strategy and workshops on 
revenue management {BP, 2002, p.6). The establishment of TIAP and public responses 
to its recommendations has resulted in greater transparency of the company's 
activities through the availability of the TIAP reports on BP's website. 
Although many Papuans interviewed for this study commended BP for its more 
comprehensive effort to establish a relationship of trust with locals, the TIAP has been 
criticised by some external observers. Hickman and Barber {2011, p.15) for example, 
have questioned the 'independence' of the Panel due to the sponsorship it receives 
from BP. Moreover) the authors argue that while BP has a system of public 
consultation, "these events tend to be carefully stage-managed to put BP in a positive 
light" {Hickman & Braber, 2011, p.15). Environmental NGO, Down to Earth has also 
criticised BP for delays between the completion of reports and their publication, and 
the lack of attention paid to the particular impacts of the project on women (Down To 
Earth, 2003). 
In line with some external criticism of the TIAP mechanism, annual reports responding 
to the Panel's recommendations tend not to address the more controversial aspects of 
the project, particularly lan d and resource rights. As Down to Earth claim, "i n fact the 
Panel avoids this crucial issue by stating that BP's compliance with Indonesian law is 
outside the scope of the Panel 's inquiry" . Down to Earth (2003) also criticise the 
relative value of BP 's efforts to establish dialogue with locals when they have no right 
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to reject the project, "the whole TIAP mission is based on the understanding that the 
project will go ahead and the question is how to do it best, not whether to do it at all". 
Despite the external criticism, my fieldwork suggests that BP's efforts to achieve 
stakeholder dialogue through regular forums with NGOs are valued by locals. As one 
NGO worker involved in forums on the Tangguh project stated: 
... BP did this well because management of BP knows that they were coming to 
an area where there has been a problem before. By understanding this case, 
they are more open with NGOs in order to make relationship with local 
community. BP also do their social analysis about the effects that can come up 
after development in the area and involve the local people there. Until now 
things like instrument to development involve regular communication with 
NGOs, government, church and other groups, Muslim and-Catholic ... Regular 
meetings every 6 months trying to share dialogue, relating to human rights and 
environment {Papua4, NGO worker). 
BP's establishment of regular forums with NGO groups has been well received amongst 
Papuan NGO workers. These workers believe the forums have resulted in a greater 
understanding of local cultures and inclusion of local people in the conduct of the 
project. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that BCL, Freeport and BP have not succeeded (to varying 
degrees) in opening long-term dialogue with all peoples affected by their business 
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activities. The Bougainville and Papua cases illustrate the importance of direct dialogue 
between natural resource companies and locals. The state, military, the motive of the 
corporation and the heterogeneity of communities were identified as constraints to 
effective dialogue. Conversely, the importance of treating locals with dignity and 
respect through early, proactive engagement was highlighted as vital to the 
development of relationships of mutual trust. 
Advancing the argument of this thesis, the focus of CSR needs to be widened to 
respond to claims for recognition and not just redistribution. Without demonstrating a 
willingness to negotiate directly with locals and a sustained commitment to treat locals 
as full participants in the resource project, it is likely that corporations will be limited in 
their capacity to achieve a 'harmonious relationship'. On a more optimistic note, the 
Bougainville and Papua data do point to the fact that locals do value and foresee 
opportunities to develop positive relationships with management, prior to any 
demands for the distribution of large amounts through community development funds. 
An important observation in this chapter was the way in which large natural resource 
companies can allow dialogue to be co -opted by the state and its security forces. The 
follow ing chapter expands this discussion through an analysis of the indign ity of 
vi olence in prising open new conflicts and falsely labelling them as threats to 'national 
unity'. 
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Chapter 9: Corporate Security Politics 
Site of 
interdependence 
Human rights 
violations 
Diseng~ged:; . 
(CSR. a;''.if mostly _i~k~:.: .;\~,1, 
Corporations don't 
acknowledge the tensions 
between local communities 
and officia I authorities 
(CSR reconfigured} 
Corporations recognise the 
hostilities and fears that local 
communities have of national 
authorities and seek to open 
new spaces of security 
The site of interdependence between the three companies and the Bougainville and 
Papua conflicts analysed in this chapter is human rights violations, through the lens of 
corporate security politics. The deployment of private and public security forces to 
protect natural resource projects has been a contributing factor to conflict associated 
with extractive projects in recent years. Concern about the issue has resulted in 
international initiatives such as the Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights, 
which aim to assist corporations to adhere to international human rights standards in 
their security arrangements. As discussed in Chapter 1, these global initiatives have 
been developed in response to significant scandals in the industry, where the use of 
private and public security has led to accusations of human rights violations by actors 
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funded by large corporations . The experiences of Freeport in Papua, Shell in -Nigeria 
and Total/Chevron in Burma are particular cases in point. 
By comparing the cases of Bougainville and Papua an important difference between 
the BCL and Freeport experiences becomes visible. While both companies have been 
associated with state security forces, this association has been borne of quite different 
approaches. BCL did not explicitly seek the protection of the PNGDF, nor was it obliged 
to engage them under the Bougainville Copper Agreement. However BCL nonetheless 
became involved in accusations of human rights violations when the PNGDF responded 
to violent attacks on the mine62 . 
As such, it was BCL's lack of preventive security that implicated the company in these 
accusations. In contrast, Freeport has financially supported the Indonesian security 
forces as a requirement of its Contract of Work with the Indonesian Government. 
Consequently, Freeport is perceived to have justified the presence of the Indonesian 
security forces in areas surrounding the mine. The BP example represents yet another 
security approach. Through the implementation of a Community Based Security 
Strategy, BP has explicitly sought to distance itself from the actions of the Indonesian 
military based on the previous experience of Freeport . 
Analysing the security pract ices of the three companies, this chapter argues that BCL 
62 An accusation of BCL/R io Tinto's complicity in war crimes is one complaint filed in a lawsuit filed in the 
US under the Alien Tort Claims Act. However, this lawsuit is not believed to be representative of the 
general view of Bougainvilleans . Rather the lawsuit is believed by some informants to have been filed in 
the in terests of the individual filing the case (Dr Alexis Sarei}, or that the case has been effectively 
hijacked by the lawyers (BOU40) . 
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and Freeport have failed in different ways to recognise the fears about and hostilities 
towards, the state's security apparatus. Quite differently, BP has made important 
progress, broadly recognising and responding to the apprehension that Papuans hold 
towards the Indonesian military. This has been made possible through the company's 
willingness to consider alternative models of corporate security, as well as a level of 
ambivalence about stories of Indonesian state sovereignty over Papua. 
Bougainville 
With the exception of the Rorovana landowner protests in 1969, the use of security to 
protect the mine has not been a dominant issue in the relatively large body of 
literature on the Bougainville conflict. This is because the security forces that were 
employed to protect the mine before the conflict have generally not been accused of 
violating human rights or violence towards local landowners. 
Security before the crisis 
When the land that would be used for the development of the mine was first mapped 
out by CRA, security for company staff was provided by the Australian colonial 
Administration. As a current executive of BCL explains: 
... everything was controlled by the police - the Administration. For example, 
when the women laid themselves on the ground to resist the mine, it was the 
police in control of security {BOUl}. 
An important event for the Administration to handle during the construction of the 
mine was the Rorovana landowner protests. These protests were staged in response to 
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the Administration's attempt to acquire land for the development of a port as a part of 
the mine's infrastructure {BCL, 2010-2011). The protests were partly motivated by the 
compensation offer of $105 per acre of land to be used by BCL, plus $2 per coconut 
tree {Cooper, 1991, p.62). Instead of responding to the protests through 
communication and negotiation, the Administration sent riot police to Bougainville to 
protect BCL surveyors who were marking the boundaries of the Rorovana land 
required. This response resulted in a major confrontation on 5 August 1969, between, 
"bulldozers with lines of riot police carrying batons, shields, rifles and respirators facing 
a motley crowd of about 65 villagers, men and women and some children, unarmed 
and quite defenceless" {Cooper, 1991, p.63). 
The Bougainvillean tactics of non-violent resistance hit front-pages back in Australia, 
where Sydney newspapers published headlines such as, 'Australia's Shame' and, 
'Australia's Bullies in New Guinea' (Denoon, 2000, p.2) . According to Braithwaite, 
Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn {2010, p.16), the news reports did indeed outrage many 
Australians adding, "to the impetus in the Australian Labor movement to push for early 
independence" for PNG . However as discussed in Chapter 5, the Australian 
Administration's priority at the time was to facilitate PNG's independence and 
unification into a single state. A consequence of this focus on PNG independence was 
that no attempt was made to re -examine "the social justice of the mine through the 
lens of the loca I landowners" ( Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.16). 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 7, one strategy BCL adopted to educate itself about the 
social impacts the mine might have on Bougainville, was to seek the advice of 
anthropologist, Douglas Oliver. According to Denoon (2000, p.201), in spite of the 
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Rorovana landowner protests, Oliver advised BCL that local, "opposition would be 
limited, and that people would be reconciled to the mine eventually" (Denoon, 2000, 
p.201). Oliver's assessment of the situation was so unquestioned within the company's 
management that it did not treat potential security threats by Bougainvilleans with any 
seriousness. 
When the mine began production BCL put large numbers of unarmed private security 
in place around the mine site . However the focus of this security apparatus was to 
prevent accidents, rather than deliberate violence (BOU38, Former ABG Department 
CEO). According to Bougainvillean former BCL employees who participated in this 
study, the provision of training for BCL employees was generally at a very high 
standard. However training to respond to civil disturbance was not provided, as such a 
scenario was not considered likely. This reflects BCL's belief that the major threats to 
mining operations did not relate to civil unrest, but were largely environmental, such 
as earthquakes and landslides (BOU34, BOU35, BOU38). A current BCL executive 
supports this view stating that: 
... when the mine was running we had a well organised unarmed security. Its 
main reason for being there was to keep people safe and off the mine site 
{BOU1}. 
The assumption that conflict would not arise as result of the mine points to the 
company's general inability to imagine and/or empathise with the interests of 
Bougainvilleans. This point is not made to advocate the removal of armed security, or 
to suggest that no substantial security strategy is required around mining development 
projects. Rather, it is made to indicate that engagement with the concerns of locals is 
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crucial to the development of a security approach that doesn't impinge on the rights of 
locals, or increase the likelihood of conflict. This is particularly evident in relation to 
BP's security approach in Papua, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Conflict begins 
... The worst mistake [of the PNG Government] was bringing in the police mobile 
squad. They were the worst criminals. They started subjecting people to torture 
and frightening people. That really upset the Bougainvilleans. They were forced 
to take up arms. It turned into an outright war. Became an island wide thing 
(BOU35, Bougainvillean former BCL employee). 
The legacy of the early approach of the PNG Government in relation to unrest on 
Bougainville was a disastrous conflict ignited by armed attacks on the mine by 
members of what became the BRA. As indicated, BCL did not have any strategies in 
place to deal with such incidents. BCL's position changed dramatically following an ill-
informed decision by the PNG Government to send in riot police to bring an end to the 
violence. However rather than bringing the violence to a halt, the abuses perpetrated 
by the riot police had quite the opposite effect. Indeed, the introduction of PNG riot 
police proved to be a decision that would fuel a civil war. 
Between 1987 and 1988, the NPLA organised publ ic demonstrations against the mine, 
culminating in violent attacks on BCL property, including minor looting, arson and the 
use of explosives (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.23). The most 
damaging attacks occurred in 1988 when, "the [electricity] pylons [of the mine] were 
blown up by Som Kauono on instructions from Francis Ona who formed the BRA" 
240 
(BOU26, Bougainvillean women's leader). In addition to attacks on the pylons, an 
incident occurred in which a bus was shot at in the area of the mine site, 
... two employees were injured. That was it. It was too dangerous to go. Only 
essential [BCL} staff will remain ti/ further notice. Then they [BCL management] 
started assessing the seriousness. If one shot was fired, more would be up 
(BOU34, Bougainvillean former BCL employee). 
A Bougainvillean women's leader living in the vicinity of the mine at the time further 
recounted, 
... at 3.30 we were told the first pylon was blown up. Buses were taking 
employees and dropping them off. My husband came and said it's bad - four 
people were shot (BOU32}. 
A build up of similar attacks over successive months led to the mine's eventual closure 
in 1989, at which time all foreign BCL employees were evacuated. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, a key debate in the Bougainville literature is whether Sam Kauona and 
Francis Ona intended to permanently close the mine or whether they, "aspired to 
reopen the mine under a new income-sharing formula that might one day support an 
independent Bougainville" (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.23} . 
Regardless of the motivation, the crucial point for Bougainville's security politics at the 
time was that the Government's response was insensitive to the potential for the 
behaviour of the PNGDF to spark pre-existing ethnic tensions (Regan, 2001, p.2}. 
With the PNG Government unable to absorb the loss of revenue that resulted from the 
disruption to mining operations, a Police Mobile Squad and the PNGDF were deployed 
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to restore the situation (Rolfe, 2001, p.41). However this decision did little by way of 
restoration, but a lot to fuel conflict. One reason this decision fuelled rather than 
neutralise the conflict was that Bougainvilleans were already resentful about the 
impact that the large numbers of migrants from other areas of PNG were having on 
their local communities. 
Bougainvilleans were angry with the Papua New Guineans, particularly those from the 
Highlands, who arrived in search of economic opportunities from the mine but who 
also created new social problems63 . In particular, the migrants were held responsible 
for an increase in violence and harassment towards local women. Tensions ignited 
when Highlanders killed a Bougainvillean nurse during a time in which BRA 
membership was increasing. As a Bougainvillean women's leader recounted: 
... the Highlanders were scattered all over the island. It was risky for women 
because the Highlanders killed a nurse ... Before this, the issue was only about 
BCC and then it became chasing squatters. [The murder] happened in 1989 ... {It 
was] one of the main contributors to why young people joined [the] BRA side 
(BOU26}. 
The insertion of the PNGDF into Bougainville can be seen to have further enflamed pre -
existing ill will held by Bougainvilleans towards Papua New Guineans. As the former 
President of Bougainville James Tanis argues, instead of seeing the PNGDF state forces 
as coming to the aid of local civil ians, Bougainvilleans saw "the colour of their skin " and 
63 Th is w ill be discussed more extens ively in Chapter 10. 
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associated them with colonial domination by PNG (Regan & Tanis, 2010). A key 
problem for BCL in responding to the eruption of the conflict was that its management 
team had never entertained the possibility for it to occur. As Vernon, (2005, p.267) 
states, "what was not foreseen was the way in which the deeply ingrained sense of 
separateness that characterised so many groups in PNG would be accentuated by the 
project". 
The decision to insert of the PNGDF into Bougainville and the ensuing civil war was 
indicative of both the company and the Government's lack of understanding of the 
social consequences of the mine. The most significant issue in this respect was the 
resentment Bougainvilleans felt towards the presence and behaviour of the PNG 
Highlanders (also known locally as 'Redskins') who migrated to Bougainville following 
the opening of the mine. As a former Bougainvillean employee of BCL stated: 
... what compounded those issues was the influx of people - Redskins. They have 
their own culture different to ours. Dealings caused problems. The mine drove 
those people here64 {BOUS}. 
In this way, the failure of BCL and the Government to deal with the social issues that 
emerged on Bougainville alongside the development of the mine can be seen to have 
predetermined the violence that followed the deployment of the PNGDF to 
Bougainville. As Ogan claims, "the entry of the PNG security forces and their variably 
brutal and grotesquely ineffectual activities created a qualitative change in a conflict 
64 However, plantation work also brought migrants from other parts of PNG to the island. 
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that might otherwise have taken a less catastrophic course" (Ogan, 1999, p.-8). This 
'catastrophic course' was marked by allegations of human rights violations on all sides. 
The newly formed BRA can be seen to have committed human rights violations that 
corresponded to the types of violence inflicted by the PNG security forces (Regan, 
2001, p.4}. 
By time the conflict had escalated in 1989, BCL believed they had lost any opportunity 
to resolve the problems associated with the mine and felt they had no choice but to 
evacuate its entire staff. One option that BCL might have considered at this point could 
have been to announce a pause in operations, and organise a meeting with all factions 
of landowners. As discussed in Chapter 8, the NPLA had in fact called a meeting with 
BCL and the Government, but BCL executives chose not to attend (BOU24, 
Chief/Landowner). 
The Bougainville conflict, which began with problems associated with a resource 
extraction project, gave rise to broader claims for independence when Ona's attacks 
against the mine and the Government, "struck a responsive chord across all of 
Bougainville and spontaneous attacks on government and foreign property erupted in 
many places in sympathy" (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.24) . As a 
Bougainvillean women's leader recounted: 
... PNG soldiers were also killing people, the civilians. Everybody was frightened. 
At the same time, PNG withdrew [government services]. There was no law and 
order ... they killed many in the mountains. Killing even young children. They 
wanted to control the situation when BRA started damaging properties of BCL. 
PNG withdrew all government workers and sent soldiers to rule this place 
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{BOU26}. 
The removal of services on Bougainville led to a significant increase in the level of 
support for the BRA, with some estimates indicating up to 300 armed and active 
members by 1990 (Wesley-Smith, 1991, p.189}. However as discussed in Chapter 4, not 
all Bougainvilleans endorsed the actions of the BRA. The BRF for example, harnessed 
increasing support in the early 1990s. The BRF fighters blamed the lack of services 
available to Bougainvilleans on the BRA's violence, and were angered by the criminal 
behaviour of some BRA combatants (BOUlS, ex-BRA combatant}. In this way 
Bougainvilleans became pitted against Bougainvilleans, adding new complexities to the 
conflict. 
Preventive security and the future of the mine 
The question that this discussion on BCL's corporate security practices raises is: if BCL 
had treated the initial protests of Bougainvilleans with more seriousness, could the civil 
war have been avoided, or put differently, 'preventive security' achieved? 
Alternatively, would the outcome have been more comparable to the repressive 
actions of the Indonesian security forces around Freeport (discussed in the next 
section}? The steps taken by the PNG Government in response to attacks against the 
mine in 1989 suggest that the Government may have been more inclined to the latter 
scenario, but the position of BCL remains unclear. A current executive of BCL for 
example, responded to a question about whether or not current human rights 
initiatives for the extractive sector would have been effective in the context of the 
Bougainville conflict in this way: 
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... there were no voluntary initiatives or human rights standards at the time the 
mine operated ... Contemporary voluntary standards wouldn't change things 
much. (BOU1). 
The contemporary existence of voluntary human rights standards indicates a greater 
awareness of the potential for resource extraction projects to lead to violence. 
However the presence of these standards does not necessarily guarantee that 
companies adhering to them will adopt a more interactive/engaged approach to 
working with security threats and/or disruptions. Moreover the application of an 
external standard can result in a 'tick the box' approach that does not take into 
account the unique contextual and cultural dynamics at play. This is demonstrated in 
the Bougainville case where the key lapse in BCL's security approach related to a 
colonial assumption that Bougainvilleans would passively accept the mine, as well as a 
lack of foresight as to how the insertion of more Papua New Guineans who impinged 
on the rights of Bougainvilleans would enflame an already volatile situation. 
Papua 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, an ongoing grievance held by Papuans centres 
on the contested way in which their territory was incorporated into Indonesia. This 
incorporation also established one of the key structural features of the conflict : the 
provocative actions of the Indonesian security forces. These security forces have been 
accused of human rights violations throughout Papua in the name of protecting both 
the 'nat ional unity' of Indonesia and its 'vital national assets', which are understood to 
inc lude large extractive projects . 
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The lack of concern for Papuan rights in context of national development and unity has 
led Indonesia to be counted as "one of three countries (along with Colombia and 
Nigeria} in which human rights in the corporate sphere are most obviously 
endangered" (Ballard, 2001, p.9}. This has raised concerns within the extract ive 
industry as to whether it is possible to invest in Papua while maintaining a commitment 
to international human rights standards (TIAP, 2009, p.47}. Moreover while the 
utilisation of state security forces may in the past have paved the way for international 
companies to enter conflict sensitive areas (by repressing local protests), it has now 
become a major reputational concern. 
The remainder of this chapter will show how Indonesia's security approach to Papua is 
illustrative of a 'contradictory narrative' between protecting the national unity of 
Indonesia (the perspective of Jakarta) and the violation of Papuan human rights (the 
perspective of Papua's independence movement). This contradictory narrative is also 
reflected in the respective security practices of Freeport and BP. 
On the one hand, Freeport (reflective of the Indonesian state view), entered Papua 
with the assistance of the TNI, yet has explicitly denied the company's involvement in 
human rights violations. This denial has been achieved by relying on a narrative of state 
sovereignty, which distances the company from accusations of complicity in the 
behaviours of the Indonesian security forces. In contrast, BP has acknowledged the 
issue of Indonesian sovereignty as a constraining factor to the protection of human 
rights in Papua, but its security practices have not been driven by it. Rather the key 
driver of BP's security approach is based on: 
... the hypothesis that if people feel they benefit from the BP project, they will 
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guard it (Papua 41, BP Indonesia employee). 
The chapter will explain how BP's Community Based Security model has opened a new 
space of security in Papua. Consequently, BP has made some progress in recognising 
Papuan fears and apprehension towards the TNI. 
Narratives of unity and threat 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the stories that states and minority groups tell about the 
past have important implications for the present and visions of the future. In Papua, 
the stories that the Indonesian state has told about the development of the TN I are 
also important for understanding corporate security in the region. The TNI has been a 
strong facet of Indonesia's self constructed identity since it gained independence from 
the Dutch in 1948. The TNI was a revolutionary army who believed they could build 
their nation. The success of the TNI in an armed struggle against the Dutch "gave rise 
to the perception of the army as the institution that preserved the Indonesian nation 
and provided the rational for the military' s role in politics" ( Ra bas a & Haseman, 2002, 
p.8). This historical account has not only entrenched a perception amongst Indonesians 
of the TNI as the 'guardia ns of national unity', but has been used to justify the TNl's 
actions against separatist sentiments within Indonesia (Blair & Phillips, 2003, p.63). 
More specifically for the purposes of this discussion, it has provided a legitimising 
rationale for the presence of the TNI in areas surrounding the Freeport mine in the 
name of protecting the state's assets. 
This rationale became most evident when Suharto gained control of the TNI and 
shifted its attention away from external enemies and towards internal threats to the 
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regime (Ballard, 2001, p.9). The TNI constituted the state's interest and ultimately 
came to align directly with the interests of Suharto, his party Golkar and his cronies. 
This mandate for the TNI as the guardians of the regime and its financial resources 
established the conditions for human rights violations surrounding large extractive 
projects (Ballard, 2001). 
Indonesia has also drawn on a narrative of national unity in response to separatism in 
Papua, which along with Aceh has felt the full force of the TNI (Rabasa & Haseman, 
2002, p.107). Indeed despite wide reports that the OPM has, "weakened, lacks 
ammunition and relies on bows and arrows" {TIAP, 2009, p.12) the Indonesian 
Government has maintained a militarised approach in Papua for over 40 years. 
The TNI in Papua and the Indonesian economy 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, the actions of the TNI in Papua have been 
intricately linked to the historical injustices that Papuans feel they have suffered as a 
result of integration into Indonesia through the Act of Free Choice process. Sadly 
however, the fall of Suharto in 1998 did not bring an end to the militarisation of Papua. 
While the TNI is no longer believed to be committing human rights abuses on the scale 
of the 1960s, high numbers of troops are deployed in Papua and pose a continued 
threat to cultural expression and Papuan autonomy. As Widjojo argues, political 
violence in Papua is psychological and structural. "The Papuans' experience of political 
violence nurtured a collective memory of suffering, or what is known as memoria 
passionis [memory of suffering]"' (Widjojo, 2010, p.12). 
National stories have been drawn upon to justify the large military presence in Papua. 
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However the TNI also has a financial interest in maintaining its Papua presence. 
According to Blair and Phillips (2003, p.8), the TNI must raise a significant proport ion of 
its own revenue due to the fact that it receives only 25 -30 per cent of its budget from 
the national government. The rest is raised through a mixture of legal and illegal 
activities, including payments by extractive companies for security. On an individual 
level, soldiers are also poorly paid with mid-ranking soldiers earning $60 to $95 per 
month and high-ranking officers earning $110 to $350 per month in 2001 (The 
Economist cited in Blair & Phillips, 2003, p.62). This situation creates strong individual 
incentives to participate in corruption, and has exacerbated the lack of TN I 
accountability to civilian authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2010, p.2). 
As we will see in the case of Freeport, the military's lack of accountability and the need 
to ra ise revenue through business activities has embroiled the company in a broad 
range of accusations of human rights violations. The economic interests of TNI in 
Freeport' s mining activ ities have also undermined attempts to control and reform the 
Indonesian security forces, and have fuelled human rights violations both in the vicinity 
of major natural resource projects, and throughout Papua (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 
p.2). 
Freeport's security practices and the narrative of state sovereignty 
... Freeport as a foreign company - as a notional asset should be looked ofte r. In 
this case by the arm [sic}. In the govern ment's m ind it is a good way and the 
company also ... Freeport is the operator. It hos a contract wi th Indonesia - i t 
hos to abide by the low and its by-lows (Papua 45, Form er Freeport emp loyee). 
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The most visible link between TNI and the Indonesian economy has been the presence 
of troops around the Freeport mining area. This presence can be described as one of 
the most long-standing Papuan concerns regarding Freeport's operations in Papua. As 
a Papuan NGO worker stated: 
... the problem is because Freeport is making trouble for a very long time. Since 
the contract., Freeport pays security {Papua23}. 
The presence of TNI in areas surrounding Freeport's concession has also limited the 
capacity of local people to speak freely against the actions of TNI troops and the social 
and environmental impacts of mining. As one Papuan from Timika stated: 
... They [local Papuans] are scared to talk about it. There are many human rights 
violations - especially of the Amungme tribes. Freeport makes people scared by 
killing and kidnapping in the area. People are scared of asking Freeport for 
information {Papua25}. 
A particularly significant security issue in the vicinity of Freeport's mining operations 
were the 1996 riots. Many Papuans believe the riots were orchestrated by the military 
but were: 
... accused on Papuan independence organisations {Papua14., Papuan Human 
Rights Activist). 
The motivation for these actions is considered to stem from the military's need to 
source external funding. By orchestrating attacks but attributing them to local 
separatists, the military can justify their ongoing value to Freeport, and secure well-
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paid contracts into the future . Similar accusations have been levelled at the military for 
numerous shooting incidents around the Freeport area from 2002-2011. Responsibility 
for these violent incidents has been caught in a blame game between Papuan activists 
and TN I. The Indonesian Government and Freeport have sided with the military by 
attributing the attacks to separatists seeking to destroy assets of national importance. 
However, Papuan advocates for independence vehemently deny these accusations. 
One of the shooting incidents around the Grasberg mine occurred during August 2002 
when teachers working on contract for Freeport, two from the United States and one 
from Java, were killed. Despite a lack of evidence the military, government officials and 
senior Freeport management publicly attributed the attack to Papuan separatists, with 
a Jakarta court later sentencing a Papuan villager, Antonius Wamang to life in prison 
(Kirskey & Harsono, 2008, p.165). The sentence occurred despite the fact that both 
police and US intelligence reports linked the murders to the military rather than to 
Wamang (Kirksey & Harsono, 2008, p.165). 
Advocates for Wamang's innocence believe the main suspects involved in the shooting 
are members of the Tenaga Bantuan Operasi (TBO). The TBO is a group of civilians who 
give logistical assistance to the Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus). Some of the 
civilians are believed to be Amungme and Dan i people who are tra ined in Java to work 
for the army to instigate violent incidents 65 (Papua 14, Papuan Human Rights activist) . 
As a Papuan human rights activist stated: 
65 Others are simply civilians who prov ide bas ic support to the armed forces, such as food . 
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... those in TBO stand in front of every tribal war - they are the spirit maker to 
make tribal war from Dani and Amungme groups (Papua14}. 
According to Ballard and Banks (2007, p.22), if the military was responsible for the 
murders, they were likely motivated by Freeport's attempts to wean the security forces 
of its financial assistance. Freeport's attempts to cease financial ties with the military 
followed national level reforms, which sought to tighten the control of TNI (Blair & 
Phillips, 2003, p.8). However, instead of improving the human rights situation around 
the mine, these reforms are believed by many Papuans to have created jealousies 
between the military and the police, who both orchestrate attacks in the Freeport area 
in order to secure security payments. The military is then accused of blaming the 
attacks on the OPM to justify the continuation of their contracts. As a Freeport 
employee explained: 
... [the] shootings took place because Freeport tried to stop military and only use 
police. Blame [Kelly] Kwalik66 and local people on this. They have already 
enjoyed the cake too much ... ln 2007 it [Freeport security] changed to 
policemen. This gains jealousy between the two. When security is taken by 
policemen, army get jealous of this. They make incident to show they need army 
(Papua12}. 
These suspicions heightened when subsequent shootings took place following further 
attempts to decrease the company's financial assistance to the military. As Braithwaite, 
66 Kelly Kwalik was a leader of the OPM, killed by Indonesian police in 2009. The police accused Kwal ik of 
a series of attacks in the Freeport mining area in 2002. 
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Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn (2010, p.69) argue in July 2009, "there were a further 
series of perhaps six shooting incidents near the mine in which one Australian mine 
engineer and two Indonesians were killed and many others were wounded" . In 
response to the shootings, Papuans and international NGOs have demanded that 
Freeport cease its ties with the Indonesian security forces . Freeport has responded to 
these demands by pointing to its legal agreement with the national government that 
binds it to work with TN I. In a letter addressed to Global Witness, for example, 
Freeport's Vice President for Communications stated: 
... pursuant to the Government's declaration that our company's mining 
operations are a Vital National Object ... there is no alternative to our reliance on 
the military and police in this regard ... The Indonesian Government - not our 
company- is responsible for employing its security personnel and directing their 
operations (Collier, letter reproduced in Global Witness, 2005, p.19) . 
In deferring to the sovereignty of the Indonesian Government and its requirement that 
the Indonesian security forces protect all 'vital national assets', Freeport has distanced 
itself from any responsibility for the actions of TNI in its area of operation . 
Consequently the company has failed to act on important opportunities to make a 
lasting contribution to improving human rights standards in Papua . 
The possibility of conceptualising Freeport's responses to the shooting incidents as a 
positive CSR opportunity missed was raised in an interview with a former Freeport 
employee . While he acknowledged that the company recognises that, ''Papuans using 
bows and arrows" did not undertake the shootings, he maintained that: 
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... Freeport is a foreign company - it can't talk about politics - by law it can't 
interfere {Papua45}. 
As a consequence of Freeport's persistent deference to Indonesian law and sovereignty 
regarding the actions of the security forces, the company has foregone important 
opportunities to transform the popular local perception that the company not only 
operates in its own financial interest, but also in the interests of the Indonesian 
security forces (Papua9, Papuan religious leader). 
Others are more understanding of the constraintsr facing Freeport in changing its 
security approach, but still critique the lack of will on the part of Freeport to limit the 
presence of the military around the mine. As a former Freeport employee stated: 
... Freeport is trying to change - they are more open for human rights - they are 
taking it seriously. But it will take time because of the surrounding environment. 
Freeport cannot say it wants less troops ... it has had small opportunities ... but I 
don't think they were successful to capitalise because Freeport is too strategic 
{Papua11}. 
While recognising that constraints on Freeport do exist (namely, the legal requirements 
of the Indonesian state for the protection of major resource projects), BP's entry into 
Papua reveals that these constraints don't necessarily need to 'drive' the company's 
interactions with the military. As will now be discussed, BP has implemented a new 
approach to security in Papua that challenges Freeport's insistence on submission to 
state law, and the narratives that have upheld the presence of TNI in the areas 
surrounding the Freeport mine and beyond. 
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'A model to avoid': BP's development of community based security 
... Tangguh was both welcomed as a new model for international corporate 
conduct and feared because of Papua's past experience (TIAP, 2009, p.47} . 
When BP first entered Papua the company acknowledged to both stakeholders and 
shareholders that security would be the most difficult and sensitive issue faced by the 
Tangguh project (BP, 2003, p.17}. Following the advice of TIAP, BP recognised that 
Papuans hold significant distrust and fear of the Indonesian security forces based on 
prior experience of Freeport. This recognition was a significant learning from BP's 
initiative to undertake a human rights impact assessment for the project. As a BP 
employee stated: 
... Tangguh is the only company with a human rights impact assessment in 
Indonesia. {It was] the basis of developing community based security to 
facilitate and prepare the system for security in the Tangguh area ... Because in 
the human rights impact assessment it already identified the community based 
security system in the Indonesian police - but it has never been implemented 
(Papua8}. 
As with Freeport, BP is required to subsidise security expenses mandated by BPMIGAS 
(Blair & Phillips, 2003, p.64). However as an alternative to financially supporting TNI, BP 
has implemented a community-based security approach. The development of this 
approach came in response to the recommendation by human rights consultants that: 
... BP should urge the highest levels of the Government of Indonesia to limit TNI 
and Brimob deployments and, if necessary, seek support for this position from 
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the U.S. and U.K. governments (Smith & Freeman, 2002, p.2). 
In response to this recommendation, BP stated: 
... as in all countries, the provision of security is ultimately the exclusive 
prerogative of the state, and we have to work within that framework. Our hope 
is that the adoption of a community based regime for Tangguh, in which our 
stakeholders, particularly those in Bintuni Bay, play an active and integral part 
of the Project's security, will reduce the risk of human rights incidents from 
taking place (BP, 2003, p.15). 
This statement suggests that although BP has acknowledged that it must operate 
according to the security regulations set by the Indonesian Government, it can 
nevertheless adopt proactive strategies that may challenge this requirement. For BP's 
efforts to reduce the presence of TNI in the Bintuni Bay area, BP's security strategy has 
been recognised as an exemplary model by the UN Global Compact as it: 
... presents the opportunity to develop mutual trust, respect, and employment 
in the local community [which] can lead to closer relations and considerably 
lessen the chances of misunderstanding leading to violence or security issues 
(UN Global Compact, 2010, p.17). 
The model developed on the basis of a comprehensive consultative process between 
parties at the local, regional and national levels (Papua, 8). During these consultations 
it was discovered that community based security could be designed to fall within the 
parameters of official Indonesian defense doctrine. BP executives uncovered a concept 
in Indonesian defense doctrine referring to a model of community policing that had 
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never been implemented as a form of corporate security (Papua, 8). When this was 
discovered: 
... BP organised a national conference of community security with the national 
security guardian board, with the generals who train the police on the 
philosophy of the country. They advised us to bring this to the national security 
board for them to agree ... We said it is the same as community based policing 
(Papua8). 
An executive of BP Indonesia further described the process: 
... The concept before it was used; we brought it to the National Defense 
Institute to discuss entirely. We agree on the type of strategy. They say, 1OK, let 
the people manage it'. We referred to human rights abuse and how to minimise 
human rights abuse. A member of the British Embassy was there - the aim was 
to change the perspective of the Indonesian Government (Papua41). 
This quote illustrates a willingness on the part of BP to resist relying on a story of state 
sovereignty to justify financially supporting the Indonesian security forces. While the 
company has recognised the constraints it faced in developing the new approach, it did 
not let those constraints overwhelm the company's ideals. Significantly in TIAP' s 2005 
(p.25 ) report, the panel quoted the Regional Military Commander as stating: 
... wh ile po inting out that Tangguh is a vital national project, he described the 
principles of ICBS as the new mechanism for secur ity at projects like Tangguh. 
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The components of Integrated Community Based Security 
The main component of BP's ICBS strategy is a social contract, "between the Project 
and the community to preserve order and mutual respect, resolving issues through 
negotiation and discussion rather than confrontation" (BP, 2003, p.20). One way in 
which BP has attempted to achieve this goal is to use unarmed locals from the BP area 
for everyday security of the project, and a commitment to only call the police if a 
security problem escalates. In contrast with the case of BCL in Bougainville, BP 
recognised that disruptions to the project were likely to occur, and additional problems 
could result from the presence of security personnel from different social, cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds. According to a BP Indonesia executive: 
... 93 per cent of security guards are Papuan and mostly from the local area. We 
recruit from local area because during their day off they go back to the village 
and become a tutor about how to obey the law - especially on alcohol and 
household abuse ... [They] become a tutor and lead the community to obey the 
law rather than have a conflict {Papua39 ). 
As mentioned in relation to the Bougainville copper mine, it is this emphasis on 
communication and a willingness to engage proactively with the community that is the 
key difference between BP's security approach and that of BCL and Freeport. 
Significantly in 2007, the Asian Development Bank claimed in a social monitoring report 
of the Tangguh project that there were, "273 guards in the ICBS programme of whom 
258 are Papuans" (Asian Development Bank, 2007, p.13}. These security guards have all 
completed, or are scheduled to receive human rights training by Papuan human rights 
NGOs. According to a Papuan involved in the human rights training of the guards, the 
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course consists of: 
... basic understanding of what human right is and how to handle mass conflict. 
How to react in case of conflict. Most materials are taken from the general 
declaration on human rights - the covenant on civil and political rights about 
social and economic rights - basic principles of human rights ... Then conflict 
resolution- how security guards make resolution after conflict (Papua14}. 
When asked if the respondent believed the training provided was sufficient to avoid 
human rights violations in the vicinity of the Tangguh project, he stated, 11it depends on 
the scope of the conflict. Small scale - yes. But if it involves the unity of several tribes it 
is impossible for them to do it" (Papua14). It is BP's policy that the military should be 
called in to assist with a security disturbance, "only as a 'last resort' upon the 
coordinated request of BP security and the Papua Police" (TIAP, 2005, p.24) . An 
executive for BP Indonesia further stated: 
.. . If the problem becomes bigger and can't rely on our security we call the 
police. And then if they can't handle it they ask the military ... We only call the 
police - we can 't call the military. If the police need more then they call the 
military {Papua41 ). 
This statemen t is in li ne w ith BP' s in it ial 2003 response to the human rights impact 
assessment on the issue of m ilitary dep loyment . BP argued that, "any attempts to 
dictate 'principles ... to limit military dep loyment' wi th or wi thout BPMIGAS support 
would likely be seen as a transg ression of that sovereign r ight" (BP, 2003, p.18). 
However BP also recognise d t hat it cou ld potent ially cap ita li se on the dialogue 
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established with government officials through the development of the ICBS program, 
as an opportunity that, "may give BP some ability to influence such issues as the 
location, strength, and missions of other Police and military deployments// (2003, p.18) . 
Similar to Freeport however, BP has faced the same problem of the TN11s history of 
economic interests in natural resource projects. One of the biggest risks the company 
has faced in the implementation of ICBS is that the TNI might orchestrate attacks 
similar to the shooting incidents around Freeport. As a BP Indonesia executive stated: 
... because of military jealousy we are trying to leave no black gap - we keep 
them updated on progress. They come in regularly and we remind them about 
the project. .. We maintain the relationship but keep them in the barracks ... It 
could also relieve the military of feeling left out - but only on the training, [we 
need to] make them feel involved (Papua39}. 
Although the ICBS program cannot make human rights training compulsory across TNI, 
training is offered and troops are encouraged to participate. Significantly, many 
Papuans involved in consultancy work for BP mentioned that it is not uncommon for 
troops to request to undergo the training. Moreover the TIAP (2009, p.56) claims that 
the Indonesian Government is now asking companies to include similar programs in 
their production-sharing contracts. 
BP1 s community based security approach has primarily been well received in Papua and 
has gained acceptance at local, regional and national levels. However due to the long 
history of controversies regarding TNI and Freeport, not all Papuans are convinced 
about community security. As a Papuan human rights advocate stated: 
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... about the security system. It is good. Community based security. The loc;al 
community guard the company. But I believe Brimob is also inside the company. 
You cannot say no policemen (Papua14) . 
Fu rt her, a Papuan religious leader commented: 
... I am still so pessimistic about this because they are contractors for the 
government. There must be government responsibility inside to protect - there 
must be army or policemen inside even if not in uniform (Papua9) . 
Many Papuans acknowledge that while it is be too early to herald BP's ICBS security 
approach an unmitigated success, they do respect the effort the company has made in 
comparison to Freeport. Consequently, BP can be seen to have made some progress in 
recognising the fears about, and hostilities towards, the Indonesian security forces . 
While the company has acknowledged the constraints to eliminating the presence of 
troops around the Tangguh project, it has attempted to open a new space of security 
and facilitated human rights training. 
Conclusion 
BCL and Freeport have failed in different ways to recognise the fears and hostilities 
that Bougainvilleans and Papuans hold towards national security authorities. In 
Bougainville, BCL's security approach was symptomatic of the company's colonial view 
that Bougainvilleans would passively accept the mine and that security would not be 
required . The question this raises is, which is preferable: a security approach that rests 
on the assumption that no civil disturbance will occur, or the imposition of a repressive 
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security force to clamp down on any potential unrest? It was argued that a total lack of 
security is equally as problematic as the imposition of a repressive regime. Both these 
approaches reflect a lack of engagement with broader local fears and in doing so; 
increase the likelihood of reactive measures, even panic, when disruptions occur. As 
we saw on Bougainville, it was the inability of BCL management and the PNG 
Government to foresee the consequences of sending in riot police and PNGDF into 
Bougainville that transformed a landowner dispute into a civil war. 
In contrast to BCL Freeport is, and was, required by Indonesian law to draw on the 
state's security forces to protect the mining area. This has implicated the company in 
numerous shooting incidents that are widely believed to have been orchestrated by 
the military to justify its presence, and secure ongoing revenue to 1protect' Freeport. 
This security situation is pathological because it puts both the military and OPM in the 
position of being able to instigate a security incident, blame the other as responsible, 
and be believed by many. It was argued that this scenario has been made possible 
because of three core issues: national stories relating the development of TNI; national 
stories relating to unity and disintegration which has characterised Indonesia's security 
approach towards separatism in Papua; as well as increased financial benefits to 
security forces in response to earlier riots. In this way, security problems surrounding 
Freeport are not solely about the financial interests of the TNI. While the TNI clearly 
has financial motives, these motives interact with a 1metanarrative' of Indonesia 
towards Papua. Using Fraser's (1996, p.9) terms, Papuans are distinguished by the 
11 lesser esteem, honor, and prestige they enjoy relative to other groups in [Indonesian] 
society". 
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Importantly, BP has shown that the state narratives and requirements can be 
challenged or worked around when there is a commitment to recognise the fears of 
the local community and think creatively about possible alternatives that will meet the 
needs of all parties. This quality of recognition and engagement with the consequences 
of the resource project on local people is a key difference that sets BP's approach apart 
from the other two case study companies. Thus while Freeport may have a larger CSR 
budget to BP, it is this type of engagement which proves more effective and 
meaningful. However, given the inherent complexity of any social landscape, it is not 
necessarily easy to predict the consequences of business practices. The following 
chapter explores the various efforts made by all three companies to predict the social 
consequences of their business practices, and the limitations of Social Impact 
Assessments to assist companies in this process. 
6 
Chapter 1 O: Social Impact Assessments 
Community 
disruption 
Corporations maintain social 
disruption and do not 
contribute to community 
development 
Corporations seek to alleviate 
new social problems through 
community development 
An important observation in Chapter 9 was the need for natural resource companies to 
engage with the potentially harmful effects of drawing on the State's security forces to 
protect their facilities. The problem this chapter explores is the limited capacities of 
large corporations to predict the likely social impacts of their business activities on 
local communities, other than to broadly recognise that resource development may 
initiate rapid and fundamental change. The focus of this chapter is different to the 
discussion in Chapter 7 about the creation of new divisions over access to resource 
wealth. This chapter focuses on the social impacts of resource development beyond 
competition for revenues. These impacts include ethnic tension, new class relations 
and the weakening of traditional social structures. 
265 
Through a discussion of the social impact and monitoring assessments of BCL, Fr€eport 
and BP, this chapter will show how the three resource projects have created a number 
of new social problems that were either not anticipated during the initial stages of 
operations, or that the companies were unwilling to engage with. Moreover the focus 
of this chapter is the sixth site of interdependence, community disruption. 
Consistent with the broader argument of this thesis, we will again see how distributing 
material resources to local communities is not always sufficient to resolve local 
grievances. Rather, the three cases illustrate the need for a continuous commitment to 
engage with the consequences of resource development on local communities, and to 
use local grievances as the basis for a more meaningful engagement. 
Social Impact Assessments 
'Social Impact Assessments' are the most commonly used tool by the natural resource 
industry to identify the positive and negative potential 'social' impacts of an extractive 
project. Social impacts refer to changes in local social and cultural systems through, for 
example, the distribution of new forms of wealth to certain members of the population 
(see Ch 7), changes in the natural environment (see Ch 11) and the migration of 
different ethnic groups into resource-producing regions (to be discussed later in this 
chapter) . 
Defined broadly, Social Impact Assessment's include: 
... processes of analysing, monitoring and managing the intended and 
unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned 
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interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change 
processes invoked by those interventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about 
a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment 
{Vanclay, 2003, p.5}. 
Social impact Assessments are not a new phenomenon, having originally emerged in 
the 1970s in response to new environmental legislation in the US {Freudenburg, 1986, 
p.451). As a result, they have been closely associated with Environmental Impact 
Assessments and CSR more broadly. Despite the close association with Environmental 
Impact Assessments, analysts such as Lockie {2001, p.277} argue that Social Impact 
Assessments are less substantive as the 'social' represents a far less predictable 
domain than the environment. This complexity is evident in Latour's (2005, p.5) 
understanding of the social as not a "thing among other things, like a black sheep 
among other white sheep, but a type of connection between things that are not 
themselves social". 
Social Impact Assessments are undertaken by a range of actors, including employees of 
resource companies, consultants and/or regulatory agencies of host governments. 
They can also be structured according to the regulatory requirements of the financial 
lenders for the resource project, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. Moreover, a new field of applied social research has emerged alongside the 
development of Social Impact Assessments with numerous academics, business 
associations and NGOs involved in the creation of new methodologies and models. 
Despite the diversity of methods and models, the dominant criticism regarding Social 
Impact Assessments is that the natural resource sector privileges 'technocratic 
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rationality' based on the view that, "it is possible to control the actual or potential 
opposition of local landowners ... " (Filer, 1990, p.98). Consequently, locals are not 
empowered to track and define the more 'subjective' social impacts associated with 
the exploitation of natural resources, such as new fears (e.g. the use of the military as a 
source of project security) and aspirations (e.g. preferences among a younger 
generation to gain employment within large corporations). As Lockie (2001, p.279} 
argues: 
... in privileging the quantifiable, technocratic rationality empowers 
governments and developers by highlighting apparently positive impacts, such 
as regional economic and employment growth, while ignoring those that are 
not measurable; the variable impact of changes within affected communities; 
and the subjective and cultural meanings that these changes hold within 
communities. 
This claim links with Latourian theory (2005, p.6}, which posits that the meaning of the 
social has shrunk over time, "starting with a definition which is coextensive with all 
associations, we now have, in common parlance, a usage that is limited to what is left 
after politics, biology, economics, law, psychology, management, technology, etc .. . ". 
Indeed a narrow understanding of the social as something that is measurable can drive 
out other important impacts. Further, critics of Social Impact Assessments argue that 
the process generally falls short of its greater potential. As Joyce and MacFarlane 
(2001, p.3} claim : 
... at one end, the SIA is a dynamic, ongoing process of integrating knowledge on 
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potential and real social impacts into decision-making and management 
practices; at the other end, it is a static, one-shot technocratic assessment 
undertaken to gain project approval of financing, with little or no follow 
through. Most SIAs fall somewhere on a continuum between the two. 
This quote indicates that while large corporations do recognise that their operations 
are likely to have significant social impacts it is, "no easy task to devise a program 
which can actually limit or control the community breakdown process" (Filer, 1990, 
p.106). Extending this critique of Social Impact Assessments, the remainder of this 
chapter argues that BCL, Freeport and BP have failed to diagnose, predict and resolve 
the social impacts of their business practices. This failure is evident in the disparity 
between the social impacts identified and the CSR projects implemented. 
Bougainville 
To BCL's credit the company attempted to understand the potential social impacts that 
the mine might cause. While these attempts can be viewed as inadequate, they were 
undertaken despite the absence of any formal requirement imposed on BCL. As 
discussed previously, BCL sought the advice of the distinguished anthropologist, Oliver, 
and in 1973 sponsored a socio-economic survey (Scott & Company, 1973). Through this 
survey, BCL attempted to gain an understanding of the potential consequences of the 
mine on PNG's economy and society, as well how PNG's economic and social 
environment might influence its own business activities (Scott & Company, 1973, p.4). 
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Population growth and in-migration 
The earliest concerns and/or predictions regarding the social impacts of the 
Bougainville copper mine related to population growth. People numbers on 
Bougainville had experienced steady growth since the 1930s and accelerated in the 
1970s and 1980s. By 1989, mine-affected villages such as the Nasioi and Nagovisi had 
one of the highest rates of population growth in the world {3.5 per cent) (Applied 
Geology Associates, 1989, p.4.1). According to John Connell {1990, p.47-8}, the main 
concern regarding this population growth was that it would result in future land 
shortages, put pressure on local resources and lead to greater demand for modern 
sector employment. These issues did not eventuate as the war greatly reduced the 
population in the region of the mine, both through the death of a large proportion of 
Bougainvilleans and by causing New Guineans, Chinese and Australians to flee. 
In 1968, Oliver {1968, p.218} advised BCL that population concerns were a dominant 
theme in local resentment of the mine. Bougainvilleans believed BCL was 'looting' their 
Island, leaving them with nowhere to live or plant crops. Moreover, Bougainvilleans 
who were not opposed to mining in general believed there would be nothing left to 
mine once PNG gained independence from Australia {Connell, 1990, p.48) . However as 
a result of the war, only a small proportion of the resource extraction occurred before 
PNG 's independence. 
In terms of how population growth would influence BCL's business activities, Oliver 
(1968, p.219} advised management that local concerns about land acquisition would 
continue to increase. Oliver thus sent a warning signal to BCL that any further 
pressures placed on land through population growth would be problematic and would 
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exacerbate these concerns. What the company less understood, however, was the way 
in which the in-migration of New Guineans especially Highlanders, in search of 
economic opportunities would lead to ethnic tensions (Vernon, 2005, p.267). 
While Oliver (1968, p.228-9) did warn the company, " ... direct or uncontrolled contacts 
between CRA personnel (Europeans, Asians, 'Redskins' and non-local Bougainvilleans) 
and local Bougainvilleans are going to result in incidents detrimental to CRA's 
interest ... " he did not foresee migrants remaining on Bougainville if they did not gain 
employment at the mine. The failure to predict this outcome is reflected in the only 
recommendation Oliver put forward to BCL in regard to avoiding racial conflict: that 
BCL develop its proposed mining town of Arawa in a sparsely populated area away 
from local villages {Oliver, 1968, p.229). The number of migrants was significant, with 
estimates that the squatter population amounted to approximately 4,400 people, with 
only 54 per cent engaged in some type of employment and about two-thirds of 
children in these settlements not attending school (Applied Geology Associates, 1989, 
p.4.7) . 
Despite the chronological link between the establishment of the mine and the 
proliferation of squatter settlements on Bougainville, BCL claimed the problem of 
'vagrant migration' was an issue between the provincial and national Governments 
(Bougainville Copper Limited, n.d, p.15). However neither the provincial nor central 
government can be seen to have adequately dealt with the situation . An Applied 
Geology Associates (AGA} review of the impacts of the mine claimed, " ... after much 
discussion of possible policies, there was little direct action either to reduce squatter 
numbers or to upgrade welfare services in squatter settlements" (Applied Geology 
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Associates, 1989, p.4.6) . BCL's argument was that although the provincial government 
was keen to restrict migration from other provinces, " political implications at the 
National level have continued to militate against positive action " (Bougainville Copper 
Limited, n.d, p.14). The issue of migration on Bougainville was not adequately 
addressed as the two main actors responsible for the mine; the central government 
and BCL were more concerned about negative political implications at the national 
level. 
Employment 
BCL' s responsiveness to the interests of the national government also dominated its 
employment practices. As an executive of BCL stated, "there was a preference towards 
PNG but the trouble was [that] it was not to Bougainville separately 11 (BOU2, BCL 
executive). The fact that BCL focussed more on creating employment opportunities for 
citizens from all over PNG than for local Bougainvilleans supports the argument made 
in Chapter 6 that resource companies are often responsive to priorities of host 
governments at the expense of local landowners. As former Chairman of BCL, Don 
Carruthers (1990, p.62), explains : 
... th e Company and the Papua New Guinea Government saw Bougainvi lle 
Copper as an operation for the country as a whole . For th is reason it was felt 
t hat emp loyment opportun ities should be ava ilable for people throughout the 
co un t ry, with the ma in criter ion be ing su itab ility for the j ob . 
Accordingly, BC L executives proud ly reported the ir ind igenou s employment f igures, 
with estimates that during the con struct ion period , approx imately 10,000 people were 
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employed, of which 6000 were indigenous (Moulik, 1977, p.12). In spite of these 
figures a number of criticisms were levelled at BCL for their employment policies. For 
example, Denoon (2000, p.168-9), highlights the low wages of Bougainvillean 
employees in contrast to expatriates. However this is also true of foreign aid workers 
and other professionals working on Bougainville today, and is not on the face of it a 
criticism unique to BCL. 
The issue of whether BCL could have done anything to raise the wage for its 
Bougainvillean employees has caused some debate. While BCL is believed to have 
wanted to reduce inequalities between expatriates and indigenous wage levels, it was 
constrained in doing so by the PNG Government (Harvard Business School, 1974, p.10). 
A Bougainvillean former employee of BCL supports this claim, "PNG tried to stick to 
minimum wages. It should have raised them to divert the crisis',6
7 (BOU14, Former BCL 
Employee). 
The Bougainville data collected for this study indicate conflicting views as to whether 
Bougainvilleans were treated fairly in regards to employment levels and conditions. 
While some Bougainvilleans said, "BCL was a very good company to work for because 
they looked after the employees" {BOUS, Bougainvillean former BCL employee), others 
criticised the lack of opportunities for Bougainvilleans to elevate to senior positions. 
For example one Bougainvillean former employee of BCL claimed: 
... [BCL} should have provided the opportunity to elevate Bougainvilleans to 
67 However, it is not clear why PNG would do this given it goes against their national interest. 
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senior levels. It was an injustice. I was convinced I should be up there [on the 
board of directors] after 16years (BOU61 ABG Department CEO/Former BCL 
employee). 
Either way, the main social impacts associated with employment did not take the form 
of tensions between staff over wages, but rather what employees did with this money 
when they returned to villages. 
One of the most important problems associated with the transition of an increasing 
proportion of the Bougainvillean population participating in the labour market was the 
breakdown of traditional village culture, or what Filer refers to as a, "process of local 
social disintegration" (Filer, 1990). A crucial impact of more opportunities for 
employment on Bougainville was that it resulted in gradual changes within traditional 
village authority. Bougainvilleans identified the potential for this to occur early in the 
life of the mine and Oliver relayed this concern to the company's management through 
the following account: 
... CRA will have a bad effect on our young people. They go there, earn lots of 
money and many evil ways and when they come home they will not do as we 
tell them anymore (Oliver, 1968, p.214). 
This concern became a reality in the 1970s when it appeared that men were beginning 
to usurp the role of women's rights over land, as well as their authority over younger 
men in the village (Togolo, 2005, p.283). In spite of this transformation, Togolo {2005, 
p.283) argues that Filers (1990) use of the concept "social disintegration" is an 
inappropriate characterisat ion . In Togolo 's view senior women continued to play an 
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important role in the community. Moreover Togolo (2005, p.283} argues that "despite 
social tensions, the quintessential elements of the society held together ... ". 
Nonetheless changes in village authority can be seen to have had crucial implications 
on the control of the younger generation who were enjoying the benefits of a cash 
income for the first time. 
As a consequence of the breakdown of traditional forms of authority and the fact that 
many young men became more interested in employment at the mine than traditional 
farming occupations (Moulik, 1977, p.186}, village elders found it hard to maintain 
social control. 
Income derived from new forms of employment also led to the creation of a new "class 
struggle" (Filer, 1990, p.90}, with increasing economic inequality between those who 
were engaged in some form of employment and those who were not. One 
consequence of this inequality was that it left many young men who were not working 
for the mine without a source of income at a time when significant changes were 
occurring within their village culture. Although BCL executives claim the company was 
not in a position to, "offer anything to young men outside employment" {BOU2, BCL 
executive) the lack of opportunities the mine created for a significant proportion of 
young men motivated them to join the BRA. As Regan (1998, p.275} claims, "BRA's 
strongest support came from frustrated young men with few economic opportunities 
for whom membership of the BRA gave power and status". 
Despite the scale of the aforementioned community disruption, BCL did in fact adopt 
numerous social and employment policies, "unusual for mining companies in less-
developed countries at that time" (Harvard Business School, 1974, p.8). Unfortunately, 
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as suggested earlier many of BCL's early community development initiatives (such as 
scholarships, medical aid, and community grants) failed to achieve their objectives and, 
"most (seemingly) altruistic actions may have produced negative results" (Oliver, 1968, 
p.224). Oliver's main criticism of BCL's early voluntary social initiatives was that they 
were implemented without an adequate understanding of possible consequences . 
Oliver's advice to improve these initiatives was for BCL to gain a more adequate 
understanding of the events and general social trends on the Island (Denoon, 2000, 
p.167). Oliver believed this knowledge would enable the company to implement 
community projects that would target actual rather than imagined needs of locals. As 
Oliver stated, "there is a crying need for roads, and no single thing would be treated 
with more satisfaction" (Oliver, 1968, p.227). 
In summary, BCL's affirmative action policies were largely driven by the company's 
enlightened self-interest in appeasing the national government. In turn, these policies 
led to disruption within the community that the company was unable, and in some 
cases unwilling to adequately address. According to Oliver, this was largely because 
BCL did not have a sufficient understanding of the situation on Bougainville at the time . 
Subsequently, BCL had minimal capacity to foresee the potential impacts of the 
community projects it implemented . 
Papua 
The social impacts of resource extraction projects associated with Freeport and BP in 
Papua are similar to those discussed for Bougainville . They include: the in -migration of 
people from other parts of Indonesia who have come to dominate local space, as well 
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as limited opportunities for Papuans to elevate to senior employment positions. 
As has been highlighted throughout this thesis, Freeport had little concern for 
environmental and social issues in the early stages of its business activities in Papua 
(Rifai-Hasan, 2009, p.29}. The 1967 Contract of Work with the Indonesian Government 
did not include regulatory requirements concerning social or environmental impact 
assessments. Further, the company did not seek the advice of anthropologists or other 
consultants in the way that BCL did in the initial stages of the Bougainville mine. 
In spite of this lack of interest in considering or addressing potential social impacts, 
Banks (1999, p.4} argues that various forms of social monitoring of Freeport's mining 
activities in Papua have occurred from time to time. However these did not occur until 
well into the 1990s, and mainly focused on environmental issues {Ballard & Banks 
2007, p.7}. In fact it was not until 2004 that Freeport granted- an organisation, the 
International Centre for Corporate Accountability, permission to conduct and publish 
the findings of an audit of the social and environmental consequences of the Grasberg 
mine (see International Centre for Corporate Accountability, 2005}. As such, there is 
much less information publicly available on the predicted social impacts of Freeport's 
mining activities in comparison with the Bougainville case. 
In contrast to Freeport and as a result of the more substantive social and 
environmental regulations with which major natural resource companies must now 
comply, BP was obliged to engage in a more rigorous social impact process prior to the 
construction of the Tangguh project. The BP case provides an instructive contrast to 
BCL's perspective on what companies can and cannot achieve in relation to in-
migration and economic opportunities. 
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According to BP's Summary Environmental Impact Assessment {SEIA), environmental 
studies in the area of the Tangguh LNG project commenced in 1998 (BP, 2005, p.l). 
However it was not until 2000 that detailed environmental and social impact 
assessments were carried out {BP, 2005, p.1). As discussed in Chapter 6, the exchange 
of land for the Tangguh project occurred in 1999. This means that the exchange took 
place before any considerable social and/or environmental impact processes had taken 
place. Therefore it is reasonable to question how much knowledge the locals had of 
the social and environmental changes that would occur before 'agreeing' to 'sell' (see 
Ch 6). 
On 25 October 2002, the Indonesian Government ruled that the Tangguh Project had 
complied with its environmental impact analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak 
Lingkungan [Integrated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment] or 'AMDAL') 
(BP, 2005 , p.1-2). In order to be granted approval under the AMDAL process, BP was 
required to produce three reports: an environmental impact assessment analysing the 
Project ' s environmental and social impacts ; an enviromnental management plan which 
outlined mitigation plans; and an environmental monitoring plan which detailed the 
monitoring and compliance plans (Hickman & Barber, 2011 , p.5). 
Under the AM DAL process, social impacts are included in the analysis of environmental 
impacts . This supports broader critiques that the social consequences of resource 
development are primarily considered as add-ons to the more comprehensive 
environmental monitor ing requirements {Banks, 1999, p.l). However in addition to 
AMDAL, BP has been required to produce Social Impact Reports, plans and monitoring 
processes in order to secure the backing of international financial donors, the Asian 
Deve lopment Bank and the Japanese Bank for International Development. These 
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documents include: an Indigenous Peoples' Development Plan (BP, 2006b), 
Resettlement planning document (BP, 2006a), as well as the publication of annual 
reports by the TIAP (see Ch 8). These reports are publicly available through BP 
Indonesia's website. 
There have been two major criticisms of these documents to date. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, Hickman and Barber (2011, p.9) raise concerns that they are not entirely 
neutral or independent, as BP has commissioned them 68. Secondly, Down to Earth has 
criticised BP and its advisors for failing to review how the Project will affect men and 
women differently (Down to Earth, 2005, p.10). The neglect of women's rights in BP's 
social impact and monitoring assessments is evident in the absence of issues such as; 
gender balance in employment, women's involvement in decision-making, and 
disruptions to sources of income for women in these documents (Down to Earth, 2005, 
p.10). Also, there are no female representatives on the TIAP panel. Despite these 
criticisms, the level of transparency afforded by the availability of these documents 
provides a unique opportunity to observe the social consequences of a resource 
extraction Project in a way that is not possible in relation to most projects. 
Population growth and in-migration 
In spite of BP and Freeport's (later) attempts to minimise the social impacts of their 
business operations, both projects have led to considerable population growth and 
tensions along ethnic lines. However the situation for Papuans is arguably worse than 
68 However, this criticism is not specific to BP as Social Impact Assessments are usually sponsored by the 
operating company. 
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for Bougainvilleans for two reasons. Firstly, the Freeport mine has resulted in an influx 
not just of economic migrants, but also large numbers of Indonesian military (see Ch 9). 
Second, the domination of local space by non-indigenous Papuans has been perceived 
by Papuans as a deliberate strategy on the part of the Indonesian government to 
'lndonesianise' Papua (see Ch 5). However a large proportion of non-Kamara and non-
Amungme Papuans have also migrated to areas surrounding the Freeport mine in 
search of economic opportunities and often share problematic relationships with the 
Amungme and Kamara landowners. 
Before the fall of Suharto in 1998, the Indonesian Government sponsored an official 
policy of transmigration to Papua in order to relieve population pressure from over-
populated areas of Indonesia, as well as to provide a supply of cheap labour to foreign-
owned plantations {Leith, 2003, p.96}. Because the large number of migrants resulted 
in indigenous Papuans becoming a minority on their own land, many Papuans viewed 
the policy as a deliberate attempt by the Government to subsume Papuan identity 
within a singular 'Indonesian' identity (Elmslie, 2011). The experience of ethnic 
marginalisation has been historically entwined with Freeport's mining activities, as the 
areas surrounding Freeport's Contract of Work have been targeted by the Indonesian 
Government for the placement of transmigration settlements (Braithwaite, 
Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.75). The Amungme and Kamara peoples thus 
claim that Freeport is not only responsible for the presence of these settlements, "but 
also the ir econom ic viability and continuation" (Leith, 2003, p.207) . 
Like the squatter settlements surrounding the Bougainville copper mine, large numbers 
of Indones ian migrants and non-local indigenous Papuans arrived in areas surrounding 
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the Freeport mine in search of economic opportunities. According to one social and 
environmental monitoring report (International Centre for Corporate Accountability, 
2005, p.21) for example, the population within Freeport's Contract of Work area was 
less than 1,000 at the time of the initiation of mining activities in 1967, but grew to 
more than 120,000 by 2005. This has made the area surrounding the mine one of the 
most highly populated in the province (Ondawame, 1997). 
Again, similar to the Bougainville case, rapid population growth associated with mining 
in Papua resulted in greater competition for economic opportunities (International 
Centre for Corporate Accountability, 2005, p.21). Compounding this, Cook (2001) 
claims one of the greatest sources of antagonism has been an influx of neighbouring 
tribal groups into the vicinity of the Amungme and Kamara communities. According to 
Cook, tensions between the Amungme and the Kamara and neighbouring groups have 
exceeded those between Papuans and lndonesians69 as they share a long history of 
tribal warfare. This claim is supported by Leith (2003, p.96) who argues that: 
... this volatile mix of rival sukus [tribal groups] forced into close proximity 
(rather than conflict between Indonesians and Papuan residents) has, to date 
been the cause of the greatest tension and violence in the area. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Freeport exacerbated tensions in the mid-1990s, by 
including tribal groups that the Amungme and Kamara resented for encroaching on 
69 It is important, however, not to dismiss the tensions that do exist between the Indonesian migrants 
and Papuan residents as a result of "widespread Indonesian racism ... which blames them for being 
'primit ive', 'stupid', 'l azy' and worse" (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.76). 
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their land as beneficiaries of the One Per Cent Trust Fund. In this way, the contested 
distribution of the Fund heightened pre-existing conflict between tribes {Soares 2002, 
p.136). More importantly, TNI provoked inter-tribal conflict to justify their security 
services. This new kind of conflict has been referred to as 'military wars' (Braithwaite, 
Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.118). Wanting to prove that the security 
situation in the Freeport area under the leadership of the police is worse (see Ch 9L 
TNI can be seen to have manipulated traditional fighting. This has occurred by 
supplying guns for one side thereby altering the rules and means of traditional warfare 
(see Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.117-8). 
In contrast to both BCL and Freeport, BP has made an explicit attempt to avoid 
significant migration into the communities surrounding the Tangguh Project. The 
strategies employed by BP include: a policy of no onsite recruitment at the LNG plant; 
programs to limit construction worker off-duty activities in and around the Bintuni Bay 
area; affirmative action policies relating to local employment; returning employees 
home for rest periods and when their employment ends; paying wages in places where 
people are originally hired; and accommodating workers in closed camps. 
According to BP, the aim of these measures is to "avoid the 'honey-pot' syndrome and 
the impact of excessive spontaneous in-migration into the Bintuni Bay area" (BP, 2007, 
p.11). As an executive of BP Indonesia stated: 
... the strategy is to recruit from open ports around Papua and send back to post 
rather than have them marginalise local people. We are giving the chance for 
local workers first and then we look for another one. Start with locals. We are 
not aiming to make discrimination but it is designed to manage expectations 
282 
and reduce jealousy (Papua39, BP Indonesia executive). 
Additionally, BP has initiated programs to counter the negative impacts associated with 
in-migration such as increased pressure on existing infrastructure and services; greater 
competition for jobs and training; crime; violence; alcohol abuse; prostitution; ethnic 
tension; and the erosion of traditional cultures (BP p.l.c, 2012b}. In spite of these 
initiatives, BP claims that it is ultimately the central government that is responsible for 
restricting access to the area surrounding the Tangguh project. It claims: 
... ultimately, in-migration policy is a matter for the Indonesian government. We 
can offer advice and advocate specific actions - but cannot successfully address 
the issue acting alone (BP p.l.c, 2012b}. 
The TIAP panel has supported this view, asserting that it is up to local leaders to decide 
the restrictions that should be placed on migrants. Consequently, the TIAP advised BP 
that its core responsibility is to maintain programs to limit worker off-duty activities 
and, "benefit to the maximum extent possible the original members of the community 
and support them economically" (TIAP, 2002, p.25). In 2009, the TIAP reported that a 
process was underway to regulate immigrant activities through, for example, a deposit 
of fees for transportation back to the migrants' place of origin; limitations on the 
length of stay; and permissible activities (TIAP, 2009, p.55). These regulations were 
developed in response to the TIAP's findings in 2009 that: 
... there are large numbers of migrants in each of the RAVs [resettlement 
affected villages]. Their population has grown from 1,074 to 2,153, with Onar 
having the most dramatic growth of almost 300% (TIAP, 2009, p.50}. 
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This result however, also revealed an unintended consequence of BP's compliane:e with 
the Asian Development Bank's requirements on the forced relocation of villages 
surrounding the Tangguh project. These requirements include the development of new 
housing and community facilities (see BP, 2006a). According to the TIAP, the new 
housing and community facilities that BP was obliged to provide was the main 
attraction for the arrival of large numbers of migrants to these villages. An Indonesian 
NGO worker involved in monitoring the Tangguh project told me that many of the 
houses BP built for the relocated villagers have since been sold by the villagers to 
migrants from Java (Papua30, Indonesian NGO worker). This suggests the houses 
provided to the locals were either inappropriate for their lifestyle, that the gains of 
selling outweighed the loss of the house, or possibly a combination of both. 
While the TIAP does not go so far as to suggest locals have been selling the houses 
provided to them by BP, it does suggest that: 
... many of the migrants are sharing or renting homes of the original residents. 
This has raised tensions over agricultural and fisheries resources, village 
governance, population management, and social issues including prostitution, 
alcohol and gambling (TIAP, 2009, p.50). 
According to Down to Earth (2005, p.9), migrants are particularly interested in staying 
with the locals so that they can gain employment with BP for positions that are set-
aside for indigenous Papuans (discussed in the following section). The migrants do this 
by seeking the recommendation of the village head and Village Development 
Committee that BP classify them as 'local people'. In return, the migrants pay the 
village head between RpS0, 000 to Rpl million (US$5-100) and give cigarettes to the 
28 
committee leader (Down to Earth, 2005, p.9}. This claim has been confirmed by the 
TIAP, who have reminded BP of their responsibility to ensure that all jobs designated 
for locals are in fact given to indigenous Papuans70 (TIAP, 2011, p.6}. 
Employment 
As discussed in relation to Bougainville, employment practices and the income they 
generate can have a number of important flow on effects detrimental to the welfare of 
local communities, such as the breakdown of traditional village structures and 
increased economic inequality. Although the employment practices of Freeport and BP 
have led to similar effects in Papua, there a number of important differences. 
The first difference is that unlike BCL, Freeport was not quick to localise the mine's 
workforce. As a consequence of the close relationship between the company and the 
Suharto regime, Freeport did not share BCL's concern that the government might one 
day fully nationalise the mine. As discussed in Chapter 5, Suharto was more interested 
in signalling to the international community that Indonesia was 'open for business'. As 
a result, Freeport largely neglected the professional development of indigenous 
Papuans for over 25 years, and it is only since the mid-1990s that the company has 
adopted an affirmative action employment policy. 
One of the most significant policies Freeport implemented in the 1990s was a 
70 In addition to increased competition for BP employment, they have also taken opportun iti es away 
from Papuans to participate in commercial activiti es in surround ing areas, such as motorcycle taxis and 
food kiosks. 
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commitment to double the employment of Papuans at the mine by the year 2000, and 
to double it again by the year 2006 (International Centre for Corporate Accountability, 
2005, p.9). While both these targets were exceeded and represent a considerable 
improvement (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.74L by 2008 the 
number of Papuans directly employed by Freeport amounted to only 3,352 (29 per 
cent) out of a total workforce of 11, 659 direct employees (PT Freeport Indonesia, 
2008, p.23). Moreover Freeport took 25 years longer than BCL to reach the same 
proportion of indigenous employment. However as was the case on Bougainville, the 
achievement of employment targets in Papua has not necessarily resulted in 
satisfaction amongst the indigenous workforce. As a Papuan member of the Tongoi 
Papua claimed: 
... 80 per cent of employees are Indonesian and 20 per cent are Papuan - mostly 
in low level jobs. The relationship inside is good but sometimes in promotion it is 
different. I don't know what they say - it's always special for their people 
[Indonesians] (Papua24}. 
One consequence of competition between Indonesians and Papuans for Freeport 
employment is that, similar to Bougainville, it has created a new kind of class struggle, 
" between those who have jobs and those who do not, and those that have supervisory 
positions (overwhelmingly migrants) and those who do not" (Braithwaite, 
Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn, 2010, p.16) . Competition for Freeport employment 
therefore, has added a class dimension to ethnic tension between Papuans and 
m igrants from other parts of Indonesia . 
In response to Papuan concerns relating to the perceived lack of opportunity to elevate 
286 
to senior positions, Freeport was advised in 2005 to move away from a sole focus on 
employment targets. As the report of the International Centre for Corporate 
Accountability {2005, p.11) states: 
... the issue about Papuan employment cannot end with reaching an 
employment goal alone; it must also deal with on-going issues of Papuan 
employee satisfaction, fair treatment for Papuans in the workforce and 
enhanced opportunities in the future. 
This recommendation was based on Freeport's slow progress in providing training and 
apprenticeships to local Papuans. For example it was not until 2003 that Freeport 
formed the Nemangkawi Mining Institute, which provides apprenticeships and career 
development opportunities for hundreds of Papuans and other Indonesians each year 
{PT Freeport Indonesia, 2008, p.23). Freeport's delayed commitment to local training 
and education has resulted in small numbers of local Papuans possessing the skills 
required to achieve employment with the company. This in turn has been used to 
justify Freeport's inequitable recruitment of Papuans. 
BP: Employment at Tangguh 
BP's employment practices at the Tangguh Project have been quite different to those 
of BCL and Freeport. One major difference is that BP has been obliged under the 
AMDAL process to favour local people since the initial stages of construction. 
Specifically, BP is required to give preference to applicants from the nine directly 
affected villages surrounding the Tangguh project. 
BP's employment obligations include a commitment to a gradual increase in the 
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number of Papuan employees. Targets have been set at 31 per cent initial operations 
stage, 62 per cent after 10 years, and 85 per cent after 25 years (BP, 2005, p.35}. In 
regard to the initial stage, BP committed to employ at least one person from each of 
the 700-800 households in the nine directly affected villages to help construct the LNG 
facility (BP, 2005, p.15). In 2009 the TIAP (2009, p.20) reported that BP had successfully 
achieved this commitment, confirming that job offers were made to at least one 
member in every family. 
A concern regarding Tangguh's construction workforce was that it was only short-term . 
While a cohort of 5,800 workers was required to construct the facility, this number 
dropped to just 450 when operations began {Hickman & Barber, 2011, p.13). Hence, 
the biggest concern for BP and its advisors in regards to employment was how to limit 
the potential negative effects of a sudden, yet temporary, increase in employment 
opportunities. 
One strategy BP deployed to mitigate the potential negative impacts of short -term 
employment was by financing a vocational training centre for workers in carpentry, 
plumbing, electricity and welding {BP, 2007, p.12). The aim, according to BP was, "to 
support the transition of [the] construction workforce to non -Project employment as 
construct ion related employment starts to decline" (BP, 2007, p.17). Demonstrating 
impressive fores ight, and in contrast to the view of the BCL executive who claimed that 
the company could not offer opportunities outside of the mine, BP believed it could 
provide sk ills beyond those needed by BP in order to reduce the potential for long-
term dependency {BP, 2007, p.3} . 
Recognisi ng that contractors would recruit most of the construction workforce, the 
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TIAP panel also advised BP to encourage its contractors to train and recruit ethnic 
Papuans (TIAP, 2002, p.23). While TIAP were aware that BP did not have direct control 
of its contractors (TIAP, 2003, p.13), the Panel stressed the issue of employment was 
one of the key expectations and primary benefits to be derived from the Project (TIAP, 
2003, p.20). Consequently, BP wrote into the terms and conditions of its contracting 
agreements a requirement that contractors employ a certain percentage of Papuans 
(TIAP, 2006, p.16). 
By 2006, the TIAP panel reported, "thus far, BP and its contractors have met most of 
their obligations for employment of local villagers and Papuans" (TIAP, 2006, p.16) . 
However the Panel did add, "because so few Papuans are skilled in the areas needed, 
many of these jobs are short term and have little potential for advancement" (TIAP, 
2006, p.16-7). Like Freeport, BP has argued that its need for skilled workers has 
constrained its capacity to employ local Papuans. 
By 2007 the construction workforce at the Tangguh project peaked at more than 
10,000 people, of which 3,000 (30 per cent) workers were Papuan, including 608 
(about 6 per cent) from the directly affected villages (TIAP, 2008}. In this way BCL, 
Freeport, and BP can be seen to have all shared the 30 per cent local employment 
figure, with the main differences being the length of time required to reach this figure, 
and the temporal nature of employment at the Tangguh site . 
Despite the achievements of BP's local employment initiatives, the TIAP has 
maintained pressure on the company to educate the construction workforce on the 
demobilisation process in order to mitigate the impact of any shock or disappointment 
when employment ceases (TIAP, 2008, p.3). By 2009 the TIAP reported that the 
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demobilisation process was well under way, with most Papuan employees having 
returned to their homes and most, but not all, non-Papuans having left Papua (TIAP, 
2009, p.4). Moreover BP provided temporary assistance to employees from the nine 
affected villages in their return to traditional fishing, and some were provided training 
for employment in the operations phase of the Project (TIAP, 2009, p.4). 
In spite of the post-employment provisions put in place by BP, the TIAP maintains that 
the limited employment and other economic opportunities for Papuans will remain a 
serious issue for the long-term (TIAP, 2009, p. 69). However the Panel's most recent 
report (TIAP, 2011, p.5} claims, "regional and local leaders, although anxious for more 
employment and advancement of Papuans, are pleased at BP's efforts and 
accomplishments thus far". 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that BCL, Freeport and BP's business activities in Bougainville and 
Papua have led to considerable community disruption within local communities 
associated with population growth, class struggle and transformations of traditional 
forms of authority. It was argued that the problems brought about by these changes 
were either not anticipated during the initial stages of the resource projects, or the 
companies were unwilling to engage with them. Yet as Latour (2005, p.41) argues: 
... for scientific, political and even moral reasons, it is crucial that enquirers do 
not in advance and in place of the actors, define what sorts of building blocks 
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the social world is made up of. 
The social world is heterogeneous, constantly shifting and unpredictable. Given this 
complexity, it is crucial that natural resource companies engage with these impacts 
continuously through preventive peace dialogue {see Ch 8}. 
In relation to the Bougainville case, it was argued that BCL did not foresee that many 
migrants would be attracted to remain on Bougainville despite not securing 
employment at the mine. Consequently the company and government had no policies 
in place to regulate migration to Bougainville once the mine opened, and failed to 
address the proliferation of squatter settlements. With regard to employment, it was 
argued that BCL's primary interest was in appeasing the national government, rather 
than ensuring economic opportunities for local Bougainvilleans and the preservation of 
their traditional village cultures. 
In relation to the Papua case, it was argued that Freeport did not have adequate 
strategies in place to engage with the potential social impacts of its mining operations. 
This was demonstrated by the slow localisation of the mine's workforce and the poor 
provision of training to indigenous Papuans. In contrast, BP has been obliged to engage 
in a more rigorous social impact assessment process as a result of new Indonesian and 
international regulations, and has embraced the challenge. In spite of this, the Ta ngguh 
project has produced similar social problems to those that afflicted communities 
surrounding the BCL and Freeport mines. However a key difference is that BP is 
considered by local leaders to have made a significant effort to engage with and 
mitigate these negative social impacts (TIAP, 2011, p.S}. BP's strategies have not been 
completely successful in alleviating all negative impacts. However a positive perception 
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has been maintained overall due to the company' s successful strategy of ongoing 
engagement with the TIAP and designing community development projects to target 
the social problems associated with the project. 
A common theme in both the Bougainville and Papua cases has been the importance of 
empowering locals to define for themselves the impacts associated with natural 
resource development. The next chapter explores this in more depth, through a 
discussion of local inclusion in environmental protection measures. 
2 
Chapter 11: Environmental Damage 
Environmental 
Damage 
Environmental impact 
assessments are conducted 
with no local participation and 
opportunities to contest the 
results are repressed 
Environmental impact 
assessments are conducted 
with local participation and 
opportunities to contest the 
results are provided. 
This chapter focuses on the seventh site of interdependence between the companies 
and the root causes of conflict in Bougainville and Papua: environmental damage. As 
discussed in Chapter 10, concern for the social impacts associated with resource 
development has often formed a component of larger assessments of environmental 
impacts. In practice however and based on Western technocratic conceptions of the 
environment and reliance on scientific analysis, large corporations are inclined to treat 
the 'social' and the 'environmental' as separate domains. 
Beginning with a discussion of 'sustainable development' discourse, Western 
conceptions of the environment will be contrasted with those of Melanesian cultures. 
The work of Escobar (1995) and Banerjee (2003) will be drawn on to question the 
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model of development that tends to be ascribed to and perpetuated by multinational 
resource extraction companies. This theoretical paradigm will then be applied to the 
Bougainville and Papua cases. Through this analysis the chapter seeks to demonstrate 
that corporate and state actors do not share the same cultural attachments to land as 
local communities. Yet these actors usually make decisions relating to environmental 
management. This has a tendency to provoke conflict as it triggers strong feelings of 
injustice relating to the control of land and the denial of local wisdom. The chapter 
explains that by learning to be more interdependent with indigenous peoples, 
resource companies might develop more meaningful, less Western and more socially 
and spiritually engaged forms of ecological interdependence. 
Sustainable development 
The concept of 'sustainable development' emerged in the 1980s alongside heightened 
concerns about the deterioration of the environment, natural resources and the 
consequences for economic development (Banerjee, 2003). These concerns emerged 
alongside greater awareness of the ways in which human activity might threaten the 
future survival of the planet (through problems relating to global warming, ozone 
depletion, declining biodiversity, environmental pollution and the scarcity of natural 
resources) (Shrivastava & Hart, 1995). As Escobar argues, sustainable development 
has been "part of a broader process of the problematisation of global survival" 
(Esco bar, 1995, p.194) . 
The term sustainable development came to prominence following a report compiled by 
the World Commission on Environment and Economic Development in 1987, chaired 
by the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland. The 'Brundtland 
report' defines the goal of sustainable development as: 
... meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs [which] should become a central guiding 
principle of the UN, Governments and private institutions, organizations and 
enterprises (WCED, 1987}. 
Following the publication of the Brundtland Report, there has been greater recognition 
by the private sector that, "the economy and society depend on the biosphere and 
environmental processes occurring within them" (Dunphy, Benveniste, Giffiths & 
Sutton, 2000, p.22}. This reflects a reworking or re-understanding of the relationship 
between nature and society in which there is greater recognition that the future of the 
global economic system is dependent on the future of the planet itself. 
Heightened attention to the environmental costs of economic development has led to 
the emergence of numerous regulatory initiatives concerning environmental 
protection by the extractive industry. This includes the conduct of environmental 
impact assessments prior to the development of large resource projects, as well as the 
implementation of independent monitoring and evaluation processes throughout the 
life of the project. It is also customary for large natural resource extraction companies 
to publish 'sustainable development reports' alongside other CSR commitments on 
company websites. 
While the adoption of the sustainable development discourse by the extractive 
industry has been far-reaching, there are many concerns relating to its intent and 
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implications . The dominant concern relates to its impact at the, " broader level of the 
political economy" (Banerjee, 2003, p.145). The main concern is that notions of 
sustainable development progresses Western assumptions that economic growth is an 
assumed good 71 . Situating his critique within a broader analysis of 'development' as a, 
"historically singular experience" Escobar {1995, p.195) for example, argues sustainable 
development: 
.. . focuses less on the negative consequences of economic growth on the 
environment than on the effects of environmental degradation on growth and 
potential growth. It is growth (read: capitalist market expansion), and not the 
environment, that has to be sustained. 
In this way Escobar derides the sustainable development discourse as a, " feat of 
Western rationality" (1995, p. 192) that is intended to create the impression that only 
minor adjustments to the market system are needed to launch an era of 
environmentally sound development (1995, p.197). 
There are two aspects of Escobar's critique that are particularly important in the 
context of th is chapter. The first relates to the capacity of sustainable development to 
lea d to greater environmental protection. The second centres on the assumption, " that 
t he benevolent (wh ite ) hand of the West will save the Earth " (Escobar, 1995, p.193) . 
Mo re over asi de from skept icism that sustainable development w il l trigger the 
insti t ut ional re fo rm requ ired to reconc ile econom ic development w ith environmental 
71 Th is mirrors the Down to Earth (2003) critique of BP's dialogue initiatives discussed in Chapter 8 that 
they are based on the assumption the resource project will go ahead. 
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protection, Escobar argues that the discourse fails to facilitate a move, "away from 
conventional Western modes of knowing in general in order to make room for other 
types of knowledge and experience" {1995, p.216). The sustainable development 
discourse, in Escobar's view thus fails to encourage corporations to engage with less 
Western and perhaps more meaningful, forms of environmental protection. 
Sharing Escobar's {1995) two-pronged critique of sustainable development, Banerjee 
{2003) asks, "Who sustains whose development"? Banerjee {2003, p.144) claims: 
... as with development, the meanings, practices, and policies of sustainable 
development continue to be informed by colonial thought, resulting in 
disempowerment of a majority of the world's populations, especially rural 
populations in the Third World. 
As a result of the colonial logic that underpins the global economy (see Ch 5), Banerjee 
{2003, p.144) characterises sustainable development as a, "unitary system of 
knowledge", which instead of promoting an alternative path to development, focuses 
on sustaining the global economy more or less as it currently exists. Thus in Banerjee's 
view, sustainable development is more likely to further marginalise or co-opt 
traditional forms of knowledge than empower alternative environmental management 
practices, or alternative means to economic development more broadly. 
The following section discusses the discrepancies between Western and Melanesian 
conceptions of the environment, and the failure of large corporations to adapt to these 
different understandings. Building on the work of Escobar and Banerjee, it will be 
argued that Melanesians hold a more holistic (Banks, 2002, p.41) conception of the 
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environment than that which tends to dominate Western business practice. In 
Melanesian societies, environmental damage or ecological problems are rarely solely 
about the 'environment', but are also about cultural identity, land control and access 
to resources. These issues cannot be solved through corporate environmental 
strategies alone, and can be seen to require a more radical rethinking of processes of 
economic development more broadly. 
Melanesian conceptions of the environment 
In contrast to Western conceptions of the environment as separate from society, 
environmental consciousness in Melanesian societies has been described as fusing, 
"the social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental landscapes ... " (Banks, 
2002, p.41). Land forms the basis of group membership and nationality (Ballard, 1997, 
p.48) and is a source of political power and cultural sustenance. Indeed in contrast to 
the West there are no clear distinctions, "between the environment and the rest of 
one's daily life" (Banks, 2002, p. 41). 
Melanesian conceptions of the environment have led some Western environmentalists 
to characterise Melanesians as 'noble primitive ecologists' or 'natural conservationists' 
(Macintyre & Foale, 2002}. The idea of the 'noble primitive ecologist' is perhaps as 
problematic as contests over the Noble Savage debate that has dogged anthropologists 
over successive generations (Ellingson, 2001}. Indeed Macintyre and Foale (2002) 
contest the 'noble primitive ecologist' characterisation claiming there is no such th ing 
as a, " natural conservationist ethic in Melanesia ". Those who do make this claim, 
according to Macintyre and Foale, fail to acknowledge the, "degra ding ecological 
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transformations brought about by indigenous inhabitants" themselves. The authors 
argue that even in cases where companies are required to negotiate the terms of 
access to land with the customary owners; they generally do not demand stricter 
environmental controls (Macintyre & Foale, 2002). Rather, they demand more money. 
Based on this, Macintyre and Foale (2002) argue that the main concern of locals is not 
the preservation of the environment per se, but the lack of utilisable resources and 
amenity. 
Macintyre and Foale's critique does not contradict the characterisation of Melanesians 
as holding a more 'holistic' conception of the environment. Rather what the authors 
object to is the portrayal of Melanesians as, "natural stewards of their environment", 
which has the effect of obscuring the issues of most concern to Melanesians. Examples 
include the grievances of Bougainvilleans and Papuans identified in this thesis, such as 
the denial of customary land rights, regional inequality and contests over resource 
wealth. Thus, supporting the Escobar and Banerjee critique of sustainable 
development, environmental management practices based on Western conceptions of 
the environment can curtail the priorities of non-Western resource producing regions. 
Banks (2002, p.39-40) argues that while many observers continue to frame the impacts 
of mining operations in Melanesia as solely 'environmental' or 'ecological', the impacts 
most fundamentally concern the control of resources. Banks suggests that a better 
means of understanding the environmental impacts of resource extraction in 
Melanesia is to, "look at the way in which control over a range of resources is affected 
by the mining operations" (Banks, 2002, p.40-1). This includes for example, 
subsistence, political and social resources and systems of rights and responsibilities. 
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This understanding of Melanesian conceptions of the environment is supported by 
Ballard (1997, p.50), who claims that the local landscape pervades every aspect of 
social life: 
... this sense of identity-through-place finds expression in the common 
statements that water from the streams of one's own land is the sweetest - all 
other streams taste different and this taste is one of the markers of differences 
that establishes identity (Ballard, 1997, p.50). 
Echoing Escobar's (1995, p.197) concern that the sustainable development discourse 
creates an impression that only minor adjustments to the global economy are needed, 
Banks (2002, p.60-1) concludes his analysis by stating that: 
... for mining companies to consider only the environmental aspects of their 
operation, ignoring the cultural, economic, political, and social realities of 
resources use and control in the areas in which they operate, also provides 
those companies with another "easy out" . 
Instead of corporations engaging with the complexity of the environmental impacts of 
resource development in Melanesian societies, Banks argues that the tendency is to 
adopt, " technological fixes " (Banks, 2002, p.60) that are asocial, do not include locals 
and , consequently, do not respond to their highest priorities . 
Bougainville 
.. . The mine caused a lot of pollution in the Jobo River. The water become blue 
and it still is. There is no life in the river. You cannot eat the fish . It used to be a 
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big source of food (BOU16, Rorovana Resident). 
The most contentious environmental issue leading up to the development of the 
Bougainville copper mine related to the disposal of residual material (tailings), which 
had to be extracted to create the massive pit of the mine (Quodling, 1991, p.29). 
Approximately 220 hectares of tropical rainforest had to be cleared, as well as the 
removal of volcanic ash and weathered rock (Brown, 1974, p.20). Despite original 
advice from consultants that discharge of tailings into the Kawerong-Jaba river system 
would result in "massive deposition and extreme land degradation" (Gillespie, 1999, 
p.8) this advice was later amended to suggest that once the tailings reached the sea, 
the waste would be washed away by ocean currents (Gillespie, 1999, p.8; Quodling, 
1991, p.29). Defying the requirement set out in the 1967 Bougainville Copper 
Agreement, which prohibited the disposal of over-burden and tailings, the loophole 
was that the waste could be disposed of upon the approval of the government 
(Quodling, 1991, p.30). With environmentalism in its political infancy back in Australia, 
the Administration did not enforce this requirement (Denoon, 2000, p.160). Upon 
application by BCL, the Administration subsequently approved tailings disposal through 
the 'Disposal of Overburden and Tailings Agreement 1971' (Quodling, 1991, p.30). 
While Gillespie (1999, p.8) believes that BCL was aware of the potential damages t hat 
the disposal of tailing waste would cause, the company adopted this method as it was 
the least costly option. Hardly an adequate defence, the company was clearly 
responsible for the disposal of waste into the river system. To make the matter worse 
there were no detailed or enforceable strategies in place to minimise the 
environmental impacts of the mine (Boege, 1999, p.213). 
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With approximately 150,000 tons of rock waste and tailings from the mine disposed of 
each day (Brown, 1974, p.19), the most highly documented environmental impact of 
the mine has been the chemical pollution of the Kawerong-Jaba River (Brown, 1974, 
p.22) . Contaminated by heavy metals such as zinc, copper, cadmium, mercury and 
molybolenum, the tailings waste led to the depletion of fish stocks and the river itself 
could no longer be used by locals. The tailings waste also polluted areas of bush that 
were important for hunting and gathering activities. This pollution also led to the 
complete disappearance of a flying fox population in 1987 (Boege, 1999, p.231). 
Chemical pollution has made re-vegetation in the area impossible {Gillespie, 1999, 
p.10}, with experiments indicating that species of nutritional and commercial value for 
locals cannot be restored to their original state (Connell, 1991, p.67}. Thus, although 
some locals prior to the construction of the mine assumed that only a proportion of 
land would be used, it became increasingly obvious that a significant amount of land 
had been destroyed and would never be of any economic or social use again (Boege, 
1999, p.213} . 
The size of the mine pit {6km long, 4km wide, 0.5 km deep {Gillespie, 1999, p.10)) 
co upled w ith the infrastructure required to support the mine 72, resulted in a significant 
re duct ion of land ava il able for agricu ltural product ion . For an overcrowded populat ion 
tha t was dependent on agriculture, and would aga in be dependent on agr iculture once 
the mine close d, loss or damage to the land was seen as threaten ing the ba sis of future 
72 This infrastructure includes; a town at Arawa, a port at Loloho, a major power house near the port, a 
major road from the port to the mine, a minor road to the tailings dump on the West Coast, the 
concentrator plant, town at the mine site, a dam on the Jaba River to supply water to the mine and 
concentrator, a water supply for Arawa town, and a limestone quarry (Denoon, 2000, p.146) . 
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survival {Connell, 1991, p.67}. Land for the Bougainvilleans, therefore, was not just a 
commodity in the way that BCL and the Administration had treated it. As two 
Bougainvillean students wrote in 1974: 
... Land is our physical life [and] our social life; it is marriage; it is status; it is 
security; it is politics; in fact, it is our only world ... We have little or no 
experience of social survival detached from the land. For us to be completely 
landless is a nightmare which no dollar in the pocket or dollar in the bank will 
allay; we are a threatened people (Dove, Miriung & Togolo, 1974, p.182). 
It was this fear - fear about the survival of the traditional culture and aspirations to 
control the future, which BCL failed to respond in its handling of environmental 
damage. What happened instead was a commitment to undertake scientific research 
to prove that BCL was not responsible for the environmental damage. 
BCL's environmental management practices 
Prior to the construction of the mine, BCL's main 'environmental' strategy was to take 
several Bougainvillean employees to see mines in Australia. The logic was that the 
Bougainvilleans could witness firsthand the environmental impacts of a large open cut 
mine and explain to their villages what they had seen when they returned. This 
strategy was designed to combat the assumption discussed earlier, that only a small 
amount of land would be destroyed as result of the development of the mine. When I 
asked a former Bougainvillean employee of BCL if this occurred, he stated : 
... Yes, BCL took us to go to Australia and I did see environmental devastation of 
the mines there. I was token to Spain too (BOU14, Former BCL Employee). 
303 
Despite this commitment, BCL management believe the strategy failed because of the 
lack of vocabulary to explain what they had seen. As a current executive of BCL states: 
... there is a problem with this strategy. People cannot return and convey what 
they saw. It is really hard especially in Pidgin because of the lack of vocabulary. 
An example is helicopters. The word used to refer to helicopters means aJesus' 
mixer" as they imagined Jesus to be 'up there' and thought of the propeller as a 
giant mixing machine. Now we show a 3 dimensional video instead73 (BOUl, 
current executive of BCL}. 
Reflecting a commitment to distributive justice, the primary response by BCL once 
production began was to issue compensation payments for environmental damage. For 
example, in response to damage to plantations caused by the flooding of the Pinei 
River, BCL paid compensation of AU$47,000, built a new fermenter and carried out 
work to reduce the risk of another flash flood from occurring (Brown, 1974, p.21-2) . 
Brown {1974, p.26} claims that compensation was also paid to individuals at a rate of 
A$20 per person per year for the loss of fish in the Jaba River, with approximately 
A$412,000 paid to about 1,400 people as of 1974. 
Monetary compensation, however, did not satisfy the landowners' concern for the 
environment, and the landowners felt neither the company nor the government was 
do ing enough to respond to their fears . As a Bougainvillean civil servant recounted : 
3 Th is however, is not a very convincing argument as surely the Bougainvilleans would have returned 
w ith photographs of the mines they visited that would have been given to them by their hosts . 
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... Environmental damage is getting worse by the day but always hear from BCL 
that everything was 'hunky dory'. PNG sponsored a survey because of pressure 
from the landowners. It was a whitewash. Done in 1988. It said there was no 
environmental damage and Ona stormed out of the meeting. It was the 
beginning of the end (BOU13}. 
It was not until 1988, a year before the mine was abandoned, that the first 
environmental impact assessment was conducted. The PNG Ministers for Minerals and 
Energy prompted the assessment in response to a visit to Panguna in mid-1988. This 
visit: 
... resulted in the commissioning by the PNG Department of Minerals and 
Energy of a New Zealand consultancy firm, Applied Geology Associates Limited 
(AGA), to determine the social and environmental impact, both past and future, 
of mining operations at Panguna (Quodling ,1991, p.30-1). 
However, instead of resolving concerns about the environmental damage caused by 
the mine, it further angered the landowners. According to BCL, the report ignited 
tensions as it failed "to attribute a wide range of environmental concerns to mining 
activities" (BCL, 2010-2011). Landowners were also angry about their lack of 
involvement in the survey. As one Bougainvillean landowner stated: 
... the [ consultancy J team rejected the request that villagers be present at the 
time of the research ... they didn't allow it and [the landowners] decided we have 
seen the destruction, we cannot trust them (BOU20, ABG Department 
CEO/Landowner). 
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For the Bougainvilleans who were experiencing the daily effects of environmental 
pollution and disruption to their livelihoods, the findings of the study thus not only 
symbolised the misrecognition of serious environmental damage, but also their lack of 
control over their resources and their future (Banks, 2002, p.59) . They also legitimately 
reacted to the deception and denial that marred this process. 
At the conclusion of the AGA study, the consultancy team held a one-day seminar with 
the landowners to explain their findings. One member of this team, John Connell, 
recounts the events that unfolded: 
... AGA limited consultants expressed the view that although environmental 
damage from mining operations was substantial there was no direct evidence 
of significant levels of chemical pollution and thus it was unlikely that 
Bougainville Copper Limited's operations were responsible for the loss of 
wildlife, declining agricultural production or a range of human illnesses {1991, 
p.71). 
In response to this conclusion and the broken promise that wildlife would be safe, 
Francis Ona stormed out of the meeting while other landowners remained and 
rejected the conclusions . As Connell (1991,p.71-2) reflects : 
... an inquiry that was intended to aid the resolution of land -owners' grievances 
had merely emphasised ... that they would be most unlikely to receive high 
levels of compensation ... and thus may have proved to be something of a 
catalyst for conflict. 
We can only speculate on how things might have turned out differently if the AGA 
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team did attempt to include landowners in the study, or to at least have been given the 
opportunity to contest the results. Yet because the study took place within a pre-
existing climate of distrust of BCL and the Government, the potential for the study to 
further ignite tensions should have been treated with more caution. The failure to do 
so culminated in Ona's demand of 50 per cent of total mining revenue as well as KlO 
billion for environmental compensation. 
Bougainville's experience of the environmental damage caused by the Panguna mine 
highlights the importance of local participation and integrity of analysis in 
environmental protection. This will be a particularly important issue if the mine were 
to re-open (see Ch 12}. The dilemma the Panguna mine represents, is that it is 
impossible to have such a large mine without significant damage to the natural 
environment. However, one avenue where corporations can develop a more 
meaningful engagement with the environmental impacts of mining is to ensure they 
have a voice in environmental protection measures and feel included in these 
processes. The Bougainville case also highlights the importance of honesty over 
deception. The fact that landowners did not have opportunities to contest the results 
of the AGA survey symbolised their loss of control of their land, their cultural identity 
and inability to trust the company. 
Papua 
There are more similarities than differences between Papua and Bougainville when it 
comes to environmental damage. Tailings waste from the Freeport mine has created 
similar, but possibly even larger environmental impacts to the Panguna mine. The land 
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affected also holds particular spiritual and cultural importance for indigenous Papuans. 
While the environmental footprint of BP's Tangguh LNG project has not been a large as 
the two mines (as it does not require a mountain to be dug outL the project has not 
been able to take place without some notable environmental degradation. 
As discussed in relation to Bougainville, the environmental impacts of the Freeport 
mine feed into a broader distrust of the company and the Government to protect local 
community interests (see Ch 5). The major difference between the two mines 
however, is that Freeport's operations in Papua have extended into a new era of 
environmental consciousness. Over successive decades pressure on Freeport to protect 
the environment in Papua has increased. In contrast the Bougainville project ceased 
operations in the early nineties when environmental awareness was more emergent 
than ubiquitous in resource development activity. Despite, or perhaps because of the 
greater scrutiny, accusations against Freeport for severe environmental damage 
continue to tarnish the company's international reputation (Greenpeace, 2012). The 
main concerns relate to Freeport's riverine disposal of tailings waste, and insensitivity 
towards the original owners of the land. 
Environmental criticisms related to BP's Tangguh LNG project also relate to the lack of 
local involvement in environmental management processes, as well as the social and 
cultural impacts associated with BP's marine exclusion zone. These concerns reinforce 
the claim made in relation to Bougainville that concerns relating to environmental 
damage feed into broader fears relating to cultural survival and the future of individual 
and group identity. 
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Freeport 
... Every time they come they give hope. You can improve development. They 
give good dreaming for us. But after that they give not hope but killing and that 
is land. Land is the mother. They can get everything from the land - food, build 
their house,, water from the river. In the forest they can implement their 
knowledge. That's why they say when the Government and the Company 
destroy my own land it seems like they kill us. We could lose everything 
(Papual, Papuan NGO Worker). 
Freeport has been subject to significant local and international criticism for its handling 
of the environmental impacts in Papua. One of the most high profile protests is a 
lawsuit filed in the US courts by an Amungme landowner (Beanal v Freeport 
McMoRan). The lawsuit highlights the effects of mining activity on both the immediate 
mine area, as well as the downstream environment. The suit focuses on Freeport's 
disposal of tailings into the Ajkwa River, which led to approximately 120sq km of dead 
trees and thick tailings sludge (Banks, 2002, p.44). 
Similar to the Bougainville copper mine, the construction phase of Freeport's 
operations took place within a context of weak environmental regulation. Certainly no 
environmental impact assessment was conducted prior to construction. At the time, 
almost complete control of the land rested with the Suharto regime (Abrash, 2001). 
The financial and political influence of Freeport, combined with the regime's primary 
interest in pursuing national development rather than the protection of Papuans 
resulted in a situation in which environmental regulation was completely neglected 
(see Ch 5). Freeport's environmental assessment processes occurred some time later in 
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response to international rather than state pressure (Leith, 2003, p.155). Moreover, 
Shuarto and his allies have been accused of deliberately neglecting to enforce the 
environmental regulations that should have been the responsibility of the state. 
Indonesian environmental NGOs for example, charge Freeport with breeching 
numerous environmental regulations without punishment. As an Indonesian 
environmental NGO worker states: 
... AM DAL is the environmental impact assessment to comply with Indonesian 
law on water quality. That law forbids anyone to dump into rivers. Freeport is 
very obviously breeching that law (Papua36}. 
Freeport is also accused of breeching several other environmental regulations such as: 
failing to comply with government orders to amend dangerous waste management 
practices; negligence in waste rock management; refusal to build a tailings 
containment dam; illegal disposal of tailings disposal into the highlands river system; 
pollution of the river system; breeches of regulatory water quality standards, and the 
discharge of acid rock drainage without a hazardous waste license (WALHI, 2006). All of 
this occurred with apparent impunity, reinforcing the argument made in Chapter 6 that 
states have an important responsibility to compliment and enable CSR in peace 
building. This includes protecting the land from unnecessary damage. 
The perspective that Freeport's environmental damage has been 'unnecessary' led the 
Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC) to revoke Freeport's $100,000,000 
political risk insurance in 1995 . OPIC stated in a letter addressed to Freeport that it 
would exercise its statutory charge under the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to, 
" ensure that overseas investment projects do not pose unreasonable or major hazards 
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or cause the degradation of tropical rainforests in developing countries" (OPIC, 1995). 
Based on a monitoring visit of Freeport's operations in Papua in 1994, OPIC highlighted 
the environmental consequences of ore production at over 100,000 dry metric tons per 
day which has severely degraded the rainforests surrounding the Ajkwa and Minajeri 
rivers. 
In 2006 Norway's government pension fund also declared divestment from Freeport 
primarily on environmental grounds. The organisation claimed that: 
... the Grasberg mine's riverine tailings disposal threatens 'irreversible' effects, 
posing 'unacceptable risks' and creating severe environmental damage ... of 
importance to future generations {cited in Nostromo Research, 2006). 
The pension fund also highlighted the company's intention to continue its existing 
waste management system, in spite of the World Bank's declaration that it was an 
unacceptable means of disposal {Ministry of Finance, Norway, 2006). In 2011 the New 
Zealand superannuation fund also came under pressure to follow Norway and divest 
from Freeport. One reason the Fund provided for not divesting was: 
... For us, walking away might be simpler and quicker than staying engaged, it 
might avoid critical coverage, but it changes nothing ... a properly considered 
responsible investment approach should also include a significant element of 
seeking to change company behaviour as it is that, not walking away, which 
makes the biggest impact on the people and environments most affected by 
problematic company behaviour (New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2011, 
p.1-2}. 
311 
The Amungme and Kamoro language groups have felt the most damaging 
environmental impacts of Freeport's operations. A core grievance held by highland 
Amungme people is that Freeport has destroyed traditional food sources (such as sago, 
traditional medicine, fish and other animals) and sites of spiritual and cultural 
significance. Beanal describes the Amungme conception of the land as 'mother' in the 
following way: 
... when we say that the environment for us is our "mother" we mean that 
human beings are an integral part of the environment and therefore each one 
of us has to be mindful of and accountable to the limitations of the 
environment. Modern people do not recognize the special relationship of 
indigenous people to the environment. But for the indigenous people, their 
view of their natural surroundings teaches them ecologically sound principles 
to care for the environment in a sustainable way. For the indigenous people, 
destroying the environment means damaging the lives of human beings 
(Beanal, 1997). 
Similar to the experience of Bougainvilleans discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
environmental damage brought about by Freeport has been perceived by the 
Amungme as a threat to their cultural survival. The lowland Kamoro people who have 
lost sago gardens and trees traditionally used to build canoes for fishing share this fear. 
Freeport is believed to have implemented measures to reduce its impact on the 
Kamoro through relocation and the development of new infrastructure. However these 
efforts are viewed as broadly ineffective due to the Kamoro people's traditional 
re li ance on the rivers . As a journalist based in Papua stated : 
3 1 
... They [Freeport] are trying to relocate the people to other place and make 
research to find solution to environment. .. It has not worked well because 
Kamara can't go far from their river. It's their culture and always come back to 
the river. Freeport are trying to help the people. Build road from Timika city to 
Kamara area, but it is not helping {Papual}. 
Reflecting Banks's {2002, p.58) argument discussed earlier in this chapter, the central 
issue for the Kamara has been the lack of control over land and, in this case, also the 
rivers. 
Freeport's environmental management practices 
Despite the significance of Freeport's environmental impacts, it was not until 1996 that 
the company voluntarily committed to external environmental assessments every 
three years by MWH (formerly Montgomery Watson Harza). Rather than agreeing to 
engage with the fears held by the Amungme and Kamara relating to environmental 
damage and cultural survival, Freeport turned to scientific forms of authorisation 
(through, for example, ISO 14001 certification across all of the company's operating 
facilities74 ). This is reflected in Freeport's description of its approach to sustainable 
development as, "based on our objective to be compliant with laws and regulations 
and to minimize environmental impacts using risk management strategies based on 
valid data and sound science" (Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, n.d.b). Freeport's 
74 The International Organization for Standardization describes the 'ISO 1400 family as "a means of 
providing business and government with scientifically valid data on the environmental effects of 
economic activity. They may also be used as a technical basis for environmental regulations". 
(International Organisation for Standardisation, 2011) 
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environmental strategy therefore, is managed through analyses in which the c-riteria 
for evaluating environmental impacts are scientifically constituted (Macintyre & Foale, 
2002). 
Macintyre and Foale (2002) argue that the reliance on scientific analyses by 
corporations and consultants is a response to environmentalists from developed 
industrial nations, rather than local communities. The limitation of this approach is that 
corporations end up drawing on concepts that are generally unknown and inaccessible 
for locals (Macintyre & Foale, 2002). Freeport's reliance on scientific legitimacy instead 
of engaging with the complex local understandings also supports Escobar' s critique of 
sustainable development discussed earlier in this chapter, as a commitment to 
sustaining current models of growth and development (Escobar, 1995, p.193). Escobar 
argues, "the question in this discourse is what kind of new manipulations we can invent 
to make the most of the Earth's 'resources"' (Escobar, 1995, p.193) . This critique 1s 
evident in the following statement by Freeport on sustainable development: 
... As the earth's population continues to grow along with the global standard of 
living, the demand for our metals rises. We will respond to increased demand 
by expanding our operations; however, our ability to reduce or mitigate certain 
impacts, such as total greenhouse gas emissions and total water consumption, 
will be challenged as we evaluate how we can be more efficient (Freeport-
McMoRan Copper & Gold, n.d.b) . 
Th is quotes reveal s that Freeport ' s understanding of sustainable development is not 
based on a co mmitment to meaningful engagement w ith local communities. Rather 
the focus is on how best to ma intain company efficiency in the context of a growing 
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demand for metals. 
In its most recent external audit of Freeport's operations in Papua, MWH reported that 
the company was diligently following the sustainability guidelines of the International 
Council on Mining & Metals, which incorporate ten principles for the implementation 
and integration of sustainable development within the corporate decision making 
process (MWH, 2008). However Freeport has only published the executive summary of 
the MWH report, with no reference to the environmental concerns of the Amungme 
and Kamara peoples. Instead, the report highlights Freeport's compliance with all 
regulatory and sampling requirements and claims that the company demonstrates a 
strong commitment to continuous improvement. For example the report states, 
"current PTFI [PT Freeport Indonesia] management practice of controlled riverine 
tailings transport and deposition to an engineered area remains the best option 
available for the operation" (MWH, 2008}. 
The MWH report depicts Freeport in positive light, but makes no mention of 
consultation with locals in the conduct of the report, nor the concerns expressed by 
environmental NGOs about Freeport's disposal of tailings waste. As with BCL in 
Bougainville therefore, the company has relied on external scientific evaluation to 
distance itself from the perspectives of local communities who depend on the land for 
cultural and physical survival. 
BP's Tangguh LNG project 
... Environmental footprint of BP is very small. Only footprint is where the LNG 
plant is. You don,,t need to dig a mountain (Papua8,, BP employee). 
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In 2000 BP rebranded itself from British Petroleum to 'bp: beyond petroleum' in an 
attempt to portray the company as, "one that incorporated solar energy in its portfolio 
and was willing to move away from oil" (Beder, 2002) . As a part of this rebranding, BP 
adopted a new green, yellow and white sun logo named 'Helios', "after the Greek god 
of the sun" (BP p.1.c, 1996-2012). BP has failed dramatically however, in its pitch to the 
world that it is an unusually 'green' resource development corporation. In 2005 a 
refinery explosion in Texas killed fifteen BP workers and injured 170 others. That same 
year, a BP oil leak in Alaska resulted in some 4,800 barrels of oil spread into Alaskan 
snow (Lustgarten, 2010). In April 2010 BP received worldwide media coverage 
following the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico that killed 
eleven people and released nearly five million barrels of oil into marine waters 
(Robertson & Krauss, 2010). 
The changes to BP' s corporate image occurred just before the construction of the 
Tangguh project. However the company's record of environmental failure over the past 
decade has raised genuine concerns in Papua of the potential for disaster at the 
Tangguh LNG project. 
The environmental impact assessment for the Tangguh project undertaken by the 
Central AM DAL Evaluation Commission of the Indonesian Government Ministry of the 
Environment was approved by BPMIGAS in 2002. Comprising three documents, the 
assessment evaluates the Tangguh project against Indonesian regulations concerning 
issues such as noise, atmospheric emissions, water quality and sanitary wastes. The 
key anticipated impacts of the Tangguh project relate to pollution of the Bintuni Bay 
area, restricted access to traditional food sources, waste generation from industrial 
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and community activities, the level of CO2 emissions, and air quality impacts (BP, 
2005}. 
BP claims that the assessment was undertaken, "by soliciting the views of many 
stakeholders, particularly the people living in nearby villages and communities" 
(Delaney, 2005}, with, "at least 1,622 people in the villages and towns [having] 
registered their names and participated in the consultations" (BP, 2005, p.53}. BP also 
cites the names of villages where consultations took place, the dates of the 
consultations and number of attendees (BP, 2005, p.83-4). However in a joint letter 
addressed to the Asian Development Bank in opposition to the US$350m loan it 
provided for the Tangguh project, three Indonesian NGOs have contested BP's 
environmental impact assessment process: 
... the process of environmental impact assessment for-the Tangguh project was 
seriously flawed, without meaningful consultation of affected communities, 
and was a "rubber stamp" process since the national government granted the 
Tangguh license before the EIS [Environmental Impact Study] was even 
completed (WALHI, JATAM, KAU, 2005}. 
As discussed in Chapter 10, the NGOs contest BP's social and environmental impact 
assessment process as it was conducted after the exchange of land. Locals and NGOs 
have understandably viewed this 'cart before the horse' chronology of the 
environmental impact assessment process with scepticism. Indeed questions have 
been raised about the degree of local empowerment in decisions relating to the 
environment when BP had already acquired control of the land. In this way even 
though BP had made a commitment to consult locals on the environmental impacts of 
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their operations, the consultation process has been perceived by some Papuans as a 
disingenuous empty gesture. As Down to Earth (2008) claims: 
... perhaps this is an indication that the gap between the realities of this big 
multi-national corporation and local Papuan villagers is too big to be bridged in 
this way, and that Tangguh's presence remains an imposition on the local 
landscape and society. 
This quote reinforces Escobar's {1995, p.197} point that sustainable development 
discourse indicates that only minor adjustments to, rather than a radical re-thinking of 
current economic models, is required to launch an era of environmentally sound 
resource development. 
Similar to the Bougainville copper mine and Freeport cases, a crucial environmental 
concern regarding the Tangguh project to date has centred on disruptions to access 
traditional food sources. As a journalist based in Papua stated: 
... Environmental effects in Bintuni are getting more complicated ... they destroy 
fish and shrimp - the main food for the local people (PapualO}. 
This is partly due to pollution caused by a massive increase in shipping in and around 
the Bintuni Bay area. As a result, shrimp, fish and sago that indigenous groups in the 
area depend on as a source of income have been affected (JATAM, 2003) . However an 
additional disruption to access to food sources has been caused by BP's safety 
exclusion zone, which comprises a total area of approximately 4,555 ha or 0.5 per cent 
of the Bearau and Bintuni Bay area (Summary Environmental Impact Assessment, 2005, 
p.35). 
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The prohibition of fishing boats in the Bearau and Bintuni Bay area has affected 
communities who have traditionally relied on fish close to the shoreline. According to a 
Papuan human rights advocate, this has led many villagers to travel further out to sea 
despite a lack of skills or equipment for deep-sea fishing (Papua14, Papuan Human 
Rights Activist). While BP has attempted to respond to this situation by providing 
villagers with a motorboat, this has created jealousy between landowning groups. As 
an Indonesian human rights activist based in Papua explains: 
... BP collaborated with the local government to provide a motor boat for people 
of New Tanah Merah to catch fish. But when they reach the area there is anger 
and jealousy of the landowners there ... because their area is used by BP too but 
they didn't get anything {Papua 14, Human Rights Activist). 
The activist claims that the local government tried to intervene by issuing a statement 
to villagers suggesting they consider alternative sources of food and livelihood. A 
concern of Papuans observing the Tangguh project is that villagers who cannot access 
traditional food sources will end up becoming dependent on BP. One Papuan peace 
activist related: 
... Now people can't sail freely as this is a company area .. . If they want to or not 
they must depend on BP. In a long time it may be a similar situation to Freeport 
where the people depend on the company {Papua30, Papuan Peace Activist). 
An additional concern connected to the environmental impacts of the Tangguh project 
highlighted during my fieldwork was BP's environmental record in other areas of the 
world. Respondents expressed concern that if a disaster similar to the 2010 Gulf of 
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Mexico oil spill were to occur in Papua, the Indonesian Government would not work to 
guarantee the protection of Papuans, or adequately restore the environment. 
Reinforcing the arguments made in relation to the BCL and Freeport cases therefore, 
the environmental impacts associated with resource development cannot be 
considered in isolation from issues of trust between local communities, governments 
and corporations. 
Conclusion 
By drawing on an analysis of the environmental damage caused by BCL in Bougainville 
and Freeport and BP in Papua, this chapter argued that it is local participation in 
environmental protection measures that local communities value most highly. There is 
also a strong focus on honest and transparent consultation, rather than after the fact 
spin. 
While there has been a global increase in expectations that the private sector practice 
sustainable development, the cases reveal that these processes do not guarantee 
greater local participation, or honest reporting. Through a discussion of the work of 
Banerjee (2003) and Escobar (1995), this was found to attributable to the general focus 
of concepts of sustainable development on sustaining the global economic system, 
rather than Indigenous cultural relationships to land. Policies of sustainable 
development occur within a global economic system that is dominated by a Western 
ontology that views the environment and society as separate, and struggles to 
incorporate other ways of being in which distinctions between society and 
environment are less clear. 
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With the power to control the land, the power to control the science and the power to 
decide who is included and excluded from environmental management practices in the 
hands of Western corporations, locals have few opportunities to share alternative 
models of development and environmental protection. One avenue for redressing this 
imbalance is to open spaces in which corporations are able to learn from non-Western 
conceptions of the environment, through the inclusion of locals in environmental 
impact assessments and evaluations. In doing so corporations might learn more 
'holistic' forms of ecological interdependence and local communities can have 
traditional ecological knowledge respected and used to inform decisions that will 
shape their future 75 . The next chapter expands this argument through a discussion of 
the contemporary situations on Bougainville and Papua. It argues that the three 
companies have important opportunities to make progress towards the achievement 
of 'bottom-up' resource development through participation in- local reconciliation . 
75 Th is discussion w ill be extended in Chapter 13. 
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Chapter 12: Local Reconciliation 
Site of Disengaged Engaged 
interdependence ( CSR as it mostly is) {CSR reconfigured) 
Aspirations to define Corporations make no Corporations nurture 
the future attempt to heal symbolically reconciliation based on local 
injustices related to resource customs 
development 
A key conclusion of Chapter 11 was the importance of empowering locals to define the 
environmental impacts associated with resource development, and for companies to 
engage meaningfully with their concerns about the future. The final site of 
interdependence, addressed in this chapter, is aspirations to define the future. The 
chapter argues that participation in local reconciliation processes offers the greatest 
opportunity for resource companies caught up in conflict to make progress on their 
relationships with local communities. Drawing on the contemporary situations of 
Bouga inville and Papua, the chapter explores possibilities open to BCL, Freeport and 
BP to reconcile past damage and to contribute to peace building in Bougainville and 
Papua more broadly. By engaging in processes of local reconciliation, the three 
companies have an important opportunity to shift from ' top-down' to 'bottom-up' 
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resource development. 
The business and peace literature 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the potential for the private sector to contribute to peace 
building has gained significant interest from scholars, international organisations and 
NGOs. We saw that this has resulted in the development of a budding scholarship on 
'business and peace'. While acknowledging that important questions have been raised 
in this literature regarding the role of business in conflict and post-conflict settings, an 
important limitation has also been identified. That is, the development of this 
scholarship has tended to occur in the absence of an adequate understanding of how 
and why the voluntary social and environmental initiatives already pursued by the 
extractive industry might have unintended violent consequences. Examples identified 
include; the breakdown of traditional village authority through changes to employment 
opportunities, divisions amongst landowners over access to resources, and the 
development of new infrastructure attracting large numbers of migrants. One 
limitation of the business and peace literature therefore, is that it has not developed 
on the back of a deep understanding of the paradoxes of CSR. 
Rather than generate broad strategies that are applicable to all societies affected by 
conflict, the logic underlying this thesis is that when companies idiosyncratically 
engage with the ways in which their work may aggravate sources of conflict in 
particular locations, they may also find themselves in a better position to implement 
strategies to counter these dynamics (Banfield, Haufler & Lilly, 2005). It is also possible 
that in cases such as Bougainville and Papua where the foundations of the negative 
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relations between BCL and Freeport were set in train at the outset by the state (s-ee Ch 
5) that CSR may have the potential to now play a 'redemptive' role in peace building76 . 
This could occur, for example, through BCL acknowledging its role in Australia 's 
decolonisation of PNG, or Freeport lobbying the Indonesian Government to re -write 
the 1967 Contract of Work. While such an engagement may have been beyond 
corporate decision makers at the time, the point here is that through conceptualising 
business activity as interdependent with, rather than separate from, the root causes of 
conflict, it becomes easier to identify a range of measures that a corporation might 
take in order to contribute to peace. 
For example, Boege and Franks (2011, p.4} distinguish between two post-conflict 
scenarios which mining companies might operate within: 
• Post-conflict development of new mines or reopening of old mines where 
mining was a factor in prior violent conflict; 
• Post-conflict development of new mines where mining was not a cause of the 
violent conflict, or where there was no pre-conflict mining (Boege & Franks, 
2011, p.4). 
These kinds of distinctions make it easier to develop appropriate corporate strategies 
according to specific operational scenarios . For example, in cases where mining was 
not a factor in prior violent conflict, it might be possible for corporations to foster 
stab ili ty through performing their core business activities (Bais & Huijser, 2005, p.124) , 
76 The author is gratefu l to an anonymous examiner for this suggestion. 
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such as the creation of new employment opportunities. While in cases where mining 
was a factor in prior violent conflict, the same 'opportunities' may actually prolong or 
ignite conflict depending on the way they are distributed (Ch 7), and the historical 
context in which they are deployed (Ch 5). 
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to progress our understanding of the 
transformative potential of engaging with the interdependencies between business 
and conflict. In this way the 'Interdependent Engagement' Framework is only relevant 
for large corporations where resource development has been a contributing factor to 
conflict. In cases where resource development "was a factor in prior violent conflict" 
(Boege & Franks, 2011, p.4), a detailed analysis and acknowledgement of the roles that 
corporations have played in the conflict can be seen as the first step to identifying a 
'conflict sensitive' business strategy. 
Bougainville 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a process is currently under way on Bougainville to negotiate 
the island's political future as well as the possibility of re-opening the Panguna mine. 
This process follows a requirement in the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement that a 
referendum on Bougainville's independence from PNG be held sometime between 
2015 and 2020. Many Bougainvilleans believe that independence will not be 
economically sustainable without a substantial source of revenue (Momis & Garrett, 
2012). In this way the long-held desire amongst Bougainvilleans for political 
independence from PNG continues to underlie the debate on whether mining should 
take place on their island. 
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To gauge local support for the resumption of mining at Panguna, the ABG and the PNG 
Government agreed in 2007 that the Bougainville Copper Agreement should be 
reviewed. As the Agreement has not been reviewed since 1974, landowners and the 
Bougainville Government have been left with uncertainty on a number of important 
issues such as the availability of revenues from Panguna in the future, and the 
responsibility for stabilising the mine site if it is never to re-open (Bougainville 
Administration, n.d, p. 6). For these and other outstanding issues to be clarified, the 
Agreement must be reviewed. 
Reflecting the significant changes that have occurred on Bougainville since 1974, the 
review process will include the ABG and representatives of landowners from BCL's six 
mine-lease areas. For the first time the rights of Bougainvilleans to be consulted on 
whether they want mining will be recognised . To ensure the widest representat ion of 
landowners is included in the review process, the ABG has embarked on a process of 
establishing six separate associations and one umbrella body for customary 
landowners from BCL's mining-related leases. These areas include: 
1. The Spec ial M ining Lease 
2. The Port Lease 
3. The Arawa Town Lease 
4. The Port -Mine Access Road Lease 
5. Upper Tailings Lease 
6. Lower Tailings Lease 
According to the Bougainville Administration, the aim of establishing these associations 
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is to recognise that while each mining-affected area has distinct needs and concerns, 
they also need to develop the capacity to speak with one voice when they begin 
negotiations on the future of the mine (Bougainville Administration, n.d, p.8). 
Reflecting the sensitivity of the mine issue and the fact that reconciliation between the 
'old' and 'new' Panguna landowners have only very recently occurred, it has taken 
many months for these landowning groups to agree to work together (Nisira & Garrett, 
2011). Despite this, Regan reports that the process to date has been fruitful: 
... the people are very clear, they know what their problems are and they are 
identifying them with tremendous clarity and great emotion. They really feel 
they have suffered, they are aware that they are the real victims of mining, and 
they are not opposing mining, for the future for the most part, but they are 
saying if it is to happen again, then it is to be done very differently and they, 
amongst others, have to be looked after in very different ways (Regan & 
Garrett, 2011). 
The three main options the parties to the review process must consider are: 
1. The mine never opens again; 
2. The mine opens again as a BCL operation; 
3. The mine opens again under control of some other company (Bougainville 
Administration, n.d, p.4). 
In order to illustrate the potential roles that BCL might play in Bougainville ' s future, 
each of these options will be explored in more detail. This discussion will be followed 
by suggestions on how and why BCL might participate in local reconciliation processes 
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on Bougainville . 
Option 1: the mine never opens again 
... If the mine re-opens there will be another war. That 1s what I predict (BOU19, 
Bougainvillean Landowner). 
Since 2008 there has been an emerging consensus among Bougainvilleans that the 
mine should re-open (Momis, 2011). However this consensus is not without dissent, 
with numerous high profile individuals expressing concerns that re-opening the mine 
could jeopardise Bougainville's peace process. The main fears are that; 
1. the Bougainville Government will not have the capacity to contain local 
interests; 
2. there is the potential for warlords to emerge, and/or 
3. unresolved conflicts might erupt, which have the capacity to turn deadly due 
the many weapons that continue to be available on the island (Regan & Tanis, 
2011). 
In addition there are concerns that the resumption of mining will lead to a resurgence of 
the social and environmental problems that plagued Bougainville during the operating 
years of the mine. As one Bougainvillean stated: 
... we have already seen the damages. There are a lot of fears. Not only about 
the mine but fear of the PNG military coming back. Even the loss of land 
(BOU25, Me' ekamui Spokesman). 
Wh ile there are no official groups opposing the mine as such, there are a number of 
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well-known Bougainvilleans opposing the resumption of operations. For example 
Damien Dameng, a strong complainant of the impacts of the mine on traditional values 
during the 1970s and 80s, continues to oppose mining (Taylor & Garrett, 2011). Those 
who share Dameng's view believe that instead of re-opening the mine, stakeholders of 
the review should: 
... work on the exit strategy and fill that bit [the mine pit] and make it conducive 
for cultivation (BOU20, ABG Department CEO/Landowner). 
In addition to Dameng, Chris Uma, leader of the Bougainville rebel group the 'Original 
Me'ekamui', has expressed reservations about the resumption of mining. Uma's 
opposition is due to numerous outstanding issues between landowners, BCL and the 
National and Provincial Governments. Uma states: 
... Bougainville is not yet normal, there are issues we still have to sort out first. 
Things like compensation, I also want the mine pit measurement looked at and 
people compensated fairly for the damages done to this hole. We have to 
address and settle this before we can start talking about mine re-opening (cited 
in Kenneth, 2011). 
This quote, and other statements made by Uma on Australian radio programs (Uma, 
Tanis & Garrett, 2011) indicate that Uma does not fundamentally oppose the 
resumption of mining under any circumstances. However he does hold a firm view that 
the parties to the review process r11ust deal with the unresolved issues of 
compensation and environmental restoration, before any commitments are made on 
the future of the mine. Should these issues not be adequately dealt with, the potential 
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for armed conflict to resume is high. In spite of Dameng and Uma's concerns about the 
resumption of mining, the numbers of Bougainvilleans in favour of re -opening the mine 
is much larger. Indeed, all three Bougainvillean leaders who have served as President 
(Kabui, Tanis and Momis) have supported the resumption of mining. 
Option 2: the mine opens again as a BCL operation 
... People would prefer to work with the devil they know. They [BCL} will 
understand what they did wrong {BOU11, ABG Department CEO). 
While no systematic survey research evidence is available, Regan and Tanis (2011) 
suggest that approximately 95 per cent of Bougainvilleans support re-opening the mine 
and my own fieldwork also suggests a high level of support. This support is based on 
the view that Bougainville requires a reliable source of economic development for an 
independent future to be feasible. In this regard Chairman and Managing Director of 
BCL, Peter Taylor, claims that the Panguna mine is potentially: 
... large enough to support the Bougainville economy and also to produce a 
large number of jobs and businesses that always develop around a major 
project. There are stats [statistics] about how many direct employees will lead 
to how many in direct employees and the ratio is about 5 to 1 so if we are 
employing 3000 people you can expect another 15,000 people to be employed 
locally (Taylor & Garrett, 2011). 
In addition, the mine is estimated to have a life of approximately 17-20 years of 
mineral production remaining and is believed to contain, "3. 5 million tones of copper, 
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today worth about $32.4bn, and 12.7 million ounces of gold, worth today about $17.8 
bn" (Callick, 2010). In this way Panguna is considered to be a viable option to support 
an independent Bougainville for at least fifteen years. If the Bougainville Government 
and landowners deem these fifteen years of mining a success, there is also the 
potential for new mining projects to be developed on other parts of the Island. 
Should Bougainvilleans decide to re-open the mine, my fieldwork observations suggest 
that BCL would likely be the preferred operating company. Many Bougainvilleans I 
spoke to explained this preference on the basis that, 'it's better the devil you know', 
implying that it would be better to work with BCL (which wants to return to 
Bougainville}, rather than risk a company that may have lower social and 
environmental standards. Additionally, there is a popular perception on Bougainville 
that because BCL was the company which created many of the social and 
environmental problems that have plagued Bougainville since the 1970s, it should also 
be BCL that comes back to fix these problems. Here the reconciliation and legal 
arguments converge, as BCL still has a valid legal right to mine. As a Bougainvillean ex-
BRA combatant stated: 
... they [BCL] can just come back. They can do reconciliation with landowners 
and start a new chapter. BCL has to come back because it did that [the social 
and environmental damages] no other company can come back (BOUG28}. 
Underlying this openness to BCL is also a trust that the company has learned from its 
mistakes, and as a consequence, will be more committed to protecting the rights of 
landowners and their environment in the future. As two Bougainvillean landowners 
stated: 
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... / only deal with CRA. They have been here. They did the environmental 
damage. I will only talk to CRA. They know me (BOU18, Landowner) . 
... BCL already learned its mistakes. There will be better things with BCL again 
{BOU20, ABG Department CEO/Landowner). 
Within these statements there is also a sense of confidence among Bougainvilleans 
that they have the capacity to hold BCL socially and environmentally accountable. As 
one Bougainvillean landowner stated, "people are willing to sit with BCL to once again 
remind them what stimulated them to take up arms" {BOU20, ABG Department 
CEO/Landowner). Alongside the idea of inviting BCL to re-open Panguna therefore, is a 
strong expectation that the suffering Bougainvilleans have experienced through the 
previous mining experience will be acknowledged. As such, the future of mining is 
inextricably tied to the Bouga invilleans' understanding of the past and their aspirations 
to define the future. However continued support for BCL on Bougainville will 
profoundly depend on how it handles outstanding issues such as compensation and 
environmental damage. As the following landowners stated : 
.. . You [BCL] must pay out the damages [first] or we can find another company 
(BOU24, Chief/Landowner) . 
.. . What we want is compensation for the damage. If they cannot sort out the 
[existing] problems they cannot come {BOU27, Former BCL Employee/ 
Landowner). 
Option 3: the mine opens again under control of some other 
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company 
While numerous companies have been raised as potential alternatives, competition at 
the corporate level to re-open the Bougainville copper mine is not believed to be 
fierce. This is due to two main factors. Firstly, BCL holds the legal rights to the mining-
lease areas and remaining infrastructure. This means that without getting Rio Tinto 
and/or the PNG Government interested in selling their investment, it is unlikely that 
another company could obtain a legal right to re-open Panguna (Taylor & Garrett, 
2011). Secondly, an investment of approximately US$4 billion is required to re-open 
the mine (Bougainville Administration, n.d, p.4). The ABG believes that there are only 
four or five companies in the world that have this capacity. Consequently, the 
companies that have been raised as potential competitors to BCL are believed to only 
want a slice of equity in the mine, rather than operating status (BOU39, ABG Advisor). 
Despite these claims, the ABG has reportedly held discussions with several resource 
companies. For example, an Australian company with links to the China Nonferrous 
Metals and Mining Company, Ord River Resources, is believed to have held talks with 
the ABG about re-opening Panguna. Ord River heightened public speculation over the 
future of the mine when it issued several press releases (Ord River Resources 2007a, 
Ord River Resources 2007b, Ord River Resources 2007c) stating that talks with the 
Bougainville Government were 'progressing nicely'. However these talks came to an 
abrupt end in 2007, when the ABG reportedly ended discussions on the basis that the 
mine was too sensitive an issue to discuss in the absence of a Bougainville Mining 
Policy (ABG pulls out, 2007). According to Regan and Tanis (2011), however, the only 
reason these talks failed was that there were elements within the ABG who were 
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supporting a Canadian company 1 Invincible Resources. 
Invincible Resources has been involved in public debate on Bougainville since 2005 
when the late President of Bougainville 1 Joseph Kabui 1 gave the company 70 per cent 
control over Bougainville 1 s mineral resources for up to five years (Leader denies 
Bougainville 1 2008). The deal was criticised for its lack of transparency and public 
consultation, following the revelation that Kabui received K20, 000 (AUD$8000) from 
Invincible for his 2005 election campaign (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy & Dunn 1 
20101 p.128). Many Bougainvilleans were also angry with the deal as it was made 
during a period in which it had been made, "clear that they were not prepared to 
return to foreigners mining their land'1 (Rabasca, 2009). Despite these concerns, there 
was enough support within the Bougainville Government to oust members of the 
Bougainville Executive Council who were acting in favour of Ord River. 
Following Kabui's death in 2008, there has been a succession of two Presidents of 
Bougainville with different approaches to the mine issue. According to Braithwaite, 
Charlesworth, Reddy and Dunn (2010, p.129), for example, James Tanis, "has been 
genuinely open to listening to the diverse and conflicting posit ions of his people in a 
new bottom-up attempt to forge a consensus on the future of the mine". Tanis's logic 
is that for the Bouga inville peace process to be sustainable, the conflict must be taken 
back to where it started. This links to the earlier discussion about why many 
Bougainvilleans prefer BCL to other companies. As the current Vice Pres ident of 
Bougainville, Patrick Nisira (Nisira & Garrett, 2011) claims: 
... because of Panguna, Bougainville went down the drain and we believe that if 
we can fix Panguna, if we can stabilise Panguna, we can help Bougainville 
33 
[stand] on its [own] two feet again. 
While many Bougainvilleans hope the current President and former PNG Ambassador 
to China, John Momis, will continue the progress made on the mine issue by Tanis, 
some fear his close links to China will lead him to prefer Chinese investors regardless of 
the support of landowners. Momis however, denies this is the case, claiming that his 
promotion of Chinese investment on Bougainville is for everything except Panguna 
{Regan & Tanis, 2011). 
The huge investment required to re-open Panguna, coupled with the tension 
surrounding local dealings with Invincible Resources, has meant that it is less likely, 
though not impossible, that the mine will re-open under a new company. While BCL is 
clearly attempting to capitalise on the negative experience of the failed Invincible and 
Ord River deal, Taylor's reflection on the competition facing BCL does seem to ring 
true, " ... having seen the alternatives, the Bougainvilleans are saying, they actually 
prefer Bougainville Copper to reopen the mine" {Taylor, & Garrett 2011). 
Distributive vs. symbolic reparation 
Given the strong support that currently exists for BCL to re-open Panguna, the idea of 
reconciliation between the company and landowners is a possibility worth pursuing. 
From BCL's perspective nothing is off the agenda for talks about re-opening the mine, 
with Peter Taylor encouraging landowners to set the agenda for negotiations 
themselves {Taylor & Garrett, 2011). Bougainville therefore, represents a unique 
opportunity to explore the local expectations of a company involved in prior violent 
conflict in return for a new social license to operate. 
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The Bougainville data suggest there is an expectation amongst landowners for BCL to 
make both distributive and symbolic reparations for the injustices locals have 
experienced. As discussed earlier for example, there is a strong 'distributive' 
expectation amongst locals for BCL to resolve the outstanding issue of compensation. 
This reportedly includes Francis Ona's 1988 demand of Kl0 billion for environmental 
damages. However as, "the Kina has since depreciated to a third of the U.S dollar in 
value, and because metal prices have risen" (Miriori, 2010), this figure is now being 
demanded in US Dollars. Nonetheless, this demand may not be as unrealistically 
inflated as it was at 1980s metals prices due to the significant increase in world copper 
and gold prices, and the estimated stream of $S0.2bn in sales remaining in Panguna. 
Despite the firmness with which this compensation is being demanded, there is also 
awareness on Bougainville of the social problems that monetary compensation has 
caused in the past, such as intergenerational disputes and the breakdown of traditional 
village authority (see Ch 10). Some Bougainvilleans are suggesting that an apology 
and/or reconciliation with BCL should also take place. As one Bougainvillean 
peacemaker stated: 
... They [the landowners] will want the company to apologise ... The company 
could participate in peace building by the executives participating in a 
reconciliation ceremony. Compensation con be paid later (BOU12, Peacemaker) . 
Th is statement implies that Bougainvilleans are hoping for a compensation deal 
negotiated from a foundation of reconciliation . The following section explains how BCL 
part icipat ion in reconciliation could take place . 
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Reconciliation with BCL 
According to Boege and Franks {2011, p.36-7) if BCL were to participate in customary 
peace building processes on Bougainville, the company would, {{essentially have to 
behave as if it were another {{clan"". This would require BCL to make material 
reparations for the harms caused (e.g. compensation), as well as take practical steps to 
remedy those harms. The key here is to acknowledge the suffering of those who have 
been affected and to seek their forgiveness. To do this, current and former BCL 
executives will be required to put aside their own cultural interpretations of justice and 
prioritise, {{local ways of doing things" (Boege & Franks, 2011, p.38). 
According to one Nasioi man, Bougainville's justice system is particularly difficult for 
foreigners to understand as it emphasises forgiveness over punishment (Mekea, cited 
in Howley, 2002, p.102). {{Bougainvilleans do not necessar-ily see the necessity of 
making legal revenge and punishment as a necessary part of justice" (Howley, 2002, p. 
103). As Mekea claims: 
... in its simplest form, it [Bougainvillean reconciliation] is just a question of two 
people saying {II did you wrong and you did me wrong. I forgive you and you 
forgive me". That is what happens in its most simple form. Of course there will 
be an exchange of goods, money, pigs and shell-money. People in other 
cultures do not really understand this. They prefer punishment and putting 
people in jail (Mekea, cited in Howley, p.102). 
It is likely that BCL executives will want to avoid participation in this type of 
reconciliation, particularly through fear of admissions that might be used in litigation. 
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However even allowing for these risks, engagement in local reconciliation could be a 
win -win scenario for both BCL and landowners. For example, there is evidence in the 
regulatory literature that suggests that where symbolic reparation is made (e.g. an 
apology), victims are less likely to seek redress through judicial mechanisms (Healy, 
2011, p.269). Local reconciliation could thus be an attractive option for BCL whose 
parent company, Rio Tinto, has been caught in a lengthy lawsuit in the United States. In 
return for a suite of reparative and reconciliatory measures (which could include 
investment of the resources that would otherwise go to fighting a legal case into a 
better educational future for the children of Bougainville), BCL could ask for all the 
leaders of Bougainville to commit to opposition to legal action. 
The US lawsuit mentioned above involves serious allegations against Rio Tinto that 
should not be dismissed lightly. However there are concerns as to how representative 
the case is for a majority of Bougainvillean landowners, and some analysts question the 
benefits that can be derived from a, "process that does not really enjoy legitimacy in 
the eyes of the community" (Boege and Franks, 2011, p.7). For BCL, participating in 
local reconciliation offers the company an opportunity to re -gain a social license to 
operate before resolution is reached on the lawsuit against Rio Tinto . By participating 
in a process that holds legitimacy for locals, BCL would be in a better position to be, 
11truthful with the people on what happened in the past" (BOUl0, Bougainvillean small 
scale miner) and apologise for the social and environmental damage that mining 
brought to the island. If landowners then invited BCL to re-open Panguna, it would 
send a strong message to both current and future shareholders that Bougainville 
copper represents a secure investment. Importantly therefore, both BCL and 
landowners have an interest in exploring alternative redress mechanisms that draw 
338 
upon local reconciliation processes. 
My fieldwork observations suggest Bougainvilleans consider an apology a small ask of 
the company, but a significant test for how culturally sensitive BCL would be if it were 
to re-open Panguna. As the following Bougainvillean women's leaders stated: 
... cultural/symbolic recognition - it's our way of thinking. It's good manners. If 
they [BCL] were culturally sensitive, it would come naturally (BOUS, Former BCL 
Employee/Women's leader) . 
... It can be small but people will appreciate it. They should speak and say sorry 
about the damages. The people will speak about the loved ones and they will 
invite the spirits to invite them back (BOU31, Women's leader). 
Regarding how reconciliation between Bougainvilleans and BCL could take place, it is 
best to think of reconciliation as an on-going process that involves 'shallow and weak' 
forms of restoration. For example, 'shallow reconciliation' between landowners and 
BCL has already started by way of invitations to Peter Taylor as Chairman of BCL to visit 
Bougainville for the first time since the closure of the mine. In addition, a delegation of 
senior Australian diplomats was recently allowed to see the mine site for the first time 
in two decades (Taylor & Garrett, 2011). For 'deep reconciliation' to occur, there is an 
expectation that current and former BCL executives should go to Bougainville to 
participate in, 11a meeting, then a ceremony" (BOU28, Bougainvillean ex-combatant). 
Traditionally, Bougainvillean peace ceremonies involve a feast during which "former 
adversaries may feast, drink, and dance together; chew betel nut together; and 
symbolically break spears and arrows" (Boege and Franks, 2011, p.38). While 
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Bougainvilleans recognise that, 11injustice is deep and it will not heal overnight" 
(BOU31, Bougainvillean women's leader}, there remains a strong faith in the customary 
reconciliation process to restore relationships and to, 11heal the pain" (BOU31, 
Bougainvillean women's leader). There is a strong sense of confidence that if BCL were 
to engage in the 'Bougainville way' of reconciliation, there would be a strong 
foundation for a new working relationship. As a Bougainvillean ex-BRA combatant 
stated, 11the ceremony will end everything. Then the mine can kick off" (BOU28}. 
Papua 
In comparison with Bougainville, reconciliation in Papua is at an early stage. Indeed it is 
not at a stage where the conflict itself has concluded. Serious problems continue to 
characterise Papua as a 'Land of Conflict', rather than the 'Land of Peace' to which 
many indigenous Papuans aspire. This is evident in the contemporary continuation of 
human rights abuses and inequalities discussed in chapters 5 to 11. These persistent 
problems pose significant challenges to the nascent initiatives to promote 
reconciliation that have emerged in Papua. 
The lack of momentum towards achieving reconciliation in Papua has become a 
defining feature of the conflict itself. As Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson and Dunn 
{2010, p.115) claim, "the Papua conflict is distinguished by how little determined local 
or international mediation and reconciliation has occurred" . Analysts such as Rees, 
Ondawame and King {2002, p.2) attribute the slow progress made on resolving the 
Papua conflict to a, "lack of political will to promote processes of reconciliation on the 
part of the many actors, both within Papuan civil society and in State authorities". One 
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problem associated with this lack of political will is that it sets up, "high expectations of 
an immediate outcome rather than seeing reconciliation as an ongoing process" (Rees, 
Ondawame & King, 2002, p.2). 
The difficulty of achieving momentum towards reconciliation in Papua is most evident 
in the relationship between indigenous Papuans and the Indonesian Government. One 
significant example is reflected in the divergent responses to the failure of the Special 
Autonomy Law 2001 (see Ch 7). While both Papuans and the Indonesian Government 
agree that the Special Autonomy Law has failed (Chauvel, 2011), there are disparate 
views as to why, and what an appropriate way forward might be. As Chauvel (2011) 
explains: 
... Papuan responses to the failure have been demands for a referendum or 
dialogue with Jakarta. The government, however, has preferred to see Papua's 
problems as ones of socio-economic backwardness, as well as corruption and 
poor governance. 
These conflicting views highlight the commitment that will be required to agree to 
work together on finding a solution to the Papua conflict. On the Papuan side, some 
proponents believe their only real chance to initiate peaceful dialogue with Jakarta will 
be to move away from the historical emphasis on a referendum for independence. 
Father Neles Tebay for instance, argues that, "Papuans need to make clear that the 
issue of Papuan independence will not be on the agenda" (2009, p.3) if they are to get 
Jakarta to agree to participate in dialogue on the Papua conflict. Tebay does not 
dismiss the importance of the rectification of history for indigenous Papuans, however 
he argues that developing trust between the two parties so that a long-term process of 
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reconciliation can take place is a higher priority. With this goal in mind, Tebay called for 
an 'internal dialogue' amongst indigenous Papuans to address questions such as; 
• What are the features of "Papua, Land of Peace"? 
• What are the problems that impede "Papua, Land of Peace"? 
• What are the causes of these problems? 
• What solutions are required to address these problems? 
• What solutions are required to address the root causes of these problems? 
• What policies must be taken to prevent these problems from occurring in the 
future? 
• What roles should be played and tasks undertaken by various parties 
(government and civil society) to bring about "Papua, Land of Peace"? (Tebay, 
2009, p.26). 
The current situation in Papua therefore, is one of developing a collective vision for the 
future. Due to the 'curses and opportunities' that characterise natural resource 
development in Papua, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to exploring the 
potential roles for Freeport and BP to support the emerging vision of 'Papua, Land of 
Peace' . 
Expectations of Freeport and BP 
The initial stages of reconciliation centre on the relationship between Papua and 
Jakarta, Papuans and the Indonesian military, as well as among Papuans caught on 
different sides of the conflict (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dunn, 2010, p.115) . 
In this context, reconciliation between indigenous Papuans and large natural resource 
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companies is not high on the agenda. 
Papuans would certainly welcome reconciliation with large natural resource 
companies, and Freeport in particular, however there are significant obstacles to 
achieving this in the absence of the resolution of fundamental issues with the 
Indonesian Government. This is due to the sensitivity of the Indonesian Government 
when it comes to foreign 'interference' in Indonesia's domestic affairs. As one Papuan 
activist stated: 
... it would be great if they [Freeport] apologised but I'm not sure if it will be 
done. Indonesia has a government and this government has sovereignty to the 
people. If Freeport apologises to the people ... it will make the Indonesian 
government very ashamed (Papua301 Papuan activist). 
What this statement demonstrates is that expectations for symbolic reparation from 
Freeport do exist in Papua. However as indigenous Papuans currently have the higher 
priority of dialogue with Jakarta; their expectations of Freeport and BP in 'Papua, Land 
of Peace' are less defined than those discussed in relation to the Bougainville case . As 
a result there is less detail in the Papua data for what might be expected of Freeport 
and BP in processes of reconciliation. Instead, the Papua data supports the criticism 
made by Rees, Ondawame and King that reconciliation in Papua currently emphasises 
immediate outcomes rather than long-term solutions. For example, according to my 
fieldwork observations, the two dominant expectations of Freeport are that the 
Grasberg mine be closed, and that an indigenous Papuan be made the President of 
Freeport, Indonesia. International law would hardly lend support to Papuan efforts to 
sustain such claims. A compromise extracted by strikes and roadblocks or as part of a 
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wider peace agreement might be more realistic. 
The expectation that a Papuan should be made the next President of Freeport is 
particularly strong in the mining town of Timika. This view is based on the belief that if 
a Papuan were made President of Freeport, the company would be in a better position 
to conduct mining in a way that would respect the rights of Papuans. As one Papuan 
NGO worker stated: 
... it must be clear within the corporation that the next President in Freeport is 
Papuan. We hope that this is the time to take our rights and also lead our 
corporation ... We believe that when a Papuan becomes head [President] - it 
will change. Right now, I'm under an Indonesian person. When it [the President] 
is a Papuan, it will be more safe and there will be more support for our 
[community development] programs (Papua33, Papuan NGO worker). 
A former Freeport employee responded to how credible an option this is for the 
company to consider: 
... yes, to an extent. But who should be promoted? I prefer educational programs 
that give better results ... But people are not patient enough to wait. They see 
the position as a political position, like a Bupati [regency head]. They say local 
people can be elected but they don 't see the [importance of] qualifications 
(Papua45}. 
Given Freeport has been comparatively slow to initiate indigenous training and 
affirmative action policies (see Ch 8 & 10), asking Papuans to be patient and wait for a 
Papuan qualified to take up the Presidential position is a big ask . On the Papuan side, a 
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demand that a Papuan be President of Freeport is not particularly strategic. A Papuan 
as CEO of the operating company in Papua will still have to answer to the CEO of the 
holding company and the Board at corporate headquarters in the United States. These 
real controllers could surround a 'Papuan President' with their men and their women 
and hold back bonuses if the President did not do their bidding. 
The second widely held Papuan view is that the solution to the problems associated 
with resource development is that, "all mines be closed" (ICG, 2011, p.3). While the ICG 
(2011, p.3), have criticised this suggestion as, "more focused on problems than 
solutions", McKenna and Braithwaite (2012) argue that openness to a resource 
exploitation pause is a credible option worth pursuing. While it is not in Papuan 
interests to blow up pylons to attack the Freeport mine, the authors argue that 
negotiations with Freeport and BP to adopt a policy of a resource exploitation pause 
could produce long-term solutions. The aim would be to shift the current relationship 
of 'win for the investor, lose for Papuans' to a win-win for Papuans and foreign 
investors. By leaving the resources in the ground for a period of time, they are likely to 
increase in value and create an opportunity for new environmental technologies to be 
developed to manage the catastrophic environmental impacts of mining, and 
simultaneously provide a powerful leverage for Papuans to lobby Jakarta for peaceful 
dialogue, as well as changes in the conduct of natural resource exploitation generally. 
Therefore, while ideas as to how Freeport and BP can become involved in promoting 
reconciliation in Papua are still evolving, there are credible options worth considering. 
The following section outlines an additional opportunity that has been opened for 
Freeport and BP to contribute to the promotion of reconciliation in Papua. This 
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opportunity emerged out of the 2011 Papua Peace Conference, which produced 44 
'indicators of Papua, Land of Peace' (see Appendix 4). It will be argued that these 
indicators have the potential to be used by Freeport and BP as a platform from which 
to construct a new, 'bottom-up approach' to CSR in Papua. 
The Papua Peace Conference 
In 2011 significant progress was made on, "unifying Papuan civil society and activist 
groups in the interest of resolving the multi-dimensional conflict" (ICG, 2011, p.2) . The 
Papua Peace Conference held in Jayapura, 5th-7th July 2011, marked this progress. 
Organised by the Papua Peace Network and chaired by Father Neles Tebay, the 
conference attracted over 500 participants (consisting of religious groups, customary 
groups, women, academics, students and resistance groups) who came together under 
the theme 'Let us together make Papua a Land of Peace'. 
As discussed earlier, a key objective for Papuans committed to initiating dialogue with 
Jakarta has been the achievement of internal dialogue amongst Papuans themselves. In 
this regard the conference was hailed a success by all participants (ICG, 2011, p.l). 
Significantly, participants at the conference included a representative of the 
Indonesian Government, the coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister, 
Djoko Suyanto . The conference thus exceeded expectations of fostering internal 
dialogue between Papuans, by also making an initial step towards dialogue with 
Jakarta . 
Two addit ional achievements marked the conclusion to the conference. Firstly, five 
Papuans (Rex Rumakiek, John Otto Ondawame, Benny Wenda, Octovianus Mote and 
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Leoni Tanggahma) were appointed to pursue formal negotiations with Jakarta. 
Secondly, a list of 44 'Indicators of Papua, Land of Peace' was developed. These 
indicators, drafted by the Papua Peace conference participants, emphasise the 
complex political, economic, environmental and socio-cultural injustices that lie at the 
heart of the Papuan conflict. However, the most important feature of the indicators is 
that they incorporate a vision of the resolution of these injustices. For example: 
... if one problem was exploitation of natural resources by various non-Papuan 
parties, one indicator of a peaceful Papua would be a thorough mapping of 
indigenous Papuan land, with customary rights legally recognised (ICG, 2011, 
p.2). 
The 44 indicators thus provide an important insight into how indigenous Papuans see 
their current circumstances, as well as a collective vision for how 'Papua, Land of 
Peace' could be achieved. 
The following section explains how and why Freeport and BP might use these 
indicators as a basis from which to design appropriate strategies to strengthen the 
Papua peace process. These indicators represent an important 'resource opportunity' 
for large natural resource companies (and Freeport in particular) to transform the 
negative association of resource development in the 'memory of suffering' in Papua 
(see Ch 5). 
From 'top-down' to 'bottom-up' CSR in Papua 
Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that Freeport has failed to capitalise on 
opportunities to respond to local grievances ;n a way that could contribute to peaceful 
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development in Papua . Although Freeport has made significant contributions towards 
community development (in the form of hospitals, schools, employment and 
infrastructure projects), the company has generally failed to resolve the underlying 
disputes related to its business activities in Papua. This is one consequence of 
Freeport's 'distributive' approach to CSR, in which the company has attempted to 
silence local and international critics through the dispersal of large amounts of money 
(see Ch 7). This method has been unsuccessful in promoting peace in Papua as 
expressions of 'Papua, Land of Peace' are characterised by claims not just for 
redistribution but also recognition. Similar to the Bougainville case therefore, Freeport 
and BP would do well to strike a balance between distributive justice and symbolic 
reparation through their commitments to CSR. 
By documenting a thorough record of the injustices which lie at the heart of the Papua 
conflict, the Papua Peace Conference has opened an important 'resource opportunity' 
for Freeport and BP. This opportunity lays in the potential for the '44 indicators' to 
form the basis of a new 'bottom-up' approach to peaceful development. While the 44 
indicators should be thought of as a 'work in progress', they do, "give tangible content 
to Papuan aspirations for freedom" {Macleod, 2011) and could provide a valuable 
springboard from which the resource companies might begin to reset their relationship 
with Papuans on a more peaceful, sustainable path . The indicators present Freeport 
and BP with a unique insight into the types of commitments they could make, which 
locals would deem meaningful and significant. 
The 44 indicators represent a valuable opportunity for Freeport and BP in particular as 
many of the indicators relate to the exploitation of Papua 's natural resources . For 
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example, one indicator that both companies are deeply connected to is, "management 
of natural resources is undertaken in a way that protects the environment, respects 
local wisdom and provides maximal benefits to indigenous Papuans" (ICG, 2011, p.19}. 
Similar to the trajectory of this thesis therefore, the indicators highlight the complex 
interdependencies of resource development with sources of injustice in the areas of 
politics, the economy, the environment, law and human rights. By revealing these 
interdependencies it becomes easier for all stakeholders to work together on 
developing strategies to counter these dynamics. 
A strategy that used the 44 indicators as a platform to strengthen Papuan peace 
processes could be promoted as 'bottom-up CSR', as it would be indigenous Papuans 
setting the CSR agenda. This method forms a stark contrast to the dominant 'top-down 
CSR' approach that treats indigenous peoples as passive recipients of better and worse 
CSR (McKenna & Braithwaite, 2012, p.334). As we have seen throughout this thesis, 
'top-down CSR' fails companies and communities, with millions of dollars spent on 
community development projects that do not achieve their aims. One benefit to using 
the indicators as a basis for peaceful development is that it sets a clearer agenda for 
the design of appropriate corporate-community initiatives. 
An additional advantage to drawing on the 44 indicators in a bottom-up approach to 
CSR is that they would make it easier to manage local expectations of the companies. 
This is because the 44 indicators make it possible for Freeport and BP to identify both 
'quick' and 'long-term' contributions they can make towards the promotion of peace 
building. This would be an attractive option for Freeport and BP as they might be able 
to develop small (i.e. less 'politically sensitive') contributions they can make towards 
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achieving these indicators, at the same time as demonstrating a commitment to work 
towards longer-term (i.e. 1politically sensitive') goals. For example, one 'quick-win' 
might be a contribution of the skills and resources needed for the mapping of 
customary land, while a 'long-term' win might be the involvement of indigenous 
Papuans in the re-writing of Freeport's 1967 contract with the Indonesian Government. 
The key point to highlight here is that it would be a long-term process, involving all 
stakeholders of the resource project, working together with the aim of achieving 
peaceful development. 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, effective CSR requires more than collaboration 
between a 'company' and 'society'. It would require, for example, security sector 
reform to achieve indicator no. 2, "there is no longer stigmatisation of indigenous 
Papuans as separatists or rebels" (ICG, 2011). We saw in Chapter 9 the reluctance of 
Freeport to engage with this issue due to national stories relating to state save reignty. 
Using this indicator as an example, Freeport could arrange a multi-stakeholder 
dialogue, involving the police and military, to work towards this goal. The positive 
characteristic of the 44 indicators is that they provide a company like Freeport an 
opportunity to work towards such a goal without giving an impression that it is 
attempting to override state sovereignty. In this way, adopting the 44 indicators would 
significantly challenge Freeport to take action on issues it has traditionally sought to 
avoid. 
There are, however, limitations to what Freeport and BP can ach ieve in the absence of 
a broader experience of merdeko driven by the state (see Ch 6) . Firms like Freeport and 
BP can contribute greatly to a fresh start to peace building in Papua . However without 
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an experience of merdeka, whether based on a referendum for independence, or a 
more meaningful sense of political freedom to what Papua was granted through 
Special Autonomy, no amount of Interdependent Engagement of Freeport and BP is 
likely to bring sustainable peace with justice. Nonetheless, the presence of 
multinational corporations like Freeport and BP could be conceptualised as a necessary 
condition for peace with justice. For example, Papuan leaders could initiate separate 
negotiations with Freeport and BP on how they could achieve the 44 indicators in the 
context of their resource projects. This type of negotiation could represent an 
important 'confidence-building' step toward a wider transformation toward peace with 
justice. 
Conclusion 
A detailed analysis of the roles that corporations have played in specific armed conflicts 
is the first step to implementing a conflict-sensitive business strategy. Through a 
discussion of the contemporary scenarios of resource development on Bougainville and 
Papua, it has been argued that BCL, Freeport and BP are faced with important 
opportunities to participate in reconciliation processes, and shift from a focus on 'top-
down' to 'bottom-up' CSR. 
For the Bougainville case, we saw the way landowners are engaging in a process of 
strategically considering the factors that contributed to significant social and 
environmental problems in the past. They are also contemplating how resource 
extraction projects might be undertaken in a way that avoids these problems in the 
future. This process represents a significant opportunity for BCL to support the 
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empowerment of locals to determine their own future . 
The 44 Papua Land of Peace indicators present a locally meaningful v1s1on for a 
peaceful resolution to the Papua conflict. A similarity for both cases therefore, is the 
need for an approach to CSR that draws on local voices for the design of appropriate 
community engagement initiatives. Although these processes differ according to local 
circumstances, a common theme is the need for a long-term commitment involving all 
the stakeholders working together with the aim of achieving peaceful development. 
The following chapter expands on the potential for the Interdependent Engagement 
approach to enable corporations to understand and transform the complexities 
associated with natural resource extraction in areas affected by conflict. 
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Chapter 13: Interdependent Engagement 
This thesis opened with a reflection by one Bougainvillean landowner on the 
interdependence between large natural resource companies and their local host 
communities: 
... In every organisation or company, the management should be connected 
with us. It took so many years to understand that. Nobody understood that at 
the time ... but they do now (BOU18}. 
The aim throughout this thesis has been to explore the possibilities that can emerge 
through engaging with this interdependence, rather than denying or suppressing it. 
Large natural resource companies have been closely involved with the histories of the 
Bougainville and Papua conflicts, yet the potential of this dynamic association to 
facilitate peace in these areas has been the subject of little analysis. This thesis begins 
to redress this lack through an empirical analysis of the crucial sites of 
interdependence between BCL, Freeport and BP with the grievances at the heart of the 
two conflicts. These sites of interdependence include: 
• historical injustice (Ch 5), 
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• the denial of customary land rights (Ch 6), 
• regional inequality and contests over resource wealth (Ch 7), 
• cultural, political and economic marginalisation (Ch 8), 
• human rights violations (Ch 9), 
• community disruption (Ch 10), 
• environmental damage {Ch 11), 
• aspirations to define the future (Ch 12). 
The case studies presented reveal the opportunities, complexities and constraints that 
large natural resource companies must confront if they are to take seriously their social 
and environmental responsibilities. By confronting these complexities, large natural 
resource companies might become a powerful conduit for a more socially and 
environmentally responsive global economy. 
Summary 
The development of the arguments presented in this study emerged iteratively in a 
number of phases. The start of the analysis focused on the question of whether there 
is a role for large natural resource companies in the promotion of peace building in 
their local host communities. While it has been argued that there is a clear role for the 
private sector in peace build ing, this is not a task that large natural resource 
companies are inclined to overtly embrace. 
This finding emerged through interviews with corporate executives of large natural 
resource companies at their home country headquarters. The dominant theme from 
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the data collection was that large natural resource companies are unlikely to 
contribute to anything called 'peace building', but they might make contributions to 
peaceful development through existing CSR frameworks. The main reasons given for 
this position include the assertion that corporations lack peace building expertise and 
that this work should be left to other organisations that do have relevant expertise 
(such as the UN}. 
'Peace building' is also considered to be too politically sensitive for corporations to 
actively pursue and beyond the scope of the responsibilities of business. Having said 
this, most companies do recognise that it is in their reputational and business interest 
to pursue resource development in ways that minimise the likelihood of armed 
conflict. Consequently, corporate executives do see a role for business in pursuing 
peaceful development, but the most likely vehicle for this is through the paradigm of 
CSR, rather than 'peace building'. This finding is an important distinction because it 
indicates that it would be more achievable to make the existing practice of CSR more 
conducive to peace, rather than generate new roles for business that are less likely to 
be adopted. 
The result of the initial phase of the project prompted an investigation into the 
effectiveness of current CSR strategies to respond to local grievances associated with 
resource development in two conflict affected societies: Bougainville and Papua. An 
examination of the existing literature on the two conflicts illustrated some of the ways 
in which BCL, Freeport and BP have been implicated in the justice claims of a large 
proportion of Bougainvilleans and Papuans. These claims relate to colonisation and 
decolonisation processes; political grievances against the national government; the 
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creation of new divisions and unities; community disruption; and environmental 
damage. 
Having established some of the intersections between the three companies and the 
characteristics of the two conflicts, the common themes between the companies' CSR 
programs and policies were compiled. The data showed that generally speaking, the 
CSR practices and policies of the case study companies did not align with the 
grievances and root causes of the conflicts in Bougainville and Papua identified in the 
data. The strongest areas of engagement between company and local interests were 
infrastructure, education and health care, while the strongest area of disengagement 
was with community grievances over the distribution of resource wealth, historical 
injustices and environmental damage. Observing the discrepancies between the two in 
this way, enabled an initial conceptualisation of CSR as based primarily on a 
distributive justice framework. This analysis provided an empirical lead into the 
hypothesis that CSR could have the potential to assist corporations to facilitate 
peaceful development in Bougainville and Papua if it were designed to engage with the 
interdependencies of resource development with the root causes of conflict. In other 
words, if companies were able to anticipate the ways in which they might aggravate 
armed conflict, they might also be in a better position to implement strategies that 
counter these dynamics. A draft framework of Interdependent Engagement was then 
developed in an attempt to illustrate how CSR might be reconfigured to address the 
discrepancy between CSR and the grievances at the heart of the two conflicts. 
The next phases of the project involve d two fieldwork trips to PNG and Indonesia 
respectively . This fieldwork deepened my understanding of the discrepancy between 
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local expectations and large natural resource companies in the CSR context. Interviews 
with a variety of stakeholders ranging from corporate executives to indigenous 
landowners confirmed the earlier observation that despite a commitment to CSR, BCL, 
Freeport and BP failed to resolve local concerns related to resource development. 
This finding prompted a reflection on how CSR might be designed to avoid the social 
conflict that is often associated with natural resource exploitation. Based on the 
preceding phases of data and using existing case study literature as a source of 
triangulation, eight sites of interdependence between the case study companies and 
the two conflicts were identified. These sites of interdependence then formed the 
basis for the development of a new model of CSR, Interdependent Engagement. This 
reformulated model of CSR has been designed to assist corporations to not just avoid 
conflict, but also become active facilitators of peaceful development. The following 
section explains the limitations of CSR as it currently exists amongst major natural 
resource companies. The theory and practice of the reformulated model of CSR, 
Interdependent Engagement, is then outlined. 
Limitations of 'traditional' CSR 
Drawing on the theoretical insights of Latour, Fraser and a variety of analysts of CSR, it 
appears from this research that four limitations of CSR as implemented by the case 
study companies can be identified: 
• The emphasis on pledges over institutional change; 
• Responsiveness to host states to the exclusion of local communities; 
• Failure to incorporate alternative visions of justice into the design of 
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voluntary social and environmental initiatives, and 
• The implementation of one-size-fits-all solutions to complex social and 
environmental problems 
1} The emphasis on pledges over institutional change 
Based on the findings of this research, the most important limitation of CSR as it 
currently exists amongst major resource companies is the emphasis on pledges over 
institutional change. In other words CSR has been helpful for facilitating corporate 
contributions to community development, but it appears from the case studies 
examined in this study to have limited capacity to transform the business practices and 
policies that are harmful to local societies and ecologies. Chapter 3 identified this as 
one consequence of the fact that corporations have tended to underestimate the 
importance or potential of the 'social' in CSR. As Latour (2005, p.1) argues, "problems 
arise ... when 'social' begins to mean a type of material, as if the adjective was roughly 
comparable to other terms like 'wooden', 'steely', 'biological', 'economica I', 'menta I', 
'organizational', or 'linguistic"'. Conceptualising the social as an object or fixed domain 
is unhelpful as it renders invisible the complex range of actors and institutions that 
influence, and are influenced by, the presence and activities of large corporations . 
One consequence of an over-sim pl ifie d notion of the social is that it implies 
corporations can operate somewhere above society in order to then contribute to 'it'. 
This view presents corporations as 'neutral outsiders' of armed conflicts, rather than 
players who can be at times deeply implicated with their underlying causes. 
Consequently, corporations do not change business practices, policies and 
relationships that are harmful to local communities and interests. Instead, 
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corporations privilege the distribution of material benefits such as compensation, 
royalties and trust funds. Drawing on the work of Fraser, it has been argued that 
corporations might do well to balance the distribution of material benefits with 
simultaneous efforts towards the, "recognition of people's standing as full partners in 
social interaction, able to participate as peers with others in social life" (Fraser, Dahl, 
Stoltz & Willig, 2004, p.377). 
A focus on the distribution of material benefits, rather than claims for recognition has 
been a rational response by business as these kinds of contributions are relatively easy 
to document in company reports and websites. It is also possible to calculate how big 
the discount of profits will be from making the material gesture, decide that profits are 
still healthy after the payout and then write a cheque. In contrast, it is more difficult to 
document efforts towards the protection of indigenous rights and cultural traditions, 
through, for example, recognising the role of resource development in historical 
injustices, or the facilitation of regional inequality. While certainly more difficult, the 
ability to engage with these more complex issues has the potential to deliver much 
greater benefits for both corporations and communities in terms of minimising the 
likelihood of violent conflict that may lead to the disruption or total closure of resource 
projects. 
Distinguished scholars of CSR such as Porter and Kramer {2006) have previously 
highlighted the interrelationship between business and society. However by focusing 
on this interaction, Porter and Kramer and have framed their analysis according to the 
profit motive or 'competitive advantage' of firms. This study, in contrast, has been 
framed according to the justice or peace building potential of engaging with 
359 
,, 
interdependence. While the lack of engagement with the profit motive of firms in this 
study might be considered to limit the practicality of the Interdependent Engagement 
model, the prevalence of armed conflict associated with natural resources suggests a 
need for alternative frameworks. The challenge remains to devise a framework that is 
likely to be adopted by corporations, yet initiates the reform required to facilitate 
peace. 
2) Framing error of CSR: corporations are primarily responsive to 
host states to the exclusion of local communities affected by the 
resource project 
Structuring CSR according to the values and interests of corporations has created what 
is referred to in this study as the 'framing error' of CSR. This error has traditionally 
resulted in the establishment of host governments as the primary audience, to the 
exclusion of local communities affected by the resource project. Structuring CSR 
primarily in negotiation with the host state oversimplifies the complex relationships 
and agendas that are assembled alongside the development of a resource project. As 
Latour argues society is, "not a homogenous thing but a trail of associations between 
heterogeneous elements" (Latour, 2005, p.5) . The unawareness of this heterogeneity 
is reflected in BCL, Freeport and BP's responsiveness to the terms of access to land 
stipulated by the governments of PNG and Indonesia, and the sidelining of customary 
landowners. Chapter 6 argued that this approach is problematic because indigenous 
landowners often hold different legal, cultural, economic and political agendas to that 
of the nat ion state . Consequently, CSR as designed in the boardrooms of transnational 
corporations and international financial institutions has not translated into justice at 
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the local level (Merry, 2006). 
A movement towards a politics of recognition that aims to revalue, /{unjustly devalued 
identities" (Fraser, 1996, p.6) is one possibility for addressing this issue. The risk of 
such an approach however, is that it will essentialise group difference. As such, 
corporations seeking to pursue recognition as part of CSR will need to engage carefully, 
and in an ongoing manner, to maintain a balance between recognition of difference 
and a common or shared language of equity and justice. 
Merry {2009, p.297) discusses the tension between recognition of difference and 
status equality in relation to human rights reform. In this context, blending 
international standards completely with the social world includes a risk of losing the 
radical possibilities that might follow from a mutual engagement of transnational 
reformers and local communities. It would not be desirable for- the elements of human 
rights ideas to be completely absorbed by local customs, or vice versa. A better 
aspiration is for each to be used to strengthen the capacity of the other to achieve 
sustainable peace and, especially, for indigenous wisdom to enrich Western practice 
rather than just the more empirically common influence (according to Merry) in the 
other direction. 
3) CSR has not empowered alternative visions of justice into the 
design of voluntary social and environmental initiatives. 
Acknowledging the importance of a balanced approach, it has been argued that one 
limitation of existing approaches to CSR is that they have not empowered alternative 
visions of justice into the design of voluntary corporate social and environmental 
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initiatives. In Latour's words, corporations have failed to, '"follow the actors 
themselves' ... to try to catch up with their own wild innovations in order to learn from 
them what the existence has become in their hands ... " (Latour, 2005, p.12) . An 
approach to CSR that enables strong local participation is desirable, however there are 
practical challenges associated with structuring CSR regulation to accommodate the 
diverse stakeholders of resource development projects. 
At the international level, reformers must adhere to standards that apply to all 
societies to gain legitimacy (Merry 2006, p.3). Moreover if corporations base their 
community engagement entirely on local terms, there is a risk of jeopardising 
previously hard won agreements around human rights, such as international labour 
standards (Haines, 2005, p.22). In the worst case, a local indigenous leader might 
realise that if he leads his people to demand (through Interdependent Engagement) 
less than is their international right, he might be paid off with a comfortable salary. 
At the local level there are difficulties in determining who in the community wields the 
power to interpret what is needed (Fraser, Dahl, Stoltz & Willig 2004, p.375) . On the 
other hand, an argument in favour of the 'unique contribution of place' (Haines, 2005, 
p.23) is that cultural flows are not even (Merry, 2006). The cases of Bouga inville and 
Papua highlight the limitations of universal approaches. An over-em phas is on local 
engagement in CSR thus raises potent ial risks in terms of essentialising group 
differences and sidelining pre-existing global initiatives. However a framework that 
balances local and global regulation, and which opens up spaces of dialogue between 
the two might make a useful contribution by facilitating the injection of local and/or 
alternative visions of social justice into global circuits {Merry, 2006). 
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4} One-size-fits-all solutions to complex social and environmental 
problems 
Chapter 10 argued that an error made by companies is that instead of engaging with 
alternative visions of justice, they believe they can take the advice of the best experts 
(such as consultants and anthropologists} in order to predict the social and 
environmental consequences of resource development. They then seek to implement 
static 'one-size-fits-all' (Newell, 2005, p.556) measures to counter those impacts. As 
pointed out in Chapter 8 it is unrealistic to expect any 'experts' to act as social 
clairvoyants to draw on past experiences to accurately predict what will occur in 
radically different circumstances. The case studies presented in this thesis reveal that 
blanket universal approaches to CSR are both less likely to recognise local grievances 
and more likely to produce negative or unintended consequences. Chapter 12 
characterised the 'one-size-fits-all' approach as 'top-down' CSR in which indigenous 
communities are dealt with by corporations as recipients of either better or worse 
development initiatives (McKenna & Braithwaite, 2012, p.334}, rather than facilitating 
local voices into the design of CSR. In Fraser's (1996, p.30} terms, corporations have 
failed to achieve 'participatory parity', defined as the, "social arrangements that 
permit all (adult} members of society to interact with one another as peers". 
Interdependent Engagement theory 
In an effort to mitigate some of the risks and limitations of CSR as it is currently exists 
among the case study companies, a new framework for the design of CSR in areas 
affected by conflict was advanced: Interdependent Engagement. In this section, the 
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theoretical-modelling of Interdependent Engagement is discussed. This discussion will 
then be followed by an outline of issues relating to the implementation and 
assessment of the model. 
Interdependent Engagement has been developed inductively through a comparative 
case study method. In line with the preliminary finding that companies are wary of 
adopting new 'peace building' roles, Interdependent Engagement has been designed 
to enable companies and communities to use CSR in a way that may have the potential 
to contribute to peaceful development. 
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the work of Fraser and Latour in 
constructing the Interdependent Engagement model. The vertical axis represents 
Fraser's 'dual theory of justice' with recognition at one end of the spectrum and 
distribution at the other. The horizontal axis represents Latour's critique of the use of 
the term 'the social'. The far left of the 'social' axis indicates a concept of CSR in which 
corporations are thought to be separate or external to the social world in which they 
operate. Movement to the right of the horizontal axis indicates an increasing level of 
engagement with the social, or deeper understanding of corporate activity as 
fundamentally embedded in the social world . 
Interdependent Engagement sits on the far end of the social axis, and aims to strike a 
balance between distribution and recognition in a way that might maximise the 
potential for peace . The dotted line indicates that the required balance between 
distribut ion and recognition is likely to be different in every situation and may change 
over time. It is expected that the opt imal balance between distribution and recognition 
is one that alters depend ing on the primary concerns of local affected communities. It 
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is also likely that this balance will need to be revisited at various points during the 
course of the resource project to respond to changes in local priorities and other 
external pressures, such as changes in national and global economies. 
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My analysis has led me to conclude that the logic of the Interdependent Engagement 
Framework is based on the following principles: 
• The mutual dependence of all stakeholders (state, company, locals, military, 
shareholders) involved in resource development 
In Chapter 3 we saw that scholars such as Watts {2004, p.53} have highlighted the 
normative categories that can be disrupted through natural resource development, 
such as chieftainship, the space of indigeneity and the nation. Interdependent 
Engagement builds on this understanding by creating a method that enables 
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corporations to identify the ways in which they disrupt local spaces and to consider 
how they might amend their business practices to promote peace. Interdependent 
Engagement has this potential as it highlights the complex, and sometimes conflicting 
stakeholder relationships that assemble alongside resource projects. Through engaging 
with this complexity, corporations are in a better position to identify the opportunities 
and constraints facing them as they seek to pursue business development in a manner 
that safeguards the wellbeing of the communities and environments in which they 
operate. 
• Reflexivity on the consequences of actions 
The Interdependent Engagement Framework encourages corporations to critically 
reflect on their business practices and the detrimental consequences they have on 
local communities and environments. This involves not just a consideration of the 
complexity of the situation, but an active engagement with how corporate actions 
might facilitate or mitigate the structural injustices that lead to conflict. Moreover, a 
company with a commitment to Interdependent Engagement would accept the role 
that resource development can play in either the exacerbation or peaceful resolution 
of conflict. 
The principle of reflexivity however points to a limitation of the Interdependent 
Engagement model. That is, Interdependent Engagement as it currently stands does 
not engage with issues of enforcement or compliance. As discussed in Chapter 2, a 
limitation of the data collected for this study is the lack of interviews with members of 
regulatory agencies in PNG and Indonesia. Nor does it reflect the views of the financial 
lenders of the resource projects who are increasingly taking on the role of regulating 
the social and environmental impacts of resource development. 
The initial phase of research revealed the fact that corporations are unlikely to adopt 
the 'peace building' mantle. Whether they would be inclined to take on the 
Interdependent Engagement model under their CSR wing remains untested. As such, 
analysis of why Interdependent Engagement may or may not be adopted by 
corporations and what may make the model effective in a given economic and political 
context (Haines, 2005, p.8} is somewhat speculative at this stage. Yet the analysis is at 
least motivated by sensitivity to this warning from the work of Haines. Indeed it was 
this sensitivity that led to the abandonment of the initial peace building model. For 
future research, an engagement with regulatory agencies at international, provincial 
and local levels would elucidate a more nuanced analysis of the challenges associated 
with the implementation, enforcement and compliance to the model. 
• Engagement with local ontologies and the interests of others 
As discussed earlier, corporate engagement with local ontologies requires corporations 
to correct the 'framing error' of CSR by establishing local communities as active 
participants in the resource project, not just the host government. By implementing an 
Interdependent Engagement approach to CSR, corporations would commit to 
collaborate with locals on the development of a mutually beneficial resource project. 
This commitment triggers a process of engagement in which corporations and local 
communities can participate in two-way learning about the protection of society and 
the environment. The benefit of this approach is that it opens up new possibilities for 
Western business practices to be informed, indeed transformed by local wisdom, 
spirituality, reconciliation and cultural values. 
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• Flexibility through constant and on-going responsiveness to situations which 
change regularly 
The achievement of mutual engagement necessitates the development of flexible 
business strategies that respond to social and environmental problems throughout the 
life of a resource project. Moreover, the Interdependent Engagement approach 
recognises that societies are undergoing continuous processes of change. Put 
differently, the social environment in which resource development occurs is not a 
temporal vacuum. To be effective CSR must be designed to respond to the dynamic 
nature of the social, political, economic and environmental circumstances in which 
they operate. This includes a commitment to empower locals to determine their own 
future vis-a-vis the economic benefits that emerge through resource development. 
One element of the principle of reflexivity involves a commitment to regularly re-
evaluate CSR projects in order to guarantee their on-going relevance and effectiveness. 
It is possible that an initiative agreed by all stakeholders as appropriate at the start of a 
resource project may need to be adjusted or even abandoned if it does not achieve its 
intended outcomes, is found to have harmful effects or is no longer considered a 
priority. The need to respond to chang ing circumstances is represented graphically by 
the dotted lines in the theoretical d iagram of Interdependent Engagement that 
indicate the potential for movement {Figure 7) . 
Interdependent Engagement in practice 
In contrast to the CSR programs implemented by BCL, Freeport and BP, 
Interdependent Engagement may have the potential to translate global business 
regulation in to local justice. This potential is linked to the facilitation of institutional 
change through engagement with local particularities . In other words, Interdependent 
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Engagement is social self-regulation as opposed to asocial self-regulation. By 
recognising the mutuality that exists between large natural resource companies and 
the societies in which they operate, corporations might develop the capacity to move 
beyond pure self-interest and engage with the consequences of their business 
activities on locals. 
By engaging with the consequences of business activity on locals, corporations 
generate a greater capacity to reflect on how they can amend their practices and 
relationships in ways that protect the well being of society and the environment. In 
doing so, corporations have an important responsibility to ensure that the rights of 
local communities are not unjustly compromised by the corporation's profit motive, its 
reputation management and/or the state's need to achieve national economic 
development. 
Interdependent Engagement is proposed as an ethical framework for how to engage 
with complex issues in difficult circumstances. It appears from this research that a 
contrasting limitation of CSR as pursued by the case study companies is that it 
narrowly emphasises distributive justice or the achievement of affirmative action 
goals. In Chapter 10 for example, we saw the ineffectiveness of Freeport's focus on 
employment targets for the long-term training and job satisfaction of indigenous 
Papuans. Moreover, Interdependent Engagement may potentially offer a pathway for 
proactive engagement and not just the avoidance of harm or 'business as usual' . As 
shown in Table 7, the framework sets out a positive formulation for what companies 
can work towards rather than simply a list of 'do nots'. However further testing of the 
the reconfigured version of CSR against other case study examples should also be 
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conducted to assess its efficacy. 
Table 7 - Interdependent Engagement Framework 
Interdependent Engagement Framework 
Disengaged Engaged 
Site of interdependence 
(CSR as it mostly is) ( CSR reconfigured) 
Corporations side-step the ir Corporations acknowledge local 
Historical injustice entanglement with colonisation and colonial legacies and the company's 
decolonisation involvement in them 
Corporations draw on State law (or Corporations open pathways to 
Denial of customary land national stories) to delegitimise 
challenge state law ( or national 
rights local grievances and facilitate 
stories) and reg ional inequal ity 
regional inequality 
Corporations treat local 
Corporations acknowledge diversity 
in the ways local commun ities are 
Regional inequality & communities as an homogenous 
affected by resource development, 
contests over resource entity and are not conscious of the but are conscious of the dangers in 
wealth problems associated with different 
creating hierarchies of 
levels of compensation 
compensat ion 
Cultural, political & Corporations don't recognise local 
Corporations recognise local 
grievances and open long-term 
economic grievances and deny most local dialogue w ith different segments of 
marginalisation people the opportun ity to negotiate the community 
Corporations recognise the 
Corporations don't acknowledge hostilities and fears that local 
Human rights violations the tensions between loca l comm unities have of national 
commun it ies and official authorities authorities and seek to open new 
spaces of security 
Corporations maintain social Corporations seek to alleviate new 
Community disruption disruption and do not contribute to social problems through commun ity 
community development development 
Environmental impact assessments Environmental impact assessments 
Environmental damage are 
conducted w ith no loca l are conducted w ith loca l 
participation and opportun it ies to part icipation and opportun it ies to 
contest the results are repressed contest the resu lts are provided . 
Aspirations to define the Corporations make no att
empt to Corporations nurture reconcili at ion 
hea l symbo li ca ll y injustices re lated future based on loca l customs 
to resource development 
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The first component of the Interdependent Engagement Framework is historical 
injustice. Chapter 5 argued that an acknowledgement of the intertwining of resource 
companies with the local historical narratives of host societies is the starting point for 
authentic community engagement. This is because Bougainvilleans and Papuans have 
perceived BCL and Freeport as the providers of the financial capacity that has ensnared 
them in the nation states of PNG and Indonesia respectively. Consequently, BCL and 
Freeport have become implicated in highly emotive political contests for self-
determination. Despite this connection, it was argued that current and former 
executives of BCL and Freeport remain unwilling to acknowledge their involvement in 
broader colonial structures and processes. Rather, the companies have approached 
the local community according to a distributive justice framework (which in practice 
has sometimes been a distributive injustice project). Through these projects they have 
sought to establish a harmonious relationship with local communities by distributing 
material benefits. To resolve their complicity in historical injustices, corporations need 
to widen their focus to include symbolic recognition through, for example, rewriting 
the original legal agreements between states and companies to recognise the 
customary land rights of landowning communities, or participating in local 
reconciliation processes. 
The second component of the Interdependent Engagement model is customary 
landownership. As discussed earlier, recognition of the interests of locals does not 
generally occur, as there is/has been a framing error in the corporate-community 
relations strategies deployed by large natural resource companies in Bougainville and 
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Papua. The problem with this approach is that local indigenous populations often 
perceive the state as the main perpetrators of the injustices that give rise to armed 
conflict. Resource companies need to widen their responsiveness to the nation -state in 
order to incorporate the interests of locals. Interdependent Engagement has this 
potential as it can be used to add checks and balances to domestic law. This could be 
achieved by maintaining pressure on corporations to engage with the grievances of 
locals in anticipation of the fact that states' interests in generating natural resource 
wealth for national development can unjustly compromise local interests. 
A limitation of focusing on the empowerment of landowners however, is that it risks 
giving excessive windfalls to local landowners that are beyond their 'absorptive 
capacity' (Collier, 1999), while people in other parts of the country go without much 
needed resources. An emphasis on giving power to local landowners thus risks 
silencing other voices. This risk is reflected in the absence of perspectives in this thesis 
on the views of those from other geographical parts of PNG and Indonesian society 
about how the revenue derived from natural resource development should be shared . 
Interdependent Engagement does not provide an answer to the question of 'how 
much is too much for landowners?' Related to the risk identified earlier of 
essentialising group differences, focusing exclusively on the financial interests of 
landowners may jeopardise the needs of peoples from other parts of the country, such 
as uneducated children in remote villages in the PNG Highlands who might be 
considered to hold a just claim to have a school built by taxes from resource projects in 
other parts of the country . While Interdependent Engagement does not solve this 
problem, it has the potential to facilitate a balanced debate in which all of these voices 
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are heard. The purpose of such a debate would not be to satisfy one group at the 
expense of another, but to collaboratively define the conditions conducive to peace 
and equity. 
One benefit of an emphasis on affording landowners of mined land recognition and 
environmental protection is that it might result in an increased willingness to share 
wealth created by resource extraction projects for the benefit of other parts of society. 
This will be a key issue for stakeholders involved in the potential re-opening of the 
Bougainville copper mine (see Ch 12). Bougainvilleans outside of BCL's mining lease 
areas will likely claim compensation from BCL because like the Panguna landowners, 
they suffered from the conflict. Another set of demands is likely to come from PNG 
Highlanders who lost their sons and daughters to a war they did not choose, dying 
when they were ordered to protect one group of Bougainvilleans (BRA) from another 
(the Resistance). There might also be demands from the Chinese expatriate 
community on Bougainville whose homes, land and businesses have been permanently 
appropriated as a result of the war. There are clearly no simple solutions. Even so, the 
Interdependent Engagement model might enable voices from many quarters to 
participate in a conversation about sharing along multiple identities - local, provincial 
and national (see Ch 7). 
The third component of the Interdependent Engagement model is regional inequality 
and contests over resource wealth. A theme in the data collected for this study has 
been the inequitable distribution of resource wealth in favour of the central 
governments of PNG and Indonesia, rather than the resource producing regions of 
Bougainville and Papua. While recognising the importance of achieving an equitable 
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distribution of resource wealth, giving locals a greater share of this wealth that all 
stakeholders come to accept through dialogue as just is not sufficient to avoid conflict. 
Rather, the potential to avoid conflict is contingent on how this wealth is distributed; 
as well as an engagement with how these resources can distort local relationships. The 
economic wealth produced through resource development has a tendency to produce 
conflict when it alters local connections. This is a curse of resources being used to 
divide rather than strengthen local relationships. Therefore, a key component of 
Interdependent Engagement is an ongoing responsiveness to the changes that occur in 
relationships at the national, provincial and local levels. 
The fourth component of the Interdependent Engagement model is cultural, political 
and economic marginalisation, discussed in Chapter 8. It was argued that BCL, Freeport 
and BP have not succeeded in opening long-term dialogue with all stakeholders of 
their resource projects. This is one consequence of the 'framing error' of BCL, Freeport 
and BP's CSR strategies, in which large natural resource companies often initiate 
dialogue with the state rather than the local community. This exclusion aggravates 
broader grievances relating to cultural, political and economic marginalisation . In the 
Interdependent Engagement Framework, preventive peace dialogue on the social, 
political, economic and environmental terms of access to land takes place through on -
going and collaborative negotiations between all stakeholders of the resource project. 
The fifth component of the Interdependent Engagement model is human rights 
violations. In the case studies presented in this thesis it was clear that BCL and 
Freeport have failed in different ways to recognise local fears about, and hostilities 
towards, the state 's security apparatus. In contrast, it was argued that BP's 
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Community Based Security Strategy has demonstrated an awareness of the 
apprehension that many Papuans hold towards the Indonesian security forces. BP's 
community model was made possible through the company's willingness to consider 
alternative models of resource security, as well as a level of ambivalence towards 
stories of Indonesian state sovereignty. One indicator that BP has made progress in 
this area has been the absence of reports of human rights violations in the area of the 
Tangguh project to the Indonesian Commission for Human Rights. While it is still early 
in the life of this project, the BP experience demonstrates what can be achieved when 
corporations think creatively about security arrangements in ways that minimise the 
risk of human rights violations. 
The sixth component of Interdependent Engagement is community disruption. In 
Chapter 10, the limited capacity of natural resource companies to predict the social 
impacts that resource development will have on a local community was highlighted. 
This was reflected in the cases of Bougainville and Papua where BCL, Freeport and BP's 
resource projects created a number of social problems that were either not 
anticipated during the initial stages of the resource projects, or the companies were 
unwilling to engage with because of the way they saw their own business interest. As a 
consequence, the con1panies have implemented misguided community development 
projects that have either failed to resolve these social problems, or led to the creation 
of new local conflicts. Such a result can potentially be avoided by developing flexible 
and context-specific projects that respond to problems as they emerge, rather than 
static solutions based on a company's or consultants' past experiences in radically 
different circumstances. This flexibility might also enable corporations to develop the 
capacity to use local grievances as the basis from which to implement more 
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meaningful community development projects . 
The seventh component of the Interdependent Engagement model is environmental 
damage. In Chapter 11 it was argued that the adoption of the sustainable development 
discourse by the natural resource sector has not led to greater local participation in 
decisions relating to the environment. In the cases of Bougainville and Papua, this is 
reflected in the exclusion of indigenous landowners in environmental impact 
assessments and surveys. Consequently, decisions relating to environmental 
management have been made by actors and institutions, which do not share the same 
spiritual attachments to land. The environmental damage caused by natural resource 
development has a tendency to provoke conflict flash points, as it triggers strong 
feelings of injustice relating to cultural recognition and the denial of local wisdom. It 
was suggested that by engaging more sincerely with indigenous peoples, resource 
companies could learn more meaningful, less Western and more spiritually engaged 
forms of ecological interdependence. Interdependent Engagement therefore, 1s 
interdependence with both local social dialogues and environmental ecologies. 
The eighth component of the Interdependent Engagement model is aspirations to 
define the future. Participation in the promotion of local reconciliation processes is the 
greatest opportunity that natural resource companies have to empower locals to 
determine their own future. While there are important differences between 
Bougainville and Papua in regard to the expected roles that companies should play in 
reconciliation processes, both cases emphasise the need to work towards mutually 
beneficial economic development. For this to be successful all stakeholders need to 
take active responsibility for the resource project, including the local community. 
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The benefit of Interdependent Engagement more broadly 
Interdependent Engagement can be charachterised as a new method and a new 
definition of Corporate Social Responsibility. It is a process that might encourage 
corporations to be more responsive to the consequences of business activity on the 
societies in which they operate. The Interdependent Engagement Framework 
therefore, aims to prompt more effective forms of CSR through place-oriented 
approaches that acknowledge the primacy of local empowerment, and the importance 
of all stakeholders working together towards shared goals. 
The logic of Interdependent Engagement is not limited to specific locations (in this case 
Bougainville and Papua), or to CSR more generally. The principles of Interdependent 
Engagement: mutuality, reflexivity, engagement and flexibility are general qualities 
worth considering in other endeavours that aim to achieve ~conomic development 
while protecting the wellbeing of minority groups and environmental sustainability. 
The peaceful development of natural resources requires the development of new 
approaches to CSR that are responsive to bottom-up justice claims. Through engaging 
with the interdependencies of business activities with the root causes of conflict, it has 
been argued that Interdependent Engagement is one way this could be achieved. 
Empowering those who suffer disproportionately from natural resource development 
is an important step in recognising the struggle of indigenous peoples for recognition. 
This is a struggle for identity, to be taken seriously, to share alternative versions of 
history and for these histories to be acknowledged. Interdependent Engagement could 
be a powerful vehicle to facilitate this recognition. 
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It is important to note however, that the Interdependent Engagement model has 
developed out of an analysis of three specific companies operating in two resource 
conflicts located in Melanesia. It is likely that the model would benefit from further 
development by considering its application to other natural resource companies 
operating in other conflict affected societies and in different cultural contexts. 
Interdependent Engagement would also be strengthened by broader stakeholder 
consultation processes so that key components of the model can be refined in 
collaboration with corporate executives, state officials and landowning communities . 
This brings us back to the quote from the opening of the thesis: 
... In every organisation or company, the management should be connected with 
us. It took so many years to understand that. Nobody understood that at the 
time ... but they do now (BOU18, Landowner Group Chairman). 
The goals of Interdependent Engagement link with broader aspirations for a global 
economy that is more connected with the impacts of development practices on 
individuals, societies and environments. This involves an understanding of the delicate 
balance on which life depends and requires, "an extension of constructs of self-interest 
in which the needs of others begin to emerge as covalent with one 's own" (Macy, 
1991, p.194) . This aspiration connects with Escobar's (1995} search for alternatives to 
development, or development alternatives. The Interdependent Engagement 
Framework opens a space for the destabil isation of dom inant modes of knowing, by 
facilitating opportunities to engage with the ways of knowing of others . As Escobar 
(1995, p.225 } argues, " the greatest political promise of minority cultures is their 
potent ial for resisting and subverting the axiomatics of capitalism and modernity in 
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their hegemonic form". In this way, Interdependent Engagement is not a 'development 
alternative' per se, but it may represent a shift in the processes of development, which 
may lead to the emergence of alternatives. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Sample interview questions with CSR executives 
• What is your job in the company? 
• What does it mean for a company like yours to be socially responsible? What 
are some of the main issues for your company? 
• I'm interested in armed conflict and the contributions companies can 
sometimes make to peace or war. What are the social responsibilities of 
business in communities where there are armed conflicts? Are there 
particular issues you can think of that might impact your company's ability to 
be socially responsible in a conflict area? 
• What is the thing you are most proud of about the way your company has 
operated in Burma/Bougainville/Papua? 
• On the negative side, anything the company has regrets about in the way 
things have worked out in its Burma/Bougainville/Papua? 
• What are some of the ways in which your company has responded to being 
caught up in a conflict environment? Do you consider this to be a 'positive' 
response? Or in hindsight, have you thought about how you could have done 
things better? 
• Corporations are most often viewed as a negative actor in a conflict scenario, 
what is your view on this? 
• What would motivate your company to contribute to peace building? What 
would be the most pract ical yet benefic ial way for your company to 
contribute to the objective of peace? 
6 
• What are the key relationships that result in a company's activities either 
having a positive or negative impact on conflict dynamics? 
• Do you foresee any harmful side effects of companies like yours engaging 
with community development in Burma/Bougainville/Papua? 
• One of the things that excites me about my research is that I might find new 
ways that corporations can help build peace. Do you have any ideas on 
special ways or new ways that business can be a contributor to peace 
building? 
• Any lessons you draw from that on how to make CSR a better force for good? 
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Appendix 2: Sample interview questions for former and current 
employees of BCL. 
• What is your job in the company? 
• Your company found itself in a secessionist conflict. How did you manage th is 
when it came up? 
• What forms of security were used to protect the mine before the conflict 
began? 
• Did BCL management view the company as a 'symbol ' of Australian 
colonialism? Is there anything that the company could have done to 'soften' 
the impact of Australian colonialism? 
• How do you think contemporary voluntary standards and initiatives would 
have changed your company's involvement in Bougainville? What do you 
think the main differences would be? 
• I guess for BCL, CSR was not the way people talked in the 60s. Yet there was 
environmental concern by BCL. How would you describe CSR as something 
that came into BCLs way of doing business " 
• Bougainvillean communities are characterized by a kind of egalitarianism 
whereas a company is more hierarchical . What kinds of problems eme rge 
with these kinds of organisational differences? 
• Why did jealousies and suspicions emerge when BCL employed local village 
relations officers? 
• How is CSR des ign ed or negotiated when there are so many different groups 
affected by your business activity in different ways? 
• Were Bouga invilleans treated fairly in comparison to other ethnic groups? 
28 
• How did the company negotiate directly with the PLA? How did this change 
when Ona and the New PLA came on the scene? 
• What is the role of the company when tensions form as a result of the money 
the company gives out? 
• Is there some way that the company could have offered opportunities outside 
of employment for the young men who eventually formed the BRA partly for 
power and status? 
• What do you think communities ultimately want out of CSR? 
• Where does BCL fit in with negotiations taking place to re-open the mine? 
• Has the Autonomous Bougainville Government invited BCL to participate in 
any reconciliation ceremonies? 
• Do you think Bougainvilleans would prefer BCL over another company as the 
operator? 
• How much recognition will the company give to the negative implications of 
the mine in the past? Will this recognition form a framework for the design of 
your CSR strategy in the future? 
429 
Appendix 3: Sample interview questions for Bougainvilleans 
• In what ways do you think BCL was caught up in Australian colonialism? 
• Did BCL attempt to negotiate with the BRA and Panguna Landowners? How 
did they negotiate? 
• Do you think BCL was responsive to the grievances of the Panguna 
landowners? How could they have been more responsive? 
• What do you think were the major social problems caused by the mine? 
• Do you think that BCL provided opportunities for Bougainvilleans to express 
their concerns about the impacts of mining? 
• Do you think BCL could have pressured the PNG government to offer more 
protection to Bougainvilleans in regards to land rights and compensation? 
• What could BCL have done to solve the tensions between the new and old 
Panguna landowners? 
• What could BCL have done to harness a peaceful relationship between 
Bougainvilleans and 'redskins'? 
• How did BCL give out compensation money? 
• Did BCL's compensation create jealousies amongst Bouga invilleans? 
• What do you think BCL's motives were when they gave money out through 
Trust Funds and created hospitals? 
• Do you think BCL was sensitive to Bougainvillean fear or hostility towards the 
PNGDF? 
• Do you think BCL will participate in reconciliation ceremonies and peace 
building in Bougainville? How do you think this should happen? 
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• What would you want BCL or another company to do if the mine were to re-
open? 
• Would you prefer BCL over another company? 
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Appendix 4: 2011 Papua Peace Conference 'Indicators of 
Papua, Land of Peace 
Produced by the Drafting Committee of the Papua Peace Conference, 5-7 July 2011 
(Source: ICG, 2011, p.19-20) 
I. Political: 
1. Indigenous Papua ns feel safe, secure and are able to live a prosperous life on their 
land, living in harmony with each other, the land, and God. 
2. There is no longer stigmatisation of indigenous Papuans as separatists or rebels. 
3. Differences of opinion over Papua's political status are resolved. 
4. The history of Papua is rectified without manipulation or machinations. 
5. Indigenous Papuans are always involved in agreements related to the interests and 
future of the Papuan people. 
6. The roots of the Papuan problem are resolved fully and with dignity. 
7. Indigenous Papuans live without intimidation, discrimination or marginalisation. 
8. Customs are valued and honoured, and their existence recognised and legitimised. 
II. Law and Human Rights 
1. Ind igenous Papuans have freedom of expression, opinion and assembly. 
3 
2. State violence against indigenous Papuans, including against women and children, 
no longer takes place. 
3. The perpetrators of state violence are brought to trial and sentenced in a way that 
gives indigenous Papuans and victims a sense of justice. 
4. Law enforcement toward corruptors takes place in a way that gives the people a 
sense of justice. 
5. Policies that hinder the freedoms of expression, opinion and assembly are no longer 
in force. 
6. A Human Rights Court is established in the Land of Papua. 75 
7. Customary justice is recognised in the formal legal system. 
Ill. Economics and Environment 
1. Customary land (tanah ulayat) of indigenous Papuans is fully mapped. 
2. Customary rights of indigenous Papuans are recognised in law. 
3. Transfer and control of customary land does not eliminate the right of land 
ownership by indigenous Papuans. 
4. Management of natural resources is undertaken in a way that protects the 
environment, respects local wisdom and provides maximal benefits to indigenous 
Papuans. 
433 
5. Companies that damage the environment and cause losses to customary 
landowners incur legal and admin istrative punishments . 
6. Forest and fields that are sources of production for indigenous Papuans are 
rehabilitated. 
7. Forest conversion practices that contribute to global warming are stopped . 
8. Customary leaders and communities are involved in the drafting of plans for natural 
resource investment. 
9. Illegal fishing, mining and logging are stopped and the perpetrators prosecuted . 
10. The empowerment of indigenous Papuans in different sectors of the economy is 
carried out according to regulations that discriminate in favour of indigenous Papuans 
and provide training and business capital. 
11. The government and private sector prepare and implement affirmative action for 
indigen ous Papuans so that they can fill employment vacancies in various sectors. 
IV. Security 
1. Security forces carry out their ass ignm ents professiona lly and in a way that respects 
human rights, so that in digen ous Papuans feel safe. 
2. M ilitary posts are only established along international borders in non-residential 
areas . 
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3. Reduction of non-organic police and military personnel takes place across the Land 
of Papua. 
4. The institutional development of the military is not based on the creation of new 
civil government units (village, subdistrict, district/municipality and province). 
5. Intelligence operations marked by intimidation that generate a sense of insecurity 
are stopped. 
6. The military and police are banned from engaging in business or politics, with legal 
sanctions imposed on violators. 
7. Government security forces are forbidden to work as adjutants or security guards 
for civilian officials. 
V. Social-Cultural 
1. Basic socio-cultural rights of indigenous Papuans, including norms and customs, are 
recognised and valued. 
2. Labeling of indigenous Papuans as stupid, drunk, lazy and primitive ceases. 
3. Attitudes that demean and debase indigenous Papuan culture, resulting in an 
identity crisis for Papuans, disappear. 
4. Discrimination against people with HIV/ AIDS disappears. 
5. The mortality rate for indigenous Papuan women and children is brought down via 
professional health care services. 
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6. Health services in the form of medical personnel and facilities are established down 
to the most remote hamlets. 
7. The distribution and consumption of alcohol and narcotics are stopped in the Land 
of Papua. 
8. Entertainment places in the forms of bars and brothels are closed. 
9. The quality of education is raised through improvement of facilities, increase in the 
number of teachers, improvement in the welfare of teachers, development of a more 
contextual curriculum and management of education funding in accordance with 
targets and goals. 
10. Policies such as family planning programs that limit births and lead to the 
population decline of indigenous 
Papuans are stopped. 
11. Policies that limit the flow of migrants to the Land of Papua are made and 
followed. 
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